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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
As economic development proceeds, the agricultural sector typically 
declines in relative economic importance. But this does not imply that 
the agricultural sector is relatively unimportant in developmental process-
as. To the contrary: the starting point for economic development is 
man's use of land and its inherent resources. The application of labor 
and man's ingenuity to using these resources largely determines the prod­
uct forthcoming and, in turn, the physical level of living. In the 
Malthusian state, this level of living is low and essentially constant. 
However, the Malthusian doctrine minimizes the importance of man's in­
genuity in altering his environment. Man has not always made good use 
of his physical and human resources. Societies have advanced, 
economically and culturally, only later to decline and even disappear. 
At the earliest stages of economic development^, the agricultural 
sector is the only sector in the "economy". Only after individuals 
have produced enough to exceed their own consumption requirements do 
exchange and trade become feasible. As exchange is accelerated, new 
wants and new trading opportunities are generated. In turn, production 
and consumption patterns are altered by varying degrees through points 
in time. Change has not been uniform. Those countries rather arbi­
trarily classified as "developing" are characterized by a good deal of 
heterogeneity in economic and social achievements, both within and among 
^Economic development is generally viewed as changes in the 
structure of the economy which lead to sustained increases in per capita 
real incomes. Of course, per capita incomes are only averages and give 
no indication as to the distribution of income or to the adequacy of 
such incomes for realizing desired levels of living. 
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countries, as well as in potentials for future advance. Differing resource 
endowments, climatic factors, and external contacts, whether the latter 
were through colonial conquest or trade, have constrained and facilitated 
developmental processes. When such processes must be integrated with 
or superimposed on existing cultural patterns, another dimension to the 
complexity of explaining or predicting economic change is introduced. 
The focal point of interest is those countries which are termed 
"less-developed" on the basis of per capita incomes which are low rela­
tive to those in other countries. None is at the earliest stage of de­
velopment in that the agricultural sector is the only sector. Rather, 
countries have varying levels of living and economies of varying diversi­
ty. 
The desire to raise levels of living and the recognition that the 
various sectors of the economy are interrelated have increased the 
emphasis on formulating national plans to stimulate and guide economic 
activity. The orientation toward identifying and supplying the missing, 
causative input which would accelerate and sustain developmental process -
es has largely been unsuccessful. Infusing capital or developing 
entrepreneurial skills has not been sufficient. Rather, this orienta­
tion has shifted toward the need for simultaneous action at several, 
interrelated "friction points"; hence, the need for coordinated plan­
ning, both within and among sectors of the economy. This orientation 
need not imply a "balanced growth" approach to development, however. 
National planning is fashionable in many less-developed countries 
and is necessary for most. The impetus for planning largely arose after 
World War II when economic disparities among nations were publicized. 
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and social and physical scientists were engaged to determine the causes 
of these phenomena and to construct programs for moving the less-
developed areas toward the relatively more affluent-developed countries. 
Planning is fashionable because it manifests a trend toward modern­
ization, especially among those countries with a Socialistic bend. Often, 
national plans are a precondition to attracting external assistance. In 
addition, the developing and publicizing of national plans have connota­
tions for political and social stability. But this also indicates a 
necessity for planning since such stability is desirable, if not neces­
sary, for attaining: developmental goals. Conversely, invariant social 
relationships may discourage private initiative and inhibit implementa­
tion of public policies which nearly always result in a differential 
distribution of costs and benefits among those affected. Neither is 
complete political stability conducive to developmental processes if 
corruption among public officials is widespread, if public policies are 
geared toward maintaining the economic and social status quo, and if the 
public does not have confidence in the prevailing political structure. 
Thus, too much stability or too much instability is inimical to economic 
and social change. The optimum balance is not only an elusive but tenu­
ous phenomenon. 
Increasingly, the desire for change has its own built-in momentum. 
Such a desire is one of degree and varies with regions within countries 
and among countries. The desire is stimulated and sustained through in­
creased contact between rural and relatively urban areas resulting in 
more participation in the market economy and through increased comnunlca-
ation via radios, movies, and word-of-mouth. Furthermore, the growth of 
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labor unions and other economic groups which generate or mobilize in­
dividuals' goals and, in turn, publicly articulate these ends is an­
other actual and potential force for change. Also, public exhortations 
accompanying the implementation of developmental plans condition people 
to the desirability and necessity for change. But change is not uni­
directional. Adverse experiences, whether actually or illusorily per­
ceived, affect individuals' receptiveness to future change. The in­
ability to achieve individual and collective goals likely affects the 
levels at which future goals are set. This need to attain stated public 
goals also usually generates the need for a coordinated, economic plan. 
Concomitantly, planning should facilitate the establishment of a con­
figuration of goals which is economically, socially, and politically 
feasible. 
As ncttfd previously, at relatively early stages of economic develop­
ment the agricultural sector is the predominant sector in the economy, 
both in terms of its contribution to national income and the proportion 
of the population living and working in this sector. According to the 
1968 United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics (1.22), only 
10 of 113 nations for which data were available for the mid-1960's were 
reported as having agricultural sectors which contributed 50 percent or 
more to the country's gross domestic product computed at factor cost.^ 
^These percentages underestimate the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector from other viewpoints. Food is the most fundamental 
commodity in the economy. Its availability makes other economic activi­
ties possible. Also, the agricultural sector and related marketing 
activities have the capacity to absorb much of the population increase 
and additions to the labor force who cannot find alternative employment. 
To some extent, the agricultural sector is a "holding" point for in­
dividuals waiting for an expansion of external employment opportunities. 
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Of the 10, only India with 52. percent and Nepal with 66 percent are non-
African countries. Among the 8 African countries, the highest percentage 
attributable to the agricultural sector was 68 for Lesotho. Excepting 
Lesotho, these countries showed a downward trend in this percentage 
figure during the past five to ten years. For India, 51 percent of the 
GDP was attributable to the agricultural sector in 1950 while the cor­
responding figure for 1967 was 52 percent.^ The low point in this 
interim was 46 percent for 1965. 
Although several African countries have relatively high percentages 
of GDP originating in the agricultural sector, a good deal of vari­
ability exists among them and among other geographical areas. The com­
parable 1967 figures for Morocco, Tunisia, and Zambia are 30, 16, and 
9 percent, respectively. Similarly, for Latin America the figures 
range from 8 percent for Chile and Venezuela to 38 and 49 percent for 
Honduras and Haiti, respectively. Variability also exists among Asian 
countries. Yet, the prevailing tendency is to lump these countries 
into a quasi-homogenous category termed "developing countries". 
Even in many countries where the agricultural sector is not the 
principal sector, the expansion of agricultural production is often 
viewed as being the mainspring or precondition to sustained, general 
^The figures are not strictly comparable since the 1950 figure is 
in terms of the percent of national income at factor cost while the 1967 
counterpart is in terms of gross domestic product at factor cost. Thus, 
the 1950 figure would tend to be understated. 
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economic growth in the economy. A number of phenomena tend to lend 
support to this proposition. Included in these would be the following: 
(1) The high proportion of the population a'id the active labor 
2 force residing in the agricultural sector. The economic considerations 
are quite apparent. This population represents a potentially expanding 
market for producer and consumer goods produced outside of the agri­
cultural sector, both domestically and internationally. At the same 
time, these individuals represent an existing and potential demand for 
employment opportunities throughout the economy. Obversely, they re­
present a potential labor supply for economic expansion and diversifica­
tion; 
(2) The desirability of dampening current or potential infla­
tionary tendencies so that consumers and users of agricultural raw 
materials have access to these commodities at relatively low prices. 
These low prices help keep the cost of living and unit production costs 
3 
relatively low. The opportunities for expanding agricultural exports 
are also improved; 
^Kuznets states, " ... an agricultural revolution — a marked rise 
in productivity per worker in agriculture — is a precondition of the 
industrial revolution for any sizeable region in the world" (1.8, pp. 59-
60). Similarly, Nicholls writes, " ... until underdeveloped countries 
succeed in achieving and sustaining (either through domestic production 
or imports) a reliable food surplus, they have not fulfilled the funda­
mental precondition for economic development" (1.14, pp. 366-367). 
2 See Appendix Table 1. This proportion is particularly high for the 
African countries where the majority have 70 percent or more in the agri­
cultural sector. For Asia, the most populous countries of India, Pakis­
tan and Indonesia also have about 70 percent of the population in agri­
culture. The figures are considerably lower for most South American 
countries. 
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Low market prices for agricultural commodities need not be associa­
ted with low profits or a low motivation for private investment if pro­
duction costs are also low. 
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(3) The need to increase the mobility of capital and labor, 
largely to the nonagricultural sectors of the economy, through the 
generation of "surpluses" in agriculture so as to sustain workers and 
capital investment in other sectors of the economy; 
(4) To expand foreign exchange earnings through exports of agri­
cultural products and a reduction of agricultural imports. The genera­
tion of foreign exchange represents the means for importing capital and 
consumer goods, both of which have a direct impact on developmental 
processes 
(5) To promote political and social stability which are influenced 
by economic conditions in the agricultural sector. The benefits of in­
creased output and(or) agricultural income as a component of GNP are 
never equally distributed among agriculturalists. However, increased 
output and income represent a potential means whereby a system of taxation 
and transfer payments may be used to effect some considerations of 
economic equity; and 
(6) To pursue nationalistic objectives of being self-sufficient 
in food production thereby lessening the need to import foodstuffs as 
production levels vary with environmental conditions. 
Population growth and increases in per capita real incomes, both 
indigeneously and internationally, affect the rate of growth in demand 
for agricultural commodities. Where the rate of growth in quantities 
^Appendix Table 2 provides data on average imports and exports for 
selected countries for the 1964-67 period. The contribution of agri­
cultural exports to total exports exceeds 50 percent for all countries 
except India. In turn, the percent of all imports designated as manu­
factured goods and machinery ranges from around 40 percent to 65 percent. 
Thus, agricultural production and subsequent exports are major contribu­
tors to the country's capacity to import. 
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supplied does not keep pace with the growth in demand, inflationary 
tendencies are set in motion. An extremely simplified construct for re­
presenting the growth in demand is the following: d = p + ^1 g where d = 
the rate of growth in demand for agricultural goods, primarily food 
items; p = the population growth rate; T| = the income elasticity of de­
mand for agricultural commodities; and g = the rate of growth of per 
capita real, disposable incomes.^ 
The population growth rates are relatively high for most less-
developed countries. Annual, average growth rates for population, per 
capita real gross domestic product, and agricultural output are pre­
sented in Appendix Table 3. For several countries, the growth rate of 
2 
agricultural output does even not keep pace with the growth of population. 
For some Latin American countries, in particular, the population growth 
rates appear to be increasing substantially. Given the high income 
elasticity of demand for agricultural goods in these areas, any increases 
in per capita real income accentuate the race between the growth in de­
mand relative to supply. The disparity between these growth rates is ex­
acerbated during periods of adverse production conditions. 
^The construct can be disaggregated to reflect differential rates 
of population avid per capita income growth among occupational groups, 
geographical areas and income levels. That is, p and g are weighted 
growth rates and T] may be varied with the weighted components of g. 
2 The relationship is more involved. Agricultural output includes 
nonedible commodities. Several countries export a substantial portion 
of their agricultural output. Conversely, a part of export earnings is 
used to import food commodities. Furthermore, even if the growth rate 
of food production is equal to or exceeds the population growth rate, 
the distribution patterns determine whether individuals are better or 
worse off. 
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The upward pressure on prices does not benefit the majority of in­
dividuals in less-developed countries. Subsistence-oriented producers 
who account for a major proportion of the rural populations sell rela­
tively little in the monetized market. All consumers see their cost of 
living rising. Wage earners, including agricultural workers, experience 
a reduction in their real incomes unless their monetary incomes are raised 
accordingly. Increases in the cost of agricultural raw materials and in 
labor wages tend to reduce the profit margins of manufacturers. If 
private investment is dampened, growth in consumer and producer goods 
industries is also retarded. 
In several countries, notably India, Pakistan, and Israel, food 
imports from the United States under Public Law 480 were instrumental in 
increasing domestic quantities of available food and, in turn, reducing 
the upward trend on prices. Although this program has been operative 
for several years, it can usually only be a short-run alleviation of 
any food problem for recipient countries. The uncertainty of program 
continuation would be a sufficient reason for reducing or phasing out 
reliance on PL 480 shipments. More importantly, if a country is to be 
self-sufficient in any commodity, food would be the first choice. The 
large proportion of consumers' budgets expended on foods and the growth 
in food demand emphasize the importance of increasing agricultural pro­
ductivity. 
The development and gradual distribution of the improved wheat, rice, 
and corn varieties have been a bright light on the horizon. The suc­
cesses of the new wheat varieties, for example, in Mexico and India, 
îïave been rather phenomenal. Since wheat and rice are the two most im-
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portant food grains in most less-developed areas, it is important to 
note that this technological advance is limited to only two or three 
crops but also the most important ones. The initial success of and 
the publicity given to the "Green Revolution" or the "Green Evolution" 
certainly have raised expectations of many from national planners all 
the way down to the peasants. A substantially-improved means for in­
creasing agricultural productivity has been generated. However, several 
qualifications must be made. The improved seeds are primarily adaptable 
to irrigated land which, of course, limits the extensiveness of their 
adoption. Complementary inputs, in the form of fertilizers and irriga­
tion water are necessary (1.11, 1.23). The rate of adoption is retarded 
by insufficient financial means to obtain these inputs, including the 
seeds, and by the need for some additional management inputs for de­
termining the optimum mix of inputs.^ Because of the differential rate 
of adoption, the gains from the "Green Revolution", at least initially, 
go to the early adopters of the improved inputs. The majority of culti­
vators who have raised their expectations find them unfulfilled. While 
it is tempting to view this as the "social consequences" of economic 
change, such an interpretation appears to be misleading. The economic 
and, in turn, social consequences of an expanding population and in­
creasing demand, whether demand is effective or not, against a rela­
tively inelastic supply of food commodities were the Important factors 
which stimulated both the need for and interest in developing Improved 
^Even if cultivators are relatively efficient in allocating the 
traditional production inputs, they are not likely equally adept in the 
use of nontraditional inputs such as the improved seed varieties and new 
fertilizer mixtures. Furthermore, a lag in adoption on the part of sub­
sistence-oriented producers would be expected as a consequence of the 
uncertainty of response with an alternative production technique. 
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agricultural inputs. Thus, social instability appears to have been both 
the cause and consequence of the "Green Revolution." More correctly, 
the process of change involves nearly simultaneous change in social and 
economic relationships obscuring any specific cause and effect associa­
tion. ^ 
Planning focuses on sectoral growth and the consequences for inter-
sectoral relationships. The economy's infrastructure, physical and 
human resources, and individual attitudes and motivations form an inte­
grative system of economic and essentially noneconomic factors which 
mutually constrain and sustain developmental processes. The early work 
of Rosenstein-Rodan (1.17) stressed the need for an integrative approach 
to development in the sense that "balanced growth" among the various 
sectors of the economy is necessary for reducing the possibility of 
shortages and surpluses among sectors. Nurkse (1.15) popularized the 
interrelationships among factors through the concept of the "vicious 
circles of poverty." Lewis (1.9) and Ranis and Fei (1.16) were pri­
marily interested in agriculture's contribution to industrialization 
through labor transfers, and the capital embodied in labor, out of the 
2 
agricultural sector. Little attention was given to increasing agri­
cultural productivity. By implication, the industrial sector would be 
the leading sector and the necessary adjustments in the agricultural 
^See Frankel (1.4) for an excellent discussion of technical change 
in association with social change. 
2 A later version by Fei and Ranis (1.3) acknowledged that invest­
ment in the agricultural sector may be necessary. 
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sector would follow.^ 
The Harrod-Domar models (1.1, 1.5) stress the role of capital in­
vestment in the economy. This is implicit in their emphasis on the 
use of capital/output ratios and levels of investment in largely de­
termining the level of economic activity. By further implication, be­
havior patterns are assumed unchanged and no structural bottlenecks 
occur in the economy as the levels of investment are varied. The suc­
cesses of capital transfers under the Marshall Plan to Western Europe 
after World War II and the remarkable growth of Israel, partly through 
capital inflows, have perhaps overemphasized the importance of capital, 
per se. In both of these situations, experienced, competent individuals 
were available for distributing and using the external assistance. In 
addition, the problem was to a large extent that of rebuilding or, in 
the case of Israel, building an infrastructure for the econony. This 
lessened some of the problems confronting countries currently attempt­
ing reform and transformation of existing structures, some of which 
have been institutionalized over time. 
The inordinate emphasis on investment, per se, in constructing 
national developmental plans is criticized by Myrdal who stresses the 
complementary need for changes in attitudes and institutions. Myrdal 
writes : 
"This narrow approach to planning in the underdeveloped countries 
of South Asia implies one or both of two assumptions: 
^Some similarities exist between this proposition and Hirschman's 
(1.6) discussion of sectoral linkages in an "unbalanced" approach to 
economic growth. 
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(1) that development efforts directed at raising output 
by investment will induce changes favorable to development in 
all other conditions; 
(2) that efforts to change the non-economic conditions 
directly are difficult, impossible, or ruled out" (1.12, p. 
1905). I 
Such an approach minimizes the need for coordinated national planning 
and bypasses all of the ensuing problems. Reliance can be placed on 
traditional private enterprise with an occasional infusion of public 
funds where bottlenecks occur, externalities are widespread, and capacity 
for private investment is limited. 
The models which have been jioted are macro-economic in nature. 
The need for sectoral models giving more attention to individual pro­
ducer and consumer behavior and the subsequent integration of these 
models for planning purposes is apparent. For example, the agricultural 
sector in less-developed countries einbodies a continuum of landless 
laborers to subsistence-oriented producers to fully market-oriented, 
commerical producers. Such individuals, however, have different motiva­
tions and opportunities which affect individual economic activities and, 
in turn, aggregate outcomes. 
Myrdal adds, "The majority of contemporary Western economists, with 
a few notable exceptions, are planners, at least with regard to the under­
developed countries. But influenced by Marx to a degree they are rarely 
aware of, they usually make the first assumption [(1) above] that econranic 
advance will have strong and rapid repercussions on attitudes and in­
stitutions, especially on those important for development" (1.12, p. 
1905). 
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Objective, Methods of Procedure, 
and Organization of the Study 
Less-developed areas are characterized by their heterogeneity--
variations in per capita resource endowments, in institutional structures 
conditioning economic activity, and in the attitudes and motivations of 
the economic agents participating in the economy. In terms of land 
availability and employment opportunities, some countries are essentially 
overpopulated while others tend toward underpopulation. Yet, for all 
this heterogeneity, a number of factors commonly operative in each less-
developed area can be abstracted and synthesized into a generalized, con­
ceptual model of agricultural development. The weights or importance 
attached to individual factors varies for particular countries and for 
stages of economic development. However, all factors are operative to 
some degree in all countries. 
Several attempts have been made to describe the process of agri­
cultural growth and development. Johnston and Mellor's paper (1.7) was 
an early contribution to discussing some of the interrelationships 
affecting agricultural growth. Mellor (1.10) and Schickele (1.18) have 
made rather extensive discussions. Schultz's Transforming Traditional 
Agriculture (1.19) is important for his attempt to quantitatively test 
some of the hypotheses rather casually used by others. Several books 
have been edited which include papers often focusing on discussing rather 
specific components of the agricultural sector. These would include 
Eicher and Witt (1.2), Southworth and Johnston (1.20), and Thorbecke 
(1.21). A number of the papers edited by Wharton (1.24), primarily 
dealing with subsistence agriculture, are based on a more integrative 
15 
approach to understanding the interaction among economic and social 
factors. The paper by Nakajima (1.13) is particularly noteworthy. 
The focal point of this study is the individual producer and the 
factors which influence his decision-making processes relative to re­
source allocation, private investment, and, to a lesser extent, con­
sumption patterns. Two broad categories are employed: (1) subsistence-
oriented producers: and (2) market-oriented producers.^ As the term 
suggests, subsistence-oriented producers gear production decisions to 
primarily accommodate consumption requirements. However, they do have 
limited contact with an exchange or money economy. Implicit in this 
study is a tracing of the evolution of a subsistence-oriented producer 
toward a market-oriented producer. The latter is presumed to be more 
economically-motivated and, hence, more responsive to economic pressures 
and incentives generated by developmental processes. 
This evolution is facilitated or impeded by various economic and 
social factors. A laissez faire policy toward the agricultural sector 
is ruled out because of (1) the crucial need for increasing agricultural 
production quickly, (2) the desirability of involving the majority of 
cultivators in developmental processes rather than having any gains 
accrue to a relatively small proportion of highly commercialized pro­
ducers, and (3) the need for structural adjustment in the agricultural 
sector rather than assuming that the institutional structure changes in 
the right direction and corrept proportion so as to be always favorable 
^This dichotomization is only for convenience. A continuum of firm 
sizes and degree of participation in the market economy exists. 
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to developmental processes, both exogenous and endogenous. Such is the 
basis for public intervention in the form of national planning whereby 
sectoral programs and policies are coordinated and reinforced so as to 
improve realization of developmental goals. 
Following the Introduction, Chapter II focuses on a discussion of 
several basic theoretical concepts used in the study. Subsequent 
chapters deal with the principal factors affecting agricultural growth 
and development: (III) Land Tenure Systems and Firm Size; (IV) Infra­
structure of the Agricultural Sector; (VII) Government Programs and 
Policies; and (VIII) Attitudes, Values, and Objectives of Agricultural­
ists as Producers and Consumers. Initially, each of these areas is 
essentially given a theoretical discussion. Following that and inte­
grated with it are references to the literature; i.e, the documentation 
of the discussion. The implication that these are the modal or most 
prevalent types does not necessarily hold; the literature only provides 
a repository of information relative to those actually studied. Diffi­
culties arise in segregating the discussion by chapters. For example, 
production techniques are not independent of land tenure systems and 
credit availability. The distribution of credit is conditioned by land 
tenure systems, government programs, and producers' objectives. 
In Chapter IX, the individually-studied components are integrated 
into a micro-oriented conceptual model within which the influence of the 
individual factors can be qualitatively observed. By postulating a 
series of case situations confronting the producer, the conceptual model 
provides insights into the interrelationships among these factors as 
they affect agricultural productivity. From such a conceptual model 
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the "friction points" of agricultural development can be identified and 
discussed, as in Chapter X. These "friction points" represent the 
instrument variables and(or) parameters of such development. 
18 
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CHAPTER II. BASIC ECCNOMIC CONCEPTS AND 
ADAPTATIONS TO LESS-DEVELOPED AREAS 
The following question is posed: is there a separate body of theory 
dealing with the economics of less-developed areas or are the theoretical 
constructs primarily developed in and for economically-advanced countries 
applicable to all areas regardless of their stages of economic develop­
ment? Subsequent to the discussion of some basic economic concepts, a 
tentative answer will be given. 
Principal emphasis will be given to discussing the factors affecting 
the organization and operation of the agricultural firm. Initially, 
however, it may be appropriate to point out that the foundation of the 
theory of the firm; i.e., the firm operating under conditions of perfect 
competition, is based on certain assumptions some of which are not 
consistent with real-world conditions even in the economically-developed 
countries. For example, perfect knowledge and complete resource mobility 
do not exist. In addition, the assumption of profit maximization is 
conditioned by firm-household interrelationships, especially in the agri­
cultural sector. Thus, for policy and predictive purposes, the assump­
tions and theoretical constructs, as have been evolved, must be sub­
ject to qualification. Tentatively, in light of the grossly different 
institutional structures in many less-developed areas, this process of 
qualification appears crucial to the determination of operational policy 
prescriptions for these countries. 
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Production Function 
The production function represents the physical input-output re­
lationships for the firm. It, together with the relevant price ratios 
or other choice indicators, provides the Framework from which such phen­
omena as optimum resource use patterns, resource demand functions, and 
product supply functions can be derived. A generalized form of the 
production function is given in Equation 2.1.^ 
Y. = [F] (X,, ..., X : 0, E) (i = 1, ..., n) (2.1) 
1 1 m 
Y^ denotes a vector of n outputs while [F] represents the functional re­
lationships between the m inputs and the n outputs. EF] embodies the 
technical input-output relationships which are affected by factors such 
as the size and contiguity of the tracts of land. These factors, in 
turn, have implications for the production technique employed and for 
realization of any economies of size. In addition, CF] is conditioned 
by 0 = objectives of producers and E - exogenous factors such as 
weather, availability of production techniques, and information con­
cerning factor and product markets. The potential effect of the ex-
2 
ogenous factors is quite apparent. Producers' objectives, on the other 
^For a discussion of the formulation and appropriateness cr al­
ternative production functions for the firm see Heady and Dillon (2.1), 
Chapter 3. 
2 The impact of exogenous factors need not result in producers oper­
ating at points interior to their production possibility frontier. For 
example, the lack of information regarding a superior alternative pro­
duction technique which a producer could feasibly adopt simply results 
in the production possibility frontier being below a superior one but 
with the producer producing at points on the frontier of the curve rele­
vant to his situation. 
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hand, may have the following effects which may be less apparent; 
(1) Producers with insecure tenurial arrangements and those 
living near the margin of subsistence may be motivated to exploit 
available resources in the short-run with adverse consequences for 
resource productivity in the longer run; 
(2) The conservatism or traditionalism of subsistence-oriented 
producers toward nontraditional production techniques and alternative 
cropping patterns, and the consequent uncertainty associated with 
these changes, affect [F] currently and over time; and 
(3) From a dynamic standpoint, objectives influence the disposi­
tion of any "surpluses" arising. In addition to hoarding and nonpro­
ductive investment, such "surpluses" may be productively invested in the 
firm and in individuals,^ both affecting the nature of [F] over time. 
Conversely, a preference may exist for investing outside the agricultural 
sector which has little direct impact on indigenous resource productivity. 
An additional comment on producers' objectives seems appropriate. 
Neoclassical theory of the firm operating under pure or perfect competi­
tion is based on producers' objectives of profit maximization or, rather, 
profit maximization constrained by resource availabilities. Pure profit 
maximizers rarely exist, if at all. In addition to resource availability, 
profit maximization is further constrained by firm-household interrela­
tionships which affect both consumption expenditure and labor avail-
^The investment in individuals may affect not only the quality but 
the quantity of labor inputs available. For example, - managerial 
inputs and X = labor services of a particular laborer where the quantity 
of X is increased through improved health and diet conditions. Similar­
ly, investment in education may improve both the quantity and quality of 
managerial inputs. 
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ability and utilization patterns. Economists generally abstract from 
the impact of these noneconomic or social variables on the pretext that 
these phenomena are outside of the purview of economics and economists 
or that sufficiently little is known about the composition and behavior 
of these factors so as to preclude their incorporation into the theory 
of the firm. Yet, these social factors are often indistinguishable 
from producers' objectives in less-developed areas and, consequently, 
have a direct and important impact on resource allocation, private in­
vestment and production techniques employed, all of which interact to 
influence production patterns and quantities marketed.^ 
Marginal Conditions for Economic Efficiency 
The marginal conditions for economic efficiency vary with producers' 
objectives. For example, market-oriented producers whose objective is 
that of constrained profit maximization will be guided by market prices 
in making their production decisions. Subsistence-oriented producers, 
on the other hand, will primarily gear production decisions to consump­
tion requirements and be less affected by changing market conditions. 
2 
The marginal conditions for profit maximization will be outlined with 
subsequent modification to represent those applicable to subsistence-
oriented producers. 
^These social factors such as status associated with leisure and ab­
sentee landlordism, time devoted to ceremonial and local governmental 
operations, and the economic and social consequences of the extended 
family are discussed in Chapter VIII, 
2 As indicated previously, profit maximization is constrained by re­
source availabilities where such resource supplies may be considered as 
being net of expenditures and Investment outside of the firm and net of 
leisure and social demands on time for capital and labor, respectively. 
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Least-cost combinations of resources 
Taking the partial derivates of Equation 2.1 with respect to 
(i = 1, m), the marginal physical products of the respective in 
the production of are obtained as follows: 
— = = MPPt Ï (2.2) 
S Xj j j (j = 1, m) 
Considering the allocation of resources, costs are minimized when the 
MPP per unit value of production input, the , is equal in all altér­
ai 
native employments, the Y^, as in Equation 2.3. 
MPPJ MPpÎ Nppl MPPt (i =2, ..., n) 
-IT ' -ÎF 
1 2 m j 
If this condition does not hold, resources can be reallocated so as to 
realize increased production with the same amount of expenditures for in­
puts utilized. 
Optimal output configurations 
An additional restriction is necessary. Employing inputs in least-
cost combinations is not sufficient for determining the optimum levels 
of output. This optimum pattern of output for the individual Y^ is ob­
tained when each Y^ is produced at the level where the price or marginal 
revenue received for that output is equated to its marginal cost of 
production. Equation 2.4. 
MPpj- MPP^ , T 
_ - — = = (i = 1, ..., n) (2.4) 
Px, ^X MR^ SMC^ 1 m 
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X X If MR = P , as in the case of competitive producers. Equation 2.4 can 
be rewritten: 
MPP!". P^ Mppl. ^i 
1 _ _ m P 
Px, SMC^ 
= 1.0 (i = 1, ..., n) (2.5) 
m 
MVPJ" MVP^ 
——— = ... ~ ™ = 1.0 (i = 1, ..., n) (2.6) 
"^1 
The first-order marginal conditions for economic efficiency in the short 
run are obtained when Equation 2.6 holds for all outputs produced. That 
is, the MVP per unit of input cost must be equal in all alternative uses. 
Inputs are now used in the correct proportions and correct amounts. From 
a long-term standpoint, the conditions in Equation 2.5 must hold but with 
the added restriction that SMC^ = LRMC^. Long-run equilibrium for the 
firm where perfect competition exists in both the resource and product 
markets is obtained when the conditions in Equations 2.7 and 2.8 are met. 
MPP^ . P^ MPP^ . P^ _i 1 _ m r 
PX, ^X SMC^=SAC^=LRMC^=LRAC^ 
m 
(i = 1, ..., n) (2.7) 
MVPÎ" MVP^ 
— = - — = 1.0 (i = 1, ..., n) (2.8) 
Second-order conditions for profit maximization require that the mar­
ginal cost of each output must be increasing. 
To demonstrate the derivation of the marginal conditions, a func­
tional form using Lagranean multipliers is postulated as in Equation 2.9. 
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The formulation is expressed in terms (ï a constrained revenue-max imiza-
o 1 
tion problem vith the constraint being capital availability, K . 
n m 
R  =  z p  q  +  |x [ k° - z p  q  . 1 + ^ Cf]  ( q ,  ,  . . q  )  
i=l I 1 j=l J J ^ s (2.9) 
The n outputs and m inputs are incorporated in the implicit production 
function F(q^, q^) where n + m = s. Upon taking the partial 
derivates of Equation 2.9, the following n(m + 1) + 2 equations are de-
r ived : 
= p. + à = 0 
aq^ 1 
ÔR 
= -p.p _ 4- X Ft = 0 
oq. J J 
m 
(i = 1, ..., n) (2.10) 
(j = 1, .... m) (2.11) 
(i 1, n) 
(2.12) 
= [F](q^, .... q^) = 0 (2.13) 
Selecting any two equations from Equation 2.11 and dividing the two, 
the least-cost combinations of using inputs are obtained. Equation 2.14. 
This result holds for any combination of inputs. 
MPP^ 
Pk MPPJ 
MPP^ k MPP^ 
Pk 
= MRS^ , (j, k = 1, ...,m) (2.14) j-k 
(j, k = 1, ..., m) (2.15) 
( i = 1, ..., n) 
As constructed in Equation 2.9, the constrained revenue-maximiza­
tion formulation is synonymous with a constrained profit-maximization 
formulation. 
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Similarily, selecting any two equations from Equation 2.10 and 
dividing, the optimal output configuration is obtained in Equation 
2.16. That is, the rate of product transformation, the RPT, is equal 
to the corresponding inverse price ratio. This result holds for any 
combination of outputs. 
Pi pi 
—— = —^ ^ = RPT (i, h = 1, ..., n) (2.16) 
Ph F q^ 
Finally, selecting any one equation from Equation 2.11 and dividing 
this by any equation selected from Equation 2.10 yields the familiar 
input-output relationships, as in Equations 2.17 and 2.18. 
-lip F -ôq 
=  — 1 -  =  — ( 2 . 1 7 )  
Pi pi Sqj 
"J J 
Since the constraint in Equation 2.9 is in terms of capital avail­
ability, the Lagrangean multiplier M. can be interpreted as the marginal 
value product associated with an additional increment of capital. Al­
ternatively, can be viewed as the opportunity cost of using capital in 
the production of the n outputs. The form of Equation 2.18 is essen­
tially identical to that of Equation 2.6 in that |Ji = 1.0 under conditions 
of perfect competition. All of the assumptions associated with perfect 
competition have not necessarily been operative in deriving Equation 2.18. 
^See Equations 2.18 and 2.27. When Equations 2.10 to 2.13 are 
solved simultaneously and assuming that the second-order conditions for 
profit maximization are satisfied, equilibrium values for the — , — , 
~ and y are derived. Equation 2.9 is then rewritten as i j 
(footnote continued on following page) 
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The equations outlined above specify the first-order conditions 
necessary for the maximization process. It has been implicitly assumed 
that all inputs, outputs, and prices have nonnegative values. Satisfac­
tion of the second-order conditions is necessary to ensure that the 
levels of output reflect profit maximization rather than profit mini­
mization. Satisfaction of the second-order conditions requires that 
the relevant bordered Hessian determinants alternate in sign beginning 
with a plus for all (i = 1, ..., n). This is denoted in the following 
manner : 
R^l >0 
^1 ^12 AFJ 
^21 ^22 
< 0 
xfJ 0 
11 . R Is 
. R -|Xp + 
ss 
-Hp + Xf 
(footnote continued from preceding page) n _ _ 
R = S p.q + C K° -
m _ _ _ -=1 
S p.q.] + X [F] (q_, ..., q ). The p. and p.^ are fixed. Taking 
the first partial derivative with respect to K , = p, . That is, M- is 
interpreted as the marginal value product associated with an infinitesi­
mal increment of K . 
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An attempt will be made to adapt Equation 2.9 to situations within 
which subsistence-oriented producers operate. In this context, the 
producer's objective is viewed in terms of maximizing utility with an 
optimum output configuration constrained by the availability of "working 
capital". The terms in Equation 2.19 are interpreted in the following manner: 
n m 
J = Z p q. + Y [K° - Z n.q.] + X [F] q., ..., q ) (2.19) 
i=l 1 1 j=l J j ^ ^ 
(1) The Pj^ (i = 1, ..., n) represent the utility coefficients 
associated with the respective q^. That is, they are the subjective 
values attached to the q^ in terms of consumption requirements. Figure 
2.1 demonstrates the derivation of the p^. At the point of tangency, a 
price or utility coefficient ratio can be superimposed.^ 
'^(Ui) 
Figure 2.1. Derivation of utility co­
efficients for q^ and q^ 
^The geometric derivation of the p^ can also be easily effected for 
three commodities. Beyond that quantity, they can be given an intuitive 
interpretation where the p^ reflect consumption habits and requirements. 
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(2) K° is defined as a "wages fund" comprised of a carryover 
stock of conanodities and (or) credit in kind used to sustain laborers 
and draft animals in the current production period. The commodities 
are, in principle, aggregated by a conmon denominator such as caloric 
content; and 
(3) The (j = 1, m) are the m inputs in the production 
function. The corresponding Tr^ represent the amount of K required to 
support increments of the q^. For example, q^ is a work unit of adult 
labor ; is the amount of K which an adult laborer requires or consumes 
in expending one work unit of his labor. 
The set of equations representing the first-order conditions for 
maximization are obtained in the usual manner: 
= p. + = 0 (i = 1, ..., n) (2.20) 
-W: - -Y "j + X . 0 (i:i: «•"> 
m 
^ = K° - E TT q = 0 (2.22) 
j=i : J 
-|^ = [F] (q^, ..., q^) =0 (2.23) 
The marginal conditions formulated in Equations 2.14, 2.16, and 2.18 are 
satisfied here, although they assume slightly different forms. The MRS 
between any two inputs is denoted in Equation 2.24; the MPP^ per unit 
of K should be equal for all (j =1, ..., m) in all (i = 1, ..., n) uses. 
Equation 2.25 reflects the condition that total utility cannot be aug­
mented by any other output configuration. In Equation 2.27 the MVC 
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can be interpreted as the marginal utility of consumption while Y = the 
marginal utility associated with an increment of K. 
TT. MPP, 
\ MPP^ 
J 
^1 F^ 1 
F^ ÔQi 
-Y -Ôq^ 
Pi F^ 
1 
MPP^. 
J Pi _ MVCJ 
"j "j 
or 
Y 
MPP^ MPP^ 
= j. 
TT, (jj k. Ij * ) 
"j (i'- (2-24) 
(i, h = 1, n) (2.25) 
(i = 1, ..., n) 
(j 1> •••» 
(2 .26)  
(2.27) 
Tenurial arrangements and the marginal conditions 
To assess the impact of tenurial arrangements for sharing costs and 
returns on the marginal conditions for economic efficiency. Equation 2.9 
is rewritten as follows; 
n m 
R = E r.p.q. + K [K° - Z c.p.q.] + X  [F] (q , ..., q ) (2.28) 
i=l 1 1 1 J J J i s 
ÔR 
^i^i 
= r .p. + X = 0 (i = 1, ..., n) (2.29) 
4^ = c.p. + X F^ = 0 
J J J 
( j 1 ) • • • > nl) 
(i ~ 1> •••> ) (2.30) 
= K° - Z c.p.q. = 0 
j=l J J J 
(2.31) 
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= [F] (q^, q^) = 0 (2.31)' 
In Equation 2.28 and are the shares of the revenue received from 
the i-th output and costs of the j-th input paid by the tenant, re­
spectively. Upon taking the partial derivates, n(m+l)+2 equations with 
n(m+l)+2 unknowns are obtained; second-order conditions are assumed to 
exist. 
Selecting any two equations from Equation 2.29 dividing one by the 
other, the following is obtained: 
TiPi F"- ôq 
— = 1 5 ^ (1. h  .  1. (2.32) 
Equation 2.32 stipulates that the RPT for any two outputs, ceteris pari­
bus, must be equal to the inverse ratio of their prices, each weighted 
by the respective proportion of revenue to be received by the tenant. 
If r = ... = r. = r = ... r , the marginal conditions for economic ef-
1 1 h n 
ficiency are undisturbed. 
Similarly, selecting any two equations from Equation 2.30 and di­
viding : 
. '"k 
—T- — = MRS. , 
FJ MPP^ k k 
(j, k = 1, ..., m) (2.33) 
Ifc, =... =c, =c, =... =c , the marginal conditions are unaffected. 
1 J k m 
Conversely, if c. = .3 and p, = price of fertilizer and if c, = .5 and 
J J i 1 k 
MPP. MPP;^ 
p, = price of irrigation, then J_ = . But since c, < c , 
.3Pj .5Pk j 
more fertilizer is utilized, relative to irrigation water, than would be 
consistent with the marginal conditions as specified. 
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Finally, in considering input-output relationships, dividing any 
equation in Equation 2.29 by any in Equation 2.30 results in the 
following : 
Vi . _ jL- L_ 
f j mppj 
(i.l;;;;;n) ,2.34) 
= jPj 
If r^ = Cj, for example, if the tenant receives two-thirds of the out­
put revenue and at the same time incurs two-thirds of the input cost, 
the marginal conditions remain intact and the MVP per unit of input 
cost is equal to (x, the opportunity cost or the MVP of an increment of 
K. 
In the case of cash rent. Equation 2.9 can be rewritten: 
n m 
S = Z p.q. + M- [K° - Z p.q - r] + A. [F](q , ..., q ) (2.35) 
i=l 1 1 j=l J J ^ s 
where R = total cash rent to be paid. Upon deriving the partial déri­
vâtes of Equation 2.35, the constant R disappears and the marginal condi­
tions for economic efficiency are obtained. For a labor-share arrange­
ment where the tenant provides labor inputs to the landlord in ex­
change for units of land, the MVP of the labor foregone by the tenant 
in exchange for the land represents the input cost of the land to the 
tenant. Thus, if the ratio ^^land is equal to the MVP 
MVP, , = P, , labor land 
per unit of input cost for all other inputs, the marginal conditions for 
the labor-share tenant are satisfied. The above discussion applies to 
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to both market- and subsistence-oriented producers. 
Demand for Inputs of Production 
Input or resource demand is influenced by a number of phenomena. 
As relative factor prices vary, the marginal conditions for economic 
efficiency require that the pattern of resource allocation be altered 
and, in turn, the relative demand for inputs is affected. Similarly, 
technological innovations affect the MPP of inputs and, hence, their 
contribution to the production process. In addition, changes in prices 
received for products produced affect the relative profitability of 
alternative outputs and, again, the demand for the corresponding inputs. 
Restating Equation 2.18 in terms of two inputs used to produce one out­
put : 
MPP,.P MPP_.P 
L-Z- . 2—= n (2.18)' 
As the phenomena identified above occur, the equalities in Equation 2.18 
are distrubed. However, equality is restored by altering the values 
of the MPP through changes in the levels at which inputs are used. The 
variations in the levels of input utilization represent corresponding 
changes in resource demand. Of course, changes in the largely ex­
ternally-determined M- would also affect this demand. 
Other sources of resource demand exist. In addition to the competi­
tive demand from the nonagricultural sectors for capital and labor used 
in agriculture, agriculturalists demand and accumulate productive inputs 
for status or prestige and for security considerations. The principal 
example is the demand for land where social and political status are 
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associated with the size of landholdings and where land as an essentially 
indestructible resource provides a measure of security for small land­
holders and landless laborers. Cattle, viewed as breeding stock, is 
another example relevant to parts of Africa where cattle numbers are 
expanded not only for economic but also for social reasons. Thus, these 
social considerations condition optimum resource demand and subsequent 
resource allocation patterns. 
Single input, static demand 
Where all factors of production are invariant but one, the rule for 
maximizing behavior is that this variable factor should be employed up 
to the point at which its MVP is equal to its marginal factor cost, 
MFC; i.e., its acquisition cost to producers. If is the only vari­
able factor in Equation 2.1, the rule is expressed as follows: 
= MPPj ; MPP^ . p"- = p^^ = MFC^ (i = 1, ..., n) (2.36) 
Postulating a specific production function, for example, one of the 
Cobb-Douglas form as in Equation 2.37, the corresponding factor demand 
function for can be derived. 
^1 *^2 Y = a Xj^ ^ X^ (2.37) 
ÔY ^1~^ ^2 
= a b^ Xj ^2 ^^1 (2.38) 
In order to obtain the MVP^ , the components of Equation 2.38 are 
1 
multiplied by p . Finally, ths derivad MVP is equated to the factor y 
cost. Upon solving for X^, the functional form for X^ is determined, 
as In Equation 2.39. 
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= [a Xg ^ p^^^] (2.39) 
Equation 2.39 reflects that X. varies inversely only with p . That is, 
1 
if Py increases ceteris paribus, the quantity of X- demanded decreases. 
1 ^ 
Conversely, if technological innovations increase the technical coef­
ficients of the factors, if che output price increases, or if the use-
level of X^ increases, increased amounts of X^ can be profitably used. 
The price elasticity of resource demand for X^ is a coefficient of 
the responsiveness in quantity demanded as the input price varies. This 
elasticity is designated in Equation 2,40. The negative sign denotes 
that prices and quantities demanded move in opposite directions provided 
that b^ < 1.0. Conversely, the price elasticity of demand with respect 
to Py is positive assuming b^ < 1.0; i.e., increases in p^ stimulate 
demand for Xj^. This formulation is given in Equation 2.41. 
- 1 
dX, 
r ' X^ (l-b^) (2.40) 
Two-factor static demand 
For a generalized production function, Y = f(X^, Xg), where both 
inputs are variable, the MVP of each input is no longer its demand curve. 
The interaction with the other input and consequent effect on the pro­
ductivity of the first must be taken into account. Figurer 2.2 and 2.3 
will be used to derive, diagrammatically, a demand curve for labor. Let 
= capital, (K), and X^ = labor, (L). In Figure 2.2 point A repre-
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Figure 2.2. Change in input use-
levels as the price 
of labor falls rela­
tive to capital 
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Figure 2.3. Derived demand for 
labor as relative 
prices and use-level 
of capital vary 
sents the initial point where OK^ and OL^ of capital and labor, re­
spectively, are used to produce Y^. At point A, the wage rate; i.e., 
the price of labor, is W^. These initial conditions are also repre­
sented in Figure 2.3 where the MVP curve for labor when capital is 
fixed at OKj^ is drawn. If the price of labor falls to W^, ceteris 
paribus, the budget constraint in Figure 2.2 which is also the P^/P» 
ratio becomes The new budget constraint is tangent to a higher 
isoquant, Y^. As a consequence of the lower wage rate, the amount of 
labor and capital used has increased by and K^K^, respectively. It 
is this increase in capital which renders the MVP curve for labor as 
being an inappropriate demand curve for labor. That is, the lower wage 
rate and consequent lower production costs permit the producer to buy 
more of both inputs. The increased amount of capital makes it profit-
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able to use an even greater amount of labor. 
This phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 2.2. If with and 
the consequent increased real value of the budget constraint the budget 
were taxed so as to restrict the producer to isoquant and to a new 
equilibrium point at B, would represent the increase in labor 
utilized due to the substitution effect only; i.e., the increase due to 
the relatively lower price of labor. However, the higher real value of 
the budget constraint must be taken into account. This increased value 
permits the producer to purchase and of labor and capital, re­
spectively. Alternatively, in order to produce Y^, additional quanti­
ties of inputs in the amounts of LgLg and are necessary. 
The increase in capital employed has also increased labor pro­
ductivity. As arbitrarily drawn in Figure 2.3, the MVP for labor has 
shifted rightward to a new position, such as MVP.y .. Thus, through the 
combined effect of and increased employment of capital, the optimum 
level of labor use is now OL^. In Figure 2.3, points A and a' repre­
sent equilibrium points through which a demand curve for labor can be 
drawn. Thus, by successively altering the wage rate and determining 
the corresponding MVP curve of labor, dd', the demand curve for labor, 
can be derived. 
With a specified production function, using Equation 2.37 again, 
the factor demand functions can be more readily interpreted.^ 
bi b 
Y = a ^ X2 (2.37) 
For the technique of deriving the factor demand functions see 
Heady and Tweeten (2.2), Chapter 3. The authors* example on pp. 50-51 
will be used for this discussion. 
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dX b X p 
—^ ^ ^ (2.42) 
Xi = b^bg-^ Pi'l PgXg (2.43) 
Equation 2.42 represents the least-cost combinations of factors while 
Equation 2.43 expresses X^ in terms of the input prices and the other 
components of Equation 2.37. Substituting Equation 2.43 into the pro­
duction function. Equation 2.44, is the modified production function ex­
pressed in terms of X^ given that Equation 2.42 holds. 
^1 "^1 '^1 ^1 ^1 ^2 
Y = a b^ ^ bg P^ Pg %% (2.44) 
To derive the MVP to be equated to p , Equation 2.44 is multiplied by 
2 
Py to represent the total value product from which the first deriva­
tive with respect to X^ provides the MVP^ . See Equation 2.45. 
"""2 ° ° ("l " ^ "l"' "2 "X "z"' ==2 
2 
Py = P2 (2.45) 
If Equation 2.45 is solved for in terms of X^, the static factor demand 
function for X^, Equation 2.46, in terms of all prices and technical co­
efficients is obtained.^ , 
b -b^ -b^ b^-1 ^'^r^2 
Xg ~ [(^2 + bg) a b^ bg p^ Pg Py] (2.46) 
The preceding discussion is primarily applicable to market-oriented 
producers; i.e., to producers who are responsive to changing price condi­
tions. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 may be more representative of conditions de­
termining resource use, and implied resource demand, for subsistence-
similar equation can be readily derived for X^. 
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oriented producers. 
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Figure 2.4. Derivation of utility-
maximizing output 
pattern 
Figure 2.5. Relative use-levels 
of capital and labor 
under alternative pro­
duction techniques 
In Figure 2.4, the optimum output pattern is determined by the 
tangency of an indifference curve reflecting consumption preferences 
and a production possibility curve. OY^ and OZ^ of Y and Z, re­
spectively, represent the optimum output configuration. In Figure 2.5 
an isoquant representing the different combinations of resources which 
can be used to produce Y^ is drawn. The two rays from the originj OTj^ 
and OTg, denote two alternative production techniques which can be 
employed in producing Y^. If for the producer in question OT^ repre­
sents the production technique he traditionally uses, he will "demand" 
and use OL^ and OK^ of labor and capital, respectively. A similar 
diagram can be drawn to determine the input-use pattern for producing 
OZj^. Of course, the sum of inputs used to produce OY^ and OZ^ cannot 
exceed the respective quantities available. 
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Supply of Inputs of Production 
The supply of inputs, both in terms of quantity and composition, 
varies with stages of economic development. At very low stages of de­
velopment, land and particularly labor are usually in ample supply rela­
tive to inputs such as commercial fertilizers and mechanized power. At 
high levels of agricultural and general economic development, the con­
verse is more nearly approximated. That is, commerical inputs are 
readily available while labor migration to nonagricultural sectors in­
creasingly gives land and labor scarcity values. Such modifications in 
the input supply patterns affect not only the relative quantities avail­
able but also relative prices. Thus, the effects of economic develop­
ment, or the lack of, and consequent structural readjustment of certain 
sectors of the economy affect the scope and efficiency of the marketing 
mechanism which, in turn, conditions resource mobility and individuals* 
objectives. 
The recognition of marketing imperfections, both in terms of magni­
tude and permanence appears to be crucial to understanding the impedi­
ments and opportunities for using the marketing mechanism to direct or 
guide developmental processes. The simplifying assumptions incorporated 
in the neoclassical theory of the firm operating under competitive condi­
tions are not appropriate to less-developed areas. Resource immobility, 
imperfection of knowledge and objectives other than profit maximization 
are widespread, especially at low stages of economic development. Fur­
ther, the Marxist assumptions that as economic conditions change, the 
institutional framework adjusts in the correct manner and direction so 
as to be amenable to developmental pressures and incentives are not valid. 
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Few would not deny that these assumptions are applicable to any real-
world situation. The point to be stressed here, however, is that such 
assumptions are much less applicable to areas where high rates of 
illiteracy, traditionalism, and low rates of real economic growth pre­
vail. 
The discussion of resource supply functions will be restricted to 
that of land, labor, and agricultural credit. The forces affecting the 
supply of other "commercial" inputs are primarily those reflected in 
the theory of the firm which interact to determine the output supply 
schedule, the latter now viewed as the resource supply function to the 
agricultural sector. That is, input suppliers gear resource allocation 
and output decisions to meet the marginal conditions for economic ef­
ficiency or to realize some objective other than profit maximization. 
The discussion of the supply of land, labor, and agricultural credit is 
complicated by the interaction among the social and economic factors. 
The introduction of the social factors admits a great amount of heter­
ogeneity which makes modal or ideal types difficult to discern. 
Agricultural labor 
Initially, the labor supply schedule for an individual will be de­
rived geometrically through the use of indifference-curve analysis. 
In Figure 2.6 the slopes of the rays from the origin represent r, the 
wage rate per hour of labor. The indifference curves reflect the in­
dividuals' s preference between inccsne and hours worked, both on a per day 
basis. Alternatively, the curves are derived from preferences between 
income received and leisure. These are competitive "goods"; i.e., in­
creases in leisure are associated with the foregoing of potential income. 
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In some areas, leisure is highly preferred because of the social status 
accruing to nonwork, especially on the part of agriculturalists. Leisure 
is also a proxy for time devoted to local governmental affairs and to 
social obligations. The upward curvature of the indifference curves 
denote a decreasing MRS of income for leisure; i.e., laborers require 
increasing amounts of income to induce them to supply incremental units 
of labor services.^ At higher levels of income, for example, and 
the MRS decreases at a faster rate. That is, the concavity from above 
H4H1 H2H3 
Hours Worked Per Day 
I II I 
H4H1 H3H2 0 
2* 
^ Hours Worked Per Day 
Figure 2.6. Utility-maximizing length Figure 2.7. Derivation of labor 
of work-days under alter- supply curve 
native income and wage 
rate assumptions 
For laborers, other than self-employed individuals, in overpopula-
ted less-developed areas, the indifference curve representing preferences 
between income and leisure may be reduced to a point in space or only the 
lower portion of the curve may be relevant. That is, the ceteris paribus 
assumptions on which the indifference curves are based tend to create an 
employment configuration which is essentially invariant. Thus, the 
choices between income and leisure are severely restricted if, in fact, 
a choice does exist. 
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is accentuated. In Figure 2.7 the points of tangency between r^ and 
(i = 1, 4) are plotted to determine the individual labor supply 
function. In this example, a "backward-sloping" supply curve of labor 
has been derived. At some point, for example, point M in Figure 2.7, 
additional increase in r may induce higher levels of hours worked per 
day. Intuitively, rising incomes may be associated with increased contact 
with consumer goods markets. This increased awareness of goods previously 
not consumed, but assumed available either through domestic production 
or through imports may induce laborers to alter their preference patterns 
between income and leisure. Finally, increases in r above OR^ may be 
associated with hours worked > OHg. Instead of moving along ss', hourly 
wage rate increases may be accompanied by a shift of SS ' to the right 
because of factors such as changes in preferences and in costs of living. 
That is, for wages above Or^, the "backward sloping" supply curve may 
still be appropriate but it has shifted to the right rather than 
straightened out. 
The labor supply function can also be expressed mathematically.^ 
In Equation 2.47 labor supplied is expressed as a function of income 
(I), leisure (L), and additional factors (X) such as information, labor 
mobility, and physical capacity to work. The total time available for 
disposal is divided between work and leisure; i.e., T = W + L. 
f (I, L, X) 
U = g (I, L) 
(2.47) 
(2.48) 
1, This approach is that used by Henderson and Quandt (2.4), Chapter 
2. 
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" (2.49) 
oL gj 
The utility function Equation 2.48 incorporates income and leisure and 
provides the foundation for deriving the indifference curves between 
these two components. If I = rW where r = the hourly wage rate, I = 
rW and L = T-W can be substituted into Equation 2.48. 
U = g [rW, (T-W)] (2.50) 
In order to maximize the laborer's utility, the first derivative of 
Equation 2.50 with respect to W is derived and set equal to zero; i.e., 
increments of labor are supplied until the value of Equation 2.50 is 
maximized. 
= - g^ + g^r = 0 (2.51) 
.*. - = r (2.52) 
gj 
According to Equation 2.52, the marginal rate of substitution of income 
for leisure equals the wage rate. This condition is identical to the 
points of tangency derived in Figure 2.6. Equation 2.52 embodies W and 
r, and since the laborer is assumed to act so as to maximize Equation 
2.50, Equation 2.52 represents the individual's labor supply curve 
from which wage and quantities of labor supplied can be derived. The 
second-order condition that 
2 
3^2 " ®LL " ^ ®LI^ BlI^ ^ ° 
is assumed to have been satisfied. 
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Agricultural credit 
In most less-developed areas, agriculturalists obtain the major 
proportion of their credit from private sources such as landlords, 
professional moneylenders, merchants, and relatives. For the majority 
of the producers, the quantity of funds available from public sources 
is relatively small. The heterogeneity of sources and terms of credit 
complicates the analysis of a credit supply function. However, the 
factors conditioning access to credit by agriculturalists are likely 
the same as those confronting agriculturalists in the developed 
countries. Differences exist, however, in the values assigned to these 
factors and to the relative weights employed in determining the alloca­
tion of available funds to prospective borrowers. In addition, a 
general lack of public regulation of the lenders and the precarious 
economic position of many agriculturalists interact to bring about an 
extremely weak bargaining position on the part of prospective borrowers. 
This places the lender in an advantageous position to largely determine 
the amount, use, and terms of the loans. However, limited competition 
and considerations of goodwill in maintaining clients temper the lender's 
desire to exact the most demanding terms from borrowers. 
An implicit credit supply function to individual borrowers is 
given in Equation 2.53. Credit is assumed to be available from both 
private and public sources. The public sources, denoted by G and F, re­
present governmental funds and foreign assistance channelled through 
governmental agencies, respectively. Because of the relatively small 
role of the public sector in meeting the credit needs of the majority 
of cultivators, the discussion will focus on the private sector. 
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Cj = C 
iJ 
^, M-, X + G + F (2.53) 
In Equation 2.53, the amount of credit supplied to the j-th borrower 
is a function of the following: 
(1) pj represents the productivity of investment undertaken by the 
k j-th individual and p^ is the productivity of investments to be under­
taken by the k competitors for the funds; 
(2) The term i^ denotes the interest rate that the j-th borrower 
is willing to pay for a unit of credit. The ratio i^ is an indicator 
1 
of his relative willingness to pay; 
(3) The term n represents the opportunity cost of providing funds 
to the agricultural sector. For example, M- is the expected rate of re­
turn on government bonds or investments in the nonagricultural sector; 
and 
(4) X is defined as a composite index of the j-th borrower's 
relative credit worthiness, of uncertainty or riskiness associated with 
the use to which credit is to be put, and of the lender's relationship 
to the j-th borrower. Two extremes of the relationship aspect can be 
demonstrated; (a) The borrower is a relative of the lender thereby 
perhaps enabling him to receive preferential treatment, or (b) The 
borrower is already heavily indebted to the lender and the additional 
burden of debt may force the borrower to default with the lender sub­
sequently appropriating the borrower's collateral. 
The complexity of Equation 2.53 rather defies the derivation of an 
explicit credit supply function to the individual borrower. The following 
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rule summarizes the factors taken into account by the lender, as in 
Equation 2.54, in determining the distribution of his funds available 
for credit financing. 
J- S (2.54) 
(I + dj) (1 + (1+d^) 
i k The terms i , i , P- were previously defined. The demoninators reflect 
a discounting process where t = length of time to repayment and the d = 
a discounting factor incorporating the size of the loan, the credit 
worthiness of the borrower, the use of the funds for productive or non­
productive purposes, and the uncertainty of return associated with use. 
i k For example, if i > i > fi after all have been appropriately dis­
counted, then individual j represents the most attractive borrower. If 
the inequalities are all reversed, available funds are best allocated 
to the nonagricultural sector. 
Land 
Although the physical amount of land is essentially fixed, the 
amount of land available for productive purposes is affected by the 
land tenure and land-use patterns. Where land is used extensively and 
where a part of the potentially cultivable land is idled, land-use 
regulation and land redistribution would be effective in increasing the 
quantity of land available for intensive cultivation by smaller pro­
ducers. Similarily, where conditions are favorable in terms of climatic 
conditions, availability of inputs, and access to marketing outlets, 
multiple-cropping in place of single-cropping effectively increases the 
supply of land in terms of production inputs. 
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In some areas the population pressure on available land can be 
mitigated if reclamation and resettlement programs are economically and 
socially feasible. Consolidation of fragmented land units is another 
means of increasing the quantity of land for production as many bound­
ary lines and access roads are eliminated. Also, inheritance rights 
to land influence the patterns of land distribution and land use. 
These inheritance rights usually tend to accentuate the existence and 
continued expansion of large landholdings at the one extreme and in­
creasingly small, fragmented production units at the other. 
Product Supply 
The quantity supplied to the market is dependent upon a number of 
factors. Production decisions are usually made on the basis of antici­
pated factor and output prices and on expected technical relationships. 
Both are subject to allowance for price uncertainty and operation of 
exogenous forces. 
Profit maximizing producers gear production decisions so that the 
optional output level is where the SMC of production is equal to the 
price expected to be received for the product. Equation 2.59. 
y = f (X^, Xg) (2.55) 
TC = Px + Px *2 + F (2.56) 
TC = C (Y) + F (2.57) 
Profit = n = PyY - C(Y) - F (2.58) 
^Price supports and controls reduce price uncertainty. For a dis­
cussion of price expectation models, see Heady (2.3), Chapter 16, pp. 
475-496. 
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-If- = Py - C'(?) 
= Py = C'(Y) = MCy (2.59) 
In Equation 2.56 the total cost of producing Y is the summation of the 
fixed and variable costs. The total variable cost has been rewritten as 
C(Y) in Equation 2.57; i.e., the least-cost combinations of and X^ 
for various levels of Y can be translated into the corresponding quanti­
ties of X^ and X^ required to produce Y. When multiplied by their 
respective prices, the total variable cost associated with various levels 
of Y is derived. Equation 2.58 represents profits realized. Equation 
2.59 stipulates that output be altered until p = MC . Second-order y y 
conditions require that d^ir = - c"(Y) < 0. That is, MC must be 
y 
increasing at the profit-maximizing output. 
A specific production supply function will be derived from Equation 
2.37. Initially, a short-run supply function will be constructed. For 
example, aX^ = k and X^ is the only variable input. Equation 2.39 
is substituted into Equation 2.37 in order to express output in terms of 
prices, technical coefficients, and the fixed resource. The resulting 
product supply function is given in Equation 2.60. The derived elastici­
ties are given in Equations 2.61 and 2.62. 
r- _1 b 
b 
Y = ,  1  .  -1  
1 ''y ""x 
^"^1 (2.60) 
G , p = - ^1 (2.61) 
y 1 
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b 
Py = 
For a long-run product supply function. Equation 2.46 and a similar­
ly derived equation for are substituted into Equation 2.37 in order 
to express output in terms of input and output prices and of the techni­
cal coefficients embodied in the production function, as in Equation 
2.63. 1 
Y = 
b, b . b . b 
^ "l "2 Cy \ ) (Py % ) 
l-bj-b2 
(2.63) 
The above supply function is homogenous of degree zero in prices.^ Out­
put varies inversely with changes in the input prices. As input prices 
increase, ceteris paribus, the quantity produced and supplied decreases. 
Conversely, output varies directly with the price of the output. The 
elasticities of supply relative to p , p„ and p are easily derived 
1 2 y 
with the following results ; 
b. 
1 - bi - b2 
(2.64) 
' - 1 - b; . b; 
bg (2.65) 
^1 ^2 
fy - 1 . b; . b, 
A comparison of the price elasticities of supply with respect to 
p and p shows that these elasticities are higher in the long-run 
1 ^ 
product supply function than in the short-run formulation. 
To refer to Equation 2.63 as a product supply function is to im­
plicitly assume that quantities produced and quantities marketed are 
identical under these conditions. 
! 
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The actual quantity produced, in accordance with Equations 2.59, 
2.60 or 2.63, is a function of expected or estimated values, especially 
prices. However, after inputs have been committed and the actual output 
realized, the producer is now confronted by the decision of when to 
msurket his produce and in what amounts. This decision is accentuated 
if market prices, rather, prices received by producers are highly 
variable. If storage facilities are not available, producers are likely 
forced to sell their output at prices prevailing at harvest time. Also, 
debtors and crop-share tenants release quantities to landlords and 
moneylenders who may be able to store these commodities in anticipation 
of higher prices. Some subsistence-oriented producers may respond in­
versely to prices. That is, as the price paid to them rises, producers 
may market less and consume more in their households. Finally, those 
with storage facilities are in a better position to market their output 
in anticipation of and in response to movements in the prices received 
by them. For these individuals, higher prices will likely induce in­
creased marketings. 
Investment Decisions 
The potential productivity and the relative scarcity of capital in 
less-developed areas emphasize the importance of optimal distribution 
and utilization of available capital. The optimal patterns are likely 
never attained, but they represent goals which orient investment de­
cision-making processes. The concept of optimality, however, is often­
times peculiar to the investor. At early stages of development, govern­
ment investment programs may be planned so as to maximize the rate at 
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which private capital is mobilized and channeled into productive in­
vestments. The individual investor, on the other hand, perceiving an 
environment of economic and political instability, may rationally 
choose to invest his funds in foreign securities or in valuable metals 
as in the form of jewelry. In the context of investment for economic 
growth, however, both must be considered as unproductive. Thus, if the 
government's objective of mobilizing private capital for productive 
investment is to be achieved, public investment programs and other 
policies must, at least partially, be directed toward creating a 
climate of stable, economic growth. Coupled with political stability, 
such an environment is amenable to domestic and foreign investment, 
both public and private. 
In making both productive and unproductive investments, individuals 
either explicitly or implicitly attempt to evaluate the net returns from 
alternative uses of available funds. Such returns are usually expressed 
in economic terms; however, social and psychic considerations are impor­
tant to some individuals. In addition, the distribution of these net 
returns over time affects the relative attractiveness of alternative in­
vestments. 
The present value rule for determining the allocation of available 
investment funds which is given in Equation 2.67 can be given a suf­
ficiently general interpretation so as to incorporate both the economic 
and social factors affecting investment behavior. The components are 
interpreted as follows: 
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n 
PV = -(I) + Z [R(t) - E(t)](l + P)" + I (1 + p)"" (2.67) 
t«0 " 
(1) -(I) is the initial monetary cost of the investment; 
(2) n is the final time period of the planning horizon or the 
length of time over which net returns accrue to the investment; 
(3) R(t) and E(T) are the estimated returns and variable costs 
in o ^ t ^ n, respectively, associated with the particular investment 
program under consideration; and 
(4) p is the subjective discount factor which reflects the op­
portunity cost of the investment funds plus allowance for uncertainty. 
(5) + p) " is the discounted, capitalized value of I if 
the investment is not entirely used up by time period n. 
As indicated earlier, R(t) and E(t) are usually expressed in terms 
of economic costs and returns. Intuitively, these components can also 
reflect the utility and disutility associated with the investment in 
question. Disutility may be represented by negative values in the 
flow of R(t) or be a positive component of E(t). For example, the 
social status associated with land accumulation would have a positive 
value in the R(t) corresponding to investment in land. This would be in 
addition to the economic returns. Conversely, investment in a new firm 
enterprise may require more managerial Inputs. This additional time 
requirement may be viewed as both an economic and social cost in E(t). 
Quite obviously, pesos and utiles cannot be aggregated; however, the 
net economic returns can be subjectively qualified to reflect the pre­
ferences of the investor. Alternatively, such preferences may be em­
bodied in p, the discount factor. As p increases with higher degrees 
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of uncertainty, investors may also increase its value for those invest­
ment projects generating disutility. The converse is also true. 
Data availability constrains the extent to which costs and returns 
can be determined. It is not suggested here that potential investors 
are actually able to quantify Equation 2.67 and calculate the PV of 
alternative investments. Rather, investors engage in computational and 
mental processes which tend toward or are systematized by a formulation 
such as the present value rule. 
If Equation 2.67 is expressed strictly in economic terms and is 
quantifiable, the rule states that if the derived PV of the investment 
in question is greater than zero, the investment can be profitably 
undertaken. If the PV is equal to zero, the investor can be indif­
ferent; if less than zero, the investment should not be made. The 
economic feasibility of alternative investments must then be conditioned 
by any social factors associated with these investments. 
Uncertainty 
Producers do not operate in a world of perfect knowledge. Rather, 
uncertainty is an ubiquitous phenomenon which affects producers' pro­
duction, investment, and marketing decisions in all areas of the world, 
regardless of the stage of agricultural and economic development at­
tained. However, the impact of uncertainty on economic activities in 
less-developed areas is relatively more widespread and more deleterious 
to growth and development of the agricultural sector. For example, in 
the developed countries, government intervention in the forms of price 
support and stabilization programs, and government-sponsored agronomic 
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research and agricultural extension programs have been instrumental in 
reducing price and technological uncertainty. In addition, government 
regulatory agencies and judicial systems interact to safeguard individual 
personal and property rights. These institutional factors are generally 
neither well developed nor effectively operative in less-developed 
areas. 
Uncertainty takes many forms. The variance of market prices and 
of climatic conditions during the production period are perhaps the best 
examples. Individual sources of uncertainty have differential impacts 
on the decision-making processes of subsistence- versus market-oriented 
producers. Three broad categories of uncertainty are subsequently dis­
cussed. 
Price uncertainty 
Because producers' objectives are usually stated in economic terms 
rather than purely physical relationships, the impact of price uncertain­
ty on decision-making processes is pervasive. In the absence of com­
plete price controls, both input and output prices must be estimated 
if the marginal conditions for economic efficiency are to be approxi­
mated, In an environment of Imperfect knowledge, these conditions would 
be realized only by coincidence. In addition, the values assigned to 
expected or estimated prices, both currently and over time, affect the 
values of income streams associated with alternative investment oppor­
tunities and, hence, investment decisions. 
Technical and technological uncertainty 
This form of uncertainty is an outgrowth of the imperfect knowl­
edge regarding the technical coefficients of production; the avail­
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ability and characteristics of technological innovations; and the nature 
of the impact of climatic conditions, insects, and diseases on input-
output relationships. As is apparent in the marginal conditions for 
economic efficiency, these physical factors Influence resource alloca­
tion decisions and, in turn, the output configuration realized. The 
impact of technological uncertainty is especially important for invest­
ment decisions in that once resources have been committed, a time in­
terval exists before they can be recovered and invested in more 
attractive, alternative investment programs. 
For producers living near the margin of subsistence, technical and 
technological uncertainty motivate producers to continue using tradition­
al production techniques. A degree of certainty is associated with 
these practices which have been used historically. The. precarious 
economic position of many of these producers does not permit or induce 
them to experiment with technological innovations unless the benefits of 
using such innovations have been amply demonstrated. 
Institutional uncertainty 
The institutional structure of an economy generates pressures and 
incentives which condition producers' decisions. Perhaps the best ex­
ample is that of security of tenure and recourse of the tenant through 
legal proceedings. Tenurlal insecurity often encourages exploita­
tion of resources in order to maximize short-run gains and discourages 
private Investment, especially if the tenant is unable to recover the 
value of such Investment at the time the tenancy arrangement is termin­
ated. The longer-term consequences are too often lower resource pro­
ductivity and relatively low growth rates in the agricultural sector. 
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The prospects for the continuation of current and the implementa­
tion of new government programs are additional sources of uncertainty. 
If agrarian reform seems imminent, large landowners whose property may 
be expropriated are discouraged from undertaking private investments in 
their operations. Conversely, the prospect of land redistribution with 
secure titles should have a favorable impact on tenant production 
techniques and investment decisions. Similarily, the expected discontin­
uation or modification of price support policies, government subsidiza­
tion of input costs, and foreign trade policies introduce additional 
price uncertainty. Government investment in social overhead capital 
facilities introduces both technological and price uncertainty. 
The errors in resource allocation arising from the various types 
of uncertainty discussed above are costly to the individual and to 
society. The individual, other things being equal, foregoes profits 
and, in turn, capital surpluses for investment or additional consumption. 
Society loses too in that the potential "surpluses" which do not arise 
could be taxed for government revenues or could be privately invested 
by producers. Further, the output configuration realized is likely 
different from that represented by consumer preferences, and the relative 
price variability is accentuated. These factors likely interact to 
exert a depressing effect on private investment and on growth of the 
agricultural sector. 
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Circular Nature of Economic Activities 
The inability of individuals and agricultural sectors in some less-
developed areas to break out of essentially low levels of economic 
equilibrium is often interpreted as being the consequence of causative 
factors operating in a circular manner which bump against economic 
threshholds that prevent or impede cumulative, sustained growth. Nurkse 
popularized this phenomenon which he termed the "vicious circle of 
poverty", and his conception is as follows:^ 
"It (the concept) implies a circular constellation of forces 
tending to act and react upon one another in such a way as to 
keep a poor country in a state of poverty. Particular instances 
of such circular constellations are not difficult to imagine. 
For example, a poor man may not have enough to eat; being 
under-fed, his health may be weak; being physically weak, his 
working capacity is low, which means that he is poor, which 
in turn means that he will not have enough to eat; and so on. 
A situation of this sort, relating to a country as a whole, can 
be summed up in the trite proposition: 'a country is poor 
because it is poor*" (2.6, p. 4). 
The logical basis for such a "circle" also provides a framework for 
hypothesizing circular activities which are cumulative upward or down­
ward. For example, low Incomes lead to low levels of savings and in­
vestment which, in turn, result in low levels of resource productivity 
and hence, low incomes. The circle has been completed. However, if 
incomes are improved, either through favorable production or marketing 
conditions, the "circle" should, logically, move upward in a cumulative 
manner. That is, each component of the circular framework should have 
a favorable impact on the next activity in the sequence. If the system 
^A number of other formulations have been made. See, for example. 
Singer (2.7, pp. 1-11) and Higgins (2.5, p. 271). 
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operated this simply, agricultural planners would only have to devise 
some means for initiating an Income Increase and then the production 
and income of the individual would automatically grow. A number of 
factors operate to obstruct this facile solution to the production and 
income problems of agriculturalists in less-developed areas: 
(1) Higher incomes, and presumably increased profits or sur­
pluses, may be associated with higher savings. If so, a decision must 
be made regarding the disposition of these savings. Consumption may 
increase. For those living near the margin of subsistence, this in­
creased consumption is tantamount to an investment in individuals pro­
viding a greater capacity to work and potentially higher labor pro­
ductivity. Similarly, these savings may be invested in output-
increasing inputs, if such are available to the producer. Conversely, 
savings may be hoarded or invested in unproductive ventures. In the 
latter cases, higher incomes do not initiate an upward circular move­
ment of the system and the circle is broken; 
(2) To the extent that Malthus' theory of population applies to 
less-developed areas, higher incomes and increased savings may be used 
to sustain larger families and to improve diets. The result would 
primarily be a potentially larger number of labor inputs but perhaps 
with little impact on resource productivity. The improved diets may 
have a beneficial effect, however; 
(3) Even if savings are generated, the question arises as to whe­
ther or not productive outlets exist for these funds. Producers em­
ploying traditional inputs and production techniques may view invest­
ment in additional traditional inputs as being sufficiently productive 
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to justify the investment. Also, uncertainty associated with invest­
ment in the firm, for example, insecurity of tenure, dampens the in­
centives to invest so as to maintain or increase resource productivity; 
(4) "Surpluses" or savings which accrue may be at least partially 
appropriated by taxes, higher rents, and unfavorable terns of trade to 
the agricultural sector. The secondary effects arising from the use of 
these appropriations may have a stimulating effect on agricultural 
growth; and 
(5) The aggregative effect on the individual's capacity to gener­
ate savings for productive investment must be examined; i.e., the supply 
and demand conditions must be integrated. If the demand for agricultural 
commodities increases at a rate slower than the rate at which quantities 
are supplied, market prices and prices received by producers fall. Un­
less production costs are reduced proportionately, producers' savings 
will also fall. Thus, the capacity to invest is reduced and the profit­
ability of investment may also be lowered. The interaction of these 
factors would tend to maintain the low level of equilibrium in many 
agricultural sectors. 
Examples of circular forces causing a downward cumulative movement 
can also be postulated. Higher consumption requirements may be met by 
reducing the quantity of savings for maintaining or increasing resource 
productivity. The subsequently lower output and presumably reduced 
income levels place greater demands on savings and maintenance of re­
source productivity. Declining resource productivity encourages or re­
quires increased rates of exploitation and, hence, lower productivity in 
the future. Similarly, tenurial insecurity may encourage resource ex­
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ploitation and discourage private investment. Declining output levels 
may increase tenurial insecurity which, in turn, may motivate the tenant 
to extract even more from the land with little consideration of longer-
term productivity. However, potentially offsetting forces also limit 
this downward movement. Declining net investment and net depreciation 
of resources may be offset by technological advances which result in 
maintenance of resource productivity and the capacity to meet increased 
consumption requirements through lower savings. In the absence of credit 
financing, lower output is associated with lower means of sustenance. 
Inadequate diets are associated with increased illness and higher 
mortality rates which reduce consumption requirements. The level of 
living can be reduced only down to the subsistence level, the new equilib­
rium level. The tenant who perceives that tenurial insecurity is posi­
tively correlated with resource productivity will likely be motivated to 
exploit resources only down to that tolerable by the landlord. At or 
near this level, the downward circular movement may be stopped. 
These "vicious" and "beneficient" circles likely do operate within 
a constrained range of movement. Their existence is based on a number 
of implicit assumptions which must be acknowledged if these "circles" 
are to be used to explain or describe economic activities in less-
developed areas. Of importance to individuals and to national planners 
is the determination of how and where to strategically break the "circle" 
and how to remove or alleviate the obstacles to self-sustained, cumula­
tive growth. 
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Tentative Conclusion 
An economic system is characterized by the nature and strength of 
its institutional attributes. An economic theory formulated to ex­
plain and predict the workings of this system must be based on the 
existence of these institutional phenomena. Thus, a theory based on 
assumptions inappropriate for economies of less-developed areas is 
invalid for either descriptive or prescriptive purposes. Consequently, 
neither classical nor neoclassical theory of the firm is valid, as con­
structed, for noncapitalist economies. However, this is not to say 
that these theories do not provide points of departure for modification 
to reflect the social and economic conditions existent in particular 
less-developed countries. 
The basic economic concepts discussed above appear, in principle, 
to be adaptable for application to less-developed areas. Since these 
concepts were primarily developed for firms operating in economically-
advanced countries, some of the behavioral and environmental assumptions 
need to be modified. Objectives other than profit maximization are 
widespread; resources in some areas are highly immobile. Knowledge of 
marketing conditions, resource availability, and alternative production 
techniques is imperfect. It is also imperfect in developed countries 
but to a lesser degree and with a less-deleterious impact on agricultural 
growth. In addition, the knowledge of these phenomena is not sufficient 
for stimulating agricultural growth. Individual producers must have 
the know-how to make productive use of this information in arriving at 
remunerative production and marketing decisions. 
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The uncertainty surrounding alternative production techniques and 
cropping patterns likely causes some producers to be unresponsive to 
the signals emitted through the marketing system, regardless of the 
efficiency of the marketing structure. The precarious economic position 
of many small producers motivates them to continue using traditional 
production methods. For those who are essentially survival-minded, 
changing conditions in the input and output markets are largely irrele­
vant. Production decisions are primarily geared toward consumption re­
quirements. To the extent that these factors are operative, the market­
ing system and certain government policies cannot be relied upon to 
guide and develop all parts of the agricultural sector. 
Despite the limitations and qualifications which have been suggested, 
the maximizing procedures for realizing objectives are likely applicable 
to all areas, regardless of their stage of agricultural and economic de­
velopment. 
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CHAPTER III. LAND TENURE SYSTEMS AND FIRM SIZE 
Land tenure patterns are a part of the total agrarian structure. 
Agricultural growth and development are conditioned by the interaction 
of all components of this structure. For this study, land tenure is 
defined as the pattern of land distribution and of the rights and obliga­
tions of occupancy, ownership, and land use. Subsequent chapters will 
deal with rural credit institutions, social overhead capital facilities, 
and government policies, some of the other components of the agrarian 
structure. 
The evolution of the tenure structure results from social and 
economic power, custom, and legislation, all tending to become in­
stitutionalized over time. Also, ecological factors affect land-use 
opportunities and production techniques. For example, shifting cultiva­
tion is not only an accommodation to or an outgrowth of climatic condi­
tions and existing production techniques but also consistent with 
traditional social and economic relationships. The tendency for the 
population to concentrate in areas of highest land productivity and 
near growth centers of the econony affects the demand for land and, in 
turn, the landowners' degrees of freedom in formulating tenurial 
arrangements. 
Reforms have been legislated. Too often, however, such reforms 
have been oriented more toward placatlon of agriculturalists rather 
than toward coordinated, structural readjustment. In addition, they 
were often not effectively and vigorously implemented.^ At times social 
^For example, see Flores (3.9, p. 5), Madiman (3.21, p. 292), Dutta 
(3.8, pp. 80-85), Jacoby (3.14, p. 70), Myrdal (3.23, pp. 1303-4, 1324, 
1330-34), and Kermanl (3.16, p. 67). 
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gains have been at the expense of economic gains, especially from a 
longer-run viewpoint.^ The vested interests of the politically 
articulate and powerful; i.e., the landlords, large estate owners, and 
moneylenders, have motivated these individuals to champion for the 
2 
status quo or for changes which primarily benefit them. A dis­
proportionate amount of influence in the hands of large landowners 
coupled with a lack of organized political and economic power on the 
part of small-scale cultivators has tended to sustain traditional 
tenure patterns in many less-developed areas. At low stages of 
economic development, the distribution of income is highly influenced 
by the pattern of land distribution. This concentration of wealth and 
income has important implications for the strength of internal markets 
for all goods and, in turn, economic incentives for diversifying the 
economy. In addition, the high man/land ratios in some areas, for 
example. South Asia, combined with high growth rate of the agricultural 
population have enabled landlords to exact tenancy arrangements 
largely on their own terms. With nonfarm employment opportunities 
limited, the relatively more-disadvantaged are willing to work under the 
traditional tenancy arrangements or even more inequitable ones. 
^From the individual standpoint, redistribution of land to former 
tenants and landless laborers in the form of essentially unviable 
economic units generates both social and economic gains, at least in­
itially. At the macro-economic level, such land reform may be associated 
with decreases in production and(or) quantity marketed and adverse pros­
pects for improving future agricultural productivity. 
2 See references given in preceding footnote. Several counter ex­
amples exist such as the Influence of Ghandi in India, the proponents 
of collective farms in Eastern Europe and the organizers of cooperative 
farming units in Israel. 
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More important than the forms of tenure are the terms of tenure 
arrangements.^ Owner-operators are not necessarily in an advantageous 
position relative to crop-share and cash tenants. The tenant may have 
all the motivations and incentives of owner-operators. In addition, 
the former may have access to a larger resource base, part of which 
is supplied by landlords. Unfortunately, the situation in less-
developed areas is too often that of economically unviable production 
units and tenancy arrangements inimical to private investment and 
alternative input-use patterns, both with adverse consequences for 
increasing agricultural productivity. 
2 The trend toward a large number of economically unviable units 
is a consequence of many factors evolving through time. In times past, 
parts of the Near East and India, for example, were characterized by 
agricultural conditions supporting the indigenous populations at higher 
than current levels of living. During colonial rule, the implementation 
of improved health measures increased population growth rates and, in 
turn, the demand for employment opportunities. Previously viable pro­
duction units were divided and fragmented according to customary In­
heritance patterns. The smaller, fragmented units became increasingly 
insufficient to sustain existing levels of living, particularly during 
ny agriculturalists in less-developed areas would discount this 
statement. Where status is associated with land accumulation, land 
ownership is much more important than tenure arrangements and(or) land 
utilization. In addition, for tenants, especially subsistence-
oriented producers, tenancy arrangements are associated with Insecurity 
and exploitation. Conversely, land ownership is synonymous with security. 
2 See Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 for data on firm size in 
terms of land holdings. 
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periods of adverse environmental conditions.^ The inability of pro­
duction units to satisfy consumption requirements, either directly or in­
directly, and the limited off-farm employment opportunities induced or 
forced many agriculturalists to secure external financing from other 
landholders, moneylenders, and merchants. The continued pressure of 
population on land without a sufficient, offsetting improvement in pro­
duction techniques tended to increase the demand for credit for both 
consumption and production needs. Such demand placed creditors in a 
powerful position. Whether the terms of credit reflected the risks 
associated with the lending or the noncompetitive positions of lenders, 
such terms tended to maintain borrowers in an indebted position. 
Eventually, some debtors lost their land to their creditors and assumed 
tenancy arrangements on their formerly-owned land. Others became 
landless laborers. Where the creditors also assumed marketing and re­
tained functions, the potential existed for further worsening the 
borrower's well-being through Influencing the prices paid him for his 
agricultural commodities and the prices charged for consumer goods he 
purchased. In the process, the bargaining power of the debtor was 
gradually eroded and economic and social power accrued to those in posi­
tions of relative wealth--the large landowners, the moneylenders, and 
2 the merchants. 
^Small, fragmented production units operated by tenants often re­
sult in misuse of the land. The land base is insufficient to support 
the double needs and(or) interest of the owner and tenant. 
2 Grants of land to selected Individuals were also given during 
colonial rule. This was also the case in parts of Latin America. 
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Since economic power is also associated with political power, the 
relatively disadvantaged have few alternatives for improving their well-
being either through economic or political processes. Institutional 
credit, whether through the banking system or through credit and mar­
keting cooperatives, usually requires land as collateral for loans--
collateral to which tenants and landless laborers do not have access. 
They have to resort to noninstitutional lenders. Even if tenants and 
small landholders have the capacity for private investment in improved 
inputs, the proportion of net returns going to the landlord and(or) 
the proportion accruing to the marketing middlemen may tend to discour­
age such investment. The agriculturalist trying to eke out a living 
from a relatively small land base has few opportunities to improve his 
economic position, particularly when employment in the nonagricultural 
sectors is also limited. 
The above discussion emphasizes the relative disadvantage of the 
small landholder, the tenant, and the landless laborer. While this 
group usually controls a relatively small proportion of available land, 
they account for a relatively large segment of the agricultural popula­
tion. Plantations and large estates exist at the other end of the 
landholding continuum. Such firms of diverse size of operations coexist. 
Coexistence is possible where production conditions permit nearly con­
stant returns to scale within a range of firm sizes. Furthermore, the 
small, labor-intensive units, primarily employing family labor, can re­
duce actual per unit production costs by paying or imputing to family 
labor wages below the prevailing wage rate for hired labor. Finally, 
incomes from relatively small production units are often supplemented 
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by income from hiring out labor and from engaging in petty processing 
and marketing activities. 
Even if national planners could abstract from vested political and 
economic interests and from the costs of expropriation and redistribu­
tion of land units, they would be hard pressed to conceive of an 
optimum tenure system. Ownership would likely be favored by the culti­
vators. Yet, ownership and inheritance patterns have contributed io 
many of the existing tenure patterns. The optimum distribution of 
land, where land is only one input in the production system, would be 
affected by soil characteristics, climatic factors, and the distribu­
tion of complementary inputs. Furthermore, even if such an optimum 
distribution were determinable, the optimality would vary with changes 
in technology and the availability of complementary inputs. But so 
far such optimality has only an economic connotation such as optimality 
from the standpoint of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency, how­
ever, is only one component or objective in the national planners' 
framework. Economic efficiency is likely juxtaposed with considerations 
of economic and social equity affecting, in turn, the social and politi­
cal stability necessary for Implementing any optimum distribution of 
land. 
In any case optimality is never achieved; the optimum is always 
changing. Once a distribution program has been devised and implemented, 
subsequent changes through the legislative, democratic process tend to 
be slow. This tardiness of legislative processes and the worsening of 
the economic position of the small landholder, the tenant, and the land­
less laborer tend to create an environment where revolution and all its 
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attendant consequences may appear to be an acceptable, feasible alterna­
tive to these individuals. 
Tenure Systems—A Theoretical Examination 
A variety of tenure arrangements exists within and among less-
developed countries. The continuum extends from landless laborers and 
squatters who possess no legal rights to land to extensive plantations 
and state-owned and operated farm systems. Owner-operators, producers 
operating under tenancy arrangements of varying terms, tribal or com­
munal holding and operation of land, and combinations of these types of 
tenure are typically found in differing geographical areas and in varying 
economic and social systems. 
Owner-operator producers 
Generally, most agriculturalists aspire to this form of tenure which 
provides a good deal of security and prestige.^ Furthermore, for those 
living close to the margin of subsistence, the security aspect is of 
crucial importance. For market-oriented producers, security has a 
positive impact on the length of planning horizons and on production and 
investment decisions. Conversely, investment in land accumulation, 
though enhancing the owner's prestige, may not augment resource pro­
ductivity and agricultural output. That is, investment in expanding the 
land base may be unproductive in the aggregate relative to expenditures 
for irrigation wells and increased fertilizer applications. Consequently, 
security and productivity tend to reinforce each other while there may 
^In several less-developed countries, however, status is associated 
with land ownership but not with actual cultivation by the owner. He 
enhances his status by engaging tenants or landless laborers to perform 
the manual operations of the farm. 
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be a "trade-off" between prestige and land productivity, especially in 
parts of Asia and Latin America. The extensively-cultivated "latifundia" 
in the latter would be a prime example. 
Ownership of land may be at the cost of operating with a smaller 
resource base. That is, investments in working capital may be more 
productive and profitable where the landlord provides the land and 
perhaps complementary inputs. A secure and equitable tenancy arrange­
ment, avoiding the heavy investment in land, frees capital for pro­
ductive investments. Unfortunately, insecurity and inequitable tenancy 
agreements are the rule rather than the exception in less-developed 
areas. 
Since production and increments to production need not be shared 
with the landlord, the owner-operator reaps all the benefits of private 
investment and labor inputs used. He also must absorb all costs and 
any losses that are incurred. As mentioned previously, land ownership, 
ceteris paribus, reduces that amount of capital available for private 
investment. On the other hand, land provides the collateral for secur­
ing private and public credit for production and consumption purposes 
when the owner has a valid, secure title to the land. Such titles are 
usually prerequisite to the operation of a market for land. However, 
title ownership or secure tenancy arrangements cannot overcome problems 
of land fragmentation and production units of small size. 
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, owner-operators are 
individually in a position to maximize the efficiency of achieving their 
objective, given the available quantity of resources.^ To the extent 
The marginal conditions for economic efficiency were specified 
in Chapter II. 
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that externalities are present and knowledge of prices, physical re­
lationships, and maximizing techniques is imperfect, the marginal condi­
tions characterizing economic efficiency will not be realized. These 
distortions to the pricing system and decision-making processes are 
ubiquitous in less-developed areas. 
Landlord-tenant arrangement 
As noted in the previous section, a secure, equitable tenancy 
'irrangemant may be preferable to actual ownership of land. However, 
land ownership per se may be an objective of economic activity. Leas­
ing out or obtaining additional land under lease permits the aggrega­
tion of some land holdings which individually could not be economically 
viable. Ceteris paribus, the efficiency of land use should be improved. 
The types of tenancy are varied; crop-share, labor-share, and cash 
rent are used most frequently with a good deal of variation of terms 
within each type of tenancy. Logic suggests a differential impact of 
alternative tenure arrangements on agricultural production. Economic 
principles, however, provide a basis for concluding that such a 
differential need not exist. This tentative conclusion pertains to 
economic well-being; social considerations will likely condition this 
conclusion. 
The modification of a constrained revenue maximization formulation 
for application to tenancy arrangement was discussed in Chapter II, 
Equations 2.28 - 2.35. A simplification of the problem in geometric 
terms demonstrates the effect of cost and revenue sharing by the land­
lord on production decisions and on the marginal conditions of economic 
efficiency. 
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Figure 3.1. Optimum input-use level 
for the firm 
Figure 3.2. Optimum output level 
for the firm 
In Figure 3.1 if the tenant receives only one-half of the returns 
accruing to various levels of using input X, MVP/2, but pays the entire 
cost of XjMVC, the prof it-maximizing level of using X is QXj^. At OX^, 
MVP/2 = MVC. Conversely, if costs and returns are shared in the same 
proportions, OX^ is profitably used. Quantity OX^ is that quantity 
consistent with the marginal conditions for economic efficiency. 
Figure 3.2 represents the optimum output level. Again, if the tenant 
receives only one-half of the returns, MR/2, but assumes all production 
costs, output is restricted to OQj < OQ^ where OQ^ results if costs and 
returns are shared in the same proportions. Thus, to the extent r < c 
where r = tenant's share of total revenue and c = tenant's share of pro­
duction costs, both input and output levels are below those that would 
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be realized if the marginal conditions were met.^ 
If r < c, can the landlord be induced to absorb some of the costs 
or reduce his share of total returns so that r "* c? That is, if in­
creased output results from r c, is the landlord's return increased 
* * 
so that he is motivated to lower r , his share, where r = (1 - r)? 
Figure 3.3 provides a partial answer to this question. 
^The qualitative impact on output by varying r and c can be 
assessed in the following manner: 
Profit = TT = rR(q) - cC(q) where R(q) and C(q) are the total 
returns and costs, respectively, of producing an unspecified amount of 
q-
= rR'(q) - cc'(q) = 0 (1) 
= rMR = cMC 
Taking the total differential of (1) and assuming that r = c: 
rR"(q)dq + drR'(q) = cC \q)dq + dcC'(q) 
In accordance with the marginal conditions for economic efficiency, the 
denominator is assumed to be negative. The following situations are 
considered : 
(i) If dc = dr = 0 and they change in the same direction, the 
numerator is 0 [c (q) - R (q)] which is equal to zero and dq = 0. 
(ii)^ If dc < 0 and dr = 0, dq/dc > 0. Conversely, if dc > 0, 
dq/dc = c'(q)/( - ) which is < 0 and output falls. 
(iii) Similarly, other combinations of dc and dr with alterna­
tive signs can be postulated and the qualitative impact on dq de­
termined . 
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Figure 3.3. Optimum short-run output under varying tenurial arrange­
ments 
If r = .5 and c = 1.0 for the tenant, rMR = cMC at point Z where 
the slopes of TC and .5TR are equal. Output OQj^ is produced. The area 
OAB is the amount which accrues to the landlord under this tenancy ar­
rangement. If the landlord permits an increased share to the tenant, for 
example, r = .75, z' is the point where .75MR = MC and OQ^ is produced. 
* 
With r reduced to .25 but output increasing by the landlord fore­
goes OCB of revenue but obtains area ACDE. Since the latter is larger, 
the landlord realizes an increased amount of revenue by reducing r . 
Similarly, the tenant has increased both his gross and net returns. 
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* 
To what level can the landlord reduce r without also reducing his 
income from the tenancy arrangement? The answer is provided by a modi­
fied elasticity concept. If e = J J —> 1.0, 
PQ / r ^ / r 
returns to the landlord are increased. They continue to increase to the 
* 
point where e becomes equal to 1.0. 
Table 3.1 is derived from approximate readings from Figure 3.3 as 
* * 
r is varied. From the landlord s standpoint, the optimum r is .15 ^ 
* 
r ^ .25. Since the tenant assumes all costs, his position is succès-
* 
sively improved as r is lowered; Le-, as r is increased. As indicated 
earlier, his optimal position is when r = 1.0, since c = 1.0, which is 
obtained at point l!" where MC = MR and OQ^ is produced. The following 
qualifications are necessary: 
Table 3.1. Returns to the landlord and derived arc elasticities under 
alternative tenurial arrangements 
* * PO * * 
r Q c TC (p Z 9) r PQ e 
.5 25 0 22.5 11.25 
.25 54 0 48.6 12.15 2.3 
.15 58 0 52.2 7.83 0.2 
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1 * (1) The cost curves have been arbitrarily drawn. As r is 
varied, the shape of TC; i.e., the slopes associated with alternative Q 
which are also the respective MC of Q, determines the Q and dQ. If 
* 
the TC curve were to rotate counter-clockwise at point Z, the Q and e 
* 
associated with alternative r in Table 3.1 would be reduced and, in 
* 
turn, the landlord would be less motivated to reduce r . Such a rota­
tion would be tantamount to increasing the rate at which returns to 
variable inputs decrease. Conversely, a clock-wise rotation resulting 
from adoption of improved technology would tend to increase the land-
lord's motivation to reduce r , ceteris paribus; 
(2) The TVC and TC curves have, implicitly, been assumed invariant 
* 
as r and r are varied. This invariance results from the usual assump­
tion possibility curve; i.e., he does not employ production techniques 
resulting in production at interior points. In actuality, however, as 
* * 
r is reduced and c increased so that sharing of costs is more nearly 
equal, it is conceivable that the relatively improved position of the 
tenant induces him to engage in better cultivation practices and(or) to 
use labor Inputs more efficiently resulting in a higher MPP per unit of 
input. If input costs remain invariant, the cost curves shift down­
ward and output and net returns are increased; 
(3) The market price has been assumed to be invariant as the 
quantity of output produced and, presumably marketed, is increased. As 
the market price or slope of TR is altered, a differential impact re­
sults on the quantity produced and, in turn, the landlord's motivation 
* 
to adjust r ; 
^The relative numerical scales in Figure 3.3 have also been arbi­
trarily assigned. 
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(4) The landlords in less-developed areas have objectives other 
than revenue-maximization from their tenancy agreements. Conditions 
may exist such that both tenant and landlord are in improved absolute 
* 
positions as r is lowered. However, landlords may have a rational in­
terest in maintaining the economic and social status quo. If tenants 
are maintained in a low living level and highly dependent position, 
the power position of the landlord permits him to exact those terms 
of tenancy most favorable to him socially, politically, and economically, 
both in the short-run and from a longer-run point of view; 
(5) Since the shape and position of the cost curves and revenue 
rays are affected by market and environmental conditions, landlords 
would rationally require assurances of substantial increases in revenue 
* 
accruing to them before they would be induced to lower r ; and 
(6) The revenue rays are based on market prices. Where the tenant 
is effectively forced to market his output to the landlord, the land­
lord is often able to set the price to be paid to his tenant. To the 
extent this price is below the prevailing market price, the landlord re­
ceives an additional differential. Tenants who obtain credit from the 
landlord are often required to pay higher interest charges relative to 
the owner-operator who has land as collateral and, in turn, has access 
to lower-cost, institutional credit. This can be reflected in a higher 
TFC in Figure 3.3 so that, ceteris paribus, the margin between TR and 
TC is lower at the profit-maximizing output. Where tenants are also 
* 
required to provide labor inputs to the landlord, a reduction in r re­
sulting in higher gross and net returns to the tenant; i.e., a relatively 
higher degree of financial independence, may make the tenant more re-
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luetant to supply these labor Inputs. 
If the tenant pays a fixed cash rent rather than a share of the crop, 
the cash rent becomes a fixed cost and is included in the TFC. In this 
situation, still assuming that all costs are borne by the tenant, TR is 
the appropriate revenue ray in Figure 3.3. The tangency of TR, really 
(l.O)TR, and TC will be at point z'" . At this point MC = MR and OQ^ is 
the profit-maximizing output. This point corresponds to point A in 
Figure 3.2. Since the tenant is absorbing all production costs, the 
cost curves in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 will shift downward accordingly, and 
the profit-maximizing output levels will be altered. 
Another factor that needs mentioning is the degree of the landlord's 
involvement in firm operations. Absentee landlords and(or) those con­
cerned only with receiving rent payments have little or no interest in 
maintaining or improving the productivity of land and of complementary 
inputs. The tenant may have neither the financial capacity nor incentive 
to undertake these investments. Such an attitude by the landlord is 
tenable where the population pressure on land is severe and the demand 
for land, even of declining productivity, is high. This attitude is 
reinforced where landlords anticipate eventual public expropriation of 
their lands. Conversely, landlords providing inputs, including manage­
ment inputs, are more directly involved in their tenant's operations. 
But, of course, this involvement may or may not be beneficial. Where 
the landlord's managerial approach is that of innovation and adaptation 
to changing economic conditions, the landlord's and tenant's inputs can 
complement each other, particularly since the primary tenant input is 
family labor. Conversely, where the landlord is tradition-oriented, his 
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involvement would tend to be an inhibiting factor in expanding firm pro­
ductivity. 
Even when costs and returns are not shared in equal proportions, 
share-cropping and communal types of tenure and cultivation have much 
appeal. For the share-cropper, the burden of paying a fixed cash rent, 
especially in poor production years, is avoided. On the other hand, 
the results of favorable growing conditions and(or) better cultivation 
practices must be shared with the landlord even if his only contribution 
to the production process is to provide the land. In contrast to cash-
rent arrangements, landlords may supply some of the credit, implements, 
and draft animals. The landlord may also favor a share-cropping arrange­
ment since it can permit him to be actively involved in the firm opera­
tions and provides him with some control over the tenant's use of the 
land. In addition, share rentals are easily collected, often after the 
crop has been harvested and just threshed, while cash rents are more 
difficult to collect, particularly during poor production years or when 
contingencies arise within the tenant's family. The tenant may simply 
not have the reserves or access to credit for payment of the rent. 
Communal types of tenure may discourage individual initiative. However, 
the system provides a good deal of security to the members, particularly 
when ill health or some other personal misfortune strikes. 
Security of tenure is of principal importance. Even where legisla­
tion or custom prescribes maximum rents or equitable cost-return sharing 
arrangements, such safeguards for the tenant are not operative if his 
lease can be terminated involuntarily at the will of the landlord. The 
converse also holds. A high degree of security but with inequitable 
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tenancy arrangements is not conducive to private incentive and initia­
tive. Too much security, however, need not promote proper land use by 
the tenant, especially if there are few, enforceable penalties for im­
proper cultivation practices. With an insecure tenancy arrangement, 
the tenant is often motivated to maximize present output without con­
sideration of the future productivity of the soil. This example of a 
divergence between private and social costs and benefits can be re­
flected, ceteris paribus, by a downward shift of the MVP curve in 
Figure 3.1 in subsequent production periods. Alternatively, the AVC and 
ATC curves in Figure 3.2 shift upward, ceteris paribus. 
The terms of tenancy affect decisions for private investment on 
the part of the producer. The decision rule, however, is unaffected.^ 
If the prospective investor uses a decision rule approximating in nature 
the present value rule, the following expression is appropriate; 
PV = -(cl) + Z [rR(t) - cE(t)] (1 + p) ^  + rl^(l + P) " (3.1) 
t=o 
Upon quantification, if PV > 0, the investment can be profitably 
undertaken. How might the terms of tenancy affect the decision to in-
2 
vest or not to invest? First, tenure security or insecurity can affect 
two of the variables; (1) With insecurity, n is a point in time in the 
relatively near future. That is, the sum of the discounted net returns 
^See Chapter VI for a discussion of public investment in the agri­
cultural sector. Private investment is discussed in Chapter VIII. 
2 The assumption is made that the R(t) and E(t) are invariant with 
respect to the tenancy arrangement; i.e., these returns and costs are 
the same whether the tenant pays cash rent or has a crop-share arrange­
ment. To the extent the tenant does not have an equitable, secure 
tenancy arrangement, the R(t) and E(t) will be affected by cultivation 
practices and maintenance expenses. 
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must be positive over a relatively short period of time; and (2) With 
p = opportunity cost plus allowance for uncertainty, the uncertainty 
component can be adjusted for exogenous factors including insecurity of 
tenancy. As P is increased, ceteris paribus, the derived PV is reduced. 
Thus, raising p and reducing n to tend to lower the derived PV and, in 
turn, the profitability of undertaking the investment. Second, the 
values assigned to the r and £ coefficients have differential impacts 
on investment profitability. As r is raised and £ lowered, ceteris 
paribus, the PV of the investment is increased. 
Landless laborers 
As the term connotes, these individuals have only their labor ser­
vices to offer to those who have the complementary inputs. As such, 
they rank at or near the bottom of the ladder of economic and social 
stata in the agricultural sectors of most less-developed areas. Ob­
viously, some group must be at the bottom; however, the prospects for 
landless laborers improving their well-being both relatively and ab­
solutely are especially limited. The size of this group together with 
the high rate of population increase complicates the problems of pro­
viding secure, productive employment for these individuals in all sectors 
of the economy. 
The relatively low levels of living associated with landless labor­
ers represent both symptoms and causations of their essentially low 
level, equilibrium position. This consequence is a manifestation of 
poor education, of resource imnobility where alternative employment may 
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be available,^ and of a highly inferior bargaining position vis-a-vis 
landlords and other employers. Also, low levels of living result in 
the inability to accumulate productive resources, poor nutritional 
and health conditions, risk aversion and low aspirational levels—all 
of which perpetuate low resource productivity and, in turn, low per 
capita incomes. 
Because of their precarious economic position, landless laborers 
are extremely vulnerable to adverse economic and personal consequences. 
When unusual or unexpected expenditures are required, for example, 
weddings or illness, a general lack of reserves forces the laborer to 
secure credit usually from a landlord or moneylender. High interest 
rates and a low capacity to repay result in laborers assuming debtor 
status. This further weakens their bargaining position relative to 
their employers and creditors. Since they have essentially no collateral 
and some unpredictability as to sources of income, they are high credit 
r isks. 
In addition to the economic consequences referred to above, the 
social status of landless laborers is extremely low. When status is 
associated with land ownership and not with the manual operations of 
cultivating the soil, the social consequences are quite apparent. Be­
cause of illiteracy and immobility, the social gains accompanying 
education attainment and employment as noncultivators are outside the 
of most landless laborers. Finally, because of all of these 
Mobility is increased through improved conmunications systems as 
evidenced by substantial migrations to urban centers even though gain­
ful employment is not available for many migrants. 
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factors, this group is one of the least politically articulate. Thus, 
"democratic processes", largely directed by the landowners, merchants 
and moneylenders, provide little hope as a means of improving the over­
all well-being of the landless laborers. 
Firm Size and Tenure 
The size of the individual agricultural firm has important implica­
tions for producers' economic and social well-being and for facilitating 
or inhibiting developmental processes. In addition, the terms of tenure 
condition producers' production and investment decisions and, in turn, 
the size of the firm at points in time. Furthermore, producers' atti­
tudes toward income accumulation and investment in the firm must be 
evaluated. Also, the aggregative impact of firm growth on marketed 
supplies and prices received affect the growth potentials of individual 
f irms. 
For this study, firm size is defined as the quantity and quality 
of productive resources under the control of the manager; i.e., the 
decision-maker within the firm. This definition covers the continuum 
of subsistence plots to plantations producing export crops. The land 
base is often used as the indicator of firm size. However, this can 
only be a first approximation since no consideration is given to the in­
tensity with which land is used.^ Intensity of land use is determined 
^Several land reform programs have had limited success, at least 
from a standpoint of economic viability of the firm, because an in­
ordinate amount of emphasis was placed on the nund>er of acres to be 
distributed to individual producers without careful consideration of 
the availability and necessity of complementary resources needed to make 
the new land distribution pattern an economically viable one. 
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by the quantity of nonland inputs which are applied to the land. Finn 
size is affected not only by the quantity of resources, but by resource 
productivity and the organization of resources. First, land and labor 
may have low per unit productivities as a consequence of past produc­
tion practices, use of traditional production techniques, and social 
factors influencing labor productivity. Second, the distribution of 
land, that is, the size and contiguity of land tracts, and the organiza­
tion and intensity of work patterns are organizational factors affecting 
the opportunities for adopting improved technology and the timeliness 
of completing farm operations. Producers* objectives and the exogenous 
effect of government pr ograms are elements which further complicate the 
determination of firm size. 
Firm size must be viewed from both the micro- and macro-viewpoints. 
The former focuses on producers' capability and motivation to alter 
size throughout their planning horizons. At the macro or national 
planning level, firm size represents both a parameter and instrument 
variable for attaining national objectives. The former exists where 
price support programs are implemented with land tenure invariant. Firm 
size may be an instrument variable in a program of agrarian reform 
which incorporates land redistribution and provision for agricultural 
credit, provisions which are designed to Increase agricultural pro­
ductivity. Even when treating firm size as a parameter, the differential 
impact of governmental policies has indirect effects on firm size in 
subsequent periods. 
In addition to the attitudinal considerations of prestige, security, 
and wealth accumulation, firm size determines and is determined by the 
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following economic factors: 
(1) The capability to generate a surplus for saving, a part of 
which is available for private, productive investment where such re­
munerative opportunities exist 
(2) The capacity of the firm to profitably absorb additional 
increments of various forms of capital; 
(3) The choice of production technique where alternative tech­
niques are economically and socially feasible and are available; 
(4) The opportunities for diversifying firm enterprises to in­
crease the flexibility of response to changing conditions and as a 
hedge against adverse economic conditions for individual enterprises; 
and 
(5) The ability to secure access to additional resources, in­
cluding public and private credit and extension services. 
At points in time, firm size is a consequence of evolutionary 
and traditional forces: of a fixed amount of physical land and of land 
reform; of an expanding population and of persistent traditional family 
systems and inheritance rights; and of the availability of inputs and 
techniques to augment resource productivity and of the inadequacy of 
credit institutions to provide necessary financing plus producers' in­
ertia toward change. 
In an attempt to systematize the discussion, the following formula-
2 tion is employed; 
theoretical discussion of imputing the product to the various 
production inputs is given in Chapter IV. 
2 The terms in (3.2) are defined in Chapter II as they apply to 
both subsistence- and market-oriented producers. 
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J = ^  ^ Pj^jJ + ^  ^ F] (q^, ...» q^)^ (3.2) 
Equation 3.2 represents a constrained-revenue maximization formulation 
for the market-oriented producer. For the subsistence producer, it 
may be interpreted as a constrained utility maximization approach where 
the Pj^(i = 1, ..., n) are utility coefficients. 
For short-run dec ision-making, producers are restricted to their 
respective short-run average cost curves (SAC), as in Figure 3.4. 
These are the consequence of past investments in fixed assets,^ current 
technology employed, anticipated input prices, and producers' objectives. 
The SAC curves may be considered as indicators of firm size. In Figure 
3.4, SAC° may represent the initial cost structure for a market-oriented 
Price LRAC 
Quantity 
Figure 3.4. Hypothetical cost curves for the individual firm. 
Included would be investments in land, in the quantity and quality 
of family labor, in draft and mechanical power, and in farm buildings. 
In addition, public investment in social overhead capital facilities 
would affect the shape and position of some producers' SAC curves. 
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producer. Corresponding to SAC° is an equation similar to Equation 3.2 
where only one commodity is represented; i.e., n = 1. Firm size is 
affected by the following factors: 
(1) The functional relationship [f] which incorporates considera­
tion of the quantity and productivity of fixed inputs, including land; 
the physical relationships between the variable and fixed inputs; the 
production techniques employed; and the influence of exogenous factors. 
This functional relationship, along with input prices, represents the 
feasible points on SAC°; 
(2) The magnitude of K°, the working capital constraint. The 
amount of k°, along with Cf] and input prices, determines the feasible 
points on SAC° actually available to the producer; 
(3) The p. (j =1, ..., m) affect the number of q, (j = 1, ..., m) 
^ ® o 
that can be used since ^ p.q. ^  K . The q., in turn, affect the points 
o j=l ^ ^ 
on SAC that can be reached; 
(4) Given SAC°, the output price determines the profit-maximizing 
level of output. At p^ in Figure 3.4, Oq^ is produced, assuming that 
K° is sufficiently large to permit production of Oq2. If the price falls 
to p^, the optimum, planned output level is Oq^^. Although the firm size 
implicit in SAC° has remained Invariant, the actual size in terms of 
output varies with the point at which the output price equals MC°; and 
(5) The producer's objective whether it is to maximize Equation 
3.2 or to pursue some other objective. 
The usual theoretical assumption relative to long-run planning de­
cisions that all factors of production are variable may apply in Individ­
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ual cases but often not in those areas where man/land ratios are high. 
General economic expansion improves opportunities for resource avail­
ability and mobility. The rural-to-urban migration in relatively de­
veloped countries has facilitated the expansion of individual resource 
base, especially land, on the part of those remaining in agriculture. 
In much of the less-developed areas, additional land is available for 
cultivation, but the private costs of developing this land for commercial 
production are prohibitive.^ Further, the nature of rural credit in­
stitutions inhibits the profitability and feasibility of private in­
vestment and expansion of firm size. In Figure 3.4, a movement from 
SAC° to SAC^ as a result of private investment in the firm is in 
increase in the firm size or, more correctly, in the output capacity 
of the firm. In the longer-run, exogenous factors such as technological 
advances, public investment, and government programs of agrarian reform 
have both direct and indirect effects on firm size and on producers' 
motivation and capability for private, productive investment. The im­
pact of such factors varies with individual producers and with points 
in time; that is, with stages of economic development. 
The 1960 world census of agriculture (3.27) provides data relative 
to farm size, expressed as size of land holding, for a few less-developed 
countries. To reiterate, however, farm size in terms of land area is 
only an approximation of firm size. Where traditional production tech­
niques embodying labor as the primary variable input are used, farm 
size is a better indicator of the size of operations than where a large 
^Estimates of the amount of land which is potentially cultivable 
in several developing countries are presented at a later point in this 
chapter. 
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number of nonland inputs, in addition to labor, are used. Quite appar­
ently, farm size in terms of land area has no implication for land pro­
ductivity and, in turn, the producer's capacity to produce for direct 
consumption and for the market. Where environmental conditions are 
favorable for multiple cropping, relatively small land holdings need not 
be associated with low levels of annual production. Furthermore, land 
area per farming unit does not reflect the problems of land fragmenta­
tion and costs incurred in traveling to and from land tracts. Some in­
dividuals are only part-time farmers who have additional sources of 
income. Finally, consumption requirements, as affected by family size, 
need not be associated with size of land holding. Taxes and rents may 
also be so burdensome that even though the land area appears to be ade­
quate, the residual production or income is not sufficient to sustain 
traditional consumption patterns and even less the capacity for saving 
and private investment. All of the above qualifiers must be kept in 
mind when attempting to evaluate the size of land holding as the latter 
affects the producer's capacity to produce and contribute to general 
economic expansion. 
Latin America^ 
"In Latin America the growing manifestations of rural unrest, 
the unsatisfactory growth of agricultural production, the in­
creasing importation of food-stuffs, the malnutrition of the 
majority of the people and the acrimonious debate on agrarian 
reform are proof that the agrarian question has gone beyond 
the realm of academic discussion" (3.4, p. 391). 
This section is, to a large extent, based on Barraclough and 
Domike (3.4). Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala 
aid Beru are the countries included in the study. The authors state 
that since none of these has experienced "... irreversible changes of a 
'revolutionary' type in their land tenure systems, ... their agrarian 
structures as well as their re- (footnote continued on following page) 
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The pattern of land distribution tends toward large, extensively-
cultivated estates at one extreme and a large number of extremely 
small production units at the other. The former, the "latifundia", 
are a few in number but include a major proportion of the total land. 
Conversely, the latter, the 'hninifundia", are numerous but have rela­
tively small amounts of land under their control, both individually and 
collectively. The '\ninifundia" often coexist on the fringes of the 
"latifundia" and also comprise relatively separate communities of small 
landholders 
This concentration of land ownership is the consequence of several 
factors. First, foreign conquest, primarily by the Spanish and Portu­
guese, resulted in large appropriations of land by the conquerors with 
the distribution of large land units to relatively few individuals having 
associated rights of receiving payments and labor services from the 
indigenous inhabitants. The latter, in turn, were given small plots of 
land for their personal cultivation. Later land concessions by the 
2 governments tended to accentuate the ownership pattern. Those in­
dividuals with access to foreign capital were in a favored position to 
purchase land and to add to their estates through time. This trend 
(footnote continued from preceding page) actions to agrarian problems 
can be considered representative of the situation which at present pre­
vails in most of Latin America" (3.4, p. 393). 
^These communities, while physically separate, are for a varying 
extent dependent upon the "latifundia" system for part-time employment, 
market outlets and sources of credit. 
2 In addition to outright concessions for land settlement and de­
velopment, the Peruvian government used land grants as a means of re­
deeming outstanding government bonds (3.7). 
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was reinforced through landowners' credit-lending practices which tended 
to shift the economic power toward them. In other cases, individuals 
appropriated land illegally.^ 
This concentration of landownership is synonymous with economic 
and political power and with social status. Such polarization of power 
sustains a constellation of forces pervading nearly all aspects of rural 
life which tends to perpetuate and to likely make more pronounced the 
2 
economic, political and social inequalities currently existent. Tables 
3.2 and 3.3 lend support to the commonly-held contention of grossly in-
3 
equal patterns of land distribution. 
^Brodsky and Oser (3.7) comment that the Peruvian government's pro­
gram to develop the Amazonian drainage basin in eastern Peru has resulted 
in land grabbers registering claims to ownership for lands which have 
been occupied by Indian families for thousands of years. The Indians, 
however, have had no written and registered titles to the land. While 
this behavior may not be strictly illegal, it emphasizes the disparity 
of political power and access to legal processes which are at least 
indirect functions of economic power. Finally, owners of "latifundia" 
situated in the coastal area and near the headwaters of rivers were able 
to illegally appropriate the irrigation water used by smaller, down­
stream landowners and the latter were effectively forced to sell their 
landholdings (3.7, p. 408). 
2 Barraclough and Domike state, "... traditional class structure 
and income distribution patterns that have brought stagnation to the 
economies and perennial poverty to the 'campesionos' are now repudiated 
by all major political groups. Better living levels, education for all 
and the full participation of 'campesionos' in national society are the 
avowed goals of every Latin American government and of the Alliance 
for Progress" (3.4, p. 394). 
3 The census data in these tables do not reflect land ownership. 
In general, the method of enumeration was as follows: when a large 
establishment was made up of several units operated by different indiv­
iduals, each unit was counted as a holding if the unit was operated as 
a separate technical unit. To the extent that those operating small 
landholdings are also tenants, the power associated with land distribu­
tion patterns is understated. Some comments on the incidence of 
tenancy are made in subsequent subsections of this chapter. 
Table 3.2. Percentage distributions of agricultural holdings and total 
land areas according to size of land holding for specified 
Central and South American countries* 
All sizes of land holdings, 
in hectares 0 < 1 1 < 2 2 < 3 3 < 4 
Costa Rica: 
7o distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
11.6 
0.4 
15. 5 • 7 
0.1 
4 
1 
Panama : 
"U distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
5.2 
0.2 
13.8 
0.9 
11.5 
1.3 
8.4 
1.4 
All sizes of land holdings, 
in hectares : <0.6 .6 < .9 .9 < 1.9 1.9 <3.] L
Dominican Republic : 
% distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
28.2 
1.6 
16.1 
2.2 
20.6 
5.1 
12.2 
5.5 
All sizes of land holdings, 
in hectares ; <0.7 .7 <3.5 3.5<7.0 7.0 <14.0 
Nicaragua: 
% distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
2 . 2  33.2 
1.5 
15.4 
1.9 
13.0 
3.2 
Source; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' 
(3.27). Data for Peru from Brodsky and Oser (3.7, Table 2). 
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4 <5 5 <10 10 < 20 20 < 50 50 < 100 100 <200 200 <500 >500 
<— 20.0 > 14.2 17.7 8.9 3.5 2.1 0.9 
,.l > 5.1 13.3 14.5 11.5 14.9 35.9 
6.9 18.9 15.6 12.6 4.5 1.7 0.7 0.2 
1.5 6.5 10.6 19.6 15.8 11.1 10.5 20.6 
3.1 < 4.7 < 18.9 < 62.9 < 188.7< 
4.7 18.9 62.9 188.7 629 > 629 
8.4 11.0 2.8 0.5 0.2 
6.0 18.1 16.2 10.6 9.9 24.8 
14.0 < 34.9 < 69.9< 139.8< 349.4 < 
34.9 69.9 139.8 349.4 698.7 >698.7 
14.4 10.7 6.1 3.5 0.9 0.6 
8.1 12.4 14.1 17.6 10.7 30.5 
Table 3.2 (continued) 
All sizes of land holdings, 
in hectares 0  < 2  2 < 5 5 < 10 10 < 25 
Argentina: 
7o distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
Colombia: 
% distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
Mexico : 
"L distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
Peru: 
% distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
Uruguay : 
7o distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area^ 
Percent distribution of 
holdings (1950 census) 
Percent distribution of 
area (1950 census) 
22.1  
83.3 
23.2 
0.9 
14.0 
4.2 
6.9 
0.4 
9.7 
1 . 2  
12.5 
5.0^ 
15.0 
0.5 
13.0 
0.5 
16.1, 
1.2' 
16.2 
1 . 1  
The data are for 10 < 20 and 20 < 50 hectare groupings rather than 
those in the table heading. 
^Only holdings greater than 1 hectare were enumerated. Area in­
cludes arable land, pastures, and woodlands. 
'The data are for 5 < 20 and 20 < 100 hectare groupings. 
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25 <50 50 <100 100<200 200<500 5 00<1000 1000 < 2500 2 5 00<5000 >5000 
27.0 
11.0 
<-54.8 
10.9 
4.0 33.4 
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For those countries listed in Table 3.2, excepting Panama, 5 per­
cent or fewer of the landholders control at least 50 percent of the 
land area. In Mexico, for example, 5 percent of the landholders 
control 90.2 percent of the land; in Colombia, 3.5 percent control 66.1 
percent of the total land area and 28.6 percent of the arable land plus 
land in permanent crops. In Peru, 1.3 percent of the holdings account 
for 83.3 percent of the land. At the other end of the landholding 
spectrum, landholders in Mexico having 5 hectares or less of land consti­
tute about 66 percent of the landholders but account for only 0.8 per­
cent of the total land area. Similarly, in Colombia landholders having 
5 hectares or less represent 62.6 percent of all landholders and are 
associated with 4.4 and 17.3 percent of the total land and total arable 
land plus land is less inequitable than the distribution of total land.^ 
In terms of crop production for direct consumption and for marketing, 
arable land is the important category. Where livestock production is 
an important activity, both arable land and pasture acreage are impor­
tant. 
Table 3.3 provides another viewpoint for investigating land distribu­
tion patterns. Farm sizes are delimited according to the capacity to 
provide permanent employment opportunities consistent with earning 
2 
some income level. Land concentration at the extremetles is most pro-
^The data on the distribution of arable land are not given in 
Table 3.2. 
2 Barraclough and Domike (3.4) do not specify or describe the income 
levels implicit in the size groupings. Presumably, the income level is 
sufficient to cover at least the basic needs, including taxes and any 
rent obligations, of the permanent workers plus their dependents. 
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Table 3.3. Relative number and area of farm units by size groups in 
ICAD^ study countries* 
Countries 
Percentage of country total in each size class 
Sub­
family* Family^ 
Multi-family 
medium® 
Multi-family 
large^ 
Total 
Argentina: 
No. of farm 
units 43.2 48.7 7.3 0.8 100.0 
Area in farms 3.4 44.7 15.0 36.9 100.0 
Brazil: 
No. of farm 
units 22.5 39.1 33.7 4.7 100.0 
Area in farms 0.5 6.0 34.0 59.5 100.0 
Chile : 
No. of farm 
units 36.9 40.0 16.2 6.9 100.0 
Area in farms 0.2 7.1 11.4 81.3 100.0 
Colombia: 
No. of farm 
units 64.0 30.2 4.5 1.3 100.0 
Area in farms 4.9 22.3 23.3 49.5 100.0 
Ecuador : 
No. of farm 
units 89.9 8.0 1.7 0.4 100.0 
Area in farms 16.6 19.0 19.3 45.1 100.0 
Guatemala : 
No. of farm 
units 88.4 9.5 2.0 0.1 100.0 
Area in farms 14.3 13.4 31.5 40.8 100.0 
Peru: 
No. of farm 
units 88.0 8.5 2.4 1.1 100.0 
Area in farms 7.4 4.5 5.7 82.4 100.0 
Farms large enough to provide employment for less than two people 
with the typical incomes, markets and levels of technology and capital 
now prevailing in each region. 
^Farms large enough to provide employment for 2 to 3.9 people on the 
assumption that most of the farm work is being carried out by the members 
of the farm family. 
^Farms large enough to provide employment for 4 to 12 people. 
"^Farms large enough to provide employment for over 12 people. 
®Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development. 
Source: Barraclough and Domike (3,4, Tabic I). 
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nounced in Chile, Guatemala, and Peru. Barraclough and Domlke cite 
additional factors which tend to accentuate the inequitable holding 
patterns implicit in the data of Table 3.3: 
(1) With the exception of Colombia, small tenants and share­
croppers were seldom enumerated as farm operators. For census pur­
poses, they were listed as laborers; 
(2) Based on field studies, up to half of the family-sized units 
were actually found to the '^ninifundia"^ because of "disguised under­
employment" on the smaller farms, and 
(3) Large landowners frequently own or control several large pro­
duction units either through family members or business connections. 
The authors also indicate that people living on 'Vninifundia" and land­
less laborers comprise nearly nine-tenths of the farm population in 
Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru and over two-thirds of the rural people in 
all countries studied, except Argentina. 
Although most countries have legislation to promote agrarian reform 
and land redistribution, only Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba have Initiated 
major programs. The trend toward improving the lot of the majority of 
agriculturalists in the other countries is considerably slower. Con­
trary to the substantial Increase in agricultural production In Mexico, 
the "latifundia" - "minlfundla" problem prevails. The problem is be­
coming more serious even in the ejldal system of communal tenure. Ac-
^In the ICAD study, the '\nlnlfundio" are defined as " ... units 
which are too small to provide enough employment to enable a family to 
obtain an income which, by prevailing local standards, is large enough 
to satisfy Its basic needs. The concept of 'sub-family scale farm', 
employed in the present analysis Is substantially equivalent to 
'mlnifundlo'" (3.4, p. 395, footnote 3). 
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cording to Tello (3.25), the initial distribution of land was in parcels 
too small for economic viability. The government's objectives were 
likely a combination of economic and social considerations. Even though 
the minimum size of an individual ejido holding is determined by law^ 
and this minimum has been increased through time, those receiving earliest 
distributions of land now have holdings below the minimum size. Popula­
tion growth and a breaking up of ejido units, though illegal under ex­
isting legislation, have tended to accentuate the problem of small land-
holdings unable to economically support their cultivators. In an at­
tempt to obtain sustenance from these units, intensive cultivation with 
productivity-extracting techniques has reduced land productivity and, in 
turn, the cultivator's capability to produce enough to meet his consump­
tion requirements. In contrast, the relatively large landholders have 
access to productivity-increasing techniques, to adequate marketing out­
lets and are the primary beneficiaries of public policies to stimulate 
agricultural productivity. 
As mentioned earlier, the concentration of land ownership in the 
hands of relatively few individuals generates an inordinate amount of 
economic and political power (3.4, 3.20, 3.25). This power tends to take 
the following forms : 
(1) The resource base, land in particular, is severely constricted 
for the majority of agriculturalists. Juxtaposed with the large and 
rapidly growing rural population, labor productivity and gross returns 
to labor are low and, in turn, per capita incomes rise very slowly, if 
at all; 
^The current minimum size of ejido holding is 10 hectares oJf- irri­
gated land or 20 hectares of non^rrigated, cultivable land (3.25, p. 24). 
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(2) Low per capita incomes, together with the size of the rural 
population relative to farming opportunities, permit landlords to im­
pose tenancy arrangements which primarily benefit them; 
(3) Tenants are often dependent upon or obliged to work for large 
landowners on a part-time basis with little or no compensation being 
paid. Further, tenants are required to market their output at a low 
price and secure credit at relatively high costs from land owners where 
these are terms of the tenancy arrangement, where alternative markets 
do not exist, and where tenants are further exploited because of low 
education levels ; 
(4) The institutional structure is geared to the needs of the 
landowners. Marketing outlets and financing on favorable terms are 
readily available to them. This is further facilitated by their invest­
ment and consequent influence on the operations of some of these in­
stitutions. Landowners frequently ignore the constitutional require­
ment that they provide schools at the centers of work (3.4, 3.7). At 
the same time, education is one of the most effective means of improv­
ing labor mobility and of increasing cultivators* awareness of their 
rights, in contrast to existing situations, and of the means avail­
able for attempting to remedy economic and political inequities; and 
(5) Landowners generally place low priorities on investment in 
agriculture and on their own production units.^ This tends to main-
tain resource imputations and per capita incomes for workers at low 
^In the case of Peru, Whyte and Williams (3.29) note that among 
the coastal haciendas, new technology is rapidly adopted and a strong 
concern for economic efficiency prevails. Workers are paid wages and 
often represented by labor unions. Conversely, hacienda owners in the 
mountainous areas are more concerned with minimizing investments rather 
than maximizing net returns. (Footnote continued on following page) 
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levels. Further, the net outflow of capital, which should be conducive 
to expansion of the nonagricultura1 sector if channelled in the right 
directions, is too often used for unproductive purposes and for invest­
ment in other countries. Consequently, employment opportunities and 
demand expansion associated with industrialization do not materialize 
and underemployment in agriculture and low Internal, effective demand 
continue. 
Abstracting from the social and political ramifications of this 
power configuration, while recognizing that social aspects condition 
producers' attitudes and motivations, the consequences for economic 
efficiency and agricultural output can be qualitatively assessed. To 
the extent that inputs employed are indivisible, particularly machinery 
inputs, large landholders are in a position to realize economies of 
size and lower unit production costs. Conversely, small landholders 
would not have these opportunities. However, since family labor is the 
principal input, fewer indivisibilities need arise. According to 
Table 3.4, "minifundia" consistently show much higher average returns 
per hectare than the "latifundia", both from the standpoint of total 
farmland and area cultivated. This occurs despite the fact that the 
"minifundia" lands are the least suited for agricultural purposes, for 
example, located on hillsides. Conversely, the latifundia are generally 
comprised of the most productive soils and favorably situated relative 
to transportation facilities, marketing outlets and water supplies. 
However, based on the study results, only one-sixth of the land in the 
(footnote contintted from preceding page) As to support their existing 
level of living, and the attendant social and political power, they 
are satisfied. 
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Table 3.4. Relationships between the value of agricultural production, 
agricultural land, cultivated land and the agricultural 
work-fore^ by farm size-class in selected ICÂD study 
countries ^ 
Country and 
size groups 
Percent of total 
in each country 
Agricul-
Agricul- tural Value 
tural work of pro-
land force duction 
Relative value of produc­
tion as percent of that of 
sub-family farms 
Per ha. Fer ha. 
ofagri- of cul- Per agri­
cultural tivated cultural 
land land worker 
Argentina; (1960) 
Sub-family 3 30 12 100 100 100 
Family 46 49 47 30 51 251 
Multi-family medium 15 15 26 51 62 471 
Multi-family large 36 6 15 12 49 622 
Total 100 100 100 30 57 261 
irazil; (1950) 1, 
Sub-family 0^ 11 3 100 100 100 
Family 6 26 18 59 80 291 
Multi-family medium 34 42 43 24 53 422 
Multi-family large 60 21 36 11 42 688 
Total 100 100 100 19 52 408 
Colombia (1960) 
Sub-family 5 58 21 100 100 100 
Family 25 31 45 47 90 418 
Multi-family medium 25 7 19 19 84 753 
Multi-family large 45 4 15 7 80 995 
Total 100 100 100 23 90 281 
Chile; (1955) . 
Sub-family 0 13 
Family 8 28 
Multi-family medium 13 21 
Multi-family large 79 38 
Total 100 100 
4 100 100 100 
16 14 47 165 
23 12 39 309 
57 5 30 437 
100 7 35 292 
Gross value of agricultural production in all countries except 
Argentina where the estimates are of added value. Comparable data are 
not available for Peru. 
Less than one percent. 
* 
Source: Barraclough and Domike (3.4, Table III). 
106 
Table 3.4 (continued) 
Percent of total 
in each country 
Agricul-
Agricul- tural Value 
Country and tural work of pro-
size groups land force duction 
Relative value of produc­
tion as percent of that of 
sub-family farms 
Per ha. Per ha. 
of agri- of cul- Per agri­
cultural tivated cultural 
land land worker 
Ecuador; (1954)^ 
Sub-family 20 - 26 100 100 -
Family 19 - 33 130 179 -
Multi-family medium 19 - 22 87 153 -
Multi-family large 42 - 19 35 126 -
Total 100 - 100 77 135 -
Guatemala:(1950) 
Sub-family 15 68 30 100 100 100 
Family 13 13 13 56 80 220 
Multi-family medium 32 12 36 54 122 670 
Multi-family large 40 7 21 25 83 706 
Total 100 100 100 48 99 224 
^Ihe dashes (-) indicate that no data are available. 
"latifundia" of the seven countries studied is or has been under 
cultivation (3.4). The rest remains in native vegetation. These 
factors, by themselves, suggest a great potential for expanding physical 
output through a redistribution of some of the land resources. If the 
quantity and productivity of nonland inputs were increased, agricul­
tural output could be further augmented. 
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Producers living in 'Viinifundia" communities, even when not 
directly dependent upon large landowners, are dependent upon the land­
owner's counterparts living in nearby towns. These are the people 
who determine the prices producers pay and receive, determine the 
cost and availability of credit and production inputs, and essentially 
control the institutional structure within which producers operate. 
This control over the educational, health, and resource allocation 
systems; i.e., the routes through which subsistence producers can 
conceivably improve their relative position, tends to perpetuate that 
status quo favored by those in power positions at the expense of 
producers. 
Fragmentation of holdings The information on the degree of 
fragmentation among producing units is fragmentary. However, the 1960 
world census of agriculture provides some insights. For Columbia, 
the average number of parcels per holding ranges from 1.0 to 1.6 for 
the various sizes of holdings. In the Dominican Republic, nearly 99 
percent of all holdings consisted of a single, contiguous unit of land. 
In Panama, nearly 60 percent of all holdings are single units while 35 
percent are comprised of 2-3 parcels of land. The average number of 
units of land per holding varies from 1.2 to 2.9 with fragmentation 
generally increasing with the size of holding. Finally, in Costa Rica 
63 percent of the holdings are represented by single parcels of land; 
nearly 30 percent consist of 2-3 parcels. Fragmentation is most 
prevalent in the 4 to 50 hectare size groupings. The distribution of 
size holdings according to degree of fragmentation is skewed towards 
the smaller producing units. 
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Tenancy systems The terms of the tenancy arrangement affect the 
potential for growth within the existing institutional framework and 
with structural change. The following quote perhaps places in per­
spective the general nature of current tenancy systems: 
"Wage and rental agreements can be adjusted to suit the land­
owner's convenience so that all productivity increases and wind­
fall gains accrue to him. Permanent improvements such as build­
ings or fruit trees belong to the estate even when all costs 
are borne by the tenant. On many large plantations residents 
are strictly forbidden to make improvements without permission 
for fear they would acquire vested interests in the land or 
take resources away from the production of the cash plantation 
crop. Residents of the large estates can be expelled at will 
in traditional areas where there is neither a strong central 
government nor a labor union to defend them . . . Tenants and 
workers depend on the 'patron' for credit, for marketing their 
products and even for medical aid in emergencies. Food and 
clothing are frequently obtained through the estate's commissary 
and charged against wages or crops" (3.4, p. 399). 
According to a 1957 study by the International Labor Office (3.13), only 
three countries, Argentina, Cuba, and Uruguay, had legislation requir­
ing a formal contract guaranteeing a minimum degree of tenurial securi-
2 ty for tenant farmers. Legislation in the remaining countries tends 
to be vague or ineffective and, in turn, the relative bargaining power 
is on the side of the landlord. Furthermore, the tenant has little legal 
recourse, assuming he has the financial capacity to initiate legal pro-
^Also see Adams (3.2, pp. 49-50) for a related discussion of tenancy 
arrangements in Colombia. 
2 The study briefly reviews individual country legislation prior to 
1957 covering tenurial regulations such as tenurial security, compensa­
tion for land improvements, payment for land use, and settlement of 
tenure disputes. Relatively little analysis of the degree to which 
this legislation Is effectively Implemented and the Impact on actual 
tenancy systems is provided. 
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ceedings. Tenure systems based on custom tend to be for short periods 
of time, ranging from a single cropping period to a few years (3.2, 3.4, 
3.13). The tenant is often given a small parcel of land for his own 
cultivation. In turn, he is obligated to work for the landlord for a 
low salary, if any, or to "market" his production to the latter at a 
relatively low price. The general lack of written contracts makes 
most arrangements tenuous. As noted before, such insecurity has ad­
verse consequences for private, productive investment and for use of 
nonexploiting cultivation practices. The relatively low returns to 
family labor, even prior to rent payments, provide few opportunities 
for the majority of tenants to Improve their economic position, ab­
solutely or relatively. 
Landless laborers and "squatters" are in even more vulnerable 
positions. The former have no home base, no matter how small. The 
latter have little, if any, legal status to the land they occupy and 
2 
cultivate. Table 3.5 gives the distribution of holdings and land area 
3 by class of tenure for countries for which data are available. In 
^See Whyte and Williams (3.29, pp. 8-18) for a discussion of the 
costs and problems associated with legal proceedings for establishing 
rights to land in Peru. 
2 Barraclough and Domike (3.4) note that almost all land is owned 
and when new areas are opened to cultivation for previous landless 
laborers, owners often reclaim the land after it has been cleared and 
has acquired commercial value. The person clearing the land becomes a 
member of a new "latifundia" system or moves on to another uncleared 
area. "The temporary right to the use of land in exchange for clearing 
it is an established custom. Many compesinos spend their whole lives 
clearing small areas of bush or jungle, obtaining only a passing bene­
fit because they have no permanent rights to the land" (3.4, p. 408). 
3 The percentage distribution of land by size of holding with each 
class of tenure Is not available. 
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Table 3.5. Percentage distribution of number of holdings and(or) land 
area, by class of tenure, and landless laborers as a percent 
of total economic units in agriculture for selected Latin 
American countries 
Para- Time ^ ^ Landless 
meter period Owners Tenant Squatters Other laborers 
Argent ina; , 
"L holdings 1947 36.8 33.4 — 29.8 . 
% area® 1960 58.9 16.9 24.2 3 5 . 0  
Brazil ; 
% holdings 
7o area 
7o holdings^ 
7o area® 
 — 
1950 80.8 9.1 10.1 
1950 90.1 5.6 4.3 - -
1950 81.1 3.6 15.3 
1950 89.7 0.7 - - 9.6 
1960 76.3 4.0 2.5 17.2 
1960 86.6 0.6 1.3 11.4 
% holdings -- 59.8 
7o area^ 
Costa Rica: , 
,f 
^In Brazil and Guatemala this category Includes estate managers. 
^Includes tenants under cash, share, and services-supplied arrange­
ments and combinations of these. 
^Includes mixed systems of tenure. In Costa Rica, squatters are 
Included. 
'^Source; International Labor Office (3.13, Table I.). Area re­
presents area under cultivation. 
^Source : Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(3.27). Area represents total land area in holdings. 
^Source: Barraclough and Domlke (3.4, Table II.). 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Para- Time ^ ^ Landless 
meter period Owners Tenant Squatters Other laborers 
Colombia: 
% holdings^ 
% area® 
1960 
1960 
62.4 
72.4 
23.3. 
7.3^ 
3.9 
12.1 
10.3 
8.2 
23.2^ 
Guatemala ; , 
7o holdings 
7o area 
1950 
1950 
48.3 
74.5 
16.4 
2.8 
3.9 
1,2 
31.4 
21.5 
24.8^ 
Mexico: 
7o holdings® 
7o area® 
1960 
1960 
94.5 
57.3 
2.5 
4.4 
- 3.0 
38.2 
(1.4)3 
(26.3)8 
Nicaragua : 
7o holdings 
7o area® 
1960 
1960 
46.0 
69.2 
12.6 
2.6 
15.7 
19.2 
25.7 
9.0 
Panama : , 
7o holdings 
7o area 
1950 
1950 
14.1 
38.9 
9.3 
7.4 
67.3 
39.7 
9.3 
14.0 
% holdings® 
7o area® 
1960 
1960 
24.6 
37.1 
6.0. 
2.4^ 
50.4 
29.5 
19.0 
31.0 
Uruguay : , 
% holdings 
7o area* 
1951 
1951 
50.2 
40.3 
34.7 
33.0 
3.1 
0.6 
11.4 
26.1 
7o holdings® 
7o area® 
1960 
1960 
49.9 
44.5 
33.3. 
28.8 
- 16.8 
26.7 
Venezuela: ^ 
7o holdings 1950 41.3 20.6 35.8 2.3 
^Holdings operated under ejidal form of tenure. 
Sjhen total area is classed according to tenure, 8.9 percent of 
the land in Columbia, 1.6 percent in Costa Rica, 5.0 percent in Panama, 
and 40.5 percent in Uruguay is operated under tenancy arrangements. 
That is, the area included under the "Other" category includes both 
owned and rented land. 
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addition, the percentage magnitudes of landless laborers are given for 
a few countries.^ The importance of class of tenure varies with 
countries. With the exception of Panama, holdings enumerated as being 
operated by "owners" is the most important class, both in terms of 
number of holdings and land area. Tenancy is highest in Uruguay and 
Argentina where this tenurial class accounts for about one-third of the 
agricultural units. The importance of "squatters" is most pronounced 
2 in Panama, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This tenure class is most exposed 
to change and to the continued favor of their "patron" whether he be an 
individual owner or the State. Of course, the group in the most pre­
carious position among all economic units in the agricultural sector is 
the landless laborers. Landless laborers have little bargaining with 
their employers. What power exists is diluted by high population growth 
rates in rural areas, by evolutionary forces which tend to accentuate 
the concentration of land holdings, and by the limited availability of 
nonagricultural employment opportunities which tends to minimize labor 
mobility in response to economic opportunities. Out-migrâtion to rela­
tively urban areas is strong even though gainful employment is not avail­
able for many migrants. The implications for social and political stabil­
ity are quite apparent. The figures are extremely high for Brazil and 
Chile where nearly 50 percent of the agricultural families are classified 
as being headed by landless farm workers. 
^The comparable figures for Chile and Ecuador are 47.6 and 34.5 per­
cent, respectively, as of 1950 for Chile and 1960 for Ecuador (3.4). 
2 The area operated by squatters includes those areas the holder 
(squatter) operates without a legal title but which are owned by private 
persons or the state. Occupancy occurs without consent of the owner even 
though it may sometimes be tolerated by him. 
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For the three countries for which 1960 census data can be loosely 
compared to the 1950 figures, only in Panama has the tenurial situation 
improved in the sense that the classes of "owners" and "other" have 
gained relative to "tenants" and "squatters". In Costa Rica the per­
cent of holdings and area associated with "owners" declined slightly. 
In Uruguay, the distribution by tenancy was essentially unchanged with 
the exception that no "squatters" were reported in the 1950 census. 
Finally, landlord absenteeism often results in poor management 
practices (3.2). However, if these landlords are not familiar with nor 
have a strong interest in agricultural operations, the managerial func­
tions can best be exercised by others. Thus, the combination of absentee 
landlords and competent, trusted managers should, ceteris paribus, be 
beneficial to agricultural growth. This presupposes that the landlord's 
objective is that of increasing the net monetary returns from his pro­
duction units; this is a question of fact. 
Africa 
In addition to plantations producing export crops and relatively 
small subsistence- and market-orientated freehold units found through­
out less-developed areas, a comnunal or tribal form of agrarian structure 
whose members engage in shifting cultivation is indigenous to many parts 
of Africa.^ Shifting cultivation is an outgrowth of both tribal co-
hesiveness and of economic necessity. The latter is largely the conse­
quence of tropical climatic conditions on soil productivity. Shifting 
^Only fragmentary information from the 1960 world census of agri­
culture is available. Tribal or comnunal forms of tenure account for 
35 percent of the land in Libya, 35 percent in South West Africa, and 13 
percent in South Africa. La Anyane (3.18) discusses the widespread in­
cidence of communal ownership in countries of Western Africa. 
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cultivation practices result in the "bush"^ protecting the soil from the 
tropical heat, eventually restoring and preserving its capacity to 
yield crops and lessening soil and mineral erosion. 
The implications of this tenure structure for resource use and pro­
ductivity are several in nature. In general, the following would be 
included : 
(1) A large amount of land is necessary to sustain traditional 
cropping practices. Restoration of soil fertility may require that the 
2 fallow land remain idle for thirty years or more (3.15). Where demo­
graphic pressure emerges and rights cannot be secured to additional land, 
a combination of reducing the length of the cropping cycle, partial mem­
ber emigration or modification of traditional production techniques are 
necessary (3.6, 3.18). Emigration results in the severence of tribal 
ties while accelerated cropping under traditional techniques facilitates 
soil erosion and subsequent loss of fertility; 
(2) The concentration of property rights In the hands of the tribal 
chief or a governing unit affects the pattern of land distribution for 
cultivation and, in turn, cultivators* attitudes toward cultivation 
practices and private investment in the production unit. Externalities 
arise \diere cultivators are not able to realize all the benefits from 
permanent improvements, planting tree cash crops, or superior production 
^The "bush" Is the natural vegetation that covers the soil after 
cultivation has been stopped due to decline in soil productivity. In 
addition to reducing the danger of erosion, the vegetative growth which 
is subsequently cut and burned provides the "fertilizer" for the sub­
sequent cropping period. 
2 
In Western Africa, sufficient vegetative growth takes place so 
that cultivation can be resumed after a fallow period of three to seven 
years (3.18). 
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techniques since a portion of the land currently assigned to him may be 
reassigned to another member in subsequent production periods. That 
is, land assignments are often based on the producers' need and their 
socio-political position in the community. Thus, to the extent that 
individual cultivators exhibit the capacity to generate a "surplus" 
relative to their needs and the needs of others, their land base may 
be reduced to bring about a more egalitarian economic structure; 
(3) The group-focused emphasis on economic equality, at least 
equality among the majority of the tribal members, results in land dis­
tribution patterns emphasizing individual land assignments of nearly 
equal quality with little attention given to the size of individual 
tracts of land or to the spatial distribution of this land. For ex­
ample, if the communal property includes a hillside, an alluvial plain, 
and a grazing area and if there are n producers each having equal rights 
to the land area, the three classes of relatively, individually homo­
geneous land would each be divided into n tracts. Therefore, if the land 
is qualitatively heterogenus, producers likely operate with a large 
number of small, noncontiguous tracts of land. Even after allowing 
for the "insurance" aspect of land dispersion, the implications for 
labor efficiency and production control are apparent; 
(4) The tribal chief or governing unit usually has the authority 
to prescribe the production techniques to be employed and to evaluate 
producers' compliance with these policy prescriptions.^ Producers' 
^Among indigenous peoples in Sierra Leone, a vertical structure of 
land management results in a centralization of powers which largely de­
termines the distribution of land, farming practices, and even the 
timing for completing farm operations (3.18). Also, in the Congo, 
traditional tenure arrangements (footnote continued on following page) 
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continuing rights of cultivation and Inheritance are conditioned by 
their demonstration of using the "proper" cultivation methods. Although 
the insecurity aspect implicit in this system is a conditioning factor, 
the dictation of production techniques appears to be of real signifi­
cance especially in terms of the prescriber's competence and receptive-
ness to altering traditional production methods when superior alterna­
tives may be made available; 
(5) The mobility associated with this semi-nomadic way of life 
coupled with the constriction of internal markets and relative isola­
tion from other sectors of the econony interact to essentially pre­
clude the inflow of private capital. In addition, the zero price of 
land and the absence of a land market tend to maintain productivity at 
the subsistence level and to reinforce the perpetuation of this semi-
nomadism; and 
(6) Government investment in social overhead capital facilities 
and implementation of government programs, such as providing extension 
services, are hampered by the mobility and traditionalism which char­
acterizes communities engaged in shifting cultivation.^ 
Population growth relative to a fixed supply of cultivable or 
potentially cultivable land has reduced the incidence of shifting 
(footnote continued from preceding page) are characterized by communal 
ownership of the land with the elder or headman responsible for admin­
istering land use and granting rights of usufruct to the members. 
Ownership remains with the members but they are required to pay taxes 
and occasionally provide labor services to the headman or chief (3.18). 
^La Ânyane (3.18) comments that while shifting cultivation is com­
mon in all parts of West Africa, the cultivator considers himself to be 
as settled as his counterpart who engages in sedentary cultivation. 
Many shifting cultivators do not change their residences as they move 
from one tract of land to another. 
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cultivation. Also, the spread of cultivation of cash and permanent 
crops, largely due to an increased demand for Income as additional con­
sumer goods become available, has increased the trend toward rewarding 
private initiative and the demand for private ownership of land to 
ensure that cultivators receive the gains. Furthermore, land titles 
are usually needed to obtain the institutional credit necessary for 
growing these crops. The relatively recent emergency of land scarcity 
is cited in the following: 
"In many parts of Africa, the question of land scarcity is a very 
acute and difficult one. It is tied up with a great many fac­
tors; demographic, technological, ecological, economic and social; 
it is also linked with the alienation of lands in favour of stran­
gers and with the organized displacement or migration of groups. 
The fundamental problems involved seem to be the adequate re­
distribution of the population and the transformation of agri­
cultural methods. ... In many cases, scarcity of land or the 
feeling of such scarcity are due to extensive agricultural methods, 
to particular values attached to the land, to the great poverty 
of the soils and to the general level of economic development" 
(3.6, p. 58). 
Problems arise, however, in the involuntary redistribution of the popu­
lation. The economic potential of colonization schemes in previously 
unsettled areas Is one inhibiting factor. A historic gravitation to­
wards settlement on the most productive lands results in population re­
distribution taking place on less-productive lands. However, the human 
factor and social considerations appear to be the determining factors 
affecting the success of population redistributions. The nature of 
these factors as affecting resettlement programs is summarized as 
follows : 
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" . . .  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n c e  t h e  h u m a n  f a c t o r s  i n v o l v e d — s u c h  a s  
feelings of Insecurity and frustration, attachment to the an­
cestral land, unadaptability of immigrants to the new social 
environment, structure of the family and lineage groupings, 
principles of inheritance, etc.—had been underestimated or were 
thought to be easily malleable" (3.6, p. 63). 
In addition, population relocation has often been looked on by those 
involved with suspicion because of the belief that there were and are 
pre-existing rights in these lands ; and consequently, their claims to 
ownership and cultivation rights are dubious (3.5, 3.6).^ 
The consequent stationarity associated with continued population 
growth and gradual disappearance of shifting cultivation presents both 
opportunities for agricultural growth and problems of structural ad­
justment. Social interactions can continue to operate within the 
tribal organization with the tribal or communal tenurial arrangements 
persisting. The principal problem which arises, however, is that the 
traditional cultivation practices are not appropriate to sedentary farm-
2 ing. To the extent that soil productivity is rapidly reduced by 
continuous cultivation coupled with tropical climatic conditions, fer­
tilizer applications and alternative cultivation procedures are neces­
sary. This, in turn, necessitates the application of additional working 
capital and new managerial techniques on the part of cultivators, both 
^Bascom (3.5) makes the following undocumented comment: "For ex­
ample, one French anthropologist working in French West Africa empha­
sized in his writings that there was no acre of land in Africa which 
was not owned by someone, no palm tree which was not the private proper­
ty of some person. Africa is not a vacuum which can be occupied and 
developed" (3.5, p. 240). 
2 In the Congo, traditional practices were maintained with settled 
farming, at least for a period of time. "The paysannat was a system 
of farming under which farmers were settled along a road on plots laid 
out adjacent to one another in strips perpendicular to the road. These 
strips were subdivided into (footnote continued on following page) 
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being in relatively short supply. However, these phenomena also repre­
sent opportunities for some governing entity to offer programs of 
assistance to stimulate and direct agricultural growth. 
The attributes of communal cooperation and assistance associated 
with tribal organizations provide a potential foundation for establish­
ing multi-purpose cooperative structures (3.12, 3.22). Cooperatives 
appear to have been successful in the selling, grading, storing and 
simple processing of members' output. However, evidence pointing to the 
success of cooperative farms; i.e., farms where the land is farmed 
collectively and the output shared, is not available (3.15). 
Even with additional land available for cultivation (3.19, 3.30) 
and distribution to tribal groups to offset the pressure of an expanding 
population, the continuance, and implied encouragement, of shifting 
cultivation is not coterminous with increased agricultural productivity 
as a precondition to general economic expansion. The likely consequence 
is that of a greater number of rural people continuing to live at a low 
equilibrium level of subsistence. 
Increased resource productivity is an outgrowth of a change in pro­
duction techniques, private investment in the production unit, and pro-
(footnote continued from preceding page) fifteen or twenty sections. 
The farmers were to practice a kind of rolling rotation, moving down the 
strips with particular crops . . . leaving the sections behind in bush 
fallow. As various sections would be growing identical crops at the 
same time, it was possible to experiment with mechanical cultivation 
or harvesting going across the strips at right angles . . . the schemes 
collapsed due to the chaos that accompanied independence in 1960" (3.6, 
p. 112). 
^In a few cases, due to exogenous forces, people had to establish 
permanent farming even though the soil was not amenable to permanent 
cultivation with traditional practices. The people had to invent a 
system of permanent agriculture to survive, and they were successful 
(3.6). 
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ducer motivations geared to participating in an exchange economy. But 
the emergence of these preconditions is related to the anticipation or 
guarantee of use and occupancy rights on a continuing basis or of 
compensation for private investment from which all of the benefits have 
not been realized by the producer at the termination of his cultivation 
rights. This establishment and guarantee of rights appear to severely 
restrict agricultural growth and development. 
The adjudication of rights in land is costly and controversial. 
Surveying and judicial fees are obstacles. But as pointed out earlier, 
Africans attach strong significance to particular lands, especially 
those associated with ancestoral occupancy. This, coupled with the 
contention that pre-existing rights are claimed to essentially all 
land, demonstrates the complexity of apportioning land with secure rights. 
Another manifestation of the problems associated with the tradi­
tional tribal rights in land is the absence of a land market. Histori­
cally, tribal lands have had no scarcity or monetary value. The abun­
dance of land relative to undifferentiated cultivation practices for 
subsistence consumption requirements resulted in the land having no 
market or exchange value. Some writers have asserted that the absence 
of a land market and consequent exchange value have perpetuated the 
continuance of low resource productivity and general lack of a market­
able surplus (3.1, 3.30). Before a land market can be established, un­
ambiguous rights to units of land must be established. The assertion 
that land values will have a stimulating effect on resource productivity 
and marketable surpluses is based on the premise that the newly-created 
opportunity cost for land will cause producers to alter cultivation 
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and investment practices. Previously, no cost was incurred with soil 
depletion. Now, such practices would reduce the capitalized value of 
the land. Thus, a mechanism would exist for rewarding superior man­
agerial ability and saving leading to investment in the production unit. 
The operation of a land market following distribution of titles to land 
may generate a trend towards monopolization of land holdings by the 
relatively few individuals who have the financial means to purchase large 
tracts of land (3.10), If the small cultivator is to purchase his land, 
provision for long-term agricultural credit must also be made. 
In addition to the effect of tenure rights on agricultural pro­
ductivity, the migratory labor system associated with stationary com­
munal and freehold farming has positive and negative impacts on agri­
cultural production. From a positive standpoint, migrant workers 
accumulate savings for potential productive investment upon return to 
their home community. In addition, for those employed on nontraditlonal, 
market-oriented operations, they acquire skills and insights which can 
be applied to their own operations. The acquisition of managerial 
skills or observation of its workings is extremely important in light 
of the scarcity of this attribute among traditional producers. Finally, 
the migration to areas of higher levels of living and the observation 
of or increased participation in the exchange economy should conceiv­
ably have a positive impact on producers' motivations toward generating 
an agricultural surplus for Investment or exchange. Some negative re­
percussions are also present, however. The emigration of males leaves 
the cultivation decisions and operations to wcanen and children. Heavy-
labor operations such as land clearing would likely be reduced. In 
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addition, a traditional ban on women handling cattle, which would in­
clude draft animals, has had adverse consequences for completion of farm 
operations and diversification of enterprises (3.15). This taboo is 
gradually being relaxed, however. Further, the relative conservatism of 
the women together with their limited participation in the exchange 
economy may adversely affect their motivations and receptiveness to 
technical change (3.30). 
Firms of all sizes coexist. As indicated earlier, firm size within 
the communal structure is a function of the producer's need and his 
status in the tribal organization. Among the freehold units, the firm 
size in terms of area under cultivation is largely restricted by labor 
requirements for one or two crucial operations. This constraint is often 
in the form of labor available for the weeding of crops, an operation 
which must be completed within a relatively short period of time (3.3, 
3.19).^ Labor requirements for harvesting is also a limiting factor. 
In addition, firm size is further constrained by the extent to which 
the males participate in other employment and in tribal or local govern­
ment affairs. As noted before, under communal or tribal systems little 
flexibility in farm sizes, especially in response to personal initia­
tive, is evident. Again, firm sizes do not reflect problems of frag­
mentation, security of tenure, and access to agricultural credit neces­
sary for developing the land. Neither do they represent land pro­
ductivity and the economic capacity for supporting the cultivator. 
^In the Niger Development Scheme, households were given twenty-
four acres to farm. Because of the short weeding period, land units 
of this magnitude required the labor input of ten men. This exceeded 
the labor available from the household (3.19). 
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Data from the 1960 world census of agriculture on the distribu­
tion of land area by size of holding are given in Table 3.6. Little in­
formation is available on the degree of fragmentation. Both Godart 
(3.10) and La Anyane (3.18) state that the fragmentation of landholdings 
represents a serious obstacle to altering production techniques and 
improving agricultural productivity in several West African countries. 
Fragmentation is accelerated by traditional inheritance patterns. 
Population pressure coupled with family immobility and restricted 
growth of nonagricultural employment opportunities results in small in­
dividual land bases and increased fragmentation of holdings. Con­
comitantly, land holdings by nonAfricans are often extensively cultivated 
and partially unutilized (3.28, 3.30). Thus, the configuration of 
rights in land and the consequent distribution of land-use patterns tend 
to be inimical to general, sustained agricultural expansion. 
As ia 
To attempt a discussion of firm size and land tenure systems for 
a continent of immense heterogeneity such as Asia is pretentious. The 
problems and opportunities affecting landholding systems vary from 
countries of the Near East where water availability is the principal 
limiting factor to India and Pakistan where large rural populations 
characterized by high population growth rates press against a cultiv­
able area with relatively few opportunities for expansion to parts of 
Southeast Asia where man/land ratios are not high, excepting Japan 
and Java, and land availability and climatic conditions are conducive 
to expanding the cultivated area and restructuring the landholding systems 
if favorable economic and political conditions prevail. Many of the 
Table 3.6. Percentage distributions of agricultural holdings and total 
land area according to size of land holding for specified 
African countries* 
All sizes of land holdings, 
in hectares 
0 - 1  
Holdings 
without land <.5 .5 <1.0 1^2 2-3 
Libya: 
% distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
Mali: 
% distribution of holdings 
7c distribution of area 
Southwest Africa ; 
7o distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
4.2 4.2 3.5 
0 .1  
14.3 
1 .8  
6.4 
0.3 
18.3 
6 . 2  
0 . 1  
5.7 
0.4 
18.6 
10.6 
^Non-Bantu holdings including pasture, land under permanent crops, 
and forest land. 
Source; Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(3.27). 
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3- 4 4 - 5 5 -10 10 -2 0 20 - 50 50-100 100 - 200 200-500 500-1000 >1000 
5.4 
0.6 
12.5 
9.8 
0.2 
4.0 
0.6 
9.1 
9.4 
15.4 
3.9 
18.6 
29.3 
1.0  
18.6 
9.2 
6.8  
20.8 
20.1 
21.7 
6.9 3.4 <~2.2 
16.4 15.4 <-30.8 
• 1.8 
12.1 
0.5 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 94.0 
0.1 99.9 
Table 3.6 (continued) 
All sizes of land holdings. 4.3 8.6 17.1 
in hectares < 4.3 < 8.6 < 17.1 <42.8 
South Africa: 
% distribution of holdings 4.6 5.4 5.7 7.9 
% distribution of area 0.1 0.2 
All sizes of land holdings, 10.1 20.6 40.9 101.6 
in hectares <20.6 <40.9 <101.6 < 202.7 
Northern Rhodesia ; 
% distribution of holdings 7.4 5.3 7.1 8.9 
7o distribution of area 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.1 
Southern Rhodesia^: 
% distribution of holdings 2.4 4.7 8.0 6.5 
% distribution of area 0.1 0.3 0.5 
European holdings only. 
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42.8 85.7 171.3 428.3 856.7 
<85.7 <171.3 < 428.3 <«56.7 <2142 >2142 
5.6 8.1 20.4 16.4 15.0 10,9 
0.4 1.0 6.0 10.2 20.6 61.5 
202.7 405.1 1012 
< 405.1 < 1012 < 2024 > 2024 
11.0 21.1 25.2 14.0 
3.0 12.6 31.3 51.3 
8.1 26.1 24.4 19.8 
1.3 9.3 17. 2 71.3 
129 
problems afflicting agriculturalists in Latin America are also operative 
here: the patterns of land distribution so that relatively few people 
control substantial land areas, terms of tenancy inhibiting tenants* 
capacity to improve their absolute and relative economic position, the 
generally inferior bargaining position of tenants and small owner-
operators when securing credit and marketing their produce, and insuf­
ficient growth in the nonagricultural sectors to provide alternative em­
ployment opportunities and to increase resource mobility throughout the 
economy. In addition, fragmentation of production units is an important 
factor affecting choice of production technique and the capacity for in­
creasing output levels. In the absence of improved technology, suc­
cessive fragmentation tends to force producers to secure financial 
assistance from moneylenders and larger, owner-operator cultivators in 
order to meet their consumption and production expenditures.^ The 
onerous terms of credit reduce the debtor's capacity for removing his 
indebtedness. Particularly during poor production seasons and(or) un­
anticipated family expenditures, the debtor may be forced to sell his 
assets or have the creditor assume ownership rights with the previous 
owner now becoming a tenant. Alternatively, the debtor may rent his 
land to a share-cropper while the former supplements his income through 
off-farm work. The power of the creditors tends to further concentrate 
land ownership in their favor and(or) increase the incidence of tenancy 
and the usually unfavorable consequences attendant to this tenure 
arrangement. 
^For example, Myrdal (3.23) comments that while income-generating 
potential is reduced through fragmentation, individuals do not adjust 
downward their customary levels of expenditures for social events and 
ceremonial functions. External financial assistance is one alternative. 
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While land ownership accords economic power and social prestige, 
as in most parts of the world, additional social status accrues to those 
who are not directly involved in the operation of their land, either in 
terms of supplying management inputs or making private investment in 
their land holdings.^ The landowner is often content with the rents 
being received and has little inducement to increase land productivity 
2 through investment (3.14, 3.16, 3.17, 3.23) His negative attitude to­
ward involvement in agricultural operations, even in a supervisory 
3 
capacity, motivates him to rent his land to tenants. The combination 
of the tenant having neither the incentive or capacity to improve land 
productivity and the landowner's attitude toward such private investment 
interact to inhibit agricultural growth. The problem is exacerbated when 
land productivity is not maintained but diminishes through improper 
cultivation practices. 
^According to Myrdal, in rural South Asia, "To own land is the 
highest mark of social esteem; to perform manual labor, the lowest. Con­
siderable social status is attached to supervisory work, but the prestige 
enjoyed by people who abstain from work altogether is greater . . . 
Small peasants also own land, but the fact that they do much of their 
own work debars them from the high social status enjoyed by other land­
owners" (3.23, p. 1057). A similar attitude is noted by M. H. Sufi, 
"Conditions of Farming in Pakistan" in Parsons, al. (3.24, pp. 123-
125). Also see Klat (3.17, pp. 50-1). 
2 Klat (3.17) adds that most of the large landholdings belong to a 
family or group of families rather than to one individual. The owners, 
often numerous and each with small, individual claims, find little 
mutual interest in developing the land. Only a minority of enterprising 
landlords have developed their estates. 
3 Dutta (3.8) takes at least a partially contrary position by stating 
that with the exception of absentee landlords and small landowners, 
landlords in India usually share the costs of farming and take an 
active interest in decision-making and managing their lands. 
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The distribution of land by size of holdings is given in Tables 
3.7 and 3.8. The concentration of a large proportion of the land in 
the hands of relatively few land owners is not as pronounced as in 
Latin America. The exceptions are Iraq where less than 3.5 percent of 
the landholders control slightly over 70 percent of the total land and 
in India where slightly less than 7 percent of the landholders are 
associated with about 45 percent of the total area. Nearly all 
countries for which data are available are characterized by a large 
proportion of landholders operating relatively small units of land 
where the aggregate area of these small units accounts for a rela­
tively small proportion of the total land area. As noted previously, 
land area, per se, is only an approximation of firm size and of the 
capacity to generate output. In Southeast Asia where climatic factors 
are favorable for multiple cropping, relatively small landholdings are 
often associated with comparatively large annual output levels. About 
9 percent of the agricultural holdings in Pakistan and Turkey and nearly 
12 percent in India are without land or with an extremely small land 
base. About 4 percent of the holdings in Taiwan are in a similar situa­
tion. For nearly all countries, the percentage distribution of arable 
land plus land in permanent crop closely approximates the percentage 
distribution of total land area. 
Fragmentation of holdings The degree of fragmentation varies 
among countries. In India, the average size of agricultural holding 
was found to be about 6.5 acres and on the average, each holding was 
Table 3.7. Percentage distributions of agricultural holdings and total 
land area according to size of landholding for specified 
Asian countries* 
Size of land holdings, 
in hectares 
Holdings ^ 
without land" .01 < .5 .5 < 1.0 
Iraq: 
7o distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
% distribution of holdings 
(1950 census) 
Iran : 
7o distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area*^ 
Pakistan: 
% distribution of holdings^ 
7o distribution of area 
28.9 
0.3 
19.4 
16.7 
0.6 
9.5 18.4 
1.5 
9.6 
1.1 
20.8  
5.9 
These are primarily livestock or poultry units of a minimum size, 
kept for agricultural purposes, but without accompanying cultivable 
agricultural land or with an extremely small tract of land. 
^Includes fall on land. Areas double cropped or planted to inter­
tilled crops were only counted once. 
^Excludes 11,139,815 hectares of "agricultural land" outside of 
agricultural holdings: 272,616 hectares of land under temporary 
fallow; 6,740,675 hectares of permanent meadows and pastures, and 
4,126,524 hectares of cultivable land requiring minor improvements. 
^The actual size groupings reported were < .4, .4 < 1.01, 1.01 < 
2.02, 2.02 < 3.04, 3.04 < 5.06, 5.06 < 10.12, and > 12.12 hectares. 
* 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(3.27). 
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1 -2 2-3 3 -4 h-*5 5-10 10-20 20^50 50^100 100-"500 >500 
13.7 18.1 
21.2 26.9 
19.9 
12.2 
Table 3.7 (continued) 
Size of land holdings, 
in hectares 
Holdings 
without land' .01 < .5 .5 < 1.0 
Turkey : 
7o distribution of holdings^ 
°/o distribution of area® 
Repub1ic of Korea : 
7o distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
Malays ia: _ 
% distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
Thailand : 
% distribution of holdings® 
% distribution of area® 
China (Taiwan): 
% distribution of holdings 
7o distribution of area 
Republic of Viet-Nam: 
% distribution of holdings 
% distribution of area 
9.1 
35.0 
11.6 
10.2 
1.4 
18.6 
2.5 
3.9 
0.6  
1 . 1  
11.7 
0.7 
11.0 
1 .8  
36.0 
30.4 
35.0 
13.7 
35.9 
The actual size groups reqported were 0.1 < 0.6, 0.6 < 1.1, 1.1 < 
1.2 hectares, etc. 
^The actual size groups reported were < 0.4, 0.4 < 0.8, 0.8 < 1.2, 
1«2 < 1.6, 1.6 < 2.0, 2,0 < 3.0 hectares, etc. 
®The actual size groupings reported were < .96, 0.96 < 2.4, 2.4 < 
4.8, 4.8 < 9.6, 9.6 < 22.4, > 22.4 hectares. 
Government farms and estates. 
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l-*2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 10-20 20-50 50 -100 100 -500 >500 
16.5 
23.3 23.2 
2 2 . 1  16.0 
19.9 <-26.1 
29.3 19.2 
2 6 . 6  
22 .8  
31.2 
Table 3.8. Percentage distribution of agricultural holdings and total 
land area according to size of land holding for India, based 
on the 1961-62 and 1953-54 National Sample Surveys* 
All sizes of land hold­
ings , in hec tares 
Holdings 
without 
land < 1.0 1 2.5 2.5 - 5.0 
1961-62: 
7o distribution of holdings 11.7 32.5 15.8 15.2 
7o distribution of area 1.6 6.0 12.4 
1953-54: 
7o distribution of holdings 23.1 24.2 14.0 13.5 
% distribution of area 1.4 4.9 10.1 
"k 
Source: The Cabinet Secretariat: Government of India (3.11, 
Table 3.2). 
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5.0-7.5 7.5 -10 10-15 15-20 20 -25 25 -30 30-50 > 50 
8.3 4.6 5.1 2.5 1.5 0.9 1.4 0.6 
11.6 9.0 14.0 9.7 7.6 5.3 11.8 11.1 
7.8 4.7 5.0 2.7 1.5 1.0 1.7 0.9 
10.0 8.4 12.8 9.6 6.8 5.7 12.9 17.5 
1 
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comprised of 5.7 fragments or noncontiguous land units (3.11, p. 8) 
In Turkey, less than 10 percent of all holdings were single units of 
land. Nearly one-fourth consisted of 6-9 parcels of land and one-
fourth consisted of 10 or more units of land. In addition, fragmenta­
tion was most prevalent in holdings of 10 or fewer hectares. In con­
trast, 46 percent of the holdings in Malaysia are nonfragmented and 
about 87 percent are comprised of 3 or fewer parcels of land. Frag­
mentation is most prevalent among holdings of 2-3 hectares in size. 
The average number of land parcels in Iran is 6.1. For holdings 
of less than one hectare, the average number of parcels ranges from 2.5 
to 3.7. The degree of fragmentation is positively correlated with the 
size of the landholding. In the case of Pakistan, only 23 percent of 
all holdings are single-unit holdings. Nearly 20 percent consist of 
10 or more parcels of land. For this latter group, the degree of 
fragmentation is highest in the 1-2 hectare size of holding. 
Tenancy conditions As in other areas of the world, the two 
principal problems faced by tenants are insecurity of tenure and the cost-
return sharing agreements with landlords. Both inhibit the tenant's in-
2 
centive and capacity to improve agricultural productivity. Both also 
^Fragmentation has been furthered by inheritance patterns based on 
Hindu and Moslem law. Neither provides for primogeniture; i.e., an ex­
clusive right of inheritance belonging to the first-born, nor is such 
provision çiiade in the Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia (3.23, p. 1048; 
3.17, p. 55-6). Rather, inheritances are to be equally divided among 
all heirs, at least all male heirs. The emphasis on equity promotes 
parcelization of land units. Rapid population increase and relatively 
short life spans accentuate the rate at which land units are subdivided 
into small, noncontiguous units. 
2 
Relative to tenants in India, Madiman writes, "The small tenant is 
gradually disappearing from the scene, not by moving up the ladder to be­
come an owner-cultivator but by being dispossessed of land by the bigger 
cultivator and the rural non- (footnote continued on the following page) 
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tend to promote misuse of land resources. Myrdal states that all of 
the South Asian countries, except Indonesia, have enacted legislation 
to provide greater security and more equitable sharing arrangements 
with landlords (3.23, p. 1323).^ The emphasis on implementation and 
relative success have already been noted at the beginning of this 
2 
chapter. Legislation varies among countries. Landlords are often 
permitted to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent and(or) improper 
cultivation practices. Provisions for compensating tenants who make 
improvements, establishing minimum periods for leasing, and placing 
ceilings on rents vary among areas. Myrdal further comments that some 
countries also observe the practice in India of permitting landlords 
to terminate leases prior to expiration if the landlord Indicates that 
the land is going to be used for his own personal cultivation. Myrdal 
cites three reasons why the legislation designed to promote tenants' 
well-being is not fully realized. First, effective rents higher than 
those legally prescribed can be realized when landlords provide credit 
at high interest rates and tenants are required to sell any surpluses 
to the landlord at prices set by the latter. Furthermore, tenants may 
be required to make gifts to the landlord which are essentially a more 
(footnote continued from preceding page) cultivating landowner. Tenants 
of yesterday are today's agricultural laborers" (3.21, p. 283). 
^Also see Kermani (3.16, pp. 148-53) for land reform legislation 
in Iran, Iraq, and Jordan. 
2 According to Myrdal, "One of the great weaknesses of tenancy 
legislation in India and Pakistan and the countries of Southeast Asia 
is that its administration has been left to civil servants v^o often 
lack both the qualifications and the integrity necessary for the job, 
and are overburdened with responsibilities" (3.23, p. 1330). 
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subtle form of rent. Second, tenurial security can be bypassed if the 
landlord réassumés, pretends or even threatens to reassume, the land 
originally leased to the tenant. Third, local officials may be bribed 
to support the landlord's contention that the tenant had no valid lease 
to use the land. Also, pressure may be exerted on the tenant so that he 
releases any rights the lease may have conferred to him. 
In nearly all states of India and Pakistan, tenancy legislation has 
provided the minority of tenants who pay fixed rentals benefits which 
are not available to the remaining majority, primarily sharecroppers, 
because of the latter's inferior social position (3.23). Higher rents 
are paid by sharecroppers than by the privileged tenant.^ The absence 
of legal recourse by sharecroppers and (or) low financial capacity and 
lack of familiarity with legal proceedings where some legislative pro­
tection is operative promotes tenurial insecurity and manipulation of 
2 the rent structure by landlords. Under these conditions, landlords 
are often motivated to abandon fixed-rent arrangements and increase 
the incidence of sharecropping. 
Similar problems arise with tenancy systems in the Middle East. 
Tenurial insecurity is high. Tenancies are terminable at any time with­
out compensation for abrupt severance of tenancy arrangement or for any 
improvements in the land made by the tenant (3.16, 3.17). Even with some 
^Sharecroppers generally pay half or more of their gross output. 
Their net earnings are probably below those of most wage laborers (3.23, 
p. 1326, 1929). Dutta concurs and adds that the sharecropper often ab­
sorbs all production costs (3.8, pp. 80-81). 
O 
According to Dutta, "It is a common experience all over the country 
that the landlords, taking advantage of the limited supply of land and 
weak bargaining capacity of the share-croppers, realize exorbitant rent 
and evict the share-croppers under different pretexts" (3.8, p. 80). 
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assurance of continuation of tenure, the tenant usually has neither the 
capacity nor incentive to Increase his output through private investment. 
He does not have the capacity since after payment of rent his share 
of the output is only sufficient to cover his subsistence needs. During 
lean times, he borrows; during favorable production periods, he must 
repay his previous borrowings. If he is able to invest privately, he 
is not able to realize the full benefits of his investment. Under 
crop-share arrangements, a portion goes to the landlord simply because 
he owns the land. Consequently, the tenant's incentive is to get as 
much as possible from the land without consideration of future pro­
ductivity. Larger outputs through exploitative cultivation also mean 
higher absolute shares to the tenant. 
Klat (3.17) describes a communal type of tenure operating in parts 
of Iraq and Syria which is similar to that found in seme African 
countries. The land is held collectively with the cultivator receiving 
only a right to a share of the land and not to a particular tract of 
land which he can cultivate year after year. Initially, equal parcels 
of land were allocated to the male members usually for a full crop 
rotation period. At the end of this time, the initial distributions 
were voided and a new distribution was made. The right of heirs to in­
herit shares led to a great number of small claims complicating the 
distribution process and resulting in a system of large number of 
small land units. The economic unvlability of these units coupled 
with the eventual redistribution process dampened both the capacity and 
incentive to increase agricultural productivity. 
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According to the 1960 world census of agriculture, about 19 percent 
of all agricultural holdings in Pakistan are rented fran others; 29 
percent are operated under more than one from of tenure. Nearly 40 
percent of all land in holdings is rented. Of the rented area, slightly 
over 90 percent is operated on a crop-share basis. In India, 23.5 of 
all operational holdings sampled reported leasing at least a portion 
of their land. Of the total land area in the survey, about 11 percent 
was under leasing arrangements (3.11, Table 3.3)^ Among smaller pro­
duction units, crop-share arrangements were the most prevalent form of 
tenancy. As the size of holding increased, the importance of crop 
share decreased and tenancy systems based on fixed money or produce pay­
ments became relatively more important. The data available for 
Pakistan and other countries are presented in Table 3.9. Tenancy is 
extremely high in Iran, both in terms of number of holdings and land 
area. Tenancy is also relatively important in Vietnam. As noted in 
footnote e to Table 3.9, the mixed systems of tenure reflected by 
the "Other" category complicate the evaluation of the distribution of 
area in holdings as to whether the land is owned, rented, held in 
communal type arrangements, or operated by squatters. 
Potential for Increasing Land Under Cultivation 
The high rates of population growth, especially in rural areas, in 
conjunction with the existing availability of cultivable land and pre­
vailing landholding patterns accentuate the problems of creating ad­
ditional employment opportunities in the agricultural sector and of in-
^Dutta adds, however, that "It is well-known that a sizeable area 
which is claimed under 'personal cultivation' is actually through in­
formal share tenancies which are neither recognized nor recorded" (3.8, p. 82). 
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Table 3.9. Percentage distribution of number of holdings and(or) land 
area, by class of tenure, for selected Asian countries* 
Time ^ 
Country Parameter period Owners Tenants Others 
Iran; 
% holdings 1960 33.3 55.9 10.8 
% area 1960 26.2 62.2 11.6 
Iraq: 
% area 1960 72.5 < 27.5 
Korea. Republic of; , 
% holdings 1960 73.6 6.8 14.2 
5.4^ 
Malaysia 
7o holdings 1960 62.7 10.0 27.3 
% area 1960 62.6 5.7 31.7 
Pakistan; 
% holdings 1960 52.1 19.3 28.6 
% area 1960 43.0 27.5® 29.5 
Taiwan : b % holdings 1960 64.5 14.1 13.8 
l.T 
% area 1960 72.5 18.0 9.5 
Thailand : 
% holdings 1960 81.9 4.1 14.0 
% area 1960 85.1 3.8 11.1 
Vietnam. Republic of; 
% holdings 1960 23.7 31.5 44.8 
% area 1960 22.2 30.5® 47.3 
^Includes mixed systems of tenure, including holdings on which land 
is both owned and rented. 
^More than 50 percent owned by the holder. 
^Less than 50 percent owned by the holder. 
'^Data for farm households only. Estates and government farms are 
excluded. 
®When total area is classed according to tenure, 39.5 percent of land 
in Pakistan and 58.2 percent in Vietnam is operated under tenancy arrange­
ments. That is, the area included under the Other" category includes 
both owned and rented land. 
'k Source; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(3.27). Area represents total land area in holdings. 
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creasing the Individual producer's capacity to generate an output level 
sufficient to sustain at least a minimum consumption level. Such a 
consumption level would include a consideration of payments for rent, 
taxes, and purchased consumer goods. The adoption of improved tech­
nologies and land redistribution programs provide opportunities for 
increasing the intensity of land use. Multiple cropping and higher use-
levels^ for land increase output levels. The concentration of a dis­
proportionately large number of people controlling only a relatively 
small amount of total land was noted earlier. The converse also holds 
true. In addition, the limited data on landless laborers and underem­
ployment in the agricultural sector suggest the need for increasing the 
cultivable land area and(or) redistributing the existing area. Alter­
natively, employment in other areas of the economy must be created. 
Not only are economic considerations important, but the security and out­
put derivable from land have direct implications for social and politi­
cal stability. Finally, some forms of improved technology are adoptable 
only on contiguous land units and where such landholdings are of a mini­
mum size. Expansion of the cultivable area potentially provides such 
opportunities. 
Estimates of the land area which is potentially cultivable have 
2 been derived for several less-developed countries. (See Table 3.10.). 
^Higher use-levels implies a shift in cropping patterns and(or) 
intensity of production so that per unit resource productivity and total 
output, in terms of calorie or consumption equivalents, are increased. 
2 The estimates were derived by Mr. William G. Harper and are based 
on unpublished materials on world soil resources and library reference 
materials of the Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agri­
culture. The study was completed through the cooperation of Charles E. 
Kellogg, Deputy Administrator (footnote continued on the following page) 
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Table 3.10. Estimates of potential cropland expansion under two assump­
tion levels and percent Increases relative to existing 
cultivable area for developing countries grouped according to 
percent Increases 
Land 
varlant Irrigation 
Major 
crops 
Minor 
crops Total 
Percent 
of FAO 
(thousand hectares) 
GROUP 1 (0-25 percent) 
As la: 
Cyprus Low 
High 
FAO 
129 
129 
274 
274 
71 
71 
474 
474 
432 
110 
110 
Iran Low 
% 
8,490 
8,626 
3,981 
4,432 
45 
45 
12.516 
13,103 
11,593 
108 
113 
Iraq Low 
High 
FAO 
4,826 
6,545 
1,590 
1,590 
26 
26 
6,442 
8,161 
7,496 
109 
Jordan Low 176 
231 
810 
810 
206 
206 
1,192 
1,247 
1,140 
105 
109 
Syria Low 
High 
FAO 
1,379 
1,960 
1,794 
1,794 
3,173 
3,754 
6,130 
Pakistan Low 
High, 
FAO 
28,725 
35,102 
1966 data. 
1960 Agricultural Census. 
1964 data. 
1965 data. 
1967 data. 
1,474 
1,474 
30,199 
36,577 
28,214 
107 
130 
Excluding Kashmir-Jammu; 1964 data relate to the reporting area 
of 67,136,000 hectares. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Land Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAG 
Afghanistan Low 1,287 1,461 - 2,748 
High 1,287 1,461 2,748 
FAG® 7,844 
Turkey Single 5,620 12,706 806 19,132 
FAG^ 26,834 
India Low 50,774 114,558 28,118 193,450 119 
High 55,488 114,558 28,118 198,165 122 
FAG® 162,434 
Nepal Single 303 2,032 - 2,335 103 
FAG 2,266 
Thailand Low 3,071 6,386 3,824 13,281 116 
High, 3,457 6,950 4,006 14,413 126 
FAG 11,415 
Indonesia Low 6,109 8,182 5,143 19,434 110 
High^ 8,115 9,883 5,797 23,795 135 
Afr ica: 
FAG 17,681 
Algeria Low 597 7,681 42 8,320 121 
High 844 7,681 42 8,567 125 
FAG 6,867 
Morocco Low 1,113 4,382 2,187 7,682 
High 1,334 4,382 2,187 7,903 
FAG 7,858 
Central African 
Republic Single. 16 5,048 161 5,225 119 
FAG^'^ 4,400 
^Including Kashmir-Jannnu; 1965 data relate to the reporting area 
of 305,947,000 hectares. 
^1954 data; total agricultural area excluding West Irian. 
^The FAG estimate of 5,900,000 hectares of arable land of which 
3,000,000 hectares are fallow has been reduced by 1,500,000 hectares 
to adjust for an assumed two-year fallow program. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Land Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAO 
Chad Single 376 1,690 164 2,230 
FAQj 7,000 
Ethiopia Single 1,116 3,903 3,661 8,680 
FAG^ 12,525 
Mauritania Single 97 - 93 190 
FAO*^ 263 
Senegal Single 129 4,323 200 4,652 121 
FAOk 5,500 
Somalia Single 152 64 129 345 
FAol 957 
South Africa Single 690 11,261 1,352 13,303 110 
FAO° 12,058 
Tunisia Single 216 1,023 558 1,797 
FAO^ 4,334 
GROUP 2 (25-50 percent) 
As ia: 
Israel Low 408 123 71 602 146 
High 516 123 71 710 173 
FAO® 411 
^1967 data; unofficial estimate. 
If 
1960 data. The FAO estimate of 5,500,000 hectares of arable land 
of which 3,300,000 hectares are fallow has been reduced by 1,650,000 to 
adjust for an assumed two-year fallow program. 
^1956 data for former British Somaliland and 1960 data for former 
Italian Somaliland. 
™In agricultural holdings, as from 1960 Agricultural Census, in­
cluding the territory of Walvis Bay. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) _______ 
Land Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAQ 
Burma Low 10,045 6,916 5,258 22,219 138 
High 14,063 7,765 5,274 27,102 169 
FAD ' 16,087 
Africa: 
Cameroon Single 32 6,532 1,794 8,358 149 
FAO° 5,593 
Uganda Single 323 5,419 1,529 7,271 149 
FAD® 4,888 
GROUP 3 (50-100 percent) 
Asia: 
Lebanon Low 145 263 52 460 150 
High 172 263 52 487 159 
FAQ® 306 
Republic of 
Korea Single 1,426 2,584 - 4,010 174 
FAG® 2,312 
Phillippines Low 2,713 7,751 3,294 13,758 165 
High 3,274 10,048 3,474 16,796 202 
FAG® 8,330 
Latin America 
Mexico Low 10,836 27,532 6,897 45,265 190 
High^ 11,710 27,532 6,897 46,139 194 
FAG° 23,817 
El Salvador Low 323 742 177 1,242 192 
High 323 742 177 1,242 192 
FAG^ 648 
^Arable land used for more than one crop during the year has been 
counted twice, 
o 1954 unofficial data for East Cameroon of which 5,410,000 hectares 
of the 8,298,000 reported by FAG are fallow. The FAG figure has been 
reduced by 2,705,000 to adjust for an assumed two-year fallow program. 
^In agricultural holdings and based on 1961 Agricultural Census. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Laad Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAG 
Chile Low 2,279 4,916 64 7,260 161 
High 2,823 4,916 64 7,803 173 
FAO"^ 4,511 
GROUP 4 (Over 100 percent) 
As ia: 
Cambodia Low 4,194 1,987 1,548 7,729 259 
High 5,355 2,870 1,577 9,802 328 
FAD® 2,984 
Republic of 
Vietnam Low 4,919 1,952 2,200 9,071 329 
High 5,794 2,342 2,239 10,375 376 
FAG 2,760 
Laos Low 1,458 2,045 2,800 6,303 788 
High 1,813 2,045 2,800 6,658 832 
FAO^ 800 
Ceylon Low 813 1,868 1,359 4,040 215 
High 942 1,868 1,359 4,169 222 
FAO® 1,875 
Taiwan Low 1,464 455 - 1,919 213 
High 1,559 583 - 2,142 238 
FAG® 902 
Africa; 
Angola Single 597 10,587 13,783 24,967 2,774 
FAO^ 900 
Dahomey Single 87 2,639 1,132 3,858 360 
FAO® 1,071 
Gabon Single 129 - 7,871 8,000 6,299 
FAO' 127 
^In agricultural holdings and based on 1965 Agricultural Census. 
^1953 unofficial estimate. 
®1963 data. The FAG estimate of 1,546,000 hectares of arable land 
of which 950,000 hectares are in fallow has been reduced by 450,000 to 
adjust for an assumed two-year fallow program. 
^1962 data. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Land 
variant Irrigation 
Major 
crops 
Minor 
crops Total 
Percent 
of FAG 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Single 
FAG" 
Single 
FAG^ 
Ivory Coast Single 
FAG* 
Single 
FAG* 
Single 
FAG? 
Single 
FAO= 
Single 
FAG* 
Single 
FAG^ 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
100 
123 
454 
103 
129 
103 
1,252 
593 
403 
6,447 
3,548 
1,684 
1,806 
2,139 
3,400 
26,778 
67 
3,064 
8,329 
3,707 
4,355 
161 
35,665 
18,968 
570 
100 
9,634 
2,544 
12,341 
2,056 
5,494 
1,696 
6,290 
3,844 
2,403 
1,221 
40,317 
2,649 
46,339 
21,795 
570 
379 
600 
324 
164 
197 
1,522 
213 
u„ The 200,000 hectares reported by FAG is designated as the estimated 
area of shifting cultivation and of bush fallow. The estimate has been 
reduced by 100,000 to adjust for an assumed two-year fallow program. 
Excluding fallow and temporary meadows. 
*1965 unofficial estimate. 
*1961 data. 
^1964 unofficial estimate. 
^The FAG estimate of 3,664,000 hectares includes 3,612,000 hectares 
of fallow. The FAG estimate is reduced by 1,806,000 to adjust for an 
assumed two-year fallow program. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Land Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAO 
Portuguese Single 77 323 903 1,303 495 
Guinea FACi^ 263 
Sierra Leone Single 497 451 1,871 2,819 152 
FAO'^'^ 1,858 
Southern 
Rhodesia Single 51 8,439 5,742 14,232 775 
FAO^^ 1,837 
Southwest 
Africa Single 107 477 839 1,423 222 
FA0°® 642 
Sudan Single 3,000 10,513 9,458 22,971 322 
FA0°^ 7,100 
Tanzania Single 1,539 21,813 10,916 34,268 293 
FAO^^ 11,702 
Togo Single 84 2,003 332 2,419 160 
FA0*'Ge 1,515 
1956 data, excluding fallow in villages. 
^^In agricultural holdings, as from 1960 Agricultural Census, in­
cluding the territory of Walvis Bay. 
^^1966 data for Tanganyika and 1963 data for Zanzibar. 
^^1954 data. 
®®The FAO estimate of 2,160,000 hectares includes 1,290,000 
hectares of fallow. The FAO estimate is reduced by 645,000 to adjust 
for an assumed two-year fallow program. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Land Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAG 
Zambia Single 161 8,071 6,262 14,494 754 
FAO 1,923 
Latin America; 
Costa Rica Low 658 1,336 916 2,910 468 
High 658 1,660 1,005 3,323 534 
FAO®® 622 
Haiti Low 342 434 — 776 210 
High , 342 434 776 210 
FAG 370 
Honduras Low 1,026 2,523 435 3,984 484 
High .. 1,026 2,553 468 4,047 492 
FAO^^ 823 
Nicaragua Low 3,658 6,171 1,713 11,542 1,322 
High 3,658 11,094 2,251 17,003 1,948 
FAG®® 873 
Panama Low 1,181 2,022 879 4,082 724 
High 1,181 3,161 903 5,245 930 
FAG^ 564 
Argentina Low 2,645 55,251 5,419 63,315 218 
High 2,774 55,251 5,419 63,444 218 
FAG®® 29,053 
Brazil Low 3,948 106,128 83,628 193,704 651 
High , 4,639 211,469 236,550 452,658 1,521 
FAG 29,760 
Bolivia Low 616 30,000 23,302 53,918 1,744 
High .. 670 40,980 26,854 68,504 2,216 
FAG^^ 3,091 
^^1963 data, excluding fallow. 
®®1963 Agricultural Census. 
^^1950 Agricultural Census. 
^^1963 data. 
^^1950 Agricultural Census which covered 32,750,000 hectares out 
of total area of 109,858,000 hectares. 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Land Major Minor Percent 
variant Irrigation crops crops Total of FAO 
Colombia Low 4,510 8,876 2,435 15,821 314 
HigK 4,510 51,036 42,202 97,748 1,937 
FAo" 5,047 
Ecuador Low 948 3,255 2,632 6,835 236 
High,, 948 10,529 6,003 17,480 604 
FAG 2.894 
Paraguay Low — 6,885 2,316 9,201 990 
High — 8,405 2,511 10,916 1,175 
FAO 929 
Peru Low 2,790 3,173 3,099 9,062 336 
High, 2,994 29,452 29,134 61,580 2,280 
FAO 2,701 
Uruguay Low 645 13,058 65 13,768 611 
High 645 19,587 97 20,329 903 
FAO^ 2,252 
Venezuela Low 1,514 11,885 13,121 26,520 508 
High 2,530 23,710 32,254 58,494 1,121 
FAO^ 5,219 
_ 
1964 data, excluding temporary meadows and pastures. 
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In the derived estimates, land for use in growing crops is classified 
according to suitability under either dry fallow, irrigated or rain-fed 
conditions. In many, but not all cases, it is possible to distinguish 
between presently irrigated and potentially Irrigable land. The crops 
Included in the 'feajor crops" category vary with individual countries. 
These are generally the crops that have been historically and recently 
important. Cereals and other staples such as potatoes and cassava are 
the principal 'kajor" crops. However, where industrial and(or) export 
crops account for a major proportion of the cropland area, such crops 
are also designated as "major" crops. The category of "minor" crops 
includes areas suitable for producing nonstaple crops presently grown 
on a relatively small proportion of the cropland area. The category 
also includes areas suitable for growing industrial and(or) export 
crops whose economic significance may far exceed their importance in 
terms of relative acreage. Where soil characteristics and climatic fac­
tors are amenable to producing both "major" and 'hnlnor" crops, the land 
was classified and evaluated only for use in producing "major" crops. 
In deriving the low and high land estimates in Table 3.10, physical 
and topological soil characteristics, climatic factors, availability of 
irrigation water, possibilities of land reclamation, and distance from 
transportation facilities were all taken into account. The climatic 
factors reflected length of growing season, annual rainfall, and the 
distribution of rain throughout the production period. The distance 
criterion was used to distinguish between those lands more than and less 
than about 50 miles from land and water transportation facilities. When 
(footnote continued from the preceding page) for Soil Survey and Arnold 
C. Orvedal, Chief, World Soil Geography Unit, Soil Conservation Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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possible, regions within countries were evaluated. These were aggre­
gated for the country cropland estimates. 
The estimates implicit in the three categories of land also re­
flect the potential for multiple cropping. Soil characteristics, water 
availability, rainfall, and length of growing season are all taken into 
account. A hectare of land designated as suitable for multiple cropping 
is counted as two hectares of cropland. Conversely, a hectare of crop­
land suitable for dry fallow rotation is included as only one-half 
hectare of cropland. That is, a two-year fallow program is assumed. 
Where cropland is designated as suitable for long-term crops, such as 
sugarcane and tree crops, no multiple cropping is considered. 
Underlying all classification decisions is a relatively high manage­
ment assumption. Management and cultivation practices similar to those 
on commercial North American and West European farms are assumed. Con­
sideration is given to the potential productivity of soils relative to 
costs of required practices. Implied in this assumption is development 
of a locally-adapted technology, and in many cases, the lowering of farm 
input prices relative to farm product prices so that economic incentives 
for adopting this technology approach those in North America and Western 
Europe. Implicit in the management assumption is the assumption that 
those inputs complementary to land are available and that producers 
have the financial means to obtain such inputs. Alternatively, inputs 
are supplied by public agencies with only a minimal cost outlay by 
producers. 
The basis for establishing low and high variant upper bounds differs 
between Latin America and countries of the Near and Far East, For Latin 
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American countries, the low variant is derived as the sum of all crop­
land located within fifty miles of rail, water or road transportation. 
Since relatively little of the cropland is presently planted more than 
once annually, the low variant includes no multiple cropping. The high 
variant reflects all cropland, regardless of location. In addition, 
multiple cropping is assumed possible on all irrigated land where suffi­
cient water is available, and in upland areas having favorable soil 
characteristics and favorable temperature and moisture for eight months 
or longer annually. 
For the countries of the Near East, multiple cropping is assumed 
possible only on presently or potentially irrigable land. No potential 
cropland is identified at distances greater than fifty miles from trans­
portation facilities. The low variant reflects all cropland identified 
in upland areas, and irrigated land presently in use. Multiple cropping 
is assumed to be at estimated present levels on irrigated land. Under 
the high assumption, potentially irrigable land is added, and multiple 
cropping is increased to reflect potential increases in supplies of 
irrigation water and better management of existing and future flows. 
Beginning with the eastern part of India and moving eastward, 
annual precipitation, in some cases, is judged sufficient to permit 
multiple cropping on upland soils. In these areas, the basis for dif­
ferentiating between low and high variant estimates is the same as for 
the Near East with the exception of the assumed multiple cropping on non-
irrigated cropland and the restriction of the distance criterion which 
is operative in parts of Indonesia. Under the high variant, multiple 
cropping is assumed possible on nonlrrlgated cropland having favorable 
157 
soil characteristics, favorable temperature, and sufficient precipita­
tion for an eight-month or longer annual growing season. Under the low 
variant, a minimum growing season of ten months is assumed to be needed. 
The relatively limited climatological and topological data for Africa 
precluded making estimates under the high and low assumptions. The 
single variant estimates would tend to represent the low assumption 
since multiple cropping on at least some irrigated land has not been 
admitted. 
Two other considerations must be kept in mind. First, the costs of 
clearing and developing the land must be evaluated. Transportation and 
marketing facilities, provision for credit so that the land can be 
purchased and necessary complementary inputs can be obtained, and 
establishing education and local government systems likely represent sub­
stantial demands on public resources, both financial and administrative. 
The costs and returns, both economic and social, of land development 
must be weighed against alternative uses of public resources which can 
be used at other growth points within the economy.^ Second, ownership 
rights exist to nearly all land in these countries. Where the land is 
privately owned, expropriation with or without compensation is necessary 
when the owner is not willing or able to develop the land himself. 
When landowners are able to legally set land values at relatively high 
levels, compensation to acquire land represents another demand on 
^For brief discussions of the problems of land development and re­
settlement see îfyrdal (3.23, pp. 1266-72) and Barraclough and Domike 
(3.4, pp. 410-12). 
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available government funds.^ Adjudication of land rights is usually 
costly and time-consuming. Until valid titles are obtained, private 
investors would tend to be reluctant to develop the land to which they 
expect to receive titles. Furthermore, in parts of Africa and South­
east Asia, people attach strong importance to ancestral rights in land 
which make them reluctant to transfer land titles and to physically 
relocate themselves. 
The derived estimates are summarized in Table 3.10. To provide 
a basis for evaluating the relative, potential cropland area, the ex­
isting levels of cropland, as reported by FAO (3.26), are also pre­
sented. The FAO data are designated as arable land plus land under 
permanent crops. The year of reference varies with individual countries 
as does the treatment of including fallow land. In some cases, for 
example, Syria, the total fallow land has apparently been included in 
contrast to counting one-half of the fallow land if a two-year fallow 
program is operative. Consequently, the potential cultivable area as 
a percent of the FAO figure is less than 100 percent. This also appears 
to be the case for several African countries. 
The countries are grouped into four classifications according to 
the total area derived for the low land variant as a percent of the FAO 
figure. The countries included in Group 1 (0 - 25 percent) are pre-
^Flores (3.9) maintains that Latin American landlords are not 
entitled to any compensation. Implicitly, they have already acquired 
substantial wealth and political and social influence from the land. 
Compensation need not be immediate. Rather, long-term bonds may be 
used which become due when, hopefully, the financial position of the 
economy is improved and the government has a greater capacity to make 
compensation through redemption of these bonds. 
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dominantly countries of the Near East where climatic factors are often 
limiting and the population density is relatively high. The group 4 
category ( > 100 percent) includes countries of the Far East and also 
several African and most Latin American countries. The potentials for 
cropland expansion in Latin America are exceptionally high. 
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CHAPTER IV. PRODUCTION TECHNIQUE 
To an observer from an economically-developed country, the use of 
traditional production techniques characterized by combining simple 
tools with relatively-large quantities of labor may be viewed as the 
major factor contributing to the economic predicament in which the 
majority of cultivators in less-developed areas find themselves. This 
low state of the technical arts can be seemingly upgraded by a transfer 
of modern technology to these areas so that production is increased 
and economic efficiency improved. Higher outputs should result in 
higher per capita incomes and the processes for agricultural develop­
ment are set into motion. 
Technology is not that easily transferred and that readily adopted, 
however. The seeds, fertilizers and cultivation practices which are 
productive in temperate climates of the developed countries are not 
equally productive or nearly as productive under different soil and 
climatic conditions and with different managerial Inputs. Although 
machinery, especially tractors, is becoming increasingly available in 
smaller power units, mechanization is not an economically-feasible, 
alternative production technique for the majority of cultivators 
operating on relatively small land units, often fragmented into a number 
of Individual parcels. In addition to the physical adaptability of 
these technologically-improved Inputs, price relationships among inputs 
and outputs, tenurial arrangements and producers' objectives affect the 
rate at which these inputs are adopted. 
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The uncertainty of production response associated with new pro­
duction techniques is of particular importance to those cultivators 
living near the margin of subsistence. For those who are essentially 
"survival-oriented", the potential costs of reduced production are 
apparent. True, these cultivators would not adopt such technology 
if they thought it was not to their advantage. But, this is a dimension 
of the problem of changing production practices even when superior in­
puts are available. Producers must be convinced that a shift to the 
new inputs is their best alternative. Furthermore, cultivators' 
capacity for acquiring Improved Inputs, either through accumulated re­
serves or external financing, is another limiting factor. Finally, 
transportation and marketing facilities condition net returns realized 
by adopting cultivators. 
The term production technique refers to the manner in which inputs 
are combined and employed for productive purposes. Subsistence pro­
ducers growing wheat on small plots of land, relying heavily on draft 
power and family labor, employ a production technique vastly different 
from that of highly-mechanized, extensive operations of Great Plains 
wheat producers in the United States. 
Two questions arise: (1) Under varying economic and social 
conditions, what is the optimal production technique for the firm? and 
(2) With existing and alternative production techniques, what are the 
implications for growth of the firm and for developmental processes, 
in general? The first question is primarily concerned with economic 
efficiency, or more generally, the efficiency with which producers' ob­
jectives are met. The second Includes a consideration of the impact of 
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production techniques on capital accumulation within the firm for private 
investment or for saving. Private investment increases the productive 
capacity of the firm. Savings transferred to other parts of the economy 
represent the means to further expansion and diversification of the 
economy, including the agricultural sector. 
From a national planning viewpoint, production and investment de­
cisions can be conditioned by government policies affecting the nature 
and rate of availability of technological innovations and by public 
pricing policies. These, in turn, interact to influence the range of 
economically-feasible techniques open to the producer and the optimal 
technique for his firm. 
Technological Change Versus Change in Production Technique 
To clarify the terminology used, the difference between technologi­
cal change and a change in technique is examined. Technological change 
usually results in a change in production technique. In Figure 4.1, 
the rays emanating from the origin represent alternative production 
techniques. These are alternative combinations of the two variable in­
puts which generate the same output level, ceteris paribus.^ For ex­
ample, 40 units of output can be produced using OT^, OT^, or OT^. In 
fact, with isoquant B, implicitly reflecting that inputs are perfectly 
^In Figure 4,1, the axes have been labeled labor and capital. This 
is done for heuristic purposes rather than for reflecting reality. That 
is, an unambiguous distinction between capital and labor does not exist. 
If capital is defined as anything that yields a flow of services over 
time, labor is certainly included in this categorization. Furthermore, 
the aggregation of nonhomogenous capital and labor inputs into their re­
spective components is assumed possible by summing according to services 
supplied. 
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divisible, an infinite number of alternative production techniques 
theoretically exista.^ If OT^ is used in period one and OT^ in period 
two to produce 100 units of output as the result of, for example, the 
price of labor increasing relative to the price of capital, a change 
in production technique has taken place. Since isoquant B is assumed 
unchanged from period one to two, no technological change affecting the 
productivity of labor, L, and capital, K, at some given K/L ratio has 
taken place. 
Technological change is associated with the development of improved 
techniques—improved in the sense that the same quantity of inputs can 
be used to produce a larger output or the initial output can be pro-
2 duced with fewer inputs. See Figure 4.2. If the input-output re­
lationship is unchanged quantitatively but if an improved produce is 
produced or if the uncertainty of production response is reduced, the 
new production technique is also an improved technique. 
^Even with isoquant A in Figure 4.1, combinations of production 
techniques OTj^, OT^ and OT^ can be used to produce 40 units of output. 
2 ^1 ^2 In Equation 2.37 where Y = aX^ , technological change may be 
represented by an increase in the value of a, b^, b^ or some combination 
of these. Because of differential rates of adoption, technological 
change affects the relative distribution of economic returns. In 
addition, and partially an outgrowth of this changing pattern of in­
come distribution, the social structure is affected. Thus, technologi­
cal change may have a number of seemingly negative side effects which 
producers and national planners do or should take into account. 
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Figure 4.1. Alternative produc­
tion techniques for 
realizing specified 
output levels 
Figure 4.2. Illustration of 
technological 
change 
Embodied and disembodied technological change 
Technological change may be of an embodied or disembodied nature. 
Briefly, embodied technological change arises when inputs are modified 
so as to Increase their productivity. For example, a more productive 
variety of seed or fertilizer mixture, a new tool or implement which 
permits better and more timely cultivation practices or a new feed 
additive is developed. In these situations, technological change is 
embodied in the new inputs. Disembodied technological change, on the 
other hand, is characterized by recombining existing inputs which are 
unchanged both quantitatively and qualitatively so as to increase the 
^See Griliches (4.7) and Jorgenson (4.9). 
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level of output. An example of this phenomenon is extension personnel 
recommending the same collection of inputs. Quite apparently, such in­
formation can be considered to be eventually embodied in improved 
management inputs provided by the producer. Consequently, the distinc­
tion between embodied and disembodied technological change is blurred, 
and it becomes primarily academic in nature. Most technological change 
will incorporate both features. The impact on producers is likely dif­
ferent, however. Disembodied technological change may be essentially 
costless to the individual producer in that he is not required to make 
additional investment or working capital outlays. Indirectly, cost 
accrues to him in that public research and dissemination facilities must 
be supported by government revenues or deficit financing. In addition, 
some producers may associate social costs with changes in traditional work 
patterns. To the extent that disembodied technological advances are 
available, the rate of adoption is primarily constrained by producers' 
awareness and their estimates of uncertainty associated with these new 
practices. 
Technologically-improved inputs would at least initially be avail­
able in relatively-limited quantities and at generally higher costs to 
producers. Under these conditions, the rate of adoption would be 
further constrained by the availability of cash reserves and external 
financing to obtain these inputs and by the nature of the "rationing" 
process through which the relatively-scarce quantities of these inputs 
are allocated to producers. 
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Effect on Input demand 
The static factor demand function for the two-factor case was given 
in Equation 2.46. Such demand is a function of input and output prices 
and of the technical coefficients of production. If no technological 
change takes place and the output level is invariant, factor demand 
varies only with changes in the price relationships.^ These changing 
price ratios usually induce market-oriented producers to alter pro­
duction techniques and their relative demand for inputs. If the iso-
quant is segmented as is isoquant A in Figure 4.1, a change in the price 
ratio need not induce a change in production technique. Considering 
point b, relative input prices can change without inducing a shift from 
production technique OT^ as long as the slopes of the p^ / p^ ratios 
are less than the slope of ab and greater than the slope of be. This 
unresponsiveness to changing economic conditions is also consistent with 
meeting the marginal conditions for economic efficiency. Only if the 
isoquant is smooth and continuous will changes in the input-price ratio 
always necessitate a change in the optimal production technique used by 
2 profit-maximizing producers. This statement, of course, holds only 
^Using the constrained revenue maximization formulation employing 
Lagrangean multipliers, as in Equation 2.9, aggregate factor demand also 
varies with K°, capital availability, and M-, the opportunity cost 
associated with capital use in the firm. 
2 
The evidence of economic efficiency among agriculturalists in less-
developed areas is not abundant. The studies of Agarwal and Pathak (4.1), 
Chennareddy (4.2), Daniel (4.3), Desai (4.4), Hooper (4.8), Sahota (4.10), 
and Tax (4.12) provide contrasting views relative to the economic ef­
ficiency of producers. The question of the generalizability of these in­
dividual studies to conditions existent in other less-developed areas re­
mains unanswered. 
The selection of an optimum technique and the factors affecting this 
determination are discussed at a later point in this chapter. 
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under conditions of perfect certainty; that is, certainty of knowledge 
relative to costs and returns conditions, including the impact of ex­
ogenous factors. Such certainty never exists. In the absence of fixed 
input and product prices, these prices must be estimated. In addition, 
the marginal conditions require that producers be able to estimate the 
relative MPP's of the inputs at different input combinations and levels 
of use, again taking into account the influence of exogenous factors. 
However, it is not suggested that producers are actually able to 
quantify, for example. Equation 2.4. Rather, on the basis of past ex­
perience, the "demonstration" effect of neighbors* experiences, and any 
other possible sources of information, producers synthesize this in­
formation and select that combination of inputs and, hence, production 
technique, which they subjectively estimate to be optimal. 
With technological change^ the technical coefficients of production 
are altered. Consequently, the production function and corresponding 
isoquants assume different positions and generally, different forms. In 
Equation 2.46, for example, technological change can affect a, b^ and 
b^ and, in turn, the level of input demand. Considering only labor and 
capital, technological progress can be classified as capital-using, 
labor-using, or neutral depending on whether the marginal rate of 
technical substitution of capital for labor increases, decreases, or 
remains unchanged, respectively, along a given labor-capital ratio. 
These consequences of technological progress, whether of an embodied or 
disembodied nature, are depicted in Figure 4.3. In Panel a, technologi­
cal change is capital-using in nature because the slopes at points B 
and C along ray OR are successively higher than at point A, the initial 
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point. These higher slopes indicate that MPP^ has increased relative 
to MPP^. Consequently, the marginal rate of technical substitution of 
capital for labor increases along OR at points closer to the origin.^ 
With prices invariant, producers find it profitable to use relatively 
more capital. The converse is true with labor-using technological 
progress. If the technological progress is neutral, as in Panel c, 
the MPP^ / MPP^ ratio is invariant at all points. If prices are un­
changed, the relative demand for labor and capital does not change; 
2 
only the aggregate demand may vary. 
1 cy g 
Using a production function, Y = a L K , the marginal rate of 
technical substitution of capital for labor is the following: 
MRS . JflL. a_âl5ç!±_, _B_ ^ 
K-L " • K 
* 
If technological progress raises 3 to S , ceteris paribus, or alter­
natively raises 8 relative to a, both MPP and MPP increase when L/K 
K L 
is invariant. However, MPP increases relatively more; i.e., 
* 
—^ ^ ^ ^ . According to Equation 2.18, if prices are 
unchanged, relatively more capital can now be profitably used. If oi 
and B increase by the same proportion, ceteris paribus, the MRS^ ^  is 
unchanged, and the technological progress has been neutral in effect. 
2 This is true only if one product is produced. Technological 
progress, whether neutral or otherwise, will affect the relative 
profitability of alternative crops. Consequently, technological progress 
is expected to affect both the relative and aggregate demand for inputs 
in the production of all outputs. 
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Factors Affecting Change in Production Technique 
and Rate of Adoption of New Technology 
A number of factors affect the choice of production techniques. 
Initially, producers' awareness of better techniques and of improved 
inputs is the primary constraining factor. Then, considerations of 
availability, adoptability and profitability must be weighed. Finally, 
any considerations of social acceptability must be taken into account. 
Some of these factors are examined below. The relative importance of 
each likely varies with the stage of economic development and attendant 
features such as levels and distribution of agricultural incomes, 
literacy rates, and attitudes toward change. 
Awareness 
The precondition to selecting an alternative production technique, 
either as the result of a change in price relationships or technological 
progress, is the awareness that a "better" means of production exists— 
"better" generally implying a more profitable technique.^ The routes 
of increasing producers' awareness of alternative production techniques 
vary with individual situations. With high rates of illiteracy, printed 
information is intelligible only to a small proportion of the rural 
population. Under these conditions, such information is communicated 
more effectively by the "demonstration" effects of some producers adopt­
ing new techniques and by government programs of "demonstration" farms. 
^"Better" has connotations other than increased profitability. 
Profitability considerations aside, techniques which reduce the physical 
strain of work and(or) permit increased amounts of leisure time are pre­
ferred, especially in those areas where social status is highly in­
fluenced by the amount of leisure and time devoted to social and local 
government functions as, for example^ in parts of Southeast Asia and 
Africa. "Better" from a macro standpoint will be discussed in a later 
subsection dealing with optimal production techniques. 
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These phenomena are complemented when extension service personnel work 
with individual producers and farm organizations. The local merchant 
or trader, both as the supplier of inputs and purchaser of agricultural 
commodities, is in a position to provide information on market conditions 
for various commodities and on the availability of improved inputs. Con­
versely, he is also in a position to exploit producers through misinforma­
tion regarding prevailing and anticipated market price relationships. 
Cooperatives engaging in marketing and input-supplying activities pro­
vide another mechanism for transmitting information, at least to co­
operative members. 
But awareness is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for 
producers switching to a "better" technique. The improved technique, 
in its present form, may not be adaptable to particular areas. For ex­
ample, seed variety highly successful in one region of the world may 
not be productive in another area. Thus, the awareness and availability 
of alternative techniques are beneficial only if techniques are adoptable 
or adaptable by potential users. Communications media, especially radio, 
have an increasing impact on individuals' awareness and expectations. 
Awareness and expectations not matched by achievement are conducive to 
social and political instability with important consequences for stimula­
ting and sustaining developmental processes. Thus, producers must also 
have the capacity, i.e., the financial resources and managerial talents 
to procure and successfully adopt technological innovations suited to 
their farming operations. 
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Adaptability and adoptability 
Changes in technique and technological change both involve considera­
tions of adaptability. Let adaptability refer to the producers* capacity 
to adjust farm operations by altering the proportions in which inputs 
are used in response to, for example, a change in relative prices. Re­
ferring to Figure 4.1, it was pointed out earlier that producers operating 
along isoquant A are not restricted to producing at points a, b, and c. 
They can combine processes OT^ and OT^, for example, to operate at 
points on segment be. Since alternative techniques in Figure 4.1 repre­
sent combinations of existing, known inputs, producers can adapt rela­
tively easily as economic conditions change, at least adapt within a 
range of input combinations. With technological change, however, this 
familiarity no longer exists. However, adaptability also refers to the 
capacity for modifying improved inputs which could not be profitably 
adopted in their current form. Fertilizer mixtures, cultivation 
practices, and feed rations suited to one region of a country may not be 
economically feasible in another area until some modifications have been 
made. The problems associated with international transfers of technology 
are more numerous and quite apparent. 
Adoptability, on the other hand, denotes producers' capacity to 
profitably assimilate technologically-improved inputs in their present 
form into the firm. Locally-developed seed varieties, artificial in­
semination techniques, and irrigation pumps would be examples of this 
phenomenon. 
In Figure 4.1, capital and labor are denoted as the variable in­
puts applied to some unspecified aggregation of fixed inputs. But what 
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type of capital is being represented in this diagram? K represents work­
ing capital such as production-period expenditures for seed, fertilizer, 
and irrigation water inputs to be combined with a collection of fixed 
inputs. The problems of adaptability and adoptability, assuming these 
working capital inputs are employable in their current form, are rela­
tively small in contrast to changes in capital-use levels involving both 
working and fixed capital inputs. A ntinber of reasons are applicable: 
(1) The working capital inputs are largely used up during each 
production period even though some fertilizer and irrigation water 
residuals remain. Since producers must purchase these inputs for each 
production period, they have a good deal of flexibility in altering 
quantities used in response to anticipated changes in economic condi­
tions and any technological innovations that may be available. Invest­
ment in fixed capital inputs provides a flow of returns over a longer 
period of time which generally reduces the rate and scope at which 
producers can adjust their operations to changing economic conditions; 
(2) In addition to the shorter life of working capital inputs, ex­
penditures are usually small relative to those for fixed capital. Ex­
penses can be at least partially financed out of current income; credit 
can usually be obtained since financing is ostensibly for productive 
purposes, the returns of which will be realized within a relatively 
short period of time. Longer-term credit obligations associated with 
investments in the structure of the firm restrict producers' activities, 
especially during unfavorable production periods when additional 
financing is often necessary; and 
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(3) Working capital inputs place fewer demands on the need for 
complementary inputs to maximize returns. For producers accustomed 
to using a seed-fertilizer-irrigation water configuration, the avail­
ability of an improved seed variety requiring a different application of 
fertilizer and water does not always tax the producers' managerial 
abilities since such adjustments have usually been made in the past. 
Conversely, the substitution of mechanical power for draft animals and 
human labor does present a situation where new managerial inputs are 
required to operate and maintain the machinery. In addition, a different 
complement of implements is often necessary. That is, a plow suitable 
for use with draft power may not be equally suitable for mechanical 
power. 
Technological change can originate exogenously or endogenously. 
The longer-term consequences for additional technological progress and 
for the rate of adoption are important, however. Technological change 
developed by indigenous institutions may have two beneficial aspects: 
(1) Technological development will be oriented toward local situations 
so that the ease and rate of adoption is facilitated; and (2) A more 
favorable attitude toward technological change, especially if endogenous 
efforts are highly successful, may develop and, in turn, an increased 
receptiveness and capacity for adopting exogenously-generated technologi­
cal change. Conversely, technological progress is cumulative in nature 
which suggests that successful technological progress requires or is 
facilitated by earlier progress in this field. The major problem in 
generating internal technological advances is that most less-developed 
areas do not have that constellation of research facilities, experienced 
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researchers, and monetary and political support conducive to making 
technological progress. This is not to say that individual producers do 
not attempt to improve the efficiency of their operations through de­
vising their own production and management techniques. Rather, the major 
technological breakthroughs that significantly stimulate developmental 
processes are likely made in established research centers; these are 
not widespread in less-developed areas.^ Exogenously-developed change 
will usually not promote endogenous technological advances unless there 
has been a fundamental modification of the indigenous social structure 
(4.6). Generally speaking, such a modification involves a change of 
attitude toward agricultural production, particularly by those elites 
who view agriculture and agriculturalists with relative distaste. Such 
a shift would include a different attitude toward workers engaged in 
manual operations, a reorientation of the educational system and the 
attitudes it generates toward physical sciences and away from the rela­
tively strong emphasis on aesthetic studies, and a reduction in the in­
cidence of absentee landlordism. 
Producers' objectives 
Only a few, general comments about producers' objectives as affect-
2 ing choice of production technique are intended here. It is perhaps 
almost axiomatic that the majority of individuals in any society are 
"economic men". That is, even though they act under social and cultural 
^The successes of agronomic research in Mexico, the Philippines 
and Nigeria cannot be considered as primarily indigenous in nature, but 
rather cooperative undertakings with researchers from developed areas. 
2 Producers' objectives are discussed more comprehensively in 
Chapter VIII. 
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restraints, both self- and externally-imposed, most individuals can be 
assumed to prefer more economic goods to less, subject to these con­
straints. As long as the net gain from procurement and consumption of 
goods is positive, utility is increased. 
Utility is a function of factors other than profits and consumer 
goods purchasable with these profits. Consequently, the rate at which 
producers adjust their operations to changing environmental conditions 
is affected. Referring again to Figure 4.1, even though the p^ / p^^ 
ratio indicates that OT^ is economically efficient rather than OT^^, 
some producers may rationally choose to maintain OT^ since using OT^ re­
sults in a substitution of capital for labor, thereby releasing a 
quantity of labor for which alternative productive employment within the 
firm is not available. Similarly, in certain societies individuals 
comparatively "well off" are expected to share their relative good 
fortune with less-fortunate relatives. Thus, even though OT^ is 
appropriate for p / p as drawn, producers may employ a greater than 
economically-optimal number of labor inputs. 
As noted in Chapter III, in areas where tenurial uncertainty is 
high or where costs and returns are not shared in equitable proportions, 
tenants are often motivated to extract the maximum possible from land­
owners ' resources without serious consideration to longer-term conse­
quences for resource productivity. Thus, these production techniques 
may be optimal for the tenant in the short-run but not optimal to the 
landlord nor to society in the long-term context. 
On large estates where land is often farmed extensively and a 
portion of productive land remains idle even though relatively inexpensive 
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labor could be employed to bring this land under cultivation, land­
owners' objectives as related to choice of production technique would 
seem to give substantial weight to factors other than economic. To the 
extent that political and social power are derived from land ownership 
and favorably skewed income distributions, landowners may prefer main­
taining the economic and social status quo within the agricultural sector. 
Even though intensive cultivation by tenants and landless laborers is 
economically remunerative to landowners, the attendant higher incomes 
for these low-income groups and the potential rise in their aspirations 
and expectations for a greater share in the product may be viewed by the 
landlord as forces eroding his increased returns with eventual social 
and political unrest threatening his continued possession of the land. 
In this situation, producers' production techniques are not optimal in 
a macro-economic sense since the majority of people tend to view these 
techniques as contributors to suppression of developmental processes and 
individual well-being. 
Optimal Production Technique 
In selecting their optimal production technique, producers give 
consideration to the number of economically-feasible alternatives, 
economic conditions as reflected in price configurations, objectives they 
pursue, factor or input endowments, and allowance for various forms of 
uncertainty. The weights assigned to these factors vary with types of 
producers. For those operating essentially outside the market economy, 
physical input-output relationships are more important than market prices. 
Noneconomic considerations may be incompatible with meeting the marginal 
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conditions for economic efficiency. Owner-operators and producers with 
secure, long-term tentorial arrangements assign a zero weight, or nearly 
so, to tenurial uncertainty while tenant-producers may weigh heavily 
this uncertainty in making production and private investment decisions, 
decisions affecting both current and future production techniques used. 
The optimal production technique is that one which is consistent 
with satisfaction of the marginal conditions for economic efficiency.^ 
This implies profit maximization, the objective whose generality has been 
questioned; but more specifically, the objective is stated as a con­
strained profit maximization. A number of side conditions can be re­
flected in the constraints. The capital constraint, K°, can be defined 
as net of "social" expenditures, hoarding, and other essentially non-
2 productive outlays. Labor endowments reflected in labor inputs avail­
able from family members may be expressed in quantities which are net 
of leisure preferences and of time devoted to social and governmental 
functions. Large landowners opting to produce crops amenable to ex­
tensive cultivation can constrain labor by the amount they want to 
employ consistent with maintaining existing social and economic re­
lationships . 
^Equations 2.15, 2.16 and 2.18 plus the second-order conditions. 
2 To term these expenditures as nonproductive is perhaps incorrect. 
"Social" expenditures, for example, social observances of family events 
and giving gifts to relatives and patrons, can be viewed as means where­
by the individual's position in local society is maintained or improved. 
Such practical consequences as being able to secure financing from 
relatives and landlords during adverse economic periods and to continue 
favorable tenancy arrangements may be partially contingent upon ob­
serving these social proprieties. Also, work-share arrangements among 
villagers are maintainable only with social stability within the village. 
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Initially, determination of the optimal production technique from 
the micro-economic or individual producer standpoint is discussed. Sub­
sequently, the problem is viewed at the macro-economic level. 
Two input, one output, static case 
In Figure 4.4, isoquants similar to those in Figure 4.1 have been 
drawn. The shape of the isoquants is determined by the technical re­
lationships incorporated in the production function. When juxtaposed 
with the appropriate input price ratio, the optimum production tech­
nique associated with the specified output levels is determinable. The 
corresponding optimal production technique varies with different pro­
ducer situations. 
Capital 
Figure 4.4. Derivation of optimal production techniques for two output 
levels under alternative input price relationships 
rTz 
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With segmented isoquant A, rays OT^ and OT^ are also ridgelines de­
noting the extremeties of the alternative, economically-feasible pro­
duction techniques.^ For isoquant B, any ray from the origin to any 
point on the isoquant is economically feasible. As observed earlier, 
producers operating along isoquant A are not restricted to producing at 
points a, b, and c. Superimposing the relevant budget constraints; i.e., 
the constraint on the amount of labor and capital which can be used, the 
appropriate least-cost combinations of inputs and the corresponding pro­
duction technique are derived. The identical slopes of the two budget 
constraints indicate that both producers confront the same labor and 
MPPr Pg 
capital costs. On isoquant A, MRS - = • „ = at point b and K-L MPPJ^ P^ 
technique OT^ is used. On isoquant B, the corresponding optimum pro-
2 duction technique is OT^. 
Assume the slope of a new p / p^ ratio is equal to the slope of K Xj 
one of the segments in Figure 4.5, for example, ab. From an economic 
standpoint the producer is indifferent as to which point on ab and the 
corresponding production technique he selects. However, his attitude 
towards using greater amounts of labor versus inanimate capital would 
condition his selection of a production technique. 
^The ridgelines delimit that portion of the isoquant reflecting 
nonzero marginal products of the two inputs. 
2 Points b and d represent least-cost combinations of producing 40 
and 200 units of output, respectively. Implicitly assumed is that the 
variable costs of production at these output levels are at least covered 
by revenues earned. Also, points b and d denote economic coexistence 
of the two firms of different sizes using different production tech­
niques only if the short-run variable costs of each firm are covered. 
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For producers with relatively fixed input endowments, for example, 
subsistence-oriented producers with relatively-large amounts of labor, 
the optimal production technique is less affected by market prices for 
the two inputs. If endowments consist of OL^ and OK^ of labor and 
capital, respectively, OT^ will be employed even though the ratio of 
input prices indicates that OT^ is that technique consistent with the 
marginal conditions. If the producer measures p^ in terms of opportunity 
costs, taking into account his subjective estimates of social costs 
associated with his working as a laborer, the p^ may be considerably 
below the prevailing market wage rate so that the modified p^ / Pj^ 
ratio has a sufficiently high slope which tends to make OT^ the pro­
duction technique which also meets the marginal conditions for economic 
efficiency. Using the system described by Equation 2.19 \Aere K° denotes 
a "wages fund" concept. Figure 4.4 is slightly modified,as in Figure 4.5. 
The same quantity of output can be produced with relatively fewer labors 
but with higher per capita consumption levels, K° / L, needed to motivate 
and to enable them to perform the necessary labor functions. Conversely, 
more laborers with each working less than the previous case require a 
lower K° / L. Thus, if in Figure 4.5 of labor is normally available 
from the active members of the family unit, OTg denotes the production 
technique employed. 
Estate owners may decide to constrain the level of labor use to 
OLg in Figure 4.4. To produce 200 units of output, production technique 
OT^ would be used. According to the p^ / p^ ratio, as drawn, OT^ is the 
optimum technique. Is OT^ nonoptimal for those producers who want to 
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•gLi 
(50) 
K® / Labor 
Figure 4.5. Production technique, labor-use level, and per capita con­
sumption for a subsistence-oriented producer 
sustain existing economic and social patterns? As before, if p^ repre­
sents the opportunity costs for labor inputs, those producers who view 
the employment of more labor as having potential social, economic, and 
political costs can subjectively view p^ as being composed of the market 
wage plus these additional costs which producers may potentially incur. 
Thus, the p / p has a lower slope than that of the ratio drawn, and 
the corresponding optimal production technique may be one which approaches 
^a-
Two input, two output, static case 
This situation can be represented through the use of an Edgeworth 
Box diagram from trfiich the production possibility curve or the product 
transformation curve can be derived. Rather than begin the analysis on 
the assumption of a fixed endowment of resources which specifies the 
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dimensions of the Edgeworth Box, the following, more meaningful situa­
tion is posited. Producers do not have a fixed endowment of the two 
inputs, but they have a budget constrain which permits them to employ 
alternative combinations of the two inputs. The range of alternative 
combinations is constrained by the input prices and the budget or ex­
penditure constraint. This constraint, BB, is drawn in Figure 4.6 with 
a slope equal to p / p • Each point on this line is an economically-
feasible combination of labor and capital. 
B 
0 K2 K| K3 
Capital 
B 
Figure 4.6. Alternative, feasible combinations of labor and capital 
employable by the producer 
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What is the optimal combination of labor and capital to be applied 
to a nonspecified configuration of fixed inputs? Implicit in Figure 4.6 
is the assumption that the two inputs are perfectly divisible. Non-
divisibility can be easily introduced by specifying that only certain 
points on BB are feasible. Initially, consider point and the corre­
sponding quantities of and of labor and capital, respectively. If 
this combination is used, these would effectively become the "fixed" 
endowments of the two variable inputs and, in turn, the dimensions of 
the Edgeworth Box represented in Figure 4.8.^ The range of alternative 
production techniques for and Y^, denoted by their respective ridge-
lines, are specified in Figure 4.7. Ridgelines OC and OD delineate the 
economically-admissible combinations of labor and capital for producing 
Y^; OA. and OB apply to Y^. As arbitrarily drawn, the production of Y^ 
involves production techniques which are capital-intensive relative to 
those for Y^. Conversely, relatively labor-intensive techniques are used 
to produce Y^. The isoquants for Y^^ and Y^ together with their corre­
sponding ridgelines are drawn in Figure 4.8. The Y^ isoquants originate 
in the southwest corner of the box; northeasterly movements represent 
isoquants at higher output levels. Similarly, the Y^ isoquants or­
iginate in the northeast corner of the box. For analytical s implication, 
constant scalar returns are assumed. Given the nature and positions of 
the isoquants in Figure 4.8, the production possibility or product trans­
formation curve representing alternative combinations of Y^ and Yg 
which can be produced with and is given in Figure 4.9. The prin-
^Edgeworth Box diagrams are familiar to economists. Figure 4.8 em­
bodies an approach contained in a study by Eckaus (4.5). 
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Capital 
Figure 4.7. Economically-feasible combinations of 
labor and capital bounded by ridgelines 
for producing and 
Capitol (Ya) 
Capital (Y| ) 
Figure 4.8. Optimum input-use levels and under-
or full utilization of available re­
sources with alternative combinations 
of and Y^ produced 
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ciple employed in deriving the production possibility curve is to select, 
* 
for example, isoquant in Figure 4.8 and then maximize the amount of 
* / // 
Yg which can be produced. Given Y^, both Y^ and Y^ are possible, but 
since Y^ ' > Y^ % Y^ ' is preferred. This process continues until point 
* 1 b is reached where Y^ is tangent to the highest Y^ isoquant. One point 
on the production possibility curve has been determined, for example, 
point b in Figure 4.9. Point a in Figure 4.8 also represents a feasible 
combination of Yj^ and Y^, but since b is preferred to a, point a would 
be an interior point to the production possibility curve in Figure 4.9. 
In this sense, point b in Figure 4.9 is on the production possibility 
frontier. These points of tangency between the Y^ and Y^ isoquants 
in Figure 4.8 delineate the "contract" curve or "efficiency locus". 
If the producer is at point a in Figure 4.8, the output of either one 
or both of Yj^ and Y^ can be Increased by a movement to points on the 
"efficiency locus", for example, point b. These points on the "efficiency 
locus" can be mapped into points on the production possibility frontier 
in Figure 4.9 and vice versa. 
To determine the economically-optimtnn configuration of Y^ and Y^, 
given and K^, the ratio of the prices received by the producer for 
the two outputs is superimposed. If p / p is as represented in 
^2 ^1 
Figure 4.9, the marginal conditions in Equation 2.16 are met at point b 
Y Y 
MPP ^ MPP J' 
At point b, MRS„ ^ = = =—; this point is one 
K-L Y. i_ 
MPP^ ^ MPP^^ 
of a locus of points denoting physical efficiency given the endowments 
of labor and capital represented in Figure 4.8. 
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* * 
where p / p = RPT. With Y. and Y-, revenue is maximized. Returning 
^2 ^1 * * 
to Figure 4.8, the combination of Y^ and Y^ is obtained at point b with 
11 * * 2. 1 
L and K used to produce Y^ and Y^ and (L^ - L ) and (K^ - K ) used 
* * 
to produce Y^ . In producing Y^ , the most capital-intensive technique, 
* 
OD, is employed; for Y^ , the appropriate production technique is repre­
sented by a ray drawn from 0^ to b. 
At this point the effect of using and in deriving p^p^ in 
Figure 4.9 has been demonstrated. But this is only one of several 
feasible input combinations. Associated with each alternative input 
configuration in Figure 4.6 is a unique, corresponding production possi­
bility curve. As these additional curves are derived, an envelope of 
such curves is obtained, as in Figure 4.10. For example, the curve, 
using and K^, will have one point, for example, s^, on the "super" 
production possibility frontier. Similarly, other points on the "super" 
frontier map back to: (1) input combinations in Figure 4.6 where these 
become the dimensions of the corresponding Edgeworth Boxes only one of 
which is given in Figure 4.8; and (2) that single point on the 
"efficiency" locus in each Edgeworth Box which corresponds to the Yj^ -
Yg configuration associated with that point on the "super" frontier. 
For convenience, assume that the p / p superimposed on the "super" 
^2 ^1 
production possibility frontier is tangent at Sj^ and that this is also 
the point on the p^p^ curve which is on the "super" frontier. Then, 
and remain the best combination of the two inputs and the optimum 
* * 
output configuration remains Y^ and Y^ as designated by point b in 
Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.9. Production possibility curve for 
producing and Y„ given L. and 
Figure 4.10. "Super" production possibility 
frontier and derivation of socially-
desirable production pattern 
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Two input, two output, dynamic case 
As discussed earlier, technological progress generally affects the 
production techniques and, in turn, relative input demand and output 
configurations for adopting producers. If p^ and p^ are assumed un­
changed even though these prices would likely vary as relative input 
demand and supply conditions vary, the expenditure constraint and the 
feasible combinations of labor and capital in Figure 4.6 are unchanged. 
Changes occur, however, in the shapes and positions of the isoquants 
associated with each input endowment and, in turn, the marginal rates 
of substitution between the two inputs and the consequent optimal pro­
duction technique. The hypothetical effects can be qualitatively ex­
pressed by the above diagrams, but a simple mathematical expression better 
demonstrates the impact of technological progress. Let Equation 4.1 de­
note the static production function and Equation 4.2 the dynamic form 
where the latter incorporates allowance for technological progress.^ 
Y = a L* 
= a K*(l + *t) (4.2) 
MPP 0(1 + 0 ) ^ 
^^K-L MPP^ Qr(l + Y^) * K ( t - 1, 2. ...) (4.3) 
Technological change is admitted for capital and labor where = 
coefficient of technology for labor inputs and 0^ = coefficient of 
^The more convention method of incorporating technological progress 
into the production function is the following: ^ _ ^rt 
r = rate of technological advance per time period, t. In this formulation 
new technology is assumed to grow at the constant compound growth rate, 
r. Technological progress, however, does not appear to take this path; 
rather, progress appears at different rates and points in time and not 
in each successive time period in the planning horizon. 
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technology for capital, each corresponding to the specific time period, 
t, under consideration.^ Since technological progress does not flow 
at a continuous, constant rate, the values of the technological coef­
ficients vary with time periods, for example, ~ ^ 2 ^3 ~ ^4* 
Consider only two time periods where ^ and 0^ ^  If from 
tj^ to t^, 0 increases relative to Y, ceteris paribus, the 
MPP 
—rr— increases. That is, MPP increases relatively more than the in-
L 
crease in MPP^. Technological progress is capital-using in nature. See 
Figure 4.4, Panel a. Conversely, if Y increases relative to 0, the 
MPP^ / MPP^ ratio declines and the technological progress is labor-using 
or capital-saving. Technological progress tends to increase both 0 and 
Y. Increased labor efficiency and improved managerial inputs through 
government extension services or some other educational program not only 
increase the MPP , but since labor is in a position to use capital inputs 
more effectively, the MPP^ is also augmented. The converse is also true. 
As indicated earlier, awareness and availability of technologically-
improved inputs are necessary before producers incorporate these into 
their operations. In addition, producers have to estimate the values of 
0^ and Y^ and the consequent impact on resource productivity. Informa­
tion of varying usefulness may be available on the productivity of a 
new seed variety, fertilizer mixture, or livestock ration. Even if pro-
^In Equation 4.1, the term a reflects, among other factors, the 
impact of fixed inputs in the production process. By implication, the 
planning horizon is sufficiently short so that all inputs are not 
variable. Technological progress of a disembodied nature which affects 
the fixed inputs, for example, improvement in quality of management in­
puts, could be incorporated into Equation 4.2 in a form such as a (1 +Trp. 
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ducers have access to this information through extension services, com­
munications media, or word-of-mouth, the production response obtained 
on a research farm or even on a neighboring producer farm is usually 
not directly applicable to the situation applicable to the potential 
adopter. Differing agronomic conditions, input complements, and weather 
factors affect the productivity that potential adopters expect to 
realize. For example, what is the expected shape and position of the 
isoquants under varying assumptions regarding weather factors and the 
effect of technological progress on the marginal physical productivities 
of labor and capital? These expectations whether rational or irra­
tional, precise or imprecise, affect investment decisions, physical 
productivity possibilities, and physical efficiency of input usage. 
Such considerations then must be juxtaposed with estimated input and 
output prices in order to determine the optimal production technique. 
Two input, two output, static macro-economic case 
This situation is postulated as representing the agricultural 
sector as viewed by the national planner. The relative quantities of 
labor and capital, together with the components of a in Equation 4.1, 
such as land, are now considered fixed to this sector. For convenience, 
assume that this sectoral endowment is as indicated la Figure 4.8. 
That is, the dimensions of the Edgevorth Box represent the quantities 
of labor and capital within the entire agricultural sector. Figure 4.9 
would be the corresponding production possibility curve for the two 
agricultural outputs and Y^. Assume that a community indifference 
curve or social welfare function, SWF, representing combinations of Y^^Yg 
which provide equal amounts of utility to society, is superimposed in 
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Figure 4.9. The optimum combination of and is determined at the 
point of tangency between p^p^ and the highest SWF curve. This point 
is then 'Snapped" back into Figure 4.8 to determine the relative combina­
tions of labor and capital to be used in producing the two outputs and 
the corresponding production techniques. These production techniques 
are optimal. 
In two extreme cases which arise if the SWF curve is tangent at a 
point toward either end of the p^p^ curve, resource unemployment re­
sults.^ To demonstrate this phenomenon, initially assume that only Y^ 
is produced-. The maximum amount of Y^ is obtained where O^B intersects 
the capital (Y^) abcissa at point e in Figure 4.8. Production of only 
Yg results in labor being fully employed, but O^e of capital as being 
redundant; i.e, labor is relatively scarce in this situation. As the 
production of Yj^ is increased, production technique O^D is used for 
Y^. The use of the relatively capital-intensive technique for Y^ is 
2 
consistent with the abundance of capital relative to labor. The re-
* * 
dundancy of capital continues until point b is reached and Y^ and Yg 
_ ^ ^  
The^r^levant curve is P P . To postulate a tangency between the 
SWF and P P at a point other than S^ requires that a new diagram for 
Figure 4.8 be drawn. Consequently, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 are used to 
demonstrate the point that labor or capital can be unemployed when 
certain combinations of Y^ and Y^ are produced. 
2 At relatively low output levels of Yj^, the Y^^ and Y^ isoquants 
are tangent at points to the right of ridgeline O^D. Therefore, at 
these points the MPP^ in producing Y^ is zero and capital usage is cut 
back to the point at which the isoquant being considered intersects 
O^D. This holds until Y^ is expanded to point b in Figure 4.8. 
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are produced. The fixed endowments of labor and capital are fully 
employed at this point. Full employment continues up to point d in 
Figure 4.8. At higher output levels, the tangency points between 
the isoquants fall to the right of ridgeline OgA. The MPP^ in pro­
duction of Yg is zero at these points. Thus, production of Y^ proceeds 
along O^A, the most labor-intensive technique for producing Y^. As 
production of Y^ is expanded beyond point d and up to point f where 
only Yj^ is produced, labor is a redundant resource and capital is now 
relatively scarce. Referring to Figure 4.9, only those combinations of 
Y^ and Y^ possible on arc bd result in full employment of both labor 
and capital. If the community indifference curve were tangent at 
points on arcs cb or de, the optimum output configuration would be 
associated with the unemployment of capital and labor, respectively. 
The relative prices of labor and capital, and, hence, the least-
cost combinations of producing Yj^ and Y^ have so far been ignored. As 
indicated earlier, if only Y^ is produced initially with production of 
Y^ successively increased, Y^ would be produced using production tech­
nique O^D. Since capital is redundant, the p^ is zero and the slope of 
p^ / p^ is therefore zero.^ Thus, the least-cost combinations of pro­
ducing Y^ between points e and b in Figure 4.8 will also occur along 
ridgeline or production technique O^D. Between points b and d where 
both inputs are fully employed, the market forces will operate to effect 
the appropriate prices for labor and capital so that at the points of 
tangency between the Y^ and Y^ isoquants both labor and capital are 
^Pj^ is zero only if the redundant capital remains in the agri­
cultural sector and only if production is restricted to Y^ and Y^, 
as in Figure 4.8. 
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fully employed and the proportions in which labor and capital are used 
are also the least-cost combinations of producing the respective 
quantities of and Y^. 
The hypothetical consequences of technological progress and govern­
ment policies on the level of resource employment are discussed in the 
following section. 
Two input, two output, dynamic macro-economic case 
Two possible actions by the government which affect relative input 
use-levels are considered: (1) The government is able to influence the 
direction of technological progress through research programs and public 
policies affecting the availability of technology; and (2) The govern­
ment can implement programs affecting resource demand in various sectors 
of the economy and resource mobility among these sectors. Figure 4.8 
is again used to demonstrate the effect of these measures. If a more 
labor-intensive production technique for Y^ were developed, ridgelines 
O^C and O^D would tend to rotate counter-clockwise about 0^. Point d 
on OgA would move along ridgeline O^A towards 0^. Each movement towards 
0^ reduces the amount of previously-redundant labor. In principle, a 
sufficiently labor-intensive technique would permit full employment of 
labor. If, concomitantly, a more capital-intensive technique were de­
veloped for producing Y^, the possibility for full employment of both 
labor and capital is increased. Conversely, if a more capital-intensive 
technique for producing Y^ is devised and implemented, a greater amount 
of labor becomes redundant. Consequently, society and particular in­
dividuals incur both economic and social costs as a portion of the labor 
force remains unemployed or underemployed. Underemployment arises when 
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labor is substituted for capital beyond the point where the MPP^ equals 
zero. Consider the production of in Figure 4.8. If additional 
labor is used beyond ridgeline OgA, the MPP of these increments of 
labor is zero. Such labor is underemployed in the sense that even 
though the labor is engaged in the producing activity, such labor could 
be removed from production without decreasing production or requiring 
additional units of capital to maintain production. A change in pro­
duction technique; i.e., a change in the proportion in which labor and 
capital are employed, would be necessary, however. 
The government has another potential means for alleviating the 
labor redundancy situation. Government investment in nonagricultural 
sectors increases the demand for labor in these areas. A portion of the 
labor force is induced to migrate from the agricultural sector in re­
sponse to higher wage rates in other sectors. Also, government pro­
jects directly employing previously unemployed or underemployed in­
dividuals would have the same effect. The impact of these measures 
would be partially offset by growth in population and in the agri­
cultural labor force. As indicated earlier, these growth rates tend to 
be high for most less-developed areas. Such growth in the agricultural 
labor force would increase the vertical dimension of Figure 4.8. In 
the absence of other changes, this growth would tend to mitigate the 
potential capital redundancy situation but exacerbate potential labor 
unemployment. This appears to be the crux of several development 
problems; i.e., growth in the labor force versus growth in employment 
opportunities. Not only is there a direct effect on labor utilization 
and per capita incomes, but in turn, implications for social and politi-
199 
cal stability are apparent. These latter forces condition the environ­
ment for private investment and for developmental processes, in general. 
If a net amount of labor is removed from the agricultural sector, 
that is, the origin point 0^ is moved downward along the right-hand 
side of the Edgeworth Box in Figure 4.8, the labor redundancy situation 
associated with arc de on p^p^ in Figure 4.9 could be eliminated. With 
the ridgelines remaining unchanged, sufficient amounts of labor can be 
removed, without affecting p^p^, so that both labor and capital can be 
fully employed. The production technique employed may have to be 
changed, however. In Figure 4.11, the two Isoquants which produce a 
tangency at point r in Figure 4.8 are isolated for examination. 
Y2 
Capital ( Yz ) 
0 
0, B 'A 
Capital t Y, ) 
Figure 4.11. Determination of redundant amounts of labor and capital 
which are removable without reducing production levels 
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Considering the production of Y^» points t and r are both feasible. 
If production occurs at t with the use of production technique O^A, the 
quantity of labor unemployed amounts to u units. However, if production 
takes place at r with O^A % the MPP of units of labor beyond point t is 
zero. The AVP of all laborers is still greater than zero, however. The 
point to be made here is that if initially production takes place at 
r, the reduction of agricultural laborers through their migration to 
other sectors of the economy can occur until point t is reached. 
Associated with the new position of full employment of both labor and 
capital is a different production technique, that is, O^A for producing 
Yg. Thus, the output of Y^ can be maintained only with a change in pro­
duction technique. 
By similar reasoning, the amount of capital which is potentially 
redundant can be reduced or eliminated through the transfer of capital 
out of the agricultural sector and(or) the employment of a more capital-
intensive technique for producing Y^. Thus, through such measures as 
influencing the direction of technological progress and the relative 
costs of labor and capital, the government is, theoretically, in a 
position to affect the production techniques employed in the agri­
cultural sector and, in turn, the employment levels of labor and capital. 
^Chapter VI has a subsection discussing public investment in the 
infrastructure of the economy. 
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Choice Indicators and Imputation of Product 
to Production Inputs 
After inputs have been committed to production and an actual out­
put configuration realized, the monetized value of the outputs can be 
imputed to the various inputs employed. This imputation process can 
be executed in any number of ways. The theoretical approach most 
commonly employed is that of allocating the values of the outputs 
according to the marginal value productivity of the various inputs used 
in producing these outputs. Implicitly, the production process is 
assumed to be instantaneous in that inputs are paid only after the 
production is realized. Actually, wages paid to hired laborers and 
consumption requirements of family laborers during the production period 
represent a continuing claim on quantities subsequently produced and 
harvested. Referring to Equation 2.9, these claims are sustained by 
K°. Expenditures for other variable inputs such as fertilizers and 
irrigation water are additional claims against K°. 
If the working capital, K°, was secured through external 
financing, then K° plus interest must be repaid out of current or future 
revenues. If K° is accumulated internally within the firm and if K° 
is to be available for the succeeding production period, then K° 
must be withheld from current revenues, obtained externally, or some 
combination of funds from these two sources must be obtained. 
If the production function is linearly homogenous and if inputs 
are paid their marginal value products, then the total product or 
revenue will be completely exhausted. However, if the firm is operating 
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in a perfectly competitive market so that the demand curve it faces is 
perfectly elastic, both MC and MR are linear and horizontal so that 
the optimum output level is indeterminate if MR  ^ MC. If MR < MC, the 
output level is zero. Determinateness can be effected if the production 
function is nonhomogenous so that the cost curves are not linear. 
Total product can be fully imputed to inputs if the first- and second-
order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied and if total 
revenue equals total costs. The following equations are in terms of 
a single output; the procedure is generalizable to several outputs. 
m 
pq = Z p q where q = f(q,, ..., q^) (4.4) 
j=l J J i -m 
pj = pfj = MVPj ( j = 1, m) (4.5) 
m m 
pq = p Z f. q .  and q  = Z f. q .  (4.6) 
j=l ^ ^ j=l ^ ^ 
VJ 
Equation 4.4 requires that TR = TC where f is the functional re­
lationship between the inputs and output q. The first-order conditions 
for profit maximization require that each input be used up to the point 
where the MVP of each input is equal to the cost of the input. This 
condition is represented in Equation 4.5. By substitution. Equation 
4.6 is derived which indicates that if each input is paid its MVP, the 
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total value of the output is just exhausted.^ If the demand curve faced 
by the producer is not horizontal so that his output level affects the 
roarlcet price, then the more general condition expressed in Equation 4.7 
2 is applicable. With horizontal demand curves, the conditions for 
total imputation of the outputs are also represented in Figure 4.12. 
LRMC 
LRAC « o 
a. 
Quantity 
Figure 4.12. Cost curves for two firms of different size 
Samuelson states that Equation 4.6 is not the same as that derived 
on the basis of Euler's theorem since the latter should be written as 
an identity; i.e., m (4.11, p. 86). Equation 4.6 is derived 
from the first-order conditions for profit maximization and is not based 
on a linearly homogenous production function. Under purely competitive 
conditions, the homogenous function would generate the above Identity. 
^With a horizontal demand curve '^  =  p .  W i t h  a  d o w n w a r d  dq ôq 
ÔR 
sloping demand curve. Equation 4.5 should be rewritten as: p^ =( / 
)fj = MRPj where is the marginal revenue product of the j-th 
input. 
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Implicit in the cost curves is the condition that the first- and second-
order conditions for profit maximization have been met. That is, each 
cost curve represents the minimum unit cost of producing the correspond­
ing output. 
With p^, TR = TC at point A for a firm having a cost structure 
SAC^ and MC^. If each input used in producing Oq^ is paid its MVP, 
then total revenue, amounting to Op^Aq^, will be completely imputed or 
exhausted. For the firm with a cost structure resulting in SAC^ and 
MCg, Oq^ is produced if the expected market price is Pj^. However, TR > 
TC for this firm, i.e., Op^Cq^ > OpDq^. 
pq > E p q (4.4) 
j=l ^ ^ 
m m 
pq > p 2 f.q. and q > Z f.q. (4.6)' 
j=l J J j=l J J 
Equation 4.4 is rewritten as an inequality in Equation 4.4 . Equation 
4.5 still holds; however, Equation 4.6 becomes an inequality and is re-
/ ® 
written as Equation 4.6 . The reason q > S f.q. is because at point 
j=l J ^ 
D on SAC^, the AP^ > MP^ = f^ and summing with the underestimates the 
total product. If with p^ the output level were Oq^, TR would equal 
TC. Alternatively, point B is the minimum point on both SAC^ and LRAC. 
Therefore, at point B constant returns to scale prevail and APj = MP^ 
and the total product and revenue will be fully imputed. At point B, 
however, p^ > MC^ so that this is a nonoptimal output level. If 
prevails, the "pure profits" accruing to Firm 2 will eventually be 
capitalized into the cost structure thereby raising the SAC curve until 
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the "pure profit" is eliminated. 
The Importance of prices received and paid is evident in Figure 
4.12. If the p. increase while technology remains essentially un-
J 
changed, the cost curves would move upward. With p^, the firm 
operating with SAC^ would not be able to cover its total costs. The 
firm having SACg would experience a decrease in the "pure profits" being 
realized. An increase in taxes would also raise average costs. A 
similar result would occur if p^ falls through shifts in the market 
supply and demand schedules. If through market imperfections or public 
pricing policies Pj^ is maintained, firms operating to the right of SAC^ 
with larger physical plants are able to realize profits in excess of 
normal returns on their investment plus allowance for risk-taking. Con­
sequently, after paying all costs, including taxes, they have a residual 
which can be consumed, saved, or privately invested. That is, they 
have the financial capability for, among other uses, net private in­
vestment in the firm. Some first can move downward along LRAC until 
point B is reached. However, increased private investment may raise 
the Pj so that the cost curves tend to shift upward. 
When TR = TC and the total product is fully imputed to the inputs, 
the income distribution pattern relative to the income pq being con­
sidered is also determined. The income is distributed on the basis the 
amounts and the productivity of the resources or inputs owned by in­
dividuals. Some of the in Equation 2.9 represent inputs of family 
labor and management and of services from draft animals. The amount of 
pq imputed to these inputs represents income to the firm for consumption 
purposes and, in the case of management inputs, a return for risk-
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taking. Similarly, a portion of pq is imputed to other inputs owned by 
the firm such as land and tools which are not included in the q^ but 
appear implicitly in F, the implicit production function. For those q^ 
obtained from merchant-traders, of total pq is paid to these in­
dividuals, If these q^ were obtained on credit, then the effective 
prices are p^(1 + i) and Pj^j plus interest must be repaid to the 
merchant-traders. As the terms of trade to cultivators vary, so does 
the income distribution within the agricultural sector and among 
sectors of the economy. Furthermore, creditors are often in a position 
to effectively force debtors to market their output with them and at a 
price set by the creditor. For example, if the firm having SAC^ in 
Figure 4.12 produces in terms of p^ where is either the market price 
expected to prevail or is even a publicly-supported price, Oq^ will be 
planned production level. If Oq^ is realized but the cultivator's 
creditor pays a price less than p^, then TR < TC and the income imputed 
to family labor or fixed inputs must be decreased. 
In densely-populated areas, land is usually the most limiting 
production input. For short-run production decisions, land is usually 
a fixed input to which a residual is imputed after expenditures for 
the variable inputs have been made. The opportunity cost of the invest­
ment in land by owner-operators should be included in the short-run 
cost curves in Figure 4.12. The capitalized value of this residual to 
land is one estimation of the value of the land. This residual is also 
one approximation of the rent value of the land. 
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CHAPTER V. RURAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
At some point in time, external financing is required by most 
agriculturalists throughout the world. The factors creating demand for 
credit are universal: to sustain consumption patterns during periods 
of falling incomes, to accommodate emergency situations, to finance 
private investment and production expenses, and to engage in conspicuous 
consumption. The conditions affecting credit availability and use 
vary with the size of the firm and the stage of development of the 
agricultural sector and of the economy, in general. For subsistence-
oriented producers, external financing is a means of alleviating the 
impact of those factors which upset the relatively stable pattern of 
production and consumption. For these individuals, the need is often 
so imperative that the terms under which credit is provided is not of 
immediate importance. The consequences, however, can be of long-term 
importance. High interest rates and repayment schedules not geared to 
the debtor's capacity to repay, a capacity which is extremely low for 
subsistence-oriented producers, put the debtor primarily at the mercy 
of private lenders. The consequence is often the need to secure ad­
ditional credit and possible, eventual appropriation of the debtor's 
assets by the lender. Consequently, providers of funds, whether pro­
fessional moneylenders, merchants, or landlords, are able to accumulate 
assets and labor services from the debtor, both which further weaken 
his bargaining power relative to those exerting influence on his economic 
and social well-being. 
Because of a relatively larger stock of assets and better acumen 
for engaging in business relationships, the market-oriented producer is 
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in a somewhat more favorable position that subsistence-oriented producers. 
Through the bargaining process, the terms of credit granted him are more 
reflective of the purpose for which the credit is to be used and of his 
credit worthiness. Yet, smaller, market-oriented producers are subjected 
to many of the pressures surrounding credit to subsistence-oriented 
producers. They have a relatively low capacity to save and, therefore, 
are highly dependent upon external financing. 
The owners of large production units such as estates and planta­
tions usually have recourse to the same sources of credit as in­
dustrialists and import-export firms. These commercial sources are in 
a position to provide relatively low-cost credit. Too often, the 
services of these institutions are not available to smaller producers 
or are available only on a very limited scale. Foreign-owned enterprises 
have access to relatively inexpensive capital available from the de­
veloped countries. These firms have the collateral, managerial com­
petence, and business contacts permitting them to secure financing on 
favorable terms. 
As a generalized definition, credit may be viewed as a temporary 
transfer of resources, either in monetary or real form, from those with 
a relative abundance to those in need of additional resources where the 
latter, in addition to repaying the Initial value of the credit extended, 
compensate the owner for the use of his resources. This compensation, 
that is, "interest", assumes a number of forms. It may be monetary or 
payment in kind, labor services provided by the debtor, or creditors 
having the use and product from some of the debtor's resources for a 
limited period of time. In addition to credit in the form of money, credit 
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in kind is granted as seeds, fertilizers, and tools are advanced by a 
local merchant, landlord, or cooperative organization. Credit in the 
form of consumption goods is also usually available from merchants. 
As will be examined below, some of the available evidence attests 
to the irony of this situation. That is, some of those who need credit 
most are those who are also crucial to the success of stimulating and 
sustaining growth in the agricultural sector. Yet, they cannot secure 
the necessary financing on favorable terms. In contrast, large, ex­
tensively-farmed estates have access to low-cost credit but are often 
interested in maintaining existing economic and social relationships. 
Further, plantations producing export crops generate foreign exchange, 
but only a relatively small proportion of these earnings are returned 
as investment in the agricultural sector. 
Subsequent to an examination of the data found in the literature 
and a discussion of the factors affecting the supply-demand conditions 
for credit in the agricultural sector, concluding statements will be 
made relative to (1) whether or not the interest rates as reported 
being paid by cultivators appear to be exorbitant, and (2) the impact 
of contemporary rural credit institutions on Investment decisions and 
on individual economic and social well-being. The heterogeneity of 
sources of credit and the terms under which credit is granted greatly 
complicate an analysis of the operation of credit institutions in 
less-developed areas. This is further accentuated by the relative 
lack of empirical evidence on credit operations, especially credit from 
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private sources.^ 
Demand for Credit 
The necessity and usefulness of credit financing have already been 
alluded to in the first paragraph. This necessity arises from the fact 
that wealth is not distributed according to the various capital require­
ments of individuals engaged in economic activities. In the context of 
agricultural growth, credit represents the means whereby private invest­
ment in improved inputs, to the extent that such inputs are available, 
provides the potential for shifting the production function upward or 
for reducing the variability of output realized in any production period. 
Credit also is necessary to obtain working capital, both in traditional 
and improved forms, so that the producer can begin cultivation and 
planting operations. 
Credit provides one of the ingredients for transforming the 
structure of the agr icultviral sector so that both development and growth 
can potentially proceed. This longer-term credit may be used for 
digging wells and expanding irrigation systems. Long-term credit may 
permit previous tenants to become landowners, thus modifying the tenure 
structure with potentially favorable effects on private investment and 
land-use patterns. Also, cooperatives engaged in marketing and input-
supplying activities may be financed by private and public funds. 
^The credit surveys undertaken in India have provided valuable 
data for this country. The results of the 1951-52 rural credit survey 
have been published (5.13). Annual follow-up surveys were undertaken 
for the years 1956-60. 
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External credit enables cultivators to weather unexpected con­
tingencies, seasonal discontinuities of income, and crop reductions or 
failures which in the absence of credit would force cultivators to 
sell a portion of their productive assets or labor services. Other 
things being equal, this reduction in productive inputs would tend to 
reduce future production and, in turn, the producer's capacity to 
meet annual production and consumption requirements. 
The high incidence of credit obtained from private or informal 
sources, and these lenders' predilection not to keep records nor to 
divulge the nature of their transactions tend to obscure the reasons 
for demanding credit and the actual use made of funds provided by 
creditors. However, determination of the actual use of credit is 
important in devising credit institutions which can accommodate the 
needs of borrowers and in assessing the economic efficiency of using 
one of the scarcer resources in most less-developed areas. 
Despite a general reluctance to incur the economic and social onus 
of debt, the data obtained in the All-India Rural Credit Survey (5.13) 
indicate that among cultivators and noncultivators, the percent of 
families borrowing was 58.6 and 38.6, respectively, during the 1951-52 
period. In determining the demand for credit, both the number of 
prospective borrowers and their respective credit requirements must 
be considered. In addition, the distribution of demand through time 
has an important bearing on the capacity of credit suppliers to provide 
the quantities of credit demanded.^ Tables 5.1 and 5.2 contain the 
high proportion of short-term loans gives creditors relatively 
high liquidity with a capacity to accommodate credit needs as they arise. 
As will be suggested later, this liquidity is usually associated with 
higher credit costs to the borrower. 
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Table 5.1. Frequency distribution of districts according to the 
proportion of borrowing families among four classes of 
cultivators in India during 1951-52* 
Proportion of Number of districts 
borrowing Big Large Medium Small 
families cultivators cultivators cultivators cultivators 
Below 10 percent - - 1 -
10 to 20 percent 3 1 - 2 
20 to 30 percent 1 3 6 8 
30 to 40 percent 7 6 2 7 
40 to 50 percent 18 11 15 15 
50 to 60 percent 13 25 15 18 
60 to 70 percent 15 12 15 11 
70 to 80 percent 12 8 14 10 
80 to 90 percent 6 8 4 3 
90 to 100 percent — — 1 3 1 
Total districts 75 75 75 75 
i fc  
Source: Jakhade (5.7, Table II.). 
Table 5.2. Frequency distribution of districts according to average size of borrowing among 
four classes of cultivators in India during 1951-52* 
Number of districts 
Big 
cultivators 
Large 
cultivators 
Average size 
of 
borrowing 
Per Per 
Per borrowing Per borrowing 
family family family family 
Medium 
cultivators 
Per 
Per borrowing 
family family 
Small 
cultivators 
Per 
Per borrowing 
family family 
Nil 
Below Rs. 100 5 -  - 5 -  - 21 3 37 10 
Rs. 100 - 200 8 17 6 30 22 28 29 
Rs. 200 - 300 13 8 14 8 13 18 8 20 
Rs. 300 - 400 6 4 13 9 9 13 2 5 
Rs. 400 - 500 10 9 10 12 2 10 8 
Rs. 500 - 600 12 5 8 6 5 -  - 2 
Rs. 600 - 700 5 7 2 7 3 1 
Rs. 700 - 800 2 8 7 -- -- -  - - -
Rs. 800 - 900 4 7 2 5 - - 1 -  - - -
Rs. 900 - 1000 1 1 2 6 - - -  - -  - — 
Rs. 1000 - 2000 8 23 2 9 
Rs. 2000 . and above 1 3 -- -  - - - -- -  - — 
Total districts 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
"k 
Source: Jakhade (5.7, Table IV,). 
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frequency distributions for the number of borrowing families and the 
amount borrowed for four classes of cultivators,^ respectively. 
According to Table 5.1, the percentage distribution of borrowers 
is not markedly different for the four classes of cultivators. The 
overall borrowing rates further substantiate this. The percent of 
families borrowing in all districts was 57 percent for the "big" 
cultivators, 59 percent for the "large" cultivators, and 61 and 55 per­
cent for 'Medium" and "small" cultivators, respectively (5.7, p. 254). 
Table 5.2 indicates a positive association between the size of the 
farming operation and the amount borrowed. "Small" cultivators borrow 
or are restricted to borrowing in relatively small amounts. This does 
not suggest, however, that small cultivators do not have need for 
or could use larger quantities of credit. "Big" cultivators not only 
have the collateral for securing large loans, but they would also be 
expected to require larger amounts for investment and working capital. 
This is borne out in Table 5.3 where capital and current expenditure on 
farms are positively associated with farm size while family or consump­
tion expenditures have an inverse association with farm size. Nearly 
60 percent of the credit obtained by small cultivators was reported as 
Within each village, cultivating families were ranked in descending 
order by the size of cultivated holding into ten deciles of approximately 
equal numbers of families. For the village sample, two families from 
each of the first five deciles and one family from each of the last five 
deciles were randomly selected. At the district level, the deciles were 
grouped into three categories. The "large", 'Wdium", and "small" 
cultivator categories represent the first three, the middle four, and 
the last three deciles, respectively. The "big" cultivator category is 
a subset of the "large" and represents only the first decile. Where the 
"upper and lower strata" terms are used, they represent the first five 
and last five deciles, respectively (5.13). 
Table 5.3. Percentage distribution of borrowing according to purpose among four classes of 
cultivators in India during 1951-52* 
Borrowing for the purpose specified as percentage of total borrowings 
Purpose of borrowing 
Big 
cultivators 
Large 
cultivators 
Medium 
cultivators 
Small 
cultivators 
All 
cultivators 
(Percent) 
Capital expenditure 
on farm 35.5 34.7 30.5 23.2 31.5 
Current expenditure 
on farm 13.3 12.1 10.1 6.8 10.6 
Non-farm business 
expenditure 6.4 4.9 3.3 6.0 4.5 
Family expenditure 37.2 41.2 49.5 59.8 46.9 
Other expenditure 7.2 6.6 6.0 3.9 6.0 
More than one purpose 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 
Total* 100.0 
(25.2) 
100.0 
(51.1) 
100.0 
(33.0) 
100.0 
(15.9) 
100.0 
figures in brackets represent the percent of total borrowings accounted for by each 
class of cultivator. 
*Source; All-India Rural Credit Survey II (5.13, p. 293). 
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being used for family expenditures. This likely reflects the rela­
tively low incomes and cash reserves of these individuals and their 
seasonality of income. Larger producers have more opportunities to 
diversify farm enterprises and to receive a more even flow of income 
throughout the year. 
The distribution between short- and long-term loans for alternative 
purposes is given by Table 5.6. Considering average borrowings for agri­
cultural uses, about two-thirds of the credit was obtained on a long-
term basis and the remaining one-third was considered to be of a short-
term nature. In comparison, average borrowings for consumption were 
nearly evenly divided between short- and long-term arrangements. The 
amounts borrowed for other uses were relatively unimportant. Again, it 
should be kept in mind that these data are those reported for 1951-52 
only. 
Prior to examining some estimates of demand elasticities, estimates 
which are not disaggregated according to purpose of borrowing, an in­
tuitive discussion of the nature of the demand curves for the major 
uses of credit is presented. In Figure 5.1, demand curve is 
drawn to reflect a low responsiveness of credit demand to changes in 
the interest rate.^ Curve is appropriate for small-scale 
cultivators borrowing for short-term consumption expenditures and for 
financing working expenses necessary for planting and cultivation of 
^The interest elasticity of demand varies with points on the de­
mand curve. Thus, low responsiveness does not imply an inelastic de­
mand. Rather, incremental changes in interest rates are associated 
with less-than-proportional changes in quantities of credit. 
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crops. Curve may be appropriate for a different class of consump­
tion expenditures. These are, for example, marriages and other social 
events where social pressure may motivate borrowers to expend at 
least a minimum outlay, which is assumed to require of credit. Be­
yond this level, however, the amount borrowed in order to increase the 
lavishness of the event is more responsive to changes in the interest 
1 
rate (5.6). The credit demand function for consumption expenditures 
is implicitly summarized in Equation 5.1 where i = effective interest 
rate, R = cash reserves or stocks of saleable commodities, C = con­
sumption to meet physiological requirements, and S = social pressures 
influencing consumption patterns. 
= D^(i, R, C, S) (5.1) 
The weights attached to the independent variables differ with 
different consumption objectives. For D^D^, R and C assume importance 
while i and especially S have only a secondary impact. Conversely, 
for ^2^2' ^  ^ are of much greater importance. For large-scale 
cultivators, those with more assets and presumably higher reserves, 
both the shape and position of the demand curves in Figure 5.1 will be 
different from those specified. 
An implicit demand function for credit to be used as working 
capital is given in Equation 5.2. The P^/Pj ratio reflects the product-
^An important policy consideration should be apparent. With a de­
mand curve such as D^D^, the borrower's need is so imperative that the 
price or interest rate is of secondary importance. This, juxtaposed 
with private lenders* monopolistic or oligopolistic powers, suggests 
that lenders are in a favorable position to exploit borrowers by 
charging higher than justified interest rates. That is, they can 
readily shift their supply schedules to individual borrowers to the 
left and exact higher interest rates. 
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input price relationships which condition the profitability of using 
the j production 
° VPJ- (5-2) 
inputs. The term MPP^ is a proxy for the MPP of the j inputs purchas­
able with the producer's working capital. The cost of securing credit, 
i. can be added to the p^ so that the purchase price plus interest 
costs represent the total cost of acquiring inputs through external 
financing. The demand curve for a single input is identical to that 
in Figure 3.1. The input j can profitably be used in the production of 
output i up to the point where the MVP^ = p^ . MPP^ = p^ where credit 
costs are included in p^. For two inputs. Figure 2.3 is appropriate. 
Figure 5.2 is used to demonstrate the demand for credit for medium-
and long-term investments in individual farming operations.^ The demand 
curve for capital which represents the optimum capital stock at each 
rate of interest is defined in terms of that level of cost for capital 
goods or services which would be operative if net investment were zero. 
This cost level is denoted as r in Panel c. In Panel a, points of 
optimum capital stock are represented by the marginal efficiency of 
capital curve, NEC. Each point on the MEC reflects expected net 
yields associated with the various levels of capital. The downward 
slope results from diminishing returns to additional increments of 
capital when replacement cost of capital amounts to r. 
For a more comprehensive discussion of Figure 5.2, see Shapiro 
(5.16), pp. 249-261. The macro-economic formulation he describes is 
adapted here to represent private investment decisions. 
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Credit 
Figure 5.1. Demand schedules for short-term 
credit to meet consumption ex­
penditures 
i.MEl i,MEC 
.MEC 
S Investment KQK, K' 
Capital 
PRICE 
(COST) 
Capitol Goods 
C 
Figure 5.2. Derivation of demand for investment goods when secured 
through external financing 
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The initial capital position is postulated as K^. Capital has been 
added to the point where MEC is equal to the prevailing interest rate, 
i^. Panel b contains the marginal efficiency of investment curves 
associated with alternative capital positions. For example, (K^) re­
presents the net returns to increments of investment added to capital 
stock K^. The MEI curves slope downward for two reasons: (1) 
Diminishing returns are associated with increments of investment to the 
previous capital stock; and (2) The supply curve of capital or invest­
ment goods to the individual investor slopes upward. The supply curve, 
s's, is drawn to reflect not only the acquisition costs of capital 
goods which are assumed to be constant to the individual investor but 
also the additional costs of financing the purchase of these goods 
through the use of credit. Assuming that credit costs increase with 
additional amounts borrowed, S S is an upward-sloping supply function.^ 
This is assumed due to higher opportunity costs and additional risk 
associated with larger quantities of credit provided. These factors 
should be partially offset by lower administrative costs associated with 
loans of larger amounts. 
Let some exogenous change occur which causes MEC^ to shift to MEC^. 
This might occur as a result of a change in the tenure arrangement, a 
newly-initiated government program of price supports or public invest­
ment in irrigation systems, or any other number of factors. The new 
Hïhether the supply curve S S is linear or curvilinear, the rate 
at which it slopes upward, and the range throughout which it exists for 
individual borrowers are empirical questions. The assumption that the 
cost of investment goods, exclusive of interest charges, is constant 
is invalid when several investors are considered. 
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* 
optimal capital position is K > where is the initial position. 
The corresponding MEI curve is now (K^). In the first time period, 
investment is undertaken to point the new temporary equilibrium, 
where MEI equals i . This amount of investment is added to K and a 
o o 
new capital stock of, for example, is obtained. However, this is 
* 
still short of K , the desired capital stock. Another MEI curve cor­
responding to is drawn and investment amounting to I^ is made in 
period two. This process is repeated until sufficient investment is 
made so that K is realized. As is apparent, the rate of investment de­
clines as successive additions to the capital stock are made. 
The credit demand function for investment goods necessary to attain 
the optimum stock of capital is implicitly represented by Equation 5.3. 
The term represents the demand for credit to finance payment of 
* 
investment goods in period t, (K - K^) is the disequilibrium in optimal 
capital position, p^ is the total acquisition cost of capital or invest­
ment goods, and T represents an allowance for technological change. 
= D^li, MEC, (K* - K^), p^, T] (5.3) 
Some variations in the credit supply curve which have differential 
impacts on the rate of investment and on the length of time necessary to 
* 
reach K can be postulated. For example, the debt incurred in investing 
I^ may make the borrower a higher risk. The lender may then be moti­
vated to alter the credit supply curve for period two, for example, S's 
rotates about point S'in a counter-clockwise direction. This results 
in MEI,_ N having a higher slope and, in turn, investment in period 
two is less than I^. To the extent that this occurs in period two and 
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subsequent periods, more time elapses before K is reached. A variation 
with an opposite consequence might be the following: the borrower's 
credit worthiness is increased by some agency guaranteeing repayment 
of his loan. Instead of facing s's, the credit supply curve rotates 
about S ' in a clockwise manner so that investment in each time period 
* 
is augmented and K is reached in a shorter period of time. In all 
of the above discussion related to Figure 5.2, it has been implicitly 
assumed that the only changes occurring are those which have been 
postulated. In reality, the shift in the NEC curve may also affect 
the shape and position of the S S curve. Furthermore, changes in the 
interest rate alter optimum capital positions and the amount of in­
vestment that can be profitably added during each time period. 
Estimates of demand elasticities for credit have been calculated 
for Indian cultivators based on the data obtained in the 1951-52 
rural credit survey and follow-up surveys undertaken during 1956-60 
(5.12)? Several tables are included in the study; only two are pre­
sented for consideration here. Table 5.4 is a composite of the derived 
marginal propensities to borrow and the estimated demand elasticities 
associated with various combinations of the independent variables. 
^Pani (5.12) used simple least squares techniques in deriving re­
gression coefficients. The statistical model employed was Credit = a + 
aj^R + a^C + a^F + a^A + u where the Independent variables are average 
rate of interest, capital expenditure on farm, family expenditure on 
selected items, and average value of selected assets, respectively; u 
is the error term. Pan! discusses the limitations of his study on pp. 187-
188 and concludes that "The results have been Interpreted more on their 
consistency rather than their statistical inference" (5.12, p. 188). 
Table 5.4. Marginal propensities to borrow and derived elasticities 
for credit demand among Indian cultivators for two time 
periods** 
Marginal propensity to borrow in Rs. 
with respect to changes in 
Average Family ex-
interest rate Capital ex- penditure on Value of 
(percent penditure on selected selected 
Constant per annum) farm (Rs.) items (Rs.) assets (Rs.) 
1951-52 (75 districts); 
+ 72.35 - 4.43 + 0.74 + 0.16 + 0,004 
(1.84) (0.14) (0.09) (0.004) 
+ 71.99 - 4.52 + 0.78 + 0.19 * 
(1.83) (0.13) (0.09) 
+ 127.29 - 4.94 + 0.93 * * 
(1.87) (0.12) 
+ 395.91 - 9.63 * * * 
(2.42) 
+ 11.37 * + 1.02 * * 
(0.11) 
1956-60 (36 districts); 
+ 79.52 - 4.04 + 0.63 + 0.22 + 0.001 
(2.80) (0.22) (0.15) (0.005) 
+ 79.14 - 4.00 + 0.65 + 0.22 * 
(2.74) (0.19) (0.14) 
+ 109.78 - 2.64 + 0.87 * * 
(2.63) (0.13) 
+ 452.69 -11.81 * * * 
(3.43) 
+ 52.81 * + 0.94 * * 
(0.11) 
^The average interest rate is exclusive of loans at the "nil" rate 
of interest. 
* 
Variable not included in the equation. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors of the coefficients. 
** 
Source; Pani (5.12, Table 9), 
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Elasticity at average level with 
respect to changes in 
M. 14- • 1 Family 
ip e or Capital expendi- Average 
® Average expendi- ture on value of 
corre a on rate of ture on selected selected 
R or r interest farm items assets 
+ 0.77 
+ 0.77 
+ 0.75 
- 0.42 
+ 0.72 
- 0.43 + 0.68 + 0.29 + 0.10 
0.43 + 0.72 + 0.36 
- 0.47 + 0.86 
- 0.93 
+ 0.94 
+ 0.84 
+ 0.84 
+ 0.83 
- 0.50 
+ 0.82 
- 0.25 + 0.54 + 0.39 
- 0.24 + 0.55 + 0.39 
0.16 + 0.74 
- 0.72 
+ 0.80 
+ 0.02 
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The derived credit demand equations when all four independent 
variables are included are given in Equations 5.4 and 5.5 which correspond 
to the 1951-52 and 1956-60 data, respectively. Considering Equation 5.4, 
a one percent decline in the average interest rate, ceteris paribus, is 
estimated to increase borrowings by about 4.4 rupees. Similarly, if only 
capital expenditure is increased by 100 rupees, the amount borrowed is 
estimated to increase by 74 rupees. An increase in family expenditures 
by 100 rupees, with the values of other variables unchanged, is 
associated with an increase in borrowing by 16 rupees. The variable 
denoting 'Value of selected assets" has only a negligible effect on the 
marginal propensity to borrow. The marginal propensities to borrow de­
rived from the 1956-60 data are of the same general magnitude as those 
in Equation 5.4. Borrowers, however, were expected to be somewhat 
less responsive to changes in capital expenditures and slightly more 
responsive to changes in family expenditures. 
Credit = 72.35 -4.43(R) + 0.74(C) + 0.16(F) + 0.004(A) (5.4) 
Credit = 79.52 -4.04(R) + 0.63(C) + 0.22(F) + 0.001(A) (5.5) 
The derived demand elasticities in Table 5.4 have the expected 
signs. Based on the 1951-52 data when all independent variables are 
included in the regression equation, a reduction In the average rate of 
interest by one percent, ceteris paribus, is associated with and in­
crease in credit borrowed by .43 percent. If capital expenditures on 
the farm increase by ten percent, borrowings are estimated to increase 
by 6.8 percent. In comparison to these estimates, the demand elastici­
ties based on the 1956-60 data are all lower except for family ex­
penditures on selected items. Thus, with the exception of family ex­
227 
penditures, credit demand had become less responsive to changes in the 
selected variables. Pani does not attempt an interpretation of this. 
Cultivators in the later period may have been in a relatively poorer 
economic position so that more credit was necessary for consumption ex­
penditures, and the interest rate was less important in meeting these 
and other expenditures. 
The amount of variation explained by the independent variables 
is obtained by squaring R or r. The fit for the 1956-60 data is some­
what better; i.e., about .71 as compared with .59 for the 1951-52 data. 
As family expenditures and average value of selected assets are omitted 
2 from the equations, the coefficients of determination, r , are 
essentially unchanged. That is, these variables had little effect in 
explaining the variation in credit or amounts borrowed, the dependent 
variable. 
The demand elasticities associated with subgroups of cultivators 
are given in Table 5.5. For the 1951-52 data, the interest elasticity 
of demand was much lower for the bottom fifty percent as compared with 
the top half. That is, the average interest rate is a relatively less 
important factor in determining the amount of credit borrowed for the 
lower half of the cultivators. The respective interest elasticities 
derived for the subgroups of cultivators in the 1956-60 surveys are 
more difficult to interpret. The interest elasticities for the last two 
groups would be expected to be lower than for the top ten or thirty per­
cent of cultivators.^ Looking at the 1956-60 portion of Table 5.5, 
^Pani's only comment is that "This divergence Is possible due to 
the fact that compared to the level of credit operations the marginal 
changes in loans are small in the case of the top group of cultivators" 
(5.12, p. 197). 
Table 5.5. Elasticities of credit demand among Indian cultivators, classified according to 
decile, for two time periods* 
Elasticity at the average level with respect to changes in 
Family 
Average Capital expenditure Value of Total ex-
Period /subgroup of interest expenditure on selected selected penditures 
cultivators rate* on farm items assets (3+4) 
1951-52; 
Top fifty percent 
Bottom fifty percent 
1956-60; 
Top ten percent 
Top thirty percent 
Middle forty percent 
Bottom thirty percent 
-0.51 
-0.10 
-0.15 
-0.10 
-0.39 
-0.25 
+0.71 
+0.62 
+0.82 
+0.88 
+0.08 
40.05 
+0.28 
+0.34 
+0.12 
+0.02 
+0.91 
+0.88 
+0.09 
+0.11 
-0.04 
-0 .01  
- 0 . 1 1  
-0.02 
+0.99 
40.96 
40.94 
40.90 
40.99 
+0.93 
^The average interest rate is exclusive of loans at the "nil" rate of interest. 
Source; Pani (2, Table 14). 
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credit demand by the top two subgroups is quite responsive to changes in 
capital expenditures on the farm. In contrast, credit demand by the 
lower two subgroups; that is, those in relatively poor economic positions, 
is essentially unaffected by capital expenditures. Conversely, family 
expenditures are very important in affecting the credit demand of these 
economically less-"well-off" cultivators as compared with the top ten 
and thirty percent of cultivators. 
Sources of Credit 
Perhaps the best term to characterize sources of credit in less-
developed areas is that they are heterogenous—heterogenous in their ob­
jectives associated with supplying credit, in the terms under which 
credit is offered, and in the nature of attendant services provided by 
creditors. Alternative sources often range from credit provided by 
relatives with low or no interest being paid to closely-supervised 
credit offered by agricultural banks or government-regulated marketing 
cooperatives requiring payment of interest. This variability com­
plicates the design and implementation of public programs to effectively 
regulate and supplement private sources of credit. 
Table 5.6 is a summarization of the data collected for 1951-52 in the 
All-India Rural Credit Survey (5.13). "Organized" or public sources; 
that is, government and conmerical banks provided only 3.2 percent of the 
reported amount borrowed. On the other hand, moneylenders represented 
the most important source of credit, providing nearly two-thirds of the 
average amount borrowed per family. Slightly over 10 percent was fur­
nished by relatives. In addition, moneylenders were the source of the 
Table 5.6. Average borrowing of Indian cultivators and percentage 
distribution according to source of credit for 1951-52, 
classified according to purpose and source** 
Credit agency Purpose 
(Amounts in 
rupees per 
Agricultural 
* 
Total Short -term Long-•term 
family) Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
Government 5.2 2.7 0.7 2.8 3.1 6.0 
Cooperatives 6.2 3.2 2.8 11.3 1.2 2.4 
Relatives 22.4 11.8 1.9 7.5 6.7 13.1 
Landlords 4.2 2.2 0.5 2.1 1.4 2.8 
Agriculturist 
moneylenders 63.3 33.2 8.4 34.1 19.9 38.7 
Professional 
moneylenders 61.8 32.4 6.2 25.1 12.0 23.3 
Traders and 
commission 
agents 16.3 8.5 2.5 10.1 4.4 8.6 
Commercial 
banks 1.0 0.5 0.4 1.7 0.2 0.5 
Others 10.6 5.5 1.3 5.3 2.4 4.6 
Total 191.0 100.0 24.8 100.0 51.3 100.0 
* 
Includes "others". 
** 
Source : Jakhade (5.7, Table X). 
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Purpose 
Non-agricultural Consumption 
Repayments of 
Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term old debts 
Am- Per- Am- Per- Am- Per- Am- Per- Am- Per-
ount cent ount cent ount cent ount cent ount cent 
0.5 
—- 1 « 4 
-- 1.8 
0.6 25.2 
0.5 22.9 
0.3 15.6 
-- 1.8 
0.7 30.8 
2.2 100.0 
-- 0.6 
0.5 7.1 
0.4 6.2 
5.6 84.1 
0.1 1.7 
0.1  
— 0.2  
6 . 6  1 0 0 . 0  
0 . 8  2 . 1  
0 . 8  2 . 2  
5.3 14.6 
0 .8  2 .1  
11.1 30.6 
11.2 30.9 
4.6 12.6 
0.2 0.6 
1.5 4.3 
36.2 100.0 
0.4 1.0 
0.4 0.9 
6.3 15.2 
0.9 2.2 
15.1 36.5 
13.6 32.9 
1.8 4.3 
0.1  0 .1  
2.9 6.9 
41.4 100.0 
- -  0 . 8  
0.4 8.7 
0.5 10.6 
0.1 2.0 
2.5 50.4 
0.5 10.6 
0.6 12.6 
-- 0.2 
0.2 4.1 
4.9 100.0 
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largest loans obtained, both on a short- and long-term basis. The amounts 
provided by the "organized" credit market were not substantial. 
In the case of agriculturalists in Chile, an estimated 30 percent 
of the total rural population obtains credit from state financial in­
stitutions, reform agencies, and private commercial banks. The re­
maining 70 percent only have access to the "unorganized" or informal 
sources (5.11). In a survey of 200 Chilean farmers, 45 percent reported 
that they participated in the "organized" or formal credit market, 44 
percent in the informal market, and 25 percent reported no borrowing. 
Some of those obtaining credit had access to both markets. Nisbet (5.11) 
points out that the percent borrowing in the formal market was higher 
than the estimated national average because the survey was conducted in 
Central Chile where agriculture is relatively commercialized, and 
fanners have easy access to the formal credit market. A monetized 
economy with commercialized agriculture not only generates a need for 
larger quantities of credit but because of a larger volume of marketing 
and investment activities, more or larger financial institutions can be 
supported. A causal relationship is not necessarily Implied, however. 
The establishment and operation of these institutions may have been in­
strumental in commercializing the area through granting credit for con­
sumption and production needs on terms favorable to expanding pro­
duction and increasing incomes. Thus, agricultural growth on a 
commercialized basis and expansion of credit facilities are likely 
mutually reinforcing. 
As will subsequently be noted, the scope and operation of credit in­
stitutions, both public and private, have important consequences for the 
233 
growth and development of the agricultural sector. Since the amount of 
credit provided by the "organized" or public sector is relatively low, 
attention will primarily be directed toward the organization and opera­
tion of the private or "unorganized" suppliers of credit such as land­
lords, professional moneylenders, merchants, and relatives. The volume 
of loans provided by conmercial institutions at relatively low rates is 
small largely because the majority of agriculturalists have limited 
amounts of assets which do not provide adequate collateral for securing 
loans at low interest rates (5.13, 5.17). In addition, commercial banks 
have few offices in rural areas. The expense associated with traveling 
to bank locations, the relatively-detailed procedures required to apply 
for a loan, and a wary attitude toward these institutions motive agri­
culturalists to rely primarily on local sources of credit.^  
In some areas, particular cultural attributes generate special 
sources of credit. According to Islamic doctrine, usury is prohibited, 
and the explicit charging of interest is viewed as a usurious practice. 
In Afghanistan, Hassana is altruistic form of lending with no interest 
charged on the loans (5.8). However, during prolonged periods of 
economic adversity, the capacity and willingness to provide funds to 
one's compatriots declines as individuals become more concerned with 
their own well-being. Even when loans at zero interest are made, 
collateral is frequently required. The lender often has the right to 
the product from the mortgaged property which in any average year would 
exceed the amount of "reasonable" interest charges if such interest 
were levied. The term of the loan, unless otherwise specified, is in­
definite. In Chore, Ethiopia, informal mutual aid organizations are 
operative. For example, the eder is an organization which provides 
financial assistance to member households in cases of death or adver­
sity. The equb is an informal small savings association to which members 
make regular contributions. The order in which members have access to 
the amounts collected is determined by lot (5.9). 
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Lenders * objectives 
The classification of lenders in less-developed areas is somewhat 
arbitrary; however, the principal categories are reflected in Table 5.6. 
If a survey of lenders' objectives were undertaken, the results would 
likely indicate that the objective of private moneylenders, other than 
relatives, was to "earn a fair return" on credit advanced while rela­
tives would likely indicate humanitarian motives with no monetary or 
real "return" paid to them. It is not always possible to impute ob­
jectives from the terms of credit or the longer-term consequences of 
lending activities. For example, high interest rates need not imply 
exorbitant or excessive returns. Also, repayment default and appropria­
tion of a part of the debtor's assets do not necessarily support the 
conclusion that the lender geared credit terms not to the debtor's 
repayment capacity but so as to increase the likelihood of debtor de­
fault. Finally, even though no interest may be stipulated on a loan 
from a friend or relative, repayment in kind can result in an Implicit 
interest rate being realized when prices are variable. Similarly, 
according to legislation or bank charters, public institutions may 
have the stated objective of meeting credit needs of agriculturalists, 
especially smaller cultivators, as a means of promoting general agri­
cultural expansion. In fact, however, small cultivators are often not 
able to provide the collateral or credit references to satisfy require­
ments for credit worthiness. In other cases, political patronage re­
places need and productivity considerations in the distribution of 
available funds. 
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The following section will cite a number of situations where the 
opportunity to Inflate interest costs above a "fair" or "normal" return 
exists. Whether these opportunities are exploited and whether lenders 
have objectives pernicious to the economic and social well-being of 
agriculturalists is an empirical question. Such a question cannot be 
answered with nonempirical arguments. 
Terms of credit 
The terms of credit are the principal factors which determine the 
rationing or distribution of available funds. If the credit market 
operated perfectly, funds would be distributed, both spatially and 
temporally, according to their highest uses.^  The term structure of 
interest rates would reflect productivity and risk considerations, and 
interest rates would guide and determine the movement of funds among 
sectors of the economy and into short- and long-term employments. As 
will be discussed below, the magnitude and permanence of credit market 
I^f the credit market operated perfectly, credit would be allocated 
according to the prices or interest rates borrowers would be willing to 
pay; i.e., borrowers realizing high returns would be willing to pay high 
rates. But, such returns are conditioned by resource distribution and, 
in turn, income distribution. Those cultivators with the largest resource 
bases perhaps also realize the highest returns from the use of credit 
because they have the necessary complementary resources. They also have 
the highest capacity to repay and, hence, can afford to pay high interest 
rates. However, the rates they pay are relatively low. To the extent 
this is true, smaller cultivators, relying primarily on traditional inputs 
which yield relatively low returns, are in a weak competitive position 
to obtain funds. Unless they have access to improved inputs, any gains 
generated by the development processes largely bypass them. In this 
connection, highest uses are also influenced by the degree of efficiency 
in other markets. Even if the input market operates well and a producer 
has access to inputs which Increase his physical product, the economic 
returns from investment may be low if adequate transportation and mar­
keting outlets are not available. In addition, returns are affected by 
the amount and accuracy of information producers have relative to market 
conditions, both for inputs and outputs. 
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imperfections inhibit the growth and development processes which less-
developed areas plan and hope to achieve. 
The interest rates paid by borrowers reflect the terms of credit. 
Small, short-term loans for consumption purposes are available at 
relatively high rates of interest; that is, relative to medium- and 
long-term loans of larger amounts for productive investment. In ad­
dition to the size and purpose of the loan, a number of other factors 
affect the structure of interest rates; (1) The availability of 
collateral to secure loans; (2) The supply and demand conditions 
which generate fluctuations in interest rates; (3) The opportunity 
costs of lending funds to agriculturalists; (4) The objectives and 
degree of competitiveness among the lenders; and (5) The number of 
services provided by the lender such as the marketing of produce and 
the retailing of producer and consumer goods. These factors were 
summarized in Equation 2.53. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 represent a geometrical determination of the 
interest rate charged a hypothetical borrower. Figure 5.3 denotes a 
three-dimensional credit supply surface where the quantity supplied is 
a function of the interest rate and the discount factor. The interest 
rate increases with successive movements to the left of the origin. 
Conversely, the discount factor, d, decreases with movements to the 
right of the origin.^  The isoquant represents combinations of i and 
d for which the amount of credit supplied is invariant. That is, a 
high d is compensated for by a high i; when d is low, the creditor is 
F^or a description of the discount factor, see the discussion re­
lating to Equation 2.54. 
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willing to lend at a relatively low i. A two-dimensional demand curve, 
D^ , is superimposed, reflecting that quantity demanded varies with the 
interest rate. If the demand schedule is tangent to the credit supply 
surface at point A, i^  is charged for quantity AB of credit. If the 
demand schedule shifts to so that more is demanded at each i, the 
interest rate increases to i^  and the discount factor increases to dg. 
The higher discount factor reflects the situation that a previous 
portion of debt AB has not been repaid or the borrower's collateral is 
not sufficient to provide additional credit at i^ . In short, the 
borrower's credit worthiness has declined. 
Figure 5,4 is a two-dimensional representation of the determination 
of i where the credit supply curves are derived from Figure 5.3. The 
demand curves are drawn fairly steeply indicating that the quantity de­
manded is not highly responsive to changes in i.^  The supply schedules 
are drawn to indicate that additional increments of credit are supplied 
only at proportionately higher rates of interest. With the shifts in 
the two schedules resulting from a rightward movement of the demand 
schedule, the Interest rate is increased to 1^ . The increase from 1^  
is decomposable into that due to the shift in demand and that generated 
by the increased risk associated with the increments in credit supplied. 
The amounts OC^  and OC^  are equivalent to AB and As', respectively, in 
Figure 5.3. The generalized formulation is D(i°) = S(i°) where 1° is 
the equilibrium rate of interest. The equilibrium rate varies with the 
source of credit. 
I^f the demand curves in Figure 5.4 are assumed to be for consump­
tion expenditures, the stock-flow problem resolved in Figure 5.2 is not 
encountered here. 
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Figure 5.3. Credit supply surface and interest 
rate determination for individual 
borrower 
Credit 
Figure 5.4. Credit supply schedule and interest rate 
determination for individual borrower 
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In addition to the factors determining i in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, 
lenders often raise the effective interest rate by hidden charges and 
unscrupulous practices such as the following (5.1, 5.12, 5.18); 
(1) Deducting the interest charge at the time the loan is made 
or deducting a premium with interest to be paid on the full amount 
requested ; 
(2) Demanding repayment in kind and undervaluing the commodity 
used for repayment at a price much lower than that likely to be in 
effect at harvest time^ (5.1, 5.11, 5.18); 
(3) Overpricing commodities when credit in kind is provided. 
This applies not only to fertilizers, seeds, and tools, but also to 
consumer goods ; 
(4) Demanding labor services, for example, by landlords providing 
credit to tenants, in addition to payment of interest; and 
(5) Keeping improper records and not giving receipts so that the 
principal repaid is in excess of that borrowed. This applies to both 
monetary credit and credit in kind and is easily effected when 
borrowers have low levels of literacy. 
As mentioned earlier, the informal nature of supplying funds by 
private lenders greatly complicates the determination of interest rates 
actually charged. Table 5.7 gives a tabulation of reported rates for 
selected countries. Wai (5.18) estimates that in the majority of 
countries, the weighted average rate of interest in the "unorganized" 
credit market varies between 24 and 36 percent per annum. 
-
The lender stands to realize even greater returns during in­
flationary periods. Not only does he gain through the lower price he 
pays, he gains as the commodities paid to him as "interest" appreciate 
in value. 
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Table 5.7. Annual rates of interest charged by moneylenders in 
selected countries classified according to frequency of 
a,* 
occurrence 
Lower b b b Higher  ^
exceptional Usual Occasional exceptional 
AFRICA ; 
Nigeria 
(1) 500 
(2) 45 150 
ASIA; 
Burma 
(1) 12-15 24-36 50-100 400-1800 
(2) 12-18 24-36 50-60 100-250 
Cambodia 36-84 120 
Ceylon 
(1) 13.5 18-24 67 100 
(2) 6 6-18 18 and above 
(3) 10-15 17-20 27-36 50 
(4) 600 
China 
(1) 20-30 40 and above 
(2) 24-48 72-96 100-200 and 
above 
India 
(1) 12-50 300-400 
(2) 25-50 
Indonesia 50 200 500-600 
Japan 10 10-15 15-20 20 and above 
Malaya 100 
D^ata refer to postwar years unless otherwise indicated in the 
section, "Descriptive Notes and Sources of Data, by Area", given in 
(5.18, pp. 141-142). 
"^The usual rate is that at v^ ich more than half of the total loans 
of moneylenders are granted, while the occasional rate refers to loans 
constituting from 10 to 20 per cent of the total. The lower and higher 
exceptional rates refer to loans constituting less than 5 per cent of 
the total loans granted" (5.18, p. 102). Multiple reports for a given 
country denote alternative sources of data. 
Source: Wai (5.18, Table 11). 
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Table 5.7 (cont inue d) 
Lower  ^
exceptional Usual 
 ^ Higher  ^
Occasional exceptional 
Pakistan 
(1)  
( 2 )  
Philippines 
(1) 
( 2 )  
(3) 
Thailand 
(1)  
( 2 )  
Vietnam 
(1 )  
( 2 )  
LA.TIN AMERICA; 
Colombia 
Cuba 
(1)  
(2 )  
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Mexico 
MIDDLE EAST; 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
(1) 
(2 )  
Israel 
(1) 
(2 )  
(3) 
(4) 
Jordan 
(1) 
(2 )  
18 and below 
20 
12 
8-18 
8-12 
15 
30 
25-30 
60-200 
25-30 
20 
36 
25-30 
36-100 
50-100 
18-24 
24-30 
24-40 
100 
24-36 
60 
25-40 
20-50 
100 
140 
30 
18-24 
30 
60 
20-40 
100-200 
60 
40-60 
240-300 
48 
300 
150 
300 
400 
300 
92 
3,650 
100 
200 
100 
200-400 
over 100 
200-600 
300-1200 
200 
775 
700 
80-90 
exorbitant 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
Lower b b b Higher  ^
exceptional Usual Occasional exceptional 
Lebanon 
(1) 50-100 
(2) 22-24 33 
Sudan, Northern 100 
Syria 
(1) 9-20 40-45 150 
(2) 18 40 
Table 5.8 is a summarization of the interest rates reported being 
paid by agriculturalists in Chile.^  About one-half of the loans were 
reported as obtained for consumption purposes and one-fourth each for 
N^lsbet comments on the negative interest rates; "... it is 
likely that these rates would be positive if we could take into account 
hidden charges commonly levied with or without the borrowers * knowl­
edge. The effective rates charged by some moneylenders and patrones 
would also increase as a result of hidden charges. It is impossible 
to know exactly how extensive these practices are since lenders, 
naturally, are unwilling to give such information, and many borrowers 
are unaware of the charges or do not take them into account within 
the financial arrangement" (5.11, p. 78). For example, in connection 
with loans obtained by sharecroppers, "Patrones often receive the 
benefit of cheap labor not only of the sharecropper, but of his 
family. Rates of return to some patrones were well over 100 percent 
on their investment, allowing them to lend without nominal interest" 
(5.11, p. 87). 
Table 5.8. Reported rates of interest in rural Chile where money 
interest rates are deflated to real rates and rates on 
loans in kind are expressed in real terms * 
Type of lender 
and 
type of loan -33 
Interest rate distribution 
-22 • 2 0  -13 -7 0 18 27 
(1) Friends; 
Cash 
Kind 
(2) Neighbors: 
Cash 
Kind 
(3) Relatives: 
Cash 
Kind 
(4) Patrones: 
Cash 
Kind 
(5) Village stores: 
Cash 
Kind 
(6) Itinerant traders: 
Cash 
Kind 
(7) Moneylender : 
Cash 
Kind 
16 
2 11 
6 1 
Total cases 25 2 2 1 30 1 1 
A^ll rates are on actual loans for the agricultural year May 1964 
through May 1965, and money interest rates were deflated by using the 
consvmier price index. The terms ranged from one month to over one year, 
so all rates were adjusted to annual figures. 
T^he same lender extends credit to different borrowers, in some 
cases. The rate of interest charged was at times the same to different 
borrowers, and at other instances different rates were charged by the 
same lender on similar loan arrangements. 
I^n seven cases, borrowers did not know the interest rate charged, 
and there were eight cases of recargos (charges in addition to the or­
iginal sum of value lent). 
* 
Source: Nisbet (5.11, Table 2). 
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(in annual percentage rates) 
Total 
30 33 40 46 60 75 90 128 . 165 360 cases 
6 
7 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
5 
6 
3 
5 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
4 
4 
7 
16 
3 
10 
11 
0 
4 
4 
14 
90 
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production and combined consumption and production uses. As to be ex­
pected, the rates charged by merchants and moneylenders were high 
relative to friends and relatives, partly because of different ob­
jectives on the part of the lenders. In addition, credit risks are 
likely higher for the former than the latter. 
Another factor tending to cause high interest rates is that 
moneylenders often grant loans secured only by verbal promises to 
repay.^  Where collateral with a secure title is offered as security, 
credit is usually obtainable at a much lower rate (5.1, 5.17). This 
is particularly true if the prospective borrower has access to funds 
2 provided by commercial and agricultural banks. Private lenders, 
while charging higher rates, are in a better position to meet the 
credit needs of prospective borrowers, at least for loans of modest 
amounts. First, private lenders often have detailed knowledge of 
the prospective borrowers' needs and credit worthiness. Credit can be 
advanced rapidly with little or no red tape and with no publicity. 
Second, the terms of repayment, in particular the repayment dates, are 
often flexible so as to accommodate the debtor's repayment capacity. At 
times, no due date is specified; often, repayment is due only after the 
L^andlords and merchants are fairly certain that they will be re­
imbursed because they serve indispensable roles as employers of tenants 
and(or) marketing middlemen, respectively. In the Chilean credit survey, 
two-thirds of the loans supplied by merchants and moneylenders were not 
secured by financial or physical assets (5.11). 
2 
In Thailand, the low interest rates charged by institutional 
lenders are so low as to be uneconomic in the sense that the interest 
payments are, at times, not sufficient to cover even the administration 
costs of the loans. In addition, a very large portion of the capital of 
cooperatives and other lending agencies has been lost through debt de­
fault (5.13). 
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annual harvest. This flexibility may also be detrimental to the borrower 
because interest obligations accumulate as due dates are relaxed, and 
additional debt may be added to that already incurred increasing the 
danger of eventual appropriation of the borrower's assets if the lender 
should require complete repayment on short notice. 
The rates of interest charged by private lenders appear to be high, 
though not necessarily exorbitant, especially in those areas where 
monetization of the economy is at low levels and where cooperatives and 
commercial banks operate only on a very small scale. As economic 
activity expands, the level of monetization and of credit supplied by 
cooperative and public sources generally increases. The structure of 
interest rates, especially those charged by the private lenders, would be 
expected to fall. For individual borrowers, however, interest rates 
will likely not fall substantially until their credit worthiness is 
improved.^  To the extent that these borrowers are beneficiaries of 
economic expansion, their credit position should be enhanced. 
The rates reported being charged by cooperatives and tabulated by 
2 
Wai (5.17) are substantially below those levied by moneylenders. Since 
the cooperative movement has not been strong in Latin America, few data 
I^n relatively developed countries, small loans of essentially 
risky nature, for example, consumer credit, are often available at 
interest rates comparable to those levied on agriculturalists in less-
developed areas. This is probably an outgrowth of administration and 
risk charges which are correspondingly high in the two situations (5.2). 
2 
Wai (5.17) has tabulated in Table 10, pp. 134-139, the interest 
rates of cooperative societies and specialized agricultural banks or 
institutions owned or sponsored by the government for the period 1950-54 
in a number of less-developed countries. He has added remarks relative 
to the duration of loans and collateral requirements. 
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are reported. For Asia, the lending rate Is usually between 8 and 12 
percent. The lower bound Is for medium-term credit while the higher 
rates are those for short-term advances. This range of rates also 
applies to the Middle Eastern countries. Few data are available for 
Africa. The lending rates of specialized agricultural institutions are 
quite low. A sampling of these rates in annual pdrcents follows; 
(1) Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya, 4& percent for long-
term loans ; 
(2) State Agricultural Bank of Burma, 6% percent for seasonal 
and medium-term loans; 
(3) Agricultural Development Finance Corporation of Pakistan, 
4-5 percent with the lower rate offered to cooperatives and the higher 
rate to individuals with land required as collateral; 
(4) Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Bank of Egypt, 3-5 
percent primarily for short-term loans but also for credit of longer 
duration. The higher rate applies to individuals; the lower to co­
operatives ; 
(5) Agricultural Bank of Bolivia, 8 percent plus other expenses 
such as the cost of trips of the bank's technician and guarantor. The 
amount lent is up to 66 percent of collateral such as machinery and 
cattle; and 
(6) Agricultural Development Bank of Peru, 6^ -8 percent plus 
charges for technical aid for loans of all durations. The amount lent 
is up to 75-80 percent of the collateral offered. 
Two points relative to these low rates should be made. First, the 
absolute amount of credit available for lending at these rates Is not 
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known. Second, in some cases, the borrowers have to pay additional 
costs which raise the effective rate of interest. Furthermore, the 
requirement that loans be secured by collateral reduces the number of 
borrowers who have access to these sources. 
The term structure of interest rates and the mode of operations in 
the "organized" money markets of less-developed areas are not much 
different from those of counterpart institutions in the developed 
countries. This correspondence is not surprising since commercial banks, 
which account for most of the activity in the "organized" money markets, 
have been patterned after the structure and practices of commercial banks 
in the developed countries. In general, interest rates, including those 
charged in the "organized" money markets, are higher than those in the 
more-developed countries. The more pronounced difference between the 
two groups of countries is that the range of interest rates is generally 
much wider in the less-developed areas (5.17). Within each category of 
interest, the rates at which commercial banks lend are a function of the 
size of the loan, the credit worthiness of the borrower, and the type 
and amount of collateral available to secure the loan. Interest rates 
are higher for smaller loans secured by less liquid collateral and vice 
versa. However, it is quite possible for a prospective borrower with 
little collateral but with good credit rating to obtain loans at rates 
lower than another person with a good collateral position but not a good 
credit standing (5.17). In a few cases, comnercial banks lend funds to 
agricultural banks and cooperatives who in turn attempt to provide 
"supervised" credit to cultivators. Again, however, those with the 
larger farm units and better asset positions are in a favored position 
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to obtain loans. In any case, the volume of loans granted at relatively 
low rates is not sizeable. The principal constraining factor is the 
limited amount of collateral against which these loans can be secured. 
Another point should be mentioned. Commercial banks and government 
lending agencies have the capacity to Increase the amount of funds for 
credit at a rate which is a multiple of their contingency reserves. If 
lending by these institutions is not financed by savings, taxation, and 
borrowing from the public, inflationary tendencies may be generated or 
accelerated. The effectiveness of monetary policy is questionable since 
the link between the organized and unorganized money markets is rather 
weak. But since the volume of credit going to the agricultural sector 
is low and since this credit Is usually for productive purposes, the 
danger of inflation arising from credit granted to agriculturalists is 
perhaps rather low. 
Competition among lenders 
Because of a high degree of immobility, lack of awareness of possible 
alternative sources, and the typing of loans to landlord and merchant re­
lationships, cultivators largely confine their borrowing activities to 
their home villages or communities. They often purchase Inputs and con­
sumer goods, market outputs, and secure credit from the same individual. 
In each transaction, the middleman is In a position to exploit the 
cultivator to some degree. These integrated economic activities, to­
gether with a usually small number of sources of credit, provide lenders 
with oligopolistic or monopolistic powers (5.3, 5.4, 5.11). Even though 
alternative sources exist, for example, relatives, landlords, and money­
lenders, the amounts obtainable from the first two sources are often In­
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adequate so that the bulk of the credit must be secured from moneylenders 
and merchants. Whether or not these lenders exploit their positions of 
power is a question of fact. The relatively high interest rates charged 
by them is not sufficient evidence. 
In the Indian rural credit survey, villages having four or more 
resident moneylenders accounted for only 10.3 percent of the total (5.4). 
In the Chilean survey, the number of moneylenders ranged from none to 
three, with an average of one operating per rural credit market area. In 
no case did a moneylender operate in an adjoining market area.^  Concern­
ing the number of village stores providing credit, the number ranged 
from two to five with an average of three per rural credit market 
area (5.11). 
The number of lenders per market area overstates the number of 
sources actually open to the prospective borrower. Some lenders provide 
marketing and retailing services which are interrelated with credit ad­
vances. Debtors may be effectively forced to secure any additional credit 
from the lender who originally advanced credit or face the threat of re­
payment and foreclosure (5.10, 5.19). Tenants may have to rely on land­
lords as their principal source of credit. The lender's relatively in­
timate knowledge of the borrower's position places him in a good com­
petitive position especially if the borrower does not have good collateral 
with secure title. The strength of these personal relationships and the 
N^isbet (5.11) indicates three reasons why moneylenders in Chile 
operate on a small scale and do not cranpete with each other: (1) They 
lack detailed knowledge of the larger market so they engage in relatively 
small-scale operations; (2) Since their operations are illegal, they 
are motivated to restrict both the number of individuals they service 
and the total volume of credit granted; and (3) Since they are primarily 
farmers whose volume of lending does not represent more than 50 percent of 
their annual gross income, (footnote continued on the following page) 
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obligations therein suggest that borrowers do not have several sources 
to choose from even when several sources exist in the community. 
The relatively high interest rates charged by moneylenders and 
merchants are not necessarily evidence of monopolistic power. High 
rates are at least partially the result of high administrative costs 
associated with small, short-term loans plus allowance for risk on 
poorly-secured loans (5.2). Only if the interest rate charged exceeds 
these costs plus the opportunity costs associated with the credit ad­
vanced does the rate reflect an additional component of monopoly 
profit. In addition, if the moneylenders' credit reserves remain idle 
throughout a part of the year, as with seasonal lending for working ex­
penses and consumption expenditures before harvest, the lender may quite 
legitimately increase charges to compensate him for the time his funds 
and administrative abilities are idle because of borrowers' seasonal 
demand. If the lender invests the otherwise idle funds, the costs of 
liquidating these investments will likely be passed on to the borrower 
when loans are made. 
Regulation of lending practices 
Commercial banks and cooperatives have constraints or guidelines 
controlling their lending activities. In some areas, legislation controls 
the maximum rates that can be charged and the process by which the credit 
worthiness of prospective borrowers is determined. Also, due dates for 
loans more closely approximate the size and purpose of the loan. This 
is in contrast to the more flexible terms usually provided by professional 
(footnote continued from preceding page) only limited quantities of funds 
are available for lending. 
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moneylenders. The credit provided by agricultural banks and cooperatives 
is, to some extent, "supervised" credit through which these lenders exert 
influence over the use of the credit advanced and provide additional 
services as an attempt to make the most productive use of credit. In 
the recent past, "supervised" credit has been used in a few Latin 
American countries (5.1, 5.17). For the majority of the less-developed 
areas, this control or assistance in the use of credit is lacking, al­
though more attention will likely be given to this practice in the future? 
An exception to the general pattern of "unsupervised" credit is the 
integrated cooperative system which evolved in Egypt in the early 1960's 
(5.5). After the 1952 revolution, the government instituted a system 
of "supervised cooperatives", the administrators of which had the re­
sponsibility for organizing production and distributing available credit 
among the farmer members. The supply of credit was permitted to keep 
pace with farmers* demand for productive purposes. The Central Bank and 
the commercial banks controlled by the government channeled credit funds 
2 through the Agricultural Credit Bank. To ensure that farmers with 
little collateral had access to credit, cooperatives were directed to 
provide credit to members on the basis of their credit requirements for 
production purposes. Simultaneously, the number of defaults was mini­
mized by commissioning a government agency with marketing the farmers' 
S^en in commenting on supervised credit provided by cooperatives in 
India, indicates that this supervision induces some cultivators, in their 
ignorance, to prefer dealing with moneylenders rather than the coopera­
tives. This is reinforced by the high proportion of loans used for con­
sumption purposes (5.15). 
2 The Central Bank purchased the long-term, low interest-bearing 
bonds issued by the Agricultural Credit Bank. By 1961, commercial banks 
had come under State ownership. 
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cash crops. Not only was repayment ensured, but a mechanism was created 
for altering the terms of trade to agriculture; i.e., the government 
could determine the prices to be paid to growersBy 1962, cooperatives 
had become the sole source of agricultural credit and cooperative member­
ship was mandatory for all farmers. By 1965, cotton, wheat, onions and 
a major part of the rice crop were subject to compulsory marketing. 
Finally, to increase control over the cooperative activities, in 1963 
the Agricultural Credit Bank was made a State organization under super­
vision of the Ministry of Agriculture. This reformed rural credit system 
primarily benefited small owner-operators who previously lacked adequate 
capital to secure low-cost loans from institutional sources. The plight 
of the landless tenants with few assets was not substantially alleviated, 
however. 
There appears a general belief that only a weak link exists between 
2 
the organized and unorganized markets in less-developed areas. This 
link, whatever its strength, does provide a connection between the two 
markets whereby the central banks, already operating under regulations, 
can have an influence on the availability and terms of credit in the 
"^Available evidence indicates that In Egypt the price paid to 
farmers for certain crops has been lower than the price at which the 
Government has disposed of them in the internal market and abroad" (5.5, 
p. 106). 
I^n Japan a close link between the two markets has been achieved 
'Mainly through the agricultural bill system^ which has been incorporated 
into the cooperative movement. In order to raise funds, agriculturalists 
and cooperative associations draw promissory notes or 'agricultural 
bills.' These bills are discounted and rediscounted by the cooperative 
associations, the credit federations, and the Central Cooperative Bank 
for Agriculture and Forestry, which borrows funds from the Bank of Japan 
whenever necessary" (5.18, p. 97). 
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"unorganized" money market, including that of the rural credit market 
(5.14, 5.17). The extent to which commercial banks have advanced funds 
to the agricultural sector is one indicator of the strength of the 
connection between the "organized" and "unorganized" credit markets.^  
Commercial bank loans to the agricultural sector are less than 10 per-
2 _ 
cent of these banks' total loans in mcst less-developed countries. me 
exceptions are Indonesia, the Philippines, and some Latin America 
countries such as Columbia, Cuba, Peru, and Paraguay. This evidence, 
based on data as available, suggests a relatively-weak link between the 
two markets. 
Additional links exist between the two markets which operate to 
make monetary policy more effective. Depending upon individual situa­
tions, these links may include the following: 
(1) In areas with a large agricultural export sector, exporters 
and traders borrow from commercial banks and make advances to producers, 
either directly or through smaller merchants, in order to ensure an ade­
quate supply of exportable commodities at favorable prices (5.17); 
(2) In Africa where marketing boards are operative, the buying 
agents of the boards secure much of their credit from commercial banks 
and then give credit to smaller traders \^ o, in turn, advance credit to 
Sen indicates that commercial banks in India " ... do provide sub­
stantial amounts of short-term credit for financing the marketing of agri­
cultural produce sometimes directly to the relatively-big farmers but 
generally through traders" ... "The chief reason why the commercial banks 
have not been able to advance even marketing finance directly to the agri­
culturists to any appreciable extent, is the absence of licensed ware­
houses through which the agriculturist can pledge his produce for an ad­
vance from commercial banks" (5.15, p. 723). 
2 
See Wai (5.17, pp. 129-133, Table 9) for a complete tabulation of 
those countries for which data were available together with the sources 
of these data. 
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the cultivators; 
(3) Importers, extending credit to wholesalers who, in turn, pro­
vide credit to village retailers who finally extend credit to agri­
culturalists provides yet another link; and 
(4) In Latin America the "latifxmdia" owners not only have access 
to credit by the commercial banks for meeting their needs and advancing 
credit to the "minifundia" operators, but some also have administrative 
or other influence over commercial banking activities. 
The essentially-informal operations of private leaders make en­
forcement of any regulations of lending practices difficult. Even if 
a legal maximum is placed on interest rates that can be charged, the 
opportunities for adding hidden charges, and the general lack of 
credit records make the determination of actual interest rates difficult. 
In addition, those cultivators charged highest rates are also those who 
are likely unaware that they may be paying usurious rates. They are 
disinclined to report payment of such rates to the proper authorities, 
the names and locations of which are perhaps unknown to most of the 
small-scale cultivators. Social pressures within the community may 
motivate private lenders to engage in self-regulatory practices. Those 
living in but not integrated in the conmunity structure, for example, 
foreign-born moneylenders, are largely immune from such pressures. In 
addition, the few alternative sources of credit relative to cultivators' 
demand lessen the importance of maintaining customer goodwill by charging 
what appear to be "reasonable" rates. 
Government programs to regulate lending activities by private 
suppliers are not only difficult to enforce, but where effective, the 
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quantity of funds supplied for lending likely falls (5.15). This re­
duction in credit availability may more than offset the gains derived 
from obtaining credit on more favorable terms. Similarly, land reform 
programs disrupt normal credit channels between landlords and tenants. 
Thus, a complementary program of increased agricultural credit is neces­
sary if reform programs are to be most effective. 
Credit availability relative to needs 
The supply of credit is inelastic. The fact that conmercial banks 
have a capacity to provide a volume of credit which is a multiple of 
actual funds on deposit is not of much significance to the agricultural 
sectors at this time because the proportion of funds provided by these 
banks to agriculturalists is small. The private lenders, on the other 
hand, are largely constrained in their lending activities by the amount 
of funds they have on hand. Large landlords and some moneylenders can 
augment their reserves by borrowing from the commercial banks but this 
practice does not appear to be widespread. Changes in the quantities 
available for credit are largely effected by variations in agricultural 
prosperity. For example, during favorable periods landlords who lent 
in the past now have expanded reserves. Others now find they have 
"surplus" funds on which a return can be made. Improved agricultural 
incomes provide opportunities for merchants to expand profits, and in­
creased debt repayment to moneylenders increases their monetary reserves. 
As noted earlier, borrowers are often restricted to obtaining their credit 
from particular merchants, marketing middlemen, or landlords. Each of 
these sources, however, has only a limited quantity of funds available for 
lending. 
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The nature of demand elasticities is less clear. The demand for 
credit to be used for consumption expenditures and working capital is 
highly interest inelastic. Consumption loans are often needed for 
survival. Without the working capital, the normal crop cannot be 
planted, income is not forthcoming, and additional debt must be in­
curred. The demand for intermediate and long-term loans is expected 
to be more elastic because (1) These are expenditures which can be 
deferred; and (2) Loans are of larger amounts which may motivate 
cultivators to be more responsive to changes in the interest rate. 
High interest rates levied by the private lenders are only partially 
symptomatic of a strong demand for credit relative to supply. As 
mentioned earlier, high administrative costs and high risks tend to 
maintain rates at relatively-high levels. A high opportunity cost 
component in the structure of interest rates is another factor. 
To some extent the scarcity of credit may be more apparent than 
real, especially on a geographical basis. This is the consequence of 
too few credit institutions, not properly distributed, so that in­
stitutionalized mechanisms are not available for channeling the hoards 
and savings of some into the hands of those who have productive uses 
for these funds. In addition, peasants may be reluctant to entrust their 
savings to these institutions with which they are at least initially un­
familiar, and prospective borrowers also often have a preference for 
dealing with the local moneylender even though higher costs for using 
the credit must be paid. 
In the final analysis, credit availability relative to needs is 
again an empirical question. The quantity of funds available for 
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mobilization and transfer to areas of excess demand is largely unknown. 
The establishment of additional outlets for saving should not only in­
crease the aggregate quantity of funds available but, ceteris paribus, 
tend to have a depressing effect on the entire structure of interest 
ratesi From the demand side, effective demand must be distinguished 
from a more generalized concept of demand. Nearly every cultivator has 
a demand for a certain quantity of credit, but whether he can use it 
productively or, more importantly, whether he can use it more pro­
ductively than his competitors and whether he has the capacity to repay 
are additional questions which must be taken into account. In the 
larger context, credit demand and productivity within the agricultural 
sector should be reconciled with requirements and investment opportunities 
with the nonagricultural sectors. If credit markets operated perfectly, 
available credit would gravitate toward its most productive uses. 
In the absence of this credit structure, national planners must de­
termine the most productive uses and the means for generating and 
channeling funds into these uses. If it is determinable that the oppor­
tunity costs for credit are highest in the agricultural sector and such 
intersectoral differentials persist, then a case can be made for con­
cluding that credit available to the agricultural sector is inadequate 
relative to the demand for credit. 
An additional qualifier is necessary. If the supply of agricultural 
credit is increased, are complementary programs also initiated or is the 
institutional structure essentially unchanged? For example, increased 
production expected to accompany the use of more credit may strain ex­
isting transportation and marketing facilities. In subsistence-oriented 
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areas, these facilities may have to be created in order to provide out­
lets for increased production. These factors and many more affect the 
estimated returns on additional credit made available to the agricultural 
sector. Thus, the attempted optimal distribution of available credit 
must take into account complementary development processes or the 
absence of these forces. 
Summary 
In summary, the principal functions of credit institutions are to 
provide an outlet for personal savings and a mechanism for making these 
savings and other sources of credit financing available to those in­
dividuals who are demanders of credit, whether for personal or business 
expenditure. In many rural areas, few institutions exist for receiving 
savings and paying interest on them. In addition, agriculturalists 
often have a preference for converting savings to assets, both productive 
and unproductive, especially where strong inflationary pressures exist 
and where uncertainty and unfamiliarity surround the operations of public 
credit institutions. The nature of the "unorganized" or informal credit 
market is such that private lenders do not solicit savings but normally 
lend only that amount that they themselves have accumulated, together 
with the relatively»»small amounts they secure from commercial sources. 
As cooperatives and agricultural banks or rural branches of commercial 
banks increase in number, savings and lending functions will be operated 
in a more-coordinated manner. 
Returning to the two areas of inquiry set out at the beginning of 
this section, only qualified statements can be made. Evidence exists 
260 
that the interest rates charged agriculturalists by commercial banks and 
cooperatives are not grossly dissimilar from those charged in the devel­
oped countries. The relatively high rates levied by private sources 
reflect a large demand for credit relative to limited, inelastic supplies 
of funds available for lending. The strong demand is primarily an out­
growth of the inability of agriculturalists to realize savings from 
their relatively-low incomes which would permit them to internally 
finance consumption and production expenses and to meet unforeseen 
contingencies. The amount borrowed from commercial banks for subse­
quent lending to agriculturalists is not large. Further, private 
lenders, unlike commercial banks, do not act as repositories for 
customers' savings nor have the capacity to issue a volume of credit 
which is a multiple of required reserves. 
High interest rates charged by private lenders are also the result 
of some of the same factors which cause high rates for consumer credit 
in developed countries; i.e., high administrative costs, default rates, 
and risk on the part of borrowers. Thus, high rates do not imply ex­
orbitant rates. If exorbitant, they must be in excess of some standard 
or "fair" rate. As has been demonstrated, several opportunities exist 
for charging high interest rates. A good deal of competition among 
lenders does not exist. The integrated functions of landlords and mer­
chants with borrowers provide opportunities for imposing hidden charges. 
Low levels of literacy and precarious economic positions among peasants 
make them vulnerable to paying high, if not excessive, interest rates. 
Only if the rates exceed allowance for opportunity costs, administrative 
overhead, and credit worthiness of borrowers, can the rates be termed 
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excessive or exorbitant. 
Based on the evidence available, contemporary credit institutions 
generally have a depressing effect on economic and social well-being 
for the majority of agriculturalists in less-developed areas. Because 
of seasonality of income and abnormally low incomes in poor crop years, 
many producers must resort to credit financing in order to sustain 
consumption requirements. Even though the size of these loans is 
relatively small, the high interest rates compared to producers* in­
comes and capacity for saving place a burden on the borrowers. If ab­
normally low incomes persist over a period of time, the debtor's 
economic position is exacerbated. 
Finally, the nature of the credit system; i.e., the essentially 
unintegrated "organized" and "unorganized" markets, tends to perpetuate 
conditions of economic dualism or quasi-dualism. For example, savings 
do not freely flow among sectors according to their most productive 
uses, either on a private or social product basis. The subsistence 
sectors continue to operate at low levels of monétisation which, in 
turn, discourage the implementation of commercial credit institutions in 
these areas. Yet these are the institutions most likely to have the 
capacity for providing adequate credit on terms approaching the credit 
requirements and repayment capacities of agriculturalists in less-
developed areas. The more aggregative problem is that of increasing the 
level and reducing the variability of cultivators* incomes. These 
phenomena would reduce the need for borrowing, especially for consumption 
expenditures, and would improve the credit worthiness of prospective 
borrowers. 
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CHAPTER VI. MARKET SYSTEMS AS A COMPONENT OF SOCIAL 
OVERHEAD CAPITAL FACILITIES 
Social overhead capital facilities are synonymous with the infra­
structure of the economy. That is, they represent the constellation of 
transportation, communication, marketing, education and government 
facilities which provides the machine for economic activity and the 
foundation for economic growth.^ This infrastructure conditions nearly 
all aspects of economic and social well-being; it functions both as a 
parameter and as an instrument variable for stimulating developmental 
processes. At low levels of economic development where economic stagna­
tion tends to be the norm, these components of the infrastructure are 
essentially parameters in economic processes. True, traders, labor 
migrants, and extension agents alter somewhat the communication and 
education mechanisms. However, the impact of these largely-exogenous 
influences is only realized in a longer-term situation and when other 
changes in the structure of the economy are effected or evolved to 
generate a more favorable economic environment. 
Poor transportation and communications facilities tend to isolate 
villages at distances from the actual or potential growth centers of 
^The infrastructure includes institutions such as land tenure 
systems, sources of public and private credit, and social and economic 
systems affecting producers' attitudes and motivations. Since these 
attributes are abstracted for separate discussion in this study, 
their interrelationships with the above are only briefly described 
here. 
I 
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the economy.^ A series of subeconomies with few external linkages re­
sults. Consequently, the impact of any pressures and incentives 
generated by developmental processes, such as government policies and 
changes in market demand, is dissipated with little, if any, effect on 
producers' activities and economic systems in remote areas. Economic 
expansion largely confined to growth points in cities and industrial 
enclaves tends to create a relatively dualistic economic system. The 
"modern" sector expands through the adoption of modern technology and 
through private and public investment. Conversely, the "traditional" 
sector, while subjected to srane external influences, continues to employ 
traditional production techniques and activities are oriented toward 
meeting local consumption requirements. 
Economic dualism need not be detrimental to aggregate growth of 
the economy. The 'Modern" sector may be the source of export earnings 
and capital accumulation, a portion of which is invested in other sectors 
of the economy. Furthermore, certain "spread effects" may emanate from 
this sector. The qualifiers are necessary because such "modern" sectors 
have differential impacts on the economy. Contrast the petroleum in­
dustry in the Middle East with plantation systems producing cash crops in 
parts of Africa and South Asia. Both generate foreign exchange earnings, 
part of which is transferred to other countries when the export-generating 
industry is foreign owned. The "spread effects" are different, however. 
^With regard to West Africa, Bauer notes: "Part of the Benue, the 
principal tributary of the Niger, is open for navigation during two months 
of the year only, and the annual requirements of the substantial hinter­
land of the upper Benue have to be transported within that short period. 
Considerable quantities of export are evaculated by the Benue and if they 
are not shipped in time, they may have to wait almost another year" (6.5, 
p. 14). Abbott (6.1, p. 48) (footnote continued on the following page) 
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The petroleum industry provides a limited demand for domestic labor. 
Domestically-produced, crude petroleum needs refining before it can be 
used locally. Local demand, however, is not likely substantial. Con­
versely, plantation systems not only generate substantial employment 
opportunities but introduce workers and producers in the surrounding 
area to new crops and production skills. Consequently, local producers 
have opportunities to produce cash crops and to diversify production 
patterns. The marketing mechanism established by the plantation owners 
also serves as an outlet for the same crops produced by local peasants. 
The new sources of output and income give impetus to local trading 
in both agricultural commodities and other consumer goods. Expansion of 
trading opportunities, in turn, tends to result in labor specialization 
and in the attraction or mobilization of additional capital inputs. 
As long as export markets remain strong and plantation crops are pro­
duced at competitive costs, the potential for additional "spread effects" 
remains favorable. 
The lack of diversification in exports renders a country's foreign 
exchange position vulnerable to fluctuations in export demand and, in 
turn, export earnings. But foreign exchange is usually a basic com­
ponent of the means for financing national developmental plans. This 
uncertainty regarding the stability of exchange earnings complicates the 
formulation and effective implementation of national plans. Consequent­
ly, national planners have an interest in expanding the export base. 
Such an orientation tends to reduce the degree of "economic dualism". 
(footnote continued from preceding page) cites additional examples 
applicable to parts of Asia. 
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Other potential advantages of diversification are apparent: (1) In­
creased integration of various sectors of the economy enhances the 
effectiveness of government policies in guiding economic activity; (2) 
New and stronger sectoral interrelationships affect resource mobility 
and the internal distribution of consumer goods; and (3) From a social 
and political viewpoint, increased participation in the economy by 
previously relatively-isolated individuals and communities may be 
conducive to improving economic well-being and consequent social 
stability.^ Diversification and integration require additional capital 
2 
and administrative inputs. Marketing reforms, public distribution of 
inputs, and dissemination of information on production techniques and 
marketing are usual necessary concomitants of public policies to 
stimulate coordinated growth of the economy. 
A generalized discussion of the marketing and transportation systems 
in less-developed countries follows. Other components such as education 
and health systems are extremely important, but they will not be directly 
considered here.^ In addition, the structure and stability of the govern-
^As noted in Chapter VIII however, the inability to satisfy or 
realize new expectations and aspirations generated by increased contact 
with a money economy and public exhortations for harder work, increased 
saving, and productive investment motivates individuals to adjust aspira­
tions downward or creates the potential for social and political unrest. 
Neither consequence is desirable. 
2 The delineation of capital and administrative inputs does not 
imply that administrative inputs are not also capital inputs. 
3 
Public programs dealing with extension services, marketing boards, 
and tax-collecting measures are covered in Chapter VII. 
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ment system undoubtedly affects investment decisions of indigenous and 
foreign investors and the receptiveness of individuals and villages to 
government policies and programs. 
Role of the Marketing Mechanism 
According to economic theory, the market mechanism performs an 
important role in guiding economic activity. In both product and 
factor markets, prices are the links between quantities supplied and de­
manded which cause markets to be cleared. Through the pricing system, 
consumers reflect their demand preferences for consumer goods and pro­
ducers reflect their demand for factors of production, including inter­
mediary goods. Also, producers and resource owners indicate the amounts 
of goods and factor services, respectively, which they will offer at 
various prices.^ Acting in an environment of imperfect knowledge, 
economic agents must estimate these prices or exchange ratios before 
making their respective consumption, resource allocation, and factor 
supply decisions so as to maximize their individual objectives. These 
are considerations primarily affecting the static efficiency of the 
market in allocating resources and distributing the final product. As 
is subsequently discussed, the market mechanism as an instrument vari­
able serves to generate and sustain developmental processes which affect 
the motivations and objectives of economic agents and the integration 
of these individuals into a more-fully interdependent economic system. 
It is in this sense that the marketing sector may also be a leading sector 
in promoting economic development. 
^A theoretical discussion of quantities of agricultural consnodities 
marketed as a function of price and some of the available empirical 
evidence are included in Chapter VII. 
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The nature and scope of the marketing systems vary with stages of 
economic development and with attendant transportation and communications 
systems. As already noted, at low stages of economic development, the 
economy's infrastructure tends to support a collection of essentially 
self-contained economic or functional areas with few links among these 
groupings. The individual areas are mostly self-sufficient and as yet 
largely unaware of exchange opportunities with other areas. The market­
ing system is largely confined to an exchange economy with only limited 
purchases of goods not locally produced. As producers rely less on 
diversification to meet most of their consumption needs and more toward 
specialization of labor and firm acifivities, the scope and need for 
participating in an exchange or money economy continually increase. 
But the fact that most are not entirely self-sufficient suggests that 
a wedge for disturbing the low-level equilibrium of these communities 
exists. This wedge is in the form of the local merchant or itinerant 
trader who initially supplies a limited range of goods which are not 
locally produced. He is the producer-consumers' link with the "outside 
world"; he represents a potential channel for initiating change and 
altering individuals' values and attitudes toward change. However, the 
scope of the merchant-trader's activities is also constrained. The 
relatively low incomes and consequent limited purchases by his customers, 
both individually and collectively, result in a small retail market. 
1 
His constricted retail market, in turn, limits his incentive for in­
creasing the variety and quantity of goods offered. Poor transportation 
and communications facilities effectively limit the merchant-trader's 
range of contact and awareness of opportunities for altering traditional 
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practices. 
Change is essentially exogenous in nature; that is, exogenous to the 
majority of individuals affected.^ For example, foreign investment in 
a plantation system for producing export crops, railway systems built by 
the government, creation of cooperatives and marketing boards, and 
activities of merchants and traders tend to set up pressures and in-
2 
centives for economic change- While these phenomena are essentially 
necessary for stimulating economic processes, they are not sufficient. 
The building of a railroad and the establishment of a marketing board 
do not result in increased production and marketings if economic in­
centives, resource productivities, and producers' goals are not con­
ducive to increased production. The railroads, marketing boards, and 
school systems only provide the means through which economic change can 
be facilitated. Thus, the infrastructure of the economy provides the 
framework or machine for economic growth which must be juxtaposed with 
the objectives of producers, consumers, and resource owners and with the 
incentives and opportunities open to these individuals. 
Population growth and the consequent pressure of population on land 
forcing or causing labor migration and changes in production technique 
may be viewed as endogenous. However, the stimulant to population 
growth, whether through medicine or the impact of favorable weather on 
production, is still usually of an exogenous nature. 
2 Geertz (6.12), for example, coiranents on the impact of foreign-
owned plantations on production and marketing systems in Indonesia. 
Kamarck (6.18) and Neumark (6.27) indicate the importance of railroads 
as a stimulant to production of export crops in Africa. The impact of 
marketing boards is briefly discussed in Chapter VII. The significance 
of merchants and traders in providing credit and generating new wants 
is documented in this chapter. 
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Market-exchange system 
Essentially all producers have some contact with an exchange or 
money economy. Since the majority of producers in less-developed areas 
produce and market on a relatively-small scale and since this vast body 
of people is to be eventually or more fully integrated into a national 
economic system, it is important to understand the factors affecting 
marketing and exchange. The point of departure is that of producers 
in contact with an exchange economy where producers bring their produce; 
i.e., their endowments, to exchange for those goods they do not produce 
but consume.^ Such endowments result from resource allocation decisions 
affecting current production, any changes in stocks on hand, and pro­
ducers* consumption decisions. In the next section, a merchant-trader 
is introduced into the exchange system. 
Each participant has a maximum quantity of goods for exchange. 
Through the supply-demand conditions for individual goods, exchange 
rates are evolved. For example, a bushel of wheat may have an exchange 
value equivalent to ten yards of cloth. In a poor crop year, the ex­
change value may increase so that a half bushel of wheat now has a worth 
equivalent to ten yards of cloth. Exchange is facilitated through use 
of a numeraire ; i.e., a measuring unit or standard by which the exchange 
values of the various goods can be expressed in terms of a single good 
or monetary unit. 
^The advantage of exchange is often represented by the Edgeworth 
box diagram where the utility of one or both individuals can be in­
creased following a movement from an initial point off the "contract 
curve" to a point on the "curve". See the discussion relative to 
Figure 4.8. 
The basic equations used to represent the exchange economy are 
those presented by Henderson and Quandt (6.15, pp. 128-131). 
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Producer's endowments are denoted as they represent the 
quantity of the i-th good brought to the market for exchange by the 
r-th producer. Similarly, q^^ is the amount of the i-th good which 
the r-th producer-consumer demands or wishes to obtain in the market. 
The excess demand for the i-th good by the r-th individual is given 
in Equation 6.1. If is positive, the r-th individual is a net de­
mander of the i-th good. If E^^ is negative, he is a net supplier of 
the i-th good to be offered in exchange for some other good. Excluding 
the possibility of credit financing,^ the value of the goods obtained 
through exchange is restricted to the value of the producer's endow­
ment. This restriction is represented by Equation 6.2. The exchange 
activities are assumed to be costless. Alternatively, the p, can 
^ r - o i r - v  
n n 
Y = Z P.q° = S p.q. (r = 1, ... t) (6.2) 
^ i=l ^ i=l ^ 
^ P.- (qu- - q? ) = ^ p.E- = 0 (6.3) 
^ " i=i ^ " 
U — U(q^ , . . , q : Ec]) — U(E^ ; E + q : Cc 1 (6.4) 
be assumed to be net of any buying and selling costs. Using the re-
struction expressed in Equation 6.2, Equation 6.1 is rewritten as 
Equation 6.3. Equation 6.4 represents the r-th producer-consumer's 
utility function. His aggregate utility is a function of the quantities 
of the goods he obtains through exchange and subsequently consumes, and 
^The possibility of credit financing is introduced in Chapter IX, 
Case 3. 
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of the quantities of goods he produces but consumes directly. The 
latter is denoted as vector [c]. The producer's objective, now operating 
as a consumer, is to maximize his utility subject to his budget con­
straint, Equation 6.2. This formulation is given in Equation 6.5. 
\ = "r^^lr " Sir' V" 'c]) - P-E.^) (6.5) 
1 — 1 
Taking the partial derivatives of Equation 5.5 with respect to E^ and 
/V and setting these equal to zero, the following system of equations 
for the r-th individual is obtained: 
ÔS ÔU (i = 1, ..., n) 
~ ~ ^ p. - 0 = 1 (6.6) ôE^^ ôE^^ ^i (r = 1, ..., t) 
ÔS n 
_r ^ _ 
i=l 
M -.Z.PiSir = 0 (6.7) 
SE. 
Since p, ^ = 1, Equation 6.6 can be rewritten as: 
^ir 
ÔS ÔU ÔE. 
^ ^ - Xp. = 0 ( 6 . 6 )  
ae- r  • aqj, i 
The nt +1 equations with nt +1 unknowns, the q^^(i = 1, ..., n; 
r =1, ..., t) and A, can now be solved simultaneously. Assuming the 
second-order conditions for a constrained maximization problem are met, 
utility maximization for the r-th producer-consumer is obtained when 
1 
the following holds: 
®"lr ' ' '"nr 
— ... — ———— or 
Pi Pn 
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MU MU 
— - = — (r = 1, t) (6.7)' 
Pi Pn 
Equation 6.7 implies that each producer consumes a portion of each 
good. Given his q?^ and the p^ in the market, the r-th producer now 
acting as a consumer is in equilibrium when Equation 6.8 holds. If 
all other participants in the exchange system are in equilibrium, 
Equation 6.9 is also satisfied. That is, a configuration of 
(i = 1, ..., n) exists such that Equations 6.8 and 6.9 hold simultaneous­
ly-
E^(Pj^5 » •••» P^) 0 (r 1, •••> t) (6.8) 
Z E (p p ..., p ) = 0 (6.9) 
r=l ^ 
The q? for the participants in the market need not reflect only 
agricultural produce in its raw form. Relatively simple processing 
techniques, which are usually highly labor-intensive, can be applied to 
grains and livestock products so as to increase their exchange value in 
the market, thereby providing additional returns to the producer's 
labor inputs. Corn can be dried, rice husked, and milk processed into 
butter and cheese. In addition, the q° can include handicrafts produced 
by the household such as weaving, pottery-making, and wood products. 
The "value-added" through processing may not be substantial in absolute 
terms ; but if the opportunity cost of labor inputs is low, such 
processing may still be remunerative. The bargaining and exchange process 
is usually time-consuming. However, these operations are labor-intensive. 
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and the opportunity cost of labor and time is low. In addition, social 
interaction associated with exchange activities often provides psychic 
returns to the participants, returns which should be included in their 
2 
utility functions. 
Expenditures on consumer goods affecting quantities marketed 
A number of items are normally consumed but not produced within 
the village or marketing area. Included would be items such as sugar, 
salt, tobacco, kerosene, and manufactured textiles usually supplied by 
itinerant traders and local merchants. At very low stages of economic 
development, the quantities of these goods consumed by subsistence-
oriented producers can be assumed to be essentially fixed according to 
3 traditional consumption patterns. The variety of goods supplied by 
traders and merchants is assumed to be essentially invariant from one 
^For example. See Dewey (6.10, p. 232-3, 236), Bauer (6.5, p. 26), 
Bauer and Yamey (6.6, pp. 33-34) and, implicitly, Mintz (6.21, p. 178). 
2 
For example, Hammond (6.14) makes the following comment relative 
to the Mossi located in Upper Volta: "Social satisfactions derived 
from participation in the market are greatly valued; it provides an 
opportunity for meeting friends and kinsmen and for exchanging gossip 
and observations on one another's dress, the crops, and current 
political developments. The market is a place for making loans and 
receiving small gifts from kinsmen and friends, for flirtations and the 
arrangement of rendezvous, and for that casual sort of social inter­
action which is one of the principal pleasures of life in the Yatenga" 
(6.14, p. 245). 
3 
Related to this assumption is the following statement by Neumark 
(6.27): "... the demand for money in a subsistence or embryonic 
exchange economy is derived from a demand for specific things for 
which there is a felt need. Once a limited objective has been attained, 
any further exertion to earn money would be meaningless. Such a demand 
for money may be called a target demand" (6.27, p. 48). 
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time period to the next so that consumer preferences and consumption 
decisions do not vary.^ Let [Ë] be a vector representing the respective 
quantities of these goods consumed. A corresponding price vector, [pg], 
reflects prices charged by the trader or merchant. The quantity of ex-
* 2 penditures on consumer goods, E , is given in Equation 6.10. In order 
E* = [pg] [ Ë ] (6.10) 
"k 
to make E , producers must sell a quantity of goods which has a value 
* 
equivalent to E . For convenience, assume that only one good, q^, is 
marketed. Other goods are exchanged according to the mechanics of the 
exchange economy. Given the prevailing market price for q^, p^. 
Equation 6.12 reflects the amount of q^ that must be marketed. 
E* = [pg] L E ] = p^q^ (6.11) 
CpJ [ i ] 
% ' — (^-1» 
n 
If Equations 6.11 and 6.12 hold for producers at low stages of economic 
development, a few interesting relationships can be derived. If p^ 
increases, ceteris paribus, the quantity of which needs to be marketed 
falls. Conversely, if p^ falls, ceteris paribus, a larger amount of q^ 
must be marketed. Thus, a perverse relationship between quantities 
^Even though consumer preferences remain Invariant, consumption 
patterns would vary with factors such as changes in family size, ob­
servance of special family events, and family illnesses. 
2 ^ ^ r n r At a later point in the study E is rewritten as E = Lp J LEj 
FC where FC represents the fixed cash payments for rents and 
taxes. 
I 
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marketed and prices received exists. See Figure 6.1. 
S  
A n  
Figure 6.1. Inverse relationship between market price and 
quantities marketed 
Curve SS is a rectangular hyperbola. The elasticity of quantity marketed 
with respect to price is equal to negative unity at all points on the 
curve. How realistic is this proposition?^ Figure 6.2 is useful in 
2 
giving an intuitive answer to this question. 
A survey of studies focusing on the relationships between market 
prices and quantities marketed is given in a subsection of Chapter VII. 
The derived estimates of the price elasticities of quantities marketed 
indicate that under certain conditions a perverse market relationship 
may be operative. 
2 The mechanics of Figures 6.2 and 6.3 are fairly straightforward. 
The discussion relative to Figures 8.1 and 8.3 is also applicable to 
the above figures. 
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Figure 6.2. Optimum labor-use levels to maintain I as income-
possibility curves shift upward 
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Figure 6.3. Optimum labor-use and income levels are income-possibility 
curves shift upward and shape and position of utility 
curves vary 
279 
Figure 6.2 represents a situation where the producer's objective 
is to achieve a fixed, target income denoted as Assume that 
is the income-possibility curve corresponding to the various levels of 
labor inputs, given the technical coefficients of labor and the values 
of outputs produced. Utility is maximized at point A when of labor 
generates of income. Assume that with I^, both E and [c] are 
satisfied. If p^ increases, ceteris paribus, the entire income-
possibility curve shifts upward for all labor-use levels. Since the 
producer's objective is still to realize the indifference curves 
must be drawn in a particular manner so that the points of tangency re­
sult in maintaining I^. 
With the higher p^ generating income-possibility , point B re­
presents the new point of utility maximization. Since > U^, a 
higher level of utility is obtained. With I^, [c] can still be met 
* 
as can E . But according to Equation 6.12, a lesser amount of q^ 
needs to be produced and(or) marketed. The reduction of labor inputs 
from to results in a reduction in the quantity of q^ produced. 
Leisure has been substituted for income. If p^ increases again so that 
Ig is the relevant income-possibility curve, utility is maximized at 
point C where is used to generate I^. Thus, with successive in­
creases in p^, ceteris paribus, less labor is employed and less q^ needs 
to be produced and marketed. Price and quantity marketed move in oppo­
site directions. Similarly, if p^ successively falls resulting in I^, 
Ig and then I^, increasing amounts of q^ must be marketed. To increase 
the production and marketing of q^, more labor inputs must be utilized. 
If p^ continues to fall so that the point of tangency results in an 
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income less than I^, then (1) External financing to the extent that 
actual income plus financing equals must be secured; and(or) (2) 
Income and consumption must be reduced if, in fact, this is a feasible 
alternative. 
Referring to Equation 6.11 again, if [p^] increases, ceteris pari-
bus, E increases as does the amount of q^ that must be marketed. The 
terms of trade have been turned against the producer. Utility maximiza­
tion through consumption requires that Equation 6.13 must be satisfied. 
According to Equation 6.13, as E p  1  increases but [E] is unchanged, 
E 
MU„ is invariant but the ratio MU„ /[p]falls. This disequilibrium 
ill Ci £< 
persists unless (1) [ E ] is reduced so that MU^ increases; or (2) 
The marginal utilities of the q^(i =1, n) are reduced by increasing 
the consumption levels of each. Alternative (2) is feasible if suf-
* 
ficient amounts of q are produced so that E can be made and q can 
n n 
be traded for the other q^. This alternative, however, is tantamount 
to an increase in income demand which is inconsistent with maintaining 
I^. The increase in[p^]must be offset by a reduction in [E] so that 
total expenditure is unchanged and Equation 6.13 is satisfied. If 
[ E ] is to be maintained as[pj increases, ceteris paribus, an income 
£ 
level higher than I^ is necessary. A higher income which is still con­
sistent with utility maximization is possible if the shape and position 
of the indifference curves are changed as in Figure 6.3. Similarly, if 
[E] is increased, ceteris paribus, a larger quantity of income is de­
manded or needed to meet consumption expenditures. This higher incrane 
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is possible with a change in the map of indifference curves, as in 
Figure 6.3.^ 
Merchant-trader-landlord middlemen 
In most less-developed areas, marketing middlemen are the most 
important links in the system that channels agricultural commodities 
from producers to domestic consumers and exporters. Marketing boards 
and marketing cooperatives are important outlets for certain crops in 
certain areas. While these organizations perform middlemen activities, 
the nature and scope of their operations differ from that of the large 
number of middlemen operating individually and on a small-scale basis. 
Despite a relatively high proportion of production consumed directly by 
small-scale producers, their aggregate marketings constitute a signifi­
cant part of total marketings by all producers. In the case of non-
edible cash crops which are grown by producers having operations of 
diverse size, a very high percentage of production realized is marketed. 
At low stages of economic development, the number of marketing 
middlemen is generally high. However, their distribution throughout the 
economy is strongly conditioned by population densities, transportation 
facilities and costs, and the effectiveness of communications systems in 
denoting areas of marketable supplies and excess consumer demand. Further­
more, a system of credit advances by wholesalers which filter down to 
various individuals in the marketing structure affect the location and 
size of operations of these various middlemen. As the distance from 
The shape and position of the new indifference curve map condition 
the effect of upward shifts in the income-possibility curves on the labor-
use levels and corresponding income levels which maximize the producer's 
utility. 
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established market areas increases, the number of middlemen at each 
stage of the marketing process decreases. The producer has progressive­
ly fewer alternative marketing outlets. 
Numerous roles are actually and potentially performed by the 
middlemen. In such capacities, middlemen are in positions to both 
stimulate and inhibit developmental processes. Quite apparently, 
their impact on these processes is an indication of the need for market 
reform and the nature of needed reform measures. The roles which are 
subsequently discussed are generally applicable to most less-developed 
areas. Again, marketing boards, marketing cooperatives, and compulsory 
marketings to public agencies also affect marketing structures in many 
of these areas. 
Want creation Since merchants and traders supply those goods 
consumed but not produced, they represent the vehicles for expanding 
the quantity and variety of consumer goods available to purchasers. 
The introduction of new consumer goods, often imported goods, and the 
creation of new consumer wants have favorably affected producers' be­
havior as evidenced by higher production levels and increased quanti­
ties marketed (6.4, 6.6, 6.25)^ In Africa where increases in production 
and marketings have primarily been in nonedible export crops appended to 
traditional food production patterns, increased exports need not have 
^See Figure 8.5 in Chapter VIII for a diagrammatical representation 
of this change in behavior. With regard to the lack of consumer goods, 
Yudelman writes, "At present in many parts of Central and East Africa 
the only sources of supply for 'incentive' goods are small trading posts. 
Most of these carry a narrow and uninspiring range of products. The 
apparent rewards for effort are restricted to the basic necessities of 
daily life" (6.33, p. 175). 
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reduced the domestic supply of food. However, as specialization in pro­
duction of export crops occurs, producer-consumers obtain increasing 
amounts of food items in the market. This specialization may reduce 
domestic supplies of food in the short run, but the increased market 
demand tends to increase returns to domestic producers and suppliers of 
food items which, in turn, may stimulate production. 
Want creation may have adverse consequences too. New consumer 
goods may increase the importance of present consumption over future 
consumption with an adverse impact on saving and private investment in 
the firm. However, this phenomenon may only be temporary and primarily 
applicable to consumer goods that can be purchased in small quantities. 
As goods are introduced which require relatively substantial expenditures, 
the motivation for deferring present consumption may increase. At this 
point, another factor with longer-term consequences is relevant. This 
is the credit extended by merchants and moneylenders which borrowers use 
for obtaining new consumer goods. Higher indebtedness without an 
improved repayment capacity places the creditor in a stronger bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the indebted producer. The possible implications for 
required marketings to the creditor at prices determinable by the latter 
were discussed in Chapter V. 
Credit to producers Producers are often forced or inclined to 
make the bulk of intended marketings shortly after harvest. The absence 
of storage facilities and the demand for money to pay rent, taxes, debt 
obligations, and expenditures for post-harvest social events are the 
primary reasons for this seasonality of marketing. These expenditures 
are often made in kind rather than money. In either case, the producer 
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parts with his output. In areas where the more stable flow of income 
through multiple cropping or diversification of farm enterprises is not 
available, producers often have to resort to credit for financing con­
sumption and production expenses until the next harvest period arrives. 
In addition, the need to make unplanned expenditures for unforeseen 
events often requires that the producer secures external financing. 
Such credit is provided by middlemen (6.13, 6.21, 6.31, 6.32). Wharton 
(6.32), for example, notes that producer indebtedness requires that the 
small-scale rubber producer in Malaya must continue to sell his rubber 
to the rubber buyer-lender who, in turn, makes regular deductions from 
his payments to the producer until the latter*s debt is repaid. In 
some areas the rubber buyer is also a local merchant retailing consumer 
goods and production inputs to the producer. Indebtedness and purchases 
1 
on account insure that the buyer-lender has a reliable source of rubber. 
Similar situations exist elsewhere where vertical trading relation­
ships are established through the use of credit (6.12, 6.22, 6.23). By 
providing credit and perhaps price concessions to producers, the middle­
man becomes the marketing outlet for the indebted producer. At the 
same time, the middleman often obtains financing from a wholesaler or 
the next individual in the marketing chain to whom marketing obligations 
^Ward (6.31) indicates that a similar middleman-lender system exists 
among the Chinese rubber producers in Sarawak. See adds that the Melanan 
producing sago in Sarawak are not as industrious as the Chinese and are 
included to withdraw from work after a dertain amount of sago flour has 
been produced. Consequently, the Chinese middlemen-retailers attempt 
to keep the Melanan in debt. Under the threat of withdrawing future 
credit, the middlemen attempt to coerce sago producers into maintaining 
a more continuous supply of sago flour to them. Further, the debtor-
creditor relationship reduces the threat of competition for supplies 
from other middlemen in the area (6.31, p. 152-3). 
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now exist. A similar pattern of credit advancement by moneylender-
traders in India exists which effectively forces indebted producers to 
market their commodities with them (6.13, 6.19). Where assistance is 
offered by landlords, their tenants are often obligated to use the land­
lords as market middlemen. 
The importance of credit in production and marketing is apparent. 
Credit advances by market intermediaries satisfy a mutual interde­
pendence. That is, producers require financing for production and 
consumption expenditures while middlemen-lenders represent local sources 
of credit and marketing outlets. The latter individuals are also able 
to lessen the uncertainty surrounding continued source of supply from 
which to procure commodities and sources of demand for those consumer 
goods retailed. In addition, producers may find the relationship some­
what advantageous in that the uncertainty relative to marketing and 
credit decisions is reduced. Price and interest cost concessions may 
be given to clients of long standing. Tenants may be given preferential 
treatment in the distribution of plots of land for cultivation, in dis­
pensation of personal and business counsel by the landlord, and in work 
obligations to and wage-labor opportunities provided by the landlord. 
Conversely, continued indebtedness maintains or increases the superior 
bargaining position of the lender relative to the borrower. 
Collection, aggregation and distribution processes Producers 
located near marketing and consuming centers often engage in petty 
trading. That is, they do not rely on the first middleman to start their 
goods through the marketing channels; they are that first middleman. Pro­
ducers located at successively farther distances from these centers are 
I 
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confronted with increasing transportation, labor and time costs and de­
creasing awareness of existing and anticipated market conditions if they 
are to market their goods themselves. Due to the state of transportation 
and communications facilities, wholesalers rely upon a hierarchy of 
middlemen to search out the relatively-small quantities sold by individual 
producers, grade and bulk these commodities of variable quality, and 
transport them to collection points (6.5, 6.6, 6.21, 6.31). These opera­
tions are costly, in terms of labor and time expended, relative to the 
value of the commodities involved. Wholesalers find it economically 
advantageous not to employ and supervise a staff of employees to complete 
these labor-intensive operations (6.5). As mentioned previously, the 
opportunity cost associated with the middlemen's time and labor inputs 
is often not high. Consequently, each is willing to work for a rela­
tively small absolute return. Collectively, such returns may be sub­
stantial in comparison to the prices received by producers and paid by 
consumers. 
Middlemen perform similar operations in the distribution of 
domestically-produced and imported consumer goods. Due to relatively 
low per capita incomes and inadequate storage facilities, consumers 
make their purchases in small quantities at frequent intervals. Under 
such conditions, retail sales are highly labor-intensive. Consequently, 
middlemen and small retailers break down the aggregates into small lots 
and distribute the goods in the amounts demanded by consumers. Again, 
wholesalers would find these distribution procedures costly if they were 
to employ salaried workers to carry out these operations. 
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Communication of information on supply-demand conditions With 
limited transportation and communications facilities and low literacy 
rates, exchange of information among middlemen at different stages is a 
principal means of identifying market conditions. Information is trans­
mitted on the quantities and sources of supply and on demand for both 
agricultural commodities and consumer goods. These individuals also are 
in positions to introduce producer-consumers to new crops for which a 
market exists, to improved production inputs, and to new consumer goods. 
Conversely, the same middlemen transmit information to wholesalers 
relative to the adoption of new crops and changes in consumer demand. 
Entrepreneurship and mobilization of resources Entrepreneur-
ship has important implications for economic development. Entrepreneurs 
are able to perceive and, subject to capital and social constraints, to 
exploit or take advantage of economic opportunities as they arise. 
Similarly, they are more responsive to changing market conditions and 
to public policies attempting to guide economic activity. Trading and 
performing other middlemen functions are important means for acquiring 
knowledge and experience of the workings of the market and of entrepre­
neurial activities (6.12, 6.21).^ This is true for both small traders 
who aspire to expanding their scale of operations and for agricultural 
producers engaging in some trading activities. Since such trading often 
takes place in an environment of brisk competition, the economically 
and socially sagacious trader is rewarded for his'efforts. Thus, the 
acquisition and perfection of entrepreneurial skills are seen as the 
^Also see Marris (6.20). 
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means to economic survival.^ 
The middleman's role in creating new wants leading to the mobiliza­
tion and better use of available resources was discussed above. Further, 
his role in serving as the outlet for producers' marketings has been 
observed. Without adequate marketing outlets, increased production is 
largely consumed locally. Where such outlets exist, the means for 
channeling agricultural commodities and expenditures for consumer goods 
to other sectors of the economy exists. Thus, middlemen can serve as 
both the mobilizers and the redistributors of resources within the 
economy. Furthermore, middlemen's margins in both their marketing 
and retail distribution activities represent net transfers from the 
agricultural sector. Such capital accumulation can potentially be 
used for productive uses in other areas of the economy, including the 
marketing sector. 
Market speculation As intermediaries in the marketing process, 
middlemen are in a position to withhold quantities from the marketing 
channels in anticipation of higher future prices. Where individuals 
are obligated, because of credit advances, to move goods to the next 
middleman in the structure, the former forego the opportunity for 
speculation. As the market demand and supply schedules tend to be 
relatively steeply-sloped, temporary shifts of the supply schedule to 
the left by speculative withholding force prices upward. Some middle­
men can now sell at higher prices with higher prices paid by consumers 
without producers benefiting from these price advances (6.2, 6.19, 6.28). 
1" As noted in Chapter V, the entrepreneurial activities of money­
lenders may be individually rewarding but often have an inhibiting in­
fluence on the capability of agriculturalists to improve their economic 
we]1-being. 
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Speculative hoarding on the part of smaller-scale middlemen is constrained 
by their need for cash and limited storage facilities. Such gyrations in 
market prices do not facilitate short- and longer-term planning by 
producers. 
Number of middlemen 
As distance from marketing and consuming centers increases, the 
number of local buyers and middlemen generally decreases (6.6, 6.16).^ 
This is due to high transportation costs, the relatively small quanti­
ties, individually sold by producers, and limited knowledge of local 
production and market supply conditions. As mentioned previously, 
differentiation in product quality and marketings in small quantities 
require substantial inputs of labor in grading, bulking, simple proces­
sing, and transporting these commodities prior to sale to the next 
middleman or wholesaler. In general, the concentration of middlemen is 
found at the marketing level where buyers have collected the goods from 
the countryside and have brought these to a middleman for sorting and 
bulking processes. Where producers are in close proximity to this mar­
keting center, they may bring the commodities directly thereby avoiding 
^In a study of cotton and groundnut marketing in the Indian dis­
trict of Rajkot in Gujarat State, Jasdanwalla observed that progressively 
fewer buyers were available at successive distances from the market 
center (6.16, Table LIV, p. 85). However, only 19.4 percent of those 
interviewed said they sold to a monopolistic buyer. The rest sold to 
two or more buyers. In addition, there was not a close association 
between the producer's size of operations and the number of buyers to 
which sales were made (6.16, Table LIII, p. 84). Jasdanwalla adds 
that in India a superior marketing mechanism for cotton and groundnuts 
exists relative to other agricultural commodities. 
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payment of the buyer's commission. More enterprising producers, to­
gether with landlords and merchants, often perform this initial col­
lection and transportation operation. 
The large concentration of middlemen at this level is due to few 
barriers to entry, a relatively low opportunity cost on time and labor 
expended, and the opportunity to earn income through simple "value-
added" processes plus normal trading margins. Since these processing 
and trading activities are labor-intensive in nature, require limited 
capital outlays, utilize trading skills which can be fairly readily 
obtained, and provide a quick turnover of capital or commodity stocks, 
a large number of traders and producer-traders participate (6.5, 6.10, 
6.21, 6.24). Similar attributes partially account for the large number 
of individuals involved in distributing and retailing consumer goods. 
Two additional factors are important. When middlemen operations 
proceed beyond the scope manageable by an individual or his family, 
additional administrative skills are required. The relative scarcity 
of these skills and the uncertainties associated with hiring other in­
dividuals tend to motivate or constrain traders to operating on a çmall-
scale basis. In addition, the relative scarcity of both individual 
savings and financing by public agencies for trading activities limit 
the scale of individual operations. Where credit is advanced by higher 
intermediaries, such credit is often provided on the security of personal 
relationships and to a relatively large number of individuals so as to 
spread the lender's risk. These factors interact to sustain a system 
of small-scale traders. 
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Market-exchange system with merchant-trader 
Equations 6.1 to 6.9 represented the conditions for individual and 
aggregate utility maximization in a pure exchange economy. Utility 
maximization was constrained by the values of producers' endowments; 
i.e., the purchasing power of the goods exchanged in the system. But 
the system was closed in that there were no leakages of goods from the 
exchange system nor external introduction of goods.^ Adding a merchant-
trader to the exchange system provides a link with the external economy 
and a channel for outward movement of agricultural commodities and in­
ward flow of consumer goods and production inputs. 
How does this new participant in the system affect the activities 
of others? First, the range of goods available to consumers is expanded. 
Second, the merchant-trader often both purchases and later retails to 
producer-consumers the same type of agricultural commodities for consump­
tion. Third, the merchant-trader often provides credit in kind to pro­
ducers who have insufficient incomes or inventories to tide them over 
from one production and harvest cycle to the next. Depending upon the 
number of competitors, the merchant-trader may have both monopolistic 
and monopsonistic powers. Where producers are located close to the mar­
keting area, they may engage in direct retailing to consumers in competi­
tion with the merchant-trader. Yet, because of the services provided by 
the latter, he is able to establish his own clientele and, in turn, exert 
^In Equation 6.4, the direct consumption vector [c] can also in­
clude quantities of goods necessarily withheld from exchange for payment 
in kind of rent, taxes and debt obligations. Taxes and perhaps rent 
would represent leakages to the economy external to the exchange system. 
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influence over his purchasing and retailing activities- The development 
of improved transportation and communications facilities would tend to 
lessen these powers as competition among middlemen increases. 
Figures6.4 and 6.5 represent situations where the merchant-trader 
has both monopolistic and monopsonistic powers. The S curves represent 
the supply schedules; i.e., offer curves, of agricultural commodities by 
producers to the merchant-trader.^ Because the curves slope upward, the 
acquisition cost to the merchant-trader ; i.e., the marginal expenditure 
2 for additional units denoted as ME^, increases as purchases are expanded. 
The merchant-trader has the options of selling these agricultural com­
modities to another trader and at a later date, to some of the same pro­
ducers who initiated the marketings. In Figure 6.4, the merchant-
trader is assumed to market his purchases with a trader or wholesaler at 
the next level in the marketing structure. Because of a limited number 
of competitors, imperfect communications systems, and differentiated 
products, the demand curve faced by the merchant-trader is assumed to 
have some downward slope. Consequently, marginal revenue is less than 
average revenue at each quantity demanded, and the marginal revenue curve 
lies below the demand curve at all points. If the merchant-trader is 
^Implicit in the supply schedules is the behavioral assumption that 
higher prices offered by the merchant elicit increased quantities of 
goods marketed with him. This assumption is re-examined in Chapter VII. 
2 Total cost = TC = pq and p = f(q). Therefore, ME dTC 
s 
Because the supply curve, S, slopes upward. 
4^ > 0 and ME > p. dq s 
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Figure 6.4. Monopolistic and monopsonistic positions of the merchant 
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Figure 6.5. Monopolistic and monopsonistic positions of the merchant-
trader as a retailer 
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a profit-maximizer, he will purchase Oq^ units from producers at price 
Op^. To the left of point M in Figure 6.4, the marginal revenue 
associated with an increment of the good is larger than the marginal 
cost of acquiring the increment. At point M, marginal revenue is equal 
to marginal expenditure and profit is maximized. In turn, the merchant-
trader markets quantity Oq^ at price Op^ to another trader. Given the 
demand and supply schedules as drawn in Figure 6.4, the merchant is able 
to realize a margin of p^PgAB through his buying and selling activities. 
This margin represents total revenue of Op^Aq^ less expenditures of 
Op^Bq^. This margin also represents the merchant-trader's gross capital 
accumulation. The question then arises as to the disposition of this 
margin. The available alternatives depend upon the stage of economic de­
velopment and would include some of the following: 
(1) To purchase additional consumer goods thereby expanding both 
the quantity and variety of goods offered to consumers. The newly-
offered consumer goods may motivate some producers to alter their pre­
ferences between income and leisure so that more labor inputs are 
utilized and agricultural output is increased. To the extent that margins 
are used to purchase imported goods for subsequent retail, capital 
leakages in the domestic economic system occur. Merchant-traders could 
also provide traditional and improved production inputs to producers to 
the extent they are available to the merchant; 
(2) To invest in the marketing structure thereby creating links 
with other marketing areas through vertical ties with suppliers of con­
sumer goods and purchasers of agricultural goods and through horizontal 
expansion of marketing outlets in other areas. Conceivably, the former 
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increases the flow of goods into and out of the market area with 
possible reductions in acquisition and unit transportation costs. Hori­
zontal expansion of marketing facilities increases the number of retail 
and purchase outlets. The larger market may permit the merchant to 
realize some cost savings through bulk purchasing from both producers 
and wholesalers of consumer goods. It does not follow that such cost 
savings are passed on to others through higher producer prices and lower 
retail prices; 
(3) To invest in areas other than marketing. Investments in 
land and housing are not directly productive. In fact, purchases of 
agricultural land further increase the control of the merchant-trader 
over producers. On the other hand, investment in government certifi­
cates increases the flow of government revenue, a part of which can be 
used for public investment and underwriting the cost of public policies; 
and 
(4) To provide additional credit to producers and consumers. In 
doing so, the merchant-trader provides an important service. His 
position as a creditor, however, increases the potential for reducing 
the bargaining power and range of individual behavior of his clientele. 
If additional merchant-traders enter the market to compete with the 
sales by the individual represented in Figure 6.4, the degree of 
monopolistic power accruing to the individual under consideration is re­
duced. The new demand curve faced by him will tend to have less slope 
than dd in Figure 6.4 and will shift toward the price axis. That is, at 
each price, the individual merchant-trader can only market a smaller 
quantity as competitors encroach upon his previously-existing market. 
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Let this modified demand curve be denoted as d'd'. The new point of 
profit maximization is A larger quantity is purchased from producers 
at a higher price. The corresponding margin accruing to the merchant-
trader is smaller than previously realized. A redistribution of income 
has taken place. In the aggregate, producers receive a larger revenue; 
the individual merchant-trader realizes a smaller marketing margin. 
In Figure 6.5, the merchant-trader is represented as an individual 
who purchases, for example, rice from producers and then resells rice 
to them at a later date. The merchant retains the monopolistic powers 
he had in Figure 6.4 but has relatively greater monopolistic powers 
in Figure 6.5. The greater monopolistic power is implicit in the 
* 
more steeply-sloping demand curve for the good he retails. The ME^ 
curve incorporates ME^ plus storage costs and any opportunity costs and, 
therefore, lies to the left of the ME^ curve. The merchant-trader's 
profits are maximized at point M. He purchases Oq^ at price Op^ from 
the producer. Later, he retails the same quantity but at price Op^. 
The producer-consumer is exploited from two sides. If the price re­
ceived by producers were Op^ corresponding to point N where the demand 
and supply schedules intersect, producers would not only be able to 
market a greater quantity at a price higher than Op^; but, in addition, 
as consumers they would demand a larger quantity at a much lower price.^ 
In fact, the merchant-trader would not be able to generate a capital 
surplus through his pricing, purchasing and retailing policies. He 
would only realize his normal profit from the transactions. Producers* 
^The equilibrium at point N ignores a consideration of the storage 
costs and any opportunity costs. 
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revenues amounting to Op^Nq^ would also equal their expenditures for the 
quantity Oq^ of goods demanded at p^. 
Although the numerical scales in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 have not been 
specified, the market supply curves, the S curves, as drawn suggest that 
producers have a large number of price-quantity marketed combinations open 
to them. That is, the quantities marketed by producers are positively 
correlated with a wide range of prices received. As mentioned earlier, 
producers bring endowments to the market for exchange with other pro­
ducers and for sale to the merchant-trader. With a given endowment during 
a marketing period, the producer has alternative outlets for his products 
and, in turn, can vary the quantities offered to individual purchasers as 
the price and exchange values vary. If the producer has storage facili­
ties for relatively-nonperishable goods, he has more power over regulating 
the marketing of his commodities as market conditions change over time. 
Thus, producers with storage facilities are able, in the aggregate, to 
influence both the position and shape of the S curve from one production 
period to the next. Of course, the maximum amount they can market in 
any period is constrained by endowments or inventory stocks. At this 
quantity, the S curve becomes vertical; beyond this point, the price 
elasticity of quantity supplied to the market is perfectly inelastic. 
The absence of storage facilities tends to accentuate the vari­
ability in market prices. At the end of the harvesting, large 
quantities of produce are typically marketed. The local market supply 
curve shifts substantially to the right while the demand curve for 
agricultural products would tend to shift to the left. The shift in 
demand is a consequence of producers now consuming from their own pro­
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duction rather than purchasing food grains in the market. The inter­
action of these two factors tends to depress market prices in the im­
mediate post-harvest season. See Figure 6.6.^ During the planting and 
pre-harvest period, diminishing inventories of agricultural produce 
cause the local market supply curve to shift to the left, for example. 
At the same time^ however, other producers who have exhausted 
their stocks demand greater quantities in the market in order to tide 
them over to the harvest season. Let this demand be represented by 
Consequently, prices are forced upward such as p^^ in Figure 6.6. In 
order to sustain consumption patterns during this period, producers with 
low incomes and few savings often have to resort to credit financing from 
a moneylender or credit in kind from the merchant-trader. The debt 
obligations to the moneylender represent a demand on future income. 
The merchant-trader also has a claim on future income; but because of 
his role as a creditor and as a purchaser and retailer of commodities, 
he is in a strong position to directly influence the economic well-being 
of the producer. As a creditor, the merchant-trader can effectively 
force the indebted producer to sell his output and purchase his consumer 
goods from him at prices which are favorable to the merchant-trader. 
At times, the merchant-trader is able to purchase the crop prior to 
harvest at prices which are lower than would prevail in the market at 
the time of harvest. In addition, the producer's reliance on the 
merchant-trader to provide credit in kind permits the latter to increase 
prices producers must pay for food and other consumer goods obtained 
^To simplify the exposition, corresponding ME and MR curves are 
not drawn in Figure 6.6. ® 
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Figure 6.6. Market prices during pre-harvest and harvest 
periods 
from him. In this situation, the producer does not have the market 
supply and demand options implicit in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. The prices 
he receives and pays are determined, or potentially determinable, by 
means external to the forces of the market. 
Inadequate storage facilities and the demand for money for meet­
ing tax, rent, and interest payments force or induce many producers to 
market the major proportion of their commodities following harvest. The 
post-harvest supply curve is designated as in Figure 6.6. As pro­
ducers harvest their crops, the market demand curve for these com­
modities shifts leftward, such as D^. The direction and magnitude of 
these two shifts depress market prices in the post-harvest period, for 
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example, in Figure 6.6. 
Returning to Equations 6.1 to 6.5, the addition of the merchant 
to the exchange economy does not alter the producer's utility maxi­
mization process. Assume the merchant-trader buys only product q^ 
from producers. The price paid producers is determined as in Figure 
6.3. Since producers also consume q^, the cost or valuation of consum­
ing q^ is the price the producer could have received; i.e., his 
opportunity cost, if he had marketed the q^ consumed. Let q^° and p^ 
be defined as the quantity marketed by the producer and the price paid 
by the merchant-trader, respectively. Assume that the merchant-trader 
provides five goods not previously available to producer-consumers. 
The quantities which can now be demanded, the q^^, range frcrni 
(i = 1, ..., n+5). In any production-consumption period, the prices 
p^ through p^^ are essentially fixed by the merchant-trader. In 
Equation 6.2, which requires that the r-th producer-consumer's ex­
penditures must equal his income, the q°^ for (i = n+1, ..., n-H5) are 
all zero. The constrained utility maximization process is identical to 
that derived in Equations 6.1 to 6.9. 
Proportion of production marketed 
If the agricultural sector is to provide the food and fiber neces­
sary for the expansion of other sectors and for generating foreign ex­
change earnings, more important than production levels are the quanti­
ties marketed and transfers of goods through payments in kind. If the 
producing unit consumes its entire production directly, essentially no 
contribution is made to development of the economy. No portion of this 
production is made available for sustaining other workers and for ex­
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panding exports. Similarly, producers do not acquire the income 
through marketing which can be spent on consumer goods produced else­
where in the economy. Therefore, from an economic standpoint, it is 
in the interest of national planners to attempt to induce the maximum 
movement of goods from the agricultural sector without adversely 
affecting future levels of production and private investment in the firm. 
Quantities marketed are a function of a number of factors, some of 
which are discussed below. Some of these factors also affect the time-
distribution of marketings. 
Size of production unit The absolute limit on quantities 
marketable is the amount harvested plus any carryover in inventories. 
If the net returns from marketings are extremely low, producers may 
not harvest a part of their standing crops, especially nonedible, cash 
crops. Small-scale producers are expected to consumer directly a large 
proportion of the edible commodities they produce. However, data avail­
able for India do not show a strong positive correlation between percent 
of production marketed and size of land holdings. Table 6.1 represents 
a summarization of results from three studies concerned with this re­
lationship.^ Columns (3) and (4) reflect only food grains marketed. 
The three researchers have used different size groupings. Only 
Dharm Narain (6.11) explicitly states that only direct marketings by 
producers are included in his concept of marketed surplus. Consequently, 
payments in kind for wages and repayment of credit would not be in­
cluded. However, payments in kind to other producers, such as rent 
and credit repayments to cultivating landlords, would be reflected in 
the surplus marketings of these individuals. In addition to tenure 
arrangements and variations in land productivity affecting production 
and marketing decisions, family size and direct consumption complicate 
any interpretation of size of marketings by the size of land holdings. 
For example, Jasdanwalla, in her survey of Indian farmers, found a 
positive association between size of family and the proportion of land 
allocated to food grain production, (footnote continued on next page) 
Table 6.1. Distribution of marketed surplus by size-grouping of land 
holdings in India 
Value of marketed 
surplus as a per­
cent of value of 
total agricultural 
production 
(1 )*  
Column (1) as a 
percent of total 
value of marketed 
surplus 
Farm size 
(acres) 
Less than 1.25 
1.25 - 2.50 
2.50 - 3.75 
3.75 - 5.00 
5.00 - 7.50 
7.50 - 10.00 
10.00 - 15.00 
15.00 - 20.00 
20.00 - 25.00 
25.00 - 30.00 
30.00 - 40.00 
40.00 - 50.00 
50.00 - 60.00 
60.00 - 70.00 
70.00 - 100.00 
100.00 -  150.00 
150.00 - and above 
Total 
Dharm Narain (6.11, p. 35). Data apply to India for the 1950-51 
period. 
^Jasdanwalla (6.16, p. 31). Data apply to a sample of farmers in 
Rajkot District in Gujarat State for the 1956-57 period. 
^A. M. Khusro as cited in Bansil (7.1, p. 28). Data apply to 
India for the 1953-54 period. 
33.6 
27.4 
32.2 
39.7 
39.8 
51.4 
100.00 
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Marketed surplus 
as a percent 
of total food 
grains production 
(3)b 
Column (3) as a 
percent of total 
marketed surplus 
of food grains 
(4)b 
Marketed surplus 
as a percent of 
total agricultural 
production 
(5)C 
5.8 
32.0 
y 29.6 1.2 34.6 
15.1 
35.5 
37.3 
13.1 10.3 34.2 
36.6 
18.1 19.6 26.8 
23.8 
8.5 7.0 26.2 
11.4 9.9 21.7 
31.5 25.3 
14.0 6.2 50.0 
J 
\ 57.5 20.5 53.5 
J 39.5 
100.00 
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The other columns refer to all agricultural products. 
Looking at columns (1), (3), and (5), the only indication of a 
positive correlation between farm size and the percent of production 
marketed is found in column (1) for farms larger than 15 acres. In all 
three studies, small-scale producers marketed a comparatively-large 
proportion of their production. See columns (1), (3), and (5). 
Columns (2) and (4) reflect the percent of total surplus marketed 
attributable to producers of different farm size groupings. For ex­
ample, in Dharm Narain's study, column (2), producers operating less 
than five acres of land marketed 26.0 percent of the value of total 
marketings by all producers.^ In column (2), a concentration of 
marketings at both extremes of farm size exists. 
No concentration pattern is observable in column (4). The 
distributions in columns (2)and (4) are not comparable for a number of 
reasons. Column (2) reflects monetary values, includes all agri­
cultural produce and applies to all India. Conversely, column (4) is 
based on physical quantities of food grains marketed and applies to a 
sample of 200 cultivators in a specific area of India. Among pro-
ducers surveyed who were operating less than ten acres, their contribu-
(footnote continued from preceding page) Furthermore, a negative 
association between family size and the amount of marketable surplus of 
groundnut and cotton cash crops was observed (6.16, p. 32-33). Finally, 
in her sample of 200, a positive association between family size and 
size of land holding was evident (Table XIX, p. 40). 
^Dharm Narain (6.11) presents two sets of estimates. Those given 
in columns (1) and (2) result from upward revisions of available esti­
mates based on official statistics to reflect the estimated under re­
porting of these official statistics of food production. The values of 
agricultural output for each farm size were increased by 30 percent 
(6.11, p. 33-34). 
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ducers surveyed who were operating less than ten acres, their contribu­
tion to total marketed surplus of food grains was only 1.2 percent, as 
indicated in column (4). However, this size-grouping allocated about 
58 percent of their land to producing groundnuts and cotton while about 
41 percent was devoted to food grains production (6.16, p. 29). With 
larger farm sizes, there was a trend toward allocating relatively more 
land to food grains production than to the two specified cash crops. 
Consequently, if column (4) included cash crops, a larger percentage of 
total marketings would be found among the smaller farm size groupings. 
Production of edible versus nonedible commodities Since pro­
duction decisions are partially oriented toward consumption require­
ments, the proportion marketed partly depends upon whether the com­
modity is edible or nonedible. In addition, consumption preferences of 
producer-consumers must be taken into account. Edible commodities are 
also used for wages in kind and for livestock feed. Table 6.2 is a 
composite of several estimates from various sources of amounts marketed 
as a percent of production for several crops in India.^ The percent 
marketed is high for both edible and nonedible cash crops. For several 
2 food crops, the percentages are relatively low. 
_ 
Several other estimates are available in the collection of papers 
included in "Problems of Marketable Surplus in Indian Agriculture" of 
which (6.2), (6.17) and (6.29) are cited in this chapter. Yudelman 
writes that among African producers only about 20 percent of total pro­
duction, including firewood and livestock, is marketed (6.33, p. 178). 
Solomon, writing primarily about the Middle East, states that family 
consumption, seed for the next production period, and the landlord's 
share of the tenant's crop absorb from 70 to 100 percent of peasants' 
production of agricultural staples, consisting primarily of food grains 
(6.28, p. 134). 
2 In column (4) of Table 6.2, the relatively-high percentage of 
wheat marketed is attributed to the low preference for consuming wheat 
among inhabitants of Hyderabad (footnote continued on following page) 
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Table 6.2. Marketable surplus as a percent of total production for 
specified conmodities in India and three Indian states 
All India^ Punjab^ Pepsu^ Hyderabad^ 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Percent 
Rice 27.5 - 53.3 33.8 
Wheat 37.7 24.8 28.9 66.6 
Jowar 23.8 17.9 28.0 20.5 
Gram 44.3 20.2 - 57.1 
Oilseeds 80.0 - 90.0 - - 82.8 
Cotton - - - 93.7 
Tobacco 97.1 - - -
Jute 97.6 - - -
^Srinivasan (6.29, pp. 112-113). The percentages have been obtained 
primarily from reports issued by the Directorate of Marketing and In­
spection, and apply to differing, unspecified time periods. Srinivasan, 
writing in 1961, adds that some of the figures are out of date. Per­
centages are given for a number of other crops and some livestock products. 
^Kahlon and Reed (6.17, pp. 48-9). The percentages apply to the 
1954-55 period. 
Market Efficiency 
Since the understanding of the operation of product and input mar­
kets in less-developed countries is limited, it is not surprising that 
relatively little is known about the efficiency with which markets 
operate. Too often, efficiency is imputed on the basis of estimated 
marketing margins and(or) the apparent degree of competitiveness in 
(footnote continued from preceding page) State. Conversely, the low per­
centage of wheat marketed relative to rice in Pepsu State, column (3), 
reflects consumption preferences for wheat (6.17, pp. 48-9). 
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markets. Neither is sufficient for evaluating efficiency. What appear 
to be relatively-high marketing margins may be the consequence of high 
transportation costs and the amount of services applied to the good prior 
to retail to consumers. The difference between retail price and the 
price initially received by producers need not reflect exploitation of 
the latter. Similarly, a large number of middlemen at one stage in the 
marketing process may help to ensure that each earns only a minimum re­
turn. However, where credit advances my middlemen and merchant-traders 
are used to finance marketing and production activities, opportunities 
for price discrimination within the vertical structure of the marketing 
channels arise. Furthermore, the large number of middlemen is normally 
found only at first stages of marketing. At higher stages, relatively-
few participants are found. Finally, poor transportation and communica­
tions facilities require that much of the market information be trans­
mitted by word of mouth among middlemen. Regardless of the number 
of middlemen, such a communications system does not ensure that reliable 
market information is transmitted. 
Technical versus economic efficiency 
Technical efficiency abstracts from costs and returns. Only 
physical relationships are encountered. Producers operating in areas 
remote to marketing centers with poor transportation facilities are 
motivated to primarily gear production decisions to consumption require­
ments. The impact of improved marketing and transportation facilities 
in making incentive goods available to these individuals so as to raise 
the levels of production and quantities marketed has already been noted. 
However, investment in transportation and marketing facilities is 
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economically feasible only if the potential increment in quantities 
marketed is sufficient to keep per unit transportation and marketing 
costs sufficiently low so that the commodities can be competitively 
priced in internal and export markets. Technical efficiency, in terms 
of increasing the quantity of goods moving to the market or consumption 
center, may be offset by economic costs which make the modified market 
structure economically inefficient. 
Mechanization of the grading, bulking and processing activities 
normally done by middlemen may improve the quality and timeliness of 
completing these operations. This potential technical efficiency is 
often offset by the costs incurred in maintaining and supervising 
a staff of employees to perform these operations (6.5). The small-
scale producers and traders who have low opportunity costs associated 
with these labor-intensive activities can do the jobs at less cost to 
the wholesaler-purchaser. Again, economic efficiency is not synonymous 
with technical efficiency. Furthermore, mechanization displaces labor 
previously employed and earning incomes. Consequently, in addition to 
economic costs, social costs should be taken into account. 
Of the two considerations, economic efficiency is always the more 
restrictive. If an innovation has the potential for increasing technical 
efficiency, it may also improve economic efficiency. If a technically-
efficient innovation is not economically efficient under the prevailing 
cost structure, it may subsequently be economically feasible as prices 
and costs change. 
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Static versus dynamic efficiency 
Static efficiency refers on how well the marketing system performs 
its functions when exogenous change is minimized; i.e., when usual 
economic activities take place. The influence of the forces of nature 
on production and potential marketings is exogenous and variable. 
However, when these forces operate in an essentially static economic 
framework, the concept of static efficiency of the marketing system 
still applies. 
The essence of economic development is economic and social change. 
The impact of changes in public investment, export demand, sectoral re­
source demand, consumer preferences, and per capita real incomes on 
developmental processes is stifled if the marketing system is unable 
to accommodate and transmit such pressures and incentives to the rele­
vant economic agents. Are changes in preferences effectively 
communicated to producers who, in turn, adjust production decisions 
accordingly? If public investment in irrigation facilities and extension 
services increase production levels, can the marketing system absorb the 
increased quantities marketed and move such quantities to areas of 
strongest effective demand? It is in this context that a consideration 
of dynamic efficiency is relevant. 
Signals through the pricing mechanism Prices play important roles 
at the production, marketing and consumption stages. Such prices evolve 
through the interplay of the forces of supply and demand in the market 
place, regardless of the existing degree of competition. At times, 
public intervention in the form of price supports and price floors are 
employed in an attempt to guide economic activity. Beginning at the 
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production level, publicly-announced or estimations of prices likely to 
prevail in the future have a differential impact on producers. Where 
producers are primarily subsistence-oriented, consumption requirements 
are more important than market prices in planning resource allocations. 
If sufficient resources are available to produce more than necessary for 
basic consumption needs, price relationships become more important. The 
prices of concern to the producers are those he receives and pays. These 
are not the prices which exist in the marketing centers, but estimates 
of these prices adjusted for transportation costs and marketing margins. 
Where government-supported prices apply to specified procurement points, 
producers at varying distances from these points must still make allow­
ance for transportation costs. In situations where producers are ob­
ligated to market their output with merchant-traders or landlords, 
supported prices and price floors have little or no impact on these 
producers. The impact may be on the consumption side when these pro­
ducers are forced to re-enter the market at a later date to purchase 
some of the same commodities they previously sold. 
The efficiency of using prices as signals depends not only upon 
their communication to producers and resource owners but also on the ex­
tent to which the price structure reflects consumers* preferences for 
quality differentials. As grading practices improve and price dif­
ferentials are established for different quality grades, producers are 
better able to decide which quality to produce so as to maximize their 
objectives. When government price supports apply only to the higher 
grades of a commodity but internal and export markets exist for other 
grades, producers' resources tend to be allocated inefficiently. As 
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distance from the marketing center increases, so do the difficulties of 
communicating market information. Newspaper reports are of limited use­
fulness when literacy rates are low. Transmission by word of mouth 
results in the reliability of information being questionable by the time 
it reaches producers. Government pronouncements and reports of extension 
service personnel may be discounted by those who question the motives 
of government agencies. 
Market prices may indicate that profits are maximized only if the 
production pattern is altered. Where prices indicate that a crop not 
previously produced is profitable, producers may not shift to produc­
tion of that crop because of production and market uncertainties, 
managerial limitations, and inability to secure the complementary in­
puts necessary to maximize returns. Both attitudinal factors and credit 
limitations are operative. This underscores the need for coordinated 
adjustment within the economy. 
Resource mobility under price changes An efficient marketing 
system requires that resources or production inputs move to their highest 
uses in the economy. Although land is essentially immobile, several 
studies of aggregate changes in cropping patterns in response to changes 
in relative prices indicate an intra-firm mobility of land services. 
Labor mobility is relatively high in many areas. The rapidity 
with which individuals enter and engage in petty trading when economic 
opportunities exist has been noted. The hiring of labor for seasonal 
work is common even among small-scale producers who themselves may later 
offer labor services for hire either locally or at some distance from 
the farm. However, much of the labor migration from rural to more urban 
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areas is not in response to wage-earning opportunities. Indirectly, 
the pressure of population on land and the low returns imputed to labor 
likely force or induce some movement out of agriculture. Improved 
education, labor mobility and consequent contact with other life styles, 
and expanded communications systems, interact to generate a shift in 
occupational preferences away from agricultural pursuits. Even when 
job opportunities exist, economic and social costs are involved in 
securing employment away from home either on a temporary or permanent 
basis. The growth of labor unions tends to keep wages above the level 
which would equate supply and demand in the labor market. Unionized 
employees benefit; however, rising wages induce employers to consider 
adopting capital-using and labor-saving production techniques.^ 
As already noted in Chapter V, credit transactions in rural areas 
tend to be localized. The links between central banking systems and 
rural lenders are few and relatively weak. Consequently, lending is 
largely constrained by the availability of local funds. While the 
channels for moving private capital into the agricultural sector are not 
well-developed, neither are mechanisms for transferring capital to other 
sectors of the economy. Some transfers take place through merchant-
traders, tax payments, and rents to absentee landlords. However, in 
many areas facilities for mobilizing individual savings for use within 
and outside of the agricultural sector are not available. For example, 
increased demand for credit in the nonagricultural sectors, as reflected 
T 
Of course, the situation is usually much more complicated. The 
price of capital goods to be substituted for labor must be taken into 
account. Considerations of quality control, labor-management relations, 
and labor skills provided by union members are additional factors. 
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in rising interest rates, does not stimulate an internal movement of 
surpluses and hoards from the agricultural sector if savings institu­
tions and rural banks neither exist nor are integrated with the central 
banking system. 
Marketing margins Few data are available on the margins accruing 
to marketing middlemen. The roles these middlemen play have been pre­
viously described. The question of the superfluity of middlemen revolves 
around their remuneration as compared with the utility or value-added 
to the commodity as a result of their activities. Utility is created 
as goods are transported to areas of consumption, processed, graded, 
bulked, and distributed through time. If fewer middlemen can provide 
the same services at the same or less cost to the consumer, then some 
middlemen are redundant. Social and economic costs accrue to those 
who are displaced. This is one of several externalities that economic 
development usually generates. However, lower marketing margins provide 
opportunities for increasing producers' returns while providing agri­
cultural commodities to consumers and manufacturers at lower costs. 
A reduction of the monopolistic and(or) monopsonistic gains re­
presented in Figures 6.4-6.6 results in higher prices paid to producers 
and lower prices charged to wholesalers or final consumers. As long as 
these marketing powers persist, increases in quantities demanded and 
supplied; that is, rightward shifts of both curves, tend to increase the 
margin accruing to the merchant-trader. If the market mechanism oper­
ates properly, additional resources should be drawn into the marketing 
system thereby increasing the level of competition and reducing the 
marketing margins of most participants. To the extent that higher mar­
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ket prices for producers stimulate private investment, increased produc­
tion, and larger marketings, the inability of the marketing system to 
absorb these increases may subsequently dampen market prices and, in 
turn, pr oduc er s ' inc ent ive s. 
Marketing "surpluses" are augmented by turning the terms of trade 
against the producer; i.e., by lowering the prices he receives relative 
to what he pays. This is tantamount to forced saving on the part of 
producers and capital extraction from the firm and, perhaps, the agri­
cultural sector. While this may be the role of the agricultural sector 
in initiating and sustaining general economic development, it is not 
sufficient because two factors have been ignored. First, how does the 
merchant-trader utilize the net flows of capital from agricultural pro­
ducers? Second, is general economic development accelerated by capital 
movements out of the agricultural sector, especially at early stages of 
development? The answer lies in whether the producer or the merchant-
trader makes the most productive use of these capital resources and in 
the effect on producers' incentives and objectives as capital is ex­
tracted from the agricultural sector. Adverse terms of trade may induce 
the producer to tend to withdraw from the market economy and concen­
trate on subsistence-oriented production, leaving a portion of his re­
sources temporarily unemployed. 
As long as marketing decisions are tied to credit advances, op­
portunities for realizing abnormal returns by middlemen persist. If 
marketing margins are excessive, Bauer (6.5) asserts that this is only 
temporary. Additional middlemen will enter, competition will increase, 
and individual middlemen margins will be minimized. Alternatively, pro-
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ducers can bypass the middlemen and sell directly to the consumer. Of 
course, this is dependent upon an awareness of existing market condi­
tions. Those who must market through creditors and landlords do not 
benefit from the increased competition. In addition, social ties and 
personalized services create opportunities for market margins in excess 
of those which would result under more competitive conditions (6.7, 
6 .10) .  
Product differentiation The heterogeneity of quality among 
products marketed and the relatively-small, individual marketings re­
quire a large number of first-stage middlemen to engage in bulking and 
some grading activities. This need also provides employment opportuni­
ties for a number of people who otherwise would be unemployed or more 
seriously underemployed. The lack of standardization of quality grades 
and the application of reliable grading procedures in the marketing 
system have two potentially-detrimental consequences. First, when 
prices received and paid do not reflect quality differentials, both pro­
ducers and consumers are penalized.^ Resource allocation and consumption 
decisions tend to be economically inefficient. Second, since wholesalers 
cannot rely on maintenance of standardized grades, purchases must be 
made through a series of middlemen. That is, wholesalers cannot place 
orders to sources of supply for specified amounts and grades at 
particular prices with assurances that such deliveries will be made. 
This constraint certainly inhibits longer-term planning on the part of 
wholesalers and retailers (6.9, 6.10). 
^Actually, if market prices reflect something approaching average 
quality, producers of, lower quality outputs realize a positive ex­
ternality in terms of higher prices received. 
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Equalization of prices Where an efficient market is operative, 
market prices for similar qualities of a good should differ among alter­
native markets only by transportation cost differentials. Rising market 
prices due to excess demand in one region will induce a movement of goods 
from relatively-surplus areas where lower market prices prevail; If 
this price plus unit transportation costs is less than the market price 
in the region of excess demand, producers and marketing middlemen will 
find it profitable to transfer goods into the latter area. Similar 
reasoning applies to labor and capital movements. As wages and interest 
rates rise in the growth centers of the economy, additional resources 
should be attracted and the price rise dampened. As resources leave 
the areas of relatively low wages and returns on capital, the supply 
curves for these resources would tend to shift leftward thereby, ceteris 
paribus, raising wages and interest rates in those localities. 
Jasdanwalla (6.16), in commenting on groundnut marketing in a 
particular area in India, concludes that intra-regional price differ­
entials were primarily due to locational factors, producers' decisions 
as to time and place of marketing, and marketing obligations arising 
out of credit advances. She indicates that these considerations "... 
had their origin in factors external to the market as such or peculiar 
to the cultivators themselves. ..." (6.16, p. 104). Consequently, 
she concluded that price differentials were not due to market imper­
fections or inefficiencies. But this is a rather tenuous conclusion 
which, at the most, has only a static application. The preponderance 
of marketings were made at the time of harvest. Higher prices were re­
ceived by those who could store and market at a later date. However, 
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the lack of storage facilities within the marketing system and(or) the 
obligation to market with those advancing credit, both resulting in 
differential prices to producers, are rather explicit examples of market 
imperfection, if not inefficiency. The system is inefficient since 
many producers are forced to sell when prices are low. The opportunities 
for returns through market speculation accrue to the owners of storage 
facilities.^ Prices fluctuate within the season and from year to year. 
This is generally detrimental to both producers and exporters. The 
system is imperfect because indebted producers are not free to market 
2 
their output where they can obtain their best price advantage. In 
addition, little is known about marketing efficiency at subsequent 
stages of the marketing system. 
Public Investment in the Economy's Infrastructure 
Public investment in the existing infrastructure is often imple­
mented to generate a complex of pressures and incentives designed to be 
instrumental in mobilizing domestic resources, attracting foreign capital, 
and increasing resource productivity. For example, the building of a 
road to a region previously inaccessible by public transportation may 
induce settlement of the region and employment of previously-untapped re-
^It is not known to what extent the increase in market prices re­
flects storage costs and allowance for risk or whether returns in excess 
of these considerations are obtainable. 
^Among indebted producers, around 25 percent of borrowings by pro­
ducers of all sizes of land holdings were obtained from trader-money­
lenders. The actual percentages varied from 22.3 percent to 47.4 percent 
for producers having holdings ranging up to 80 acres. Among those 
operating in the 10-80 acre groupings, the majority of borrowings were 
made from cooperative credit societies and land mortgage banks. Credit 
from these institutions was not tied to marketing obligations (6.16). 
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sources. If already populated, transportation facilities offer 
opportunities for increased access to output, input, and cotisumci goods 
markets which have implications for resource mobility and production 
incentives.^ In this case, the investment in transportation facilities 
can be viewed as in instrument variable. A favorable impact on com­
munication and marketing facilities will likely be a secondary result. 
If education facilities are unchanged, they serve as a parameter in this 
program to stimulate developmental process. 
It is intuitively apparent that given the objectives to be pursued 
2 by the government or national policymaker, an optimum government 
program for investment in social overhead capital facilities exists. 
The problem is to determine this optimum program subject to constraints 
such as (1) The limited amount of funds available for investment, (2) 
The availability of administrative resources to construct and implement 
the program, (3) The necessity to integrate and coordinate this pro­
gram with other measures undertaken by the government, and (4) The 
availability of reliable data for planning purposes. Furthermore, 
considerations of political and social stability must be taken into 
account. To some extent, these should be reflected in the policymaker's 
objectives. Where economies of scale provide an economic rationalization 
^In this connection, Neumark comments, "... it can hardly be 
overemphasized that lack of transport and related marketing facilities 
present the most considerable obstacle to the exploitation of the 
latent opportunities for the development of interregional trade in 
Africa" (6.27, p. 47). 
2 
Government objectives are partially discussed in Chapter VII, 
"Government Programs and Policies". 
319 
for investment in relatively few but large-scale projects such as 
fertilizer plants and agronomic research farms, political pressures may 
effectively force the government to modify economic considerations and 
construct a series of small-scale operations which are more widely 
spread throughout the countryside. Also, since international airports, 
heavy machinery and ostentatious public buildings are viewed as char­
acteristic of relatively-developed countries, nationalistic pressures 
may motivate governments to invest in these ventures in an attempt to 
provide visible evidence that the gaps between these two classes of 
countries are narrowing. Thus, national planners must engage in an 
assessment of the costs and benefits associated with alternative 
government investment programs of varying magnitudes and duration of 
time. 
The impact of the infrastructure and modifications through public 
and private investment on resource use and productivity have already 
been alluded to in the preceding discussion.^ The "spread effects" 
emanating from this infrastructure condition a number of phenomena 
influencing economic activity. Quite apparently, the strength and 
scope of these "spread effects" vary with the stage of economic develop­
ment, the existence of complementary programs, and nature of the re­
source base, including the population component. 
The thesis advanced here is that primary responsibility for the 
creation and operation of an infrastructure generating pressures and 
incentives facilitating economic progress must be borne by the govern-
^The magnitude, composition, and quality of a country's infra­
structure can be improved through appropriate investment in these facili­
ties. Conversely, deterioration with deleterious effects on economic 
activities can arise through lack of maintenance and public regulation. 
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ment, whether central or regional. This responsibility is expensive 
both in terms of financial and administrative resources.^ Ftirther-
more, a balance between public and private initiative must be pursued 
whether national planning is done on a centralized or decentralized 
bas is. 
Returns to private investment 
Two factors are operative which discourage private investment in 
the infrastructure of the economy. First, few individuals possess or 
have access to the financial resources necessary to construct a dam 
and irrigation facilities or to implement an educational system. Second, 
the inability to capture the costs and benefits of private investment, 
such as in reclamation and conservation measures, which become ex­
ternalities to other producers in the area reduce the attractivness of 
this type of investment. One exception, already noted, which is 
essentially unaffected by these two factors is the relative ease with 
which producers and family members can enter the area of petty market­
ing. Not only is this form of activity labor-intensive which provides 
an outlet to labor seasonably or chronically underemployed, but rela­
tively little capital is necessary and the personal skills involved are 
not demanding and are acquired relatively easily. 
As a result of public investment, some producers have improved 
opportunities for augmenting net returns through a reallocation of re-
^Capital requirements are relatively high with high capital/output 
ratios for building railroads, paved highways, and communications media. 
However, the construction of roads adequate for animal and bicycle 
transportation and the construction of bunds and terraces are or can be 
projects which are relatively labor-intensive in nature. Despite the 
unpretentiousness of the latter, they nevertheless constitute modifica­
tions of the economy's infrastructure resulting in a potentially-positive 
effect on agricultural productivity. 
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sources within the firm and through private investment in the firm. The 
impact on private investment can be discussed with reference to Figure 
6.7.^ 
M EC 
MEl MEC 
MEl 
Capital nvestment 
Price 
(Cost) 
Capital Goods 
Figure 6.7. Theoretical impact of public investment on the 
level and rate of private investment 
A discussion of the nature of the curves and the mechanics of 
making investments to the capital stock in succeeding time periods was 
presented with reference to Figure 5.2 in Chapter V. 
Additions to capital stock are now viewed from the macro-economic 
viewpoint. Consequently, the supply curve for capital goods, S, slopes 
upward because of rising costs in producing these goods. The MEl curves 
slope downward because of the rising costs of capital goods and diminish­
ing physical returns to increments of investment, both tending to reduce 
net economic returns to investment. 
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From a macro-economic viewpoint, the MEC curve for the agri­
cultural sector; i.e., the aggregation of firms within the sector, is 
dependent upon the existing agricultural infrastructure. Thus, the 
government is able to modify the slope and position of the MEC curve 
through judicious investment programs designed to affect the rate of 
Investment and capital accumulation in the agricultural sector. If 
MEC^ results with government investment, ceteris paribus, the rates of 
* 
investment and capital accumulation are unchanged. However, K repre­
senting the optimal capital stock has increased. If it is possible to 
2 
twist the NEC curve and change its position as with MEC , both the 
rate and absolute amounts of capital accumulation can be varied. If the 
MEC curve were twisted counter-clockwise, relative to MEC° and MEC^, 
the rate of capital accumulation would be accelerated and, in turn, the 
* 
length of time necessary to reach K would be reduced. Furthermore, 
government investment in the capital goods industries could affect the 
shape of supply schedule for capital goods, S. This would alter the 
corresponding family of MEI curves and the rate at which private in­
vestment is undertaken. If S is horizontal up to the capacity con­
straint, the rate of investment is invariant; if S rises sharply, so does 
the rate of investment. In Figure 6.7, i^ is also an instrument vari-
* 
able through which the government can affect K and the level of in-
vestment. ^ 
^The effectiveness of using i as an instrument variable by affect­
ing the interest rate or structure of interest rates through monetary 
policies is dependent upon the degree by monetization of the economy and 
the strength of the linkages between the central bank or central monetary 
authority and existing credit institutions throughout the economy; i.e., 
the development of the monetary system as one component of the overall 
infrastructure of the economy. 
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Need for an Efficient Marketing System 
The marketing mechanism potentially performs an important role in 
stimulating and sustaining developmental processes. It can be viewed as 
an instrument variable and the leading sector in economic development.^ 
At times, however, the marketing system is viewed either as performing 
a passive role or as essentially adapting in the right direction and 
proportion as economic change takes place (6.9, 6.26). This is 
partially an outgrowth of the contention that marketing is unproductive. 
But as has been noted, the activities of marketing agents create utility 
of time, form, and space. Where utility has been created, a productive 
act has taken place. 
The need for a marketing system arises when labor specialization 
is underway so that each producing unit is no longer entirely self- -
sufficient. In addition, the creation and growth of export markets 
require development of an indigenous marketing system which can supply 
export goods on a competitive basis. Now the need for an efficient 
system comes into focus. The export demand is for particular goods, at 
designated qualities, and at specified price-quantity relationships. 
An efficient marketing system would channel this information to 
potential producers. Even if some producers can produce the export 
crop at a price which covers their per unit costs, a partial shift of 
resources to cash crops may not be rational. First, allocating resources 
to cash crops may mean that producers are unable to produce enough food 
^Barber comments, "Where access to markets has permitted the sale 
of agricultural surpluses, the African has apparently intensified his 
efforts as a farmer, produced more, and sold a surplus for cash" (6.3, 
p. 251). 
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to meet their own consumption requirements. Thus, if other producers 
in the marketing area cannot fill this excess demand for food at cost 
less than or equal to the producer's net income from growing cash crops, 
the producer will choose to produce food not cash crops. The marketing 
system must be able to move goods from areas of "surplus" production to 
"deficit" areas at a cost such that sufficient effective demand in the 
latter areas is able to absorb these "surpluses". High middlemen 
margins and transportation costs attendant to moving these goods, 
ceteris paribus, reduce effective demand in the "deficit" areas. 
Second, if food consumption requirements can be met and additional 
income can be generated through producing a cash crop, the utility from 
this additional net income must be greater than the disutility of 
additional work plus allowance for any risks involved. TliaL is, tUc 
amount of utility obtainable through increases in income depends upon 
the demand for income. Such demand, in turn, is largely a function of 
desired expenditures for consumer goods. At this point, another aspect 
of an efficient marketing system is introduced. This aspect is the 
efficiency with which wholesalers and retailers operate in the distribu­
tion of consumer goods, both imported and indigenously-produced. Evi­
dence has been cited earlier of the effect of the availability and 
variety of consumer goods on producers' activities and, implicitly, 
their demand for additional income. The costs at which such goods are 
made available to consumers is obviously important. Obversely, the re­
liable transmission of consumers* preferences to wholesalers and re­
tailers is necessary for the procurement and efficient distribution of 
these goods. 
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The importance of low-cost food and agricultural raw materials in 
sustaining general economic development, the potential market for con­
sumer and producer goods among the masses of rural people if they are 
able to realize higher per capita real incomes, and the potential flow 
of resources from the agricultural sector to support other sectors of 
the economy all suggest the need for an efficient marketing system. Re­
ductions in per unit transport costs and marketing margins, improved 
information on inter-regional supply-demand conditions, and the 
availability of improved production inputs at costs which make them 
accessible to large numbers of producers all tend to raise returns to 
producers and keep costs to consumers relatively low. Higher monetary 
returns to producers, ceteris paribus, increase their purchasing power 
for consumer and producer goods. Lower food costs tend to increase the 
real income of consumers. Given a relatively high income elasticity of 
demand for food in most less-developed areas, higher real incomes also 
increase the demand for agricultural commodities. Reduction in transport 
and marketing costs also improve the competitive position of agricultural 
commodities in the expert market. Competiveness is extremely crucial 
here because of the importance of generating foreign exchange earnings 
for procuring capital and consumer goods for domestic consumption. 
To maximize individuals' objectives, the market mechanism must re­
liably transmit consumers' and resource owners' preferences and pro­
ducers' demand for production resources. Inaccurate transmission of 
consumers' preferences distorts resource allocation decisions for both 
agricultural producers and manufacturers. The efficient operation of 
resource or factor markets improves the possibility of resources moving 
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to their best uses. This is essential for coordinating the growth of 
the economy. An efficient market system also facilitates longer-term 
planning on the part of all participants in the economy, including 
national planners. 
Market reform alters the distribution of income in the economy. 
Since the marketing middlemen are often considered to be unproductive 
even though earning a return, their elimination is considered essential 
and desirable. Yet, their incomes represent forms of capital accumula­
tion. From the standpoint of overall economic development, the question 
arises as to whether this capital, in the form of the middlemen margin, 
is used more effectively by marketing middlemen or by producers who 
realize higher incomes as marketing costs decline. The answer depends 
upon the effect on incentives and individuals* objectives. As has 
been noted, however, in many areas middlemen in the first stage of the 
marketing process are also agricultural producers realizing supplemental 
incomes. If marketing middlemen are to be reduced through reform measures, 
provision must be made for absorbing the services they provided. For 
example, in their role of providing credit to producersj their elimina­
tion requires that producers be able to secure credit elsewhere. Their 
role of transmitting market information must be assumed by government 
extension personnel and improved communications media. Their role of 
bulking, grading, and transporting the initially-small quantities 
marketed must be assumed by other personnel or machines. The absorption 
of services provided by the middlemen is not without economic and social 
cost to the society in question. The monetary costs of reform are evi­
dent. The displacement of a large number of middlemen who, at least in­
327 
itially, cannot secure alternative employment also involves social and 
perhaps political costs. These costs must be weighed against the 
potentially higher unit returns to producers and lower costs to con­
sumers . 
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CHAPTER VII. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 
The concern by governments of less-developed areas for stimulating 
economic development is reflected in the emphasis given to national 
planning for growth and development. National planning and consequent 
mobilization and guided allocation of resources are viewed as the means 
for accelerating economic progress and lessening the economic gap with 
the relatively-developed countries. Devising a plan indicates a con­
cern for rationality. This rationality is expressed in terms of 
maximizing planning objectives subject to resource and technical con­
straints and to political feasibilities. 
National plans are of varying ambitions ranging from public ex­
hortations and minimal investment programs to the centrally-planned 
economies of Communist countries. Planned development is expensive in 
terms of capital resources and administrative inputs, both considered to 
be relatively scare in less-developed areas. Conversely, emphasis 
on a laissez faire approach to economic growth has been costly in terms 
of lagging growth rates, adverse foreign trade positions, and wide 
disparities in the distribution of wealth and income. Coupled with 
high population growth rates, these factors have interacted to impede 
general economic expansion in many countries. The shortage of reliable 
data limits the scope of planning. Poorly-conceived and poorly-
implemented plans are rarely able to produce the results which planners 
have at least partially conditioned people to expect. Planners can 
attribute the inability to achieve publicized objectives to some ex­
ogenous force, but successive plans will likely be viewed with in­
creased skepticism. 
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The success of implementing and sustaining government measures is 
contingent upon the existence of a stable government. In the absence 
of stability, the consequent uncertainty surrounding future economic 
activity has adverse effects on private and foreign investment, on 
willingness to participate in government programs, and on the capacity 
and motivation to engage in long-term planning, both on the national 
and individual-firm levels. 
Democratic processes theoretically provide individuals and in­
dividuals ' representatives with the means for expressing policy pre­
ferences. However, strict parochial interest are not likely consistent 
with national and regional provisions of a developmental plan which 
abstracts from political and social considerations and focuses 
primarily on economic targets. This does not preclude subsequent con­
sideration of individual economic and social well-being, however. 
These aspects can be dealt with through policies of taxation, transfer 
payments, and national welfare programs. Stating the situation alter­
natively, a trade-off or substitution may exist between economic merits 
and political stability. This has been apparent in some land reform 
programs where political expediency or necessity resulted in re­
distribution of land into a large number of economically-unviable 
parcels of land--at least unviable over longer periods of time. 
The politics and economics of change are necessarily intricate and 
intertwined. Considerations of social justice and lengths of planning 
horizons further complicate efforts of national planners to effect 
plans and policies yhich are administratively feasible, economically 
sound, and politically acceptable. Since few governments have the re-
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sources to involve nearly all economic entities In developmental programs, 
national planners must select those sectors and geographic regions 
which will be most responsive to government instrument variables and 
which will operate as "leading sectors" in developmental processes. 
Certain geographical regions or groups of individuals in some regions 
may be temporarily "forgotten" in that government programs focus on 
the most responsive areas and where short-term returns are highest. 
Spreading resources so thinly that nearly everyone is involved usually 
precludes generation of those externalities and economies of scale 
important to stimulating private initiative. However, since social 
and economic costs will subsequently be involved in eventually inte­
grating these groups more fully into the economic system, planners 
must also take these future costs into account. The dispersion of 
communications media reduces the possibility and rationality of 
temporarily "forgetting" individuals and areas. 
The government can play a number of roles in influencing economic 
growth and development. Loosely, the government attempts to guide the 
fingers of Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" so as to realize planned ob­
jectives. Public investment in the infrastructure of the economy to 
affect economic incentives and resource mobility was discussed in the 
preceding chapter. Monetary and fiscal policies provide means for in­
fluencing the growth and direction of economic activity. Sectoral 
policies such as land reform, provision for rural credit, price support 
programs, and expansion of export markets have a potentially-favorable 
impact on sectoral growth. Again, however, sectoral policies require 
capital and administrative resources which have opportunity costs. 
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For example, a unit of capital may be used in constructing an irrigation 
system, in expanding education facilities, or in importing capital 
goods for industrial uses. Thus, sectoral programs should be coordinated 
with other public policies in an attempt to maximize the return on re­
sources over time. Yet, there is an inherent danger in the government's 
undertaking of these roles. This danger is that individuals rely too 
much on the government so that individual initiative and enterprise 
necessary for complementing government activities is not forthcoming. 
Public Price Policies 
To the extent that producers and consumers respond to price in­
centives and changes in price relationships, the government has a means 
for influencing producers' production patterns, quantities marketed, and 
demand for consumer and producer goods. The direction and scope of 
pricing policies depend on the extent to which the existing state of 
economic activity differs from a preferred but feasible state. These 
preferred situations are usually associated with implicit or explicit 
national plans which have target objectives in terms of domestic food and 
fiber supplies and import-export balances. For coordinated and in­
tegrated developmental plans, the failure to realize planned production 
and market supply levels tends to inflate domestic food and fiber prices. 
In the absence of trade restrictions, price rises may be dampened by 
reduced exports and increased imports which increase supplies available 
for domestic consumption. That is, higher internal prices attract 
imports' and decrease the opportunities for exports. The foreign exchange 
position, however, tends to deteriorate which, in turn, reduces the 
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country's capacity to import needed capital goods--capital goods which 
are integral to implementing and sustaining the development plan. 
If producers are responsive to rising market prices, especially 
if production costs tend to increase at a slower rate, increased 
production and larger quantities marketed would dampen price advances. 
Several questions are introduced at this point; a sampling follows. 
First, the question of the impact of changing market conditions on 
resource allocation and production decisions arises. For example, as 
market prices vary, to what extent are these variations reflected in 
prices received and paid by producers? These latter prices are the 
ones relevant to producers. What is the producer's capacity for ad­
justing farm operations in response to changing price conditions? 
Such capacity varies with whether the adjustment is of a short-run 
nature or on a longer-term basis. Second, the question of aggregate 
production response versus a response to changing relative economic 
conditions is raised. That is, if the profitability of each output 
is raised by the same degree so that relative profitability of outputs 
is unchanged, is there an increase in the output level of each commodity 
as the result of using additional variable inputs or are the previous 
input-use levels maintained, absolutely and relatively? Again, the 
period of adjustment under consideration must be specified in that more 
opportunities for private investment and adjustment of firm operations 
exist as the planning period is lengthened. Third, most producers 
retain a portion of their output for direct consumption. Therefore, as 
economic incentives vary, a production response may result and, in turn, 
a response in the quantities offered for marketing. Increased production 
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and direct consumption and consequent improved physical well-being may 
have a positive influence on subsequent production. However, in terms 
of supplying the food needs of noncultivators and export demand, the 
quantity marketed is the important phenomenon. The level of marketings 
is conditioned by existing consumption levels and by producers' ob­
jectives . 
Several studies have attempted to provide an empirical basis for 
answering these questions. Others attempt answers on an a priori 
basis. An increasing amount of effort has been devoted to examining 
the degree of responsiveness in production patterns as price relation­
ships vary. Relatively less is known about the responsiveness in 
terms of quantities marketed. The production response studies are 
usually based on time-series data and relate to adjustment in cropping 
patterns rather than aggregate production response. In some cases, 
the time-series data on prices represent a confounding of positive pub­
lic price policies and of changes due to variations in market supply-
demand conditions independent of public pricing policies. 
Considering a single commodity, output is the product of area 
and yield, as in Equation 7.1 where 
0 = A . Y (7.1) 
= a (P) . y (P:X) 
0 = Output 
A = Area planted 
Y = Yield per unit of area 
p 
P = —^— = Ratio of price received for output to an index of 
input prices 
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X = Environmental factors 
Both area and yield are a function of P. That is, A = a(P) where a 
represents the functional relationship between A and P. Similarly, y 
is the functional relationship between Y and P. Differentiating Equa­
tion 7.1 with respect to P, Equation 7.2 is derived. Multiplying Equation 7.2 by 
P/O, the price elasticity of output is represented by the sum of the 
price elasticity of area and price elasticity of yield. 
In addition to altering price relationships, public price 
policies often reduce price uncertainty. For example, price supports 
and price floors lessen the possible range of prices producers con­
front. On a longer-term basis, uncertainty surrounding continuation 
of public price policies likely affects private investment decisions. 
Bauer and Yamey (7.3) cite an example of positive response to price 
incentives among cocoa and palm oil producers in Nigeria. To encourage 
the production of higher grades of these two commodities, marketing 
boards instituted substantial price differentials for different grades. 
Market grades and corresponding price differentials were announced in 
^Using dP in Equation 7.2 indicates that the price change is ex­
tremely small. Few producers in any country would respond to such 
price changes. The use of derivates here is for hueristic purposes to 
examine the qualitative impact of price changes. The use of AP, re­
flecting discrete price changes, is more meaningful-
2 
The conclusions apply on to palm oil produced by smallholders. 
The data provided by Bauer and Yamey (7.3) do not include production 
from plantations. 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
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advance of the production and marketing season. In addition, marketing 
boards agreed to buy all quantities offered them at not less than pre­
viously- announced prices. In effect, producers were guaranteed a 
price floor for all they produced and marketed. The period studied 
was 1947/48 to 1952/53. Bauer and Yamey concluded that the average 
grade produced and marketed rose substantially during this period.^ 
During the last three years of the period studied, prices for cocoa were 
increased considerably over previous levels. However, total purchases 
by marketing boards declined. The authors do not comment on this 
phenomenon. During the other years, prices and total purchases of 
cocoa moved in the same direction. Palm oil prices and total purchases 
moved in the same direction during the entire period. Bauer and Yamey 
reinforce their conclusion regarding producer response to price incen­
tives by adding: 
"Whenever higher prices were announced or even generally 
anticipated for the following season, producers and inter­
mediaries withheld supplies in the closing months of the 
previous season, while supplies were rushed forward when a 
reduction was announced or anticipated" (7.3, p. 805). 
The response imputed to price differentials in the study is 
partially discounted by Hogg (7.18). He criticizes Bauer and Yamey 
(7.3) for ignoring other policies attendant to implementation of the 
price differentials. Hogg notes that extension or educational programs 
incorporating printed matter, demonstration plots, and field experiments 
were employed. In addition, transportation subsidies and expenditures 
^The average quality of cocoa marketed was raised by marketing well-
fermented cocoa rather than only drying the beans. Palm oil kernals 
were cultivated more carefully and harvested more timely. The price 
differentials encouraged the use of hand-pressing machines rather than 
traditional methods. The former improved both the quality and ex­
traction rates of palm oil (7.3, p. 801). 
339 
for improving the transportation system affected the number of producers 
who could profitably respond. Bauer and Yamey (7.4) only acknowledge 
that improved transportation tended to lessen the amount of quality de­
terioration of palm oil enroute to marketing points. Their contention 
that other measures had little or no influence on producers' behavior 
is not intuitively convincing. 
A similar response among groundnut producers in northern Nigeria 
to establishment of price differentials for a particular grade of 
groundnuts is discussed by Hogendorn (7.17). To encourage the market­
ing of whole nuts, a price differential for this grade was implemented. 
Initially, the response, in terms of the proportion of marketings 
qualifying for the differential, was low. Two successive yearly in­
creases in the price differential, however, were associated with 
40 percent and then 98 percent of the groundnuts marketed qualifying 
for the special grade and corresponding price differential. 
Acreage response to output price relationships 
A few studies have been completed to estimate the aggregate re­
sponse of producers in adjusting cropping patterns as relative prices 
of crops vary. The estimating procedure employed is that of simple 
regression analysis where the dependent variable is the relative 
acreage of the crop under study and the independent variable is the 
lagged price of the crop relative to a lagged index of prices of 
principal competing crops.^ The mathematical formulation of this re­
lationship is given in Equation 7.4. A^^ is the acreage of the crop 
^The studies employing multiple regression analysis, including in­
dependent variables in addition to output price relationships, are 
discussed in the following section. 
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studied while the are acreages of competing crops. The p^ and 
are interpreted similarly while t= 1 to the end point of the time-
series data. 
f (i, k = 1, n) (7.4) 
n n 
t t-1 
Relative acreage,as the dependent variable, is used as a proxy for 
planned cropping patterns where these patterns are a function of ex­
pected or anticipated prices for alternative, competing crops. The 
use of acreages abstracts from the direct influence of weather 
conditions on yields and production^ and from the impact of prices on 
the intensity with which nonland inputs are applied to land; i.e., per 
acre yields when the influence of weather has been removed. The degree 
of responsiveness in altering cropping patterns is influenced by a 
number of factors, some of which are not included in Equation 7.4: 
(I) The number of alternative crops which can be grown by the 
producer and the ease with which inputs can be shifted among crops is 
important. The length of time necessary for adjustment has a direct 
effect on the degree of short-run response versus response over a 
longer period of time. As the number of feasible crops increases, the 
cropping pattern is expected to be more responsive to changing price 
relationships ; 
As noted in Chapter II, the planned output configuration is a 
function not only of prices received and paid but also estimates of the 
MPP of the inputs. In estimating these MPP's, past and anticipated 
weather conditions are important factors especially where dryland farm­
ing is I prevalent. 
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(2) Even though alternative crops are feasible, many low-income, 
small-scale producers are inclined to gear production decisions to 
meet consumption requirements. For example, where an inedible, cash 
crop can profitably be grown, producers growing the crop and using the 
income to purchase necessary consumption goods in the market place 
confront price uncertainty from two sides. Uncertainty surrounding 
market conditions for the cash crop and, in turn, a major proportion 
of his monetary income exists. The cash crop is often an export crop 
subject to substantial price variations. In addition, the producer 
confronts the uncertainty of prices he must pay for his food items and 
other consumer goods. When the producer receives low prices for the 
cash crop and must pay relatively-high prices for consumer goods, his 
economic vulnerability increases. Resorting to credit, or increased 
use of credit, introduces another potential set of problems. Conse­
quently, many producers do not gear cropping patterns to anticipated or 
existing market prices when producing for direct consumption is their 
major objective;^ 
(3) In addition to productivity considerations, acreage response 
is affected by access to markets, transportation costs, and by tenurial 
arrangements. Furthermore, using relative prices as the independent vari-
^The extent to which time-series data on acreages devoted to various 
crops include the land cropped by the peasant producers likely varies 
with the quality and comprehensiveness of the country's system for con­
ducting agricultural censuses and collecting annual data. The land of 
larger producers is more likely to be included. They are also the ones 
who usually account for a major proportion of all land cultivated and 
quantities supplied to the market and are the most sensitive to changing 
market conditions. Consequently, this class of producers is weighted 
more heavily in any time-series data. 
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able does not take into account variations in input prices and any 
technological change which affect production decisions. Finally, in­
dices of wholesale prices or prices received by producers do not give 
any indication of public price policies reducing price uncertainty 
where such uncertainty affects production decisions nor of other public 
policies subsidizing or taxing the costs of production inputs. Varia­
tions in wholesale prices may not be accompanied by similar changes in 
prices received by producers where the latter are important for pro­
duction decisions. 
A number of studies investigating producer response to changes in 
price relationships and some noneconomic factors are reviewed below. 
The study results are summarized in Table 7.1a.^ 
Clark (7.10) analyzed data on jute and rice prices and acreage 
and production of jute in East Bengal for the 1931/32 to 1953/54 period. 
The jute and rice prices reflected unweighted seasonal average of 
prices paid to producers and retail prices, respectively. Clark noted 
that rice was the principal crop grown while jute, as a cash crop, 
could also be readily produced. The multiple correlation between the 
two prices and jute acreage was 0.825 which was essentially identical 
to the multiple correlation of 0.829 between the prices and jute pro­
duction. This similarity suggests that prices were nearly equally 
effective in explaining about 68 percent of the variation in both pro-
2 duction and acreage, i.e., (0.82) ^ 0.68. Clark derived a price 
elasticity of production at +0.60 with respect to the average jute price 
^Table 7.1b represents a specification of the various independent 
variables used in deriving the price elasticity of area estimates. 
Table 7.1a. Estimates of price elasticity of crop area for various crops 
and geographic regions corresponding to varying time periods 
and estimating procedures, as specified 
Price elasticity of area 
SR LR Dependent variable 
Crop and 
geographic area 
Ratio of rice area 
to rice + jute area 
Irrigated rice area 
RICE: 
East Pakistan 
(Summer + winter) .03^ 
(Summer only) .09° 
9 districts^ ^ 
(Summer + winter) .05^ 
(Summer only) .12" 
Punjab (undivided) .31^ 
Thailand .18^ 
Regions : 
Northeast .04-.57 
(mean) .23 
Central .02-.62 
(mean) .18 
Western Highlands .07-.50 
(mean) .23 
Peninsula 
(mean) 
Java-Madura 
(wet) 
(dry) .08" 
^Simple model. 
^Distributed lag model. 
'These districts are the nine important jute-growing areas, 
Range of estimates derived for provinces within regions. 
b,d 
b,d 
b,d 
.59 
.31 
.06-1.04 
.30 
.07-3.12 
.32 
.07-.46 
. 22  
b,d 
b,d 
b,d 
.29-.34 
.32 
.05 
b,d 
.29-.30 
.30 
b,d 
Rice area planted 
Rice area planted 
Rice area planted 
Rice area planted 
Rice area planted 
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2 Independent 
Period R variable Source 
1948/49 - .04 A (7.21) 
1962/63 .65 A (7.21) 
1948/49 - .54 A (7.21) 
1962/63 .60 A (7.21) 
1914/15 -
1945/46 
1940-63 .89 C (7.5) 
1945/46 ® (7.27) 
1940-63 .29-.96^ C (7.5) 
1940-63 .08-.95^ C (7.5) 
1940-63 .38-.72^ C (7.5) 
1940-63 .36-.75^ C (7.5) 
1951-62 .73 D (7.34) 
1951-62 .99 D (7.34) 
Table 7.J,a (continued) 
Crop and 
geographic area 
Price elasticity of area 
SR LR Dependent variable 
Regency (wet + dry): 
Krawang 
Wonosobo 
D j ember 
Philippines 
Regions : 
Central Luzon 
Bicol 
West Visayas 
Cagayan Valley 
WHEAT 
Punjab (undivided) 
(Irrigated) 
(Unirrigated) 
•f 
West Pakistan 
CORN; 
Punjab (undivided) 
Thailand 
Provinces : 
Nakhornsawan 
.03 
.56 
.03 
.15 
.04 
a,e 
b,e 
.13-.27 b,e 
.38 
.91 
,b,e 
b,e 
negative 
.08 
1-.2 
.23 
1.92 
1.16 b,e 
.62-2.15 b,e 
b,e 3.52 
negative 
Rice area planted 
Rice area planted 
Rice area planted 
Rice area 
Rice area 
Rice area 
Rice area 
Rice area 
.56 
1.92 
Irrigated wheat area 
Unirrigated wheat area 
Irrigated wheat area 
Irrigated corn area 
Corn area planted 
Based on results from second-trial regression. 
^Estimates for irrigated production in seven districts. 
g 
The time period corresponding to the derived estimates is not 
specified. The time span indicated is that used for deriving the price 
elasticities of cotton area. 
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2 Independent 
Period R variables Source 
1951-62 .85 
1951-62 .58 
1951-62 .80 
1910/11 -
1940/41 
1953/54 -
1963/64 
I t  
( I  
I f  
D (7.34) 
D (7.34) 
D (7.34) 
E (7.30) 
E (7.30) 
E (7.30) 
E (7.30) 
E (7.30) 
1914/15 - 1943/44 .85 F (7.27) 
1914/15 - 1945/46 .50 G (7.27) 
1933/34 - 1958/59® .25 H (7.12) 
1914/15 - 1943/44 .62 I (7.27) 
1950-63 .20 J (7.5) 
Table 7.1a (continued) 
Crop and 
geographic area 
Price elasticity of area 
SR LR Dependent variable 
Lopbur i 
Nakhornrats ima 
Phetchbun 
Philippines 
Regions : 
Central Luzon 
Bicol 
West Visayas 
Cagayan Valley 
BAJRA 
Punjab (undivided) 
JOWAR 
Punj ab (und iv ided) 
BARLEY 
Punjab (undivided) 
GRAM 
Punjab (undivided) 
CASSAVA 
Thailand 
Rayong Province 
COTTON 
Punjab (undivided) 
American varieties 
1.58^ 1.81^ Corn area planted 
.27^ .41% Corn area planted 
4.47^ 14.17% Corn area planted 
negative 
a,e 
negative 
.23^:2 
^ - b,e 
negative Corn area 
b,e 
negative . . b,e negative 
I) 6 
negative ' b 6 negative ' 
.03^'® .04'''® 
Corn area 
.17^'* .43"'' 
.09 
.39 
1.09 
.36 
-.58 
.50 
-.33 
1.09 
Unirrigated jowar area 
Unirrigated barley area 
Unirrigated gram area 
Cassava area planted 
.72 1 .62  
.59 
.41 
1.08 
Irrigated area 
Irrigated area 
Cotton area 
'Estimates for the eight major cotton-producing districts. 
Local varieties 
West Pakistan^ 
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Per iod 
Independent 
variables Source 
1950 -63 .96 J (7.5) 
1950 -63 .85 J (7.5) 
1950-63 . 73 J (7.5) 
1910/11 - 1940/41 K (7.30) 
1946/47 - 1963/64 K (7.30) 
1947/48 - 1963/64 K (7.30) 
1947/48 - 1963/64 K (7.30) 
1947/48 - 1963/64 K (7.30) 
1947/48 - 1963/64 K (7.30) 
1914/15 - 1945/46 .85 M (7.27) 
1914/15 - 1943/44 .35 N (7.27) 
1914/15 - 1945/46 .29 0 (7.27) 
1914/15 - 1945/46 .44 P (7.27) 
1955-63 .14 Q (7.5) 
1922/23 - 1941/42 .92 R (7.27) 
1922/23 - 1943/44 .72 S (7.27) 
1933/34 - 1958/59 .70 T (7.12) 
Table 7-la (continued) 
Crop and Price elasticity of area 
geographic area SR LR Dependent variable 
.37' Ratio of cotton area 
to competing crops 
area 
SUGAR CANE 
Punjab (undivided) .30, 
. 60  :b:j 
Irrigated sugarcane 
area 
JUTE 
East Bengal 
Bengal, Bihar and 
Or issa 
. 60  
.65 
Jute production 
Ratio of jute area 
to competing crops 
area 
Bengal 
, 6 8  1.03 
Ratio of jute area 
to competing crops 
area 
East Pakistan 
9 districts 
.36 
.42 
Ratio of jute area to 
rice + jute area 
^Relative price lagged one year. 
^Relative price lagged two years. 
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Per iod R 
Independent 
variables Source 
1913/14 - 1937/38 U (7.44) 
1915/16 - 1943/44 
1931/32 - 1953/54 
1911/12 1938/39 
1911/12 - 1938/39 
1948/49 - 1962/63 
1948/49 - 1962/63 
.44 
. 68  
.25 
.30 
.65 
.54 
.65 
V 
W 
X 
X 
X 
(7.27) 
(7.10) 
(7.45) 
(7.45) 
(7.45) 
(7.21) 
(7.21) 
Table 7.1b. Specification of respective independent variables 
associated with elasticity estimates in Table 7.1a 
A Lagged price ration of (sunniicr )r Lee to jute. 
B Lagged price ratio of rice to six alternative kharif (summer) 
crops, lagged yield ratio similar in construction to the price 
ratio, and lagged rice area. 
C All equations include the lagged relative price of rice and 
lagged rice areas. The equations vary according to the in­
clusion of relative yield of rice, variations in prices and 
yields, and population. 
D Lagged and deflated price of rice, seasonal rainfall, and time 
in all equations. For Java-Madura (wet), the standing area of 
rice at the end of the prior dry-season rice crop is included; 
for Java-Madura (dry), the standing area of the prior wet-
season rice crop is added. 
E Lagged price ratio of rice to a single, major competitive crop; 
ladded yield ratio of rice to a single crop; lagged wage rate 
for hired agricultural workers; and t as a trend variable. 
F Lagged price ratio of wheat to index of ten alternative crops, 
lagged total irrigated area of all crops, and lagged irrigated 
wheat area. 
G Lagged price ratio of wheat to gram, lagged yield ratio of wheat 
to gram, and rainfall. 
H Lagged price ratio of wheat to sugarcane. 
I Lagged price ratio of corn to six alternative kharif (summer) 
crops and lagged corn area. 
J All equations include the lagged relative price of corn. The 
other equations vary relative to additional variables included. 
See C above. 
K Same as E above, but substitute corn for rice. 
L The dependent variable is the ratio of unirrigated area under 
bajra to the unirrigated area in all kharif (summer) crops. 
M Lagged price ratio of bajra to six alternative kharif (summer) 
crops, lagged irrigation and bajra area, and rainfall. 
N Lagged price ratio of jowar to bajra, lagged irrigation area, and 
rainfall. 
0 Lagged price ratio of barley to wheat, rainfall, and lagged 
barley area. 
P Lagged price ratio of gram to wheat and rainfall. 
Q Lagged relative price and proxy variable for price variation. 
R Lagged price ratio of cotton (American) to six alternative 
kharif (summer) crops, lagged irrigation area, and lagged cotton 
(American) area. 
S Lagged price ratio of cotton (local) to six alternative kharif 
(summer) crops, lagged yield ratio similar in construction to 
the price ratio, and lagged cotton (local) area. 
T Lagged price ratio of cotton to index of rice, bajra, jowar, corn 
and sugarcane. 
U Lagged price ratio of cotton to competing crops. 
V Lagged price ratio of sugarcane to six alternative kharif (summer) 
crops and lagged sugarcane area. 
W Lagged average jute price. 
X Lagged price ratio of jute to rice plus ten other crops, all prices 
at the wholesale level. The lagged jute area ratio is added for 
the distributed lag model. 
Y Lagged price ratio of jute to (summer)rice. 
lagged one year at the mean of the data. The price eias-i-it» c: -
duction with respect to the lagged rice price vas of îh«» sasssr aaf»:-
tude but negative. Clark added that variations in the yitldf ?>;-r 
hectare did not appear to be a function of econoteic . ai 
he did not test this relationship. Also, a "cobweb" effect appeared 
operative between jute production and the lagged jute price. 
In a similar study, Hussain (7.21) estimated acreage re; 
functions for rice and jute in East Pakistan for the *c t 
period. For rice, the proportion of rice acreage to rice rlcs 
acreage was regressed on the lagged, relative price of rice tc jute.' 
For jute, the proportion of jute to jute plus rice acreage was the 
dependent variable while the lagged, relative price of jute tc 
(summer)rice was the independent variable. Several regressim 
were derived. The price elasticity of rice acreage for the 17 di»-
2 tricts was estimated to be +0.03 at the data mean. in a of 
the data representing only the nine principal jute-growing regia»» 
where competition between jute and rice production was ex'pecced to be 
strongest, the estimated price elasticity increased to -M3.05. Nhem the 
data on (summer)rice which is most seasonally competitive with jot* 
was used rather than (suiraner)- plus (winter)rice, the estimated el«t£ci 
ties increased to +0.09 and +0.12 for the 17 and 9 regions, respecti«ly. 
^The price for rice was that corresponding to the simmer (rice) 
crop only. 
2 Hussain explicitly notes that the derived elasticities are «ttaîîy 
the price elasticity of rice to total rice and jute acreage. Be adds 
" . . . the variation in total area is sufficiently small that the price 
elasticity of this ratio may be taken as a good approximation of th* 
price elasticity of rice acreage" (7.21, p. 99, footnote 8>. 
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lAggîjd one year at the mean of the data. The price elasticity of pro-
diicticn vith respect to the lagged rice price was of the same magni­
tude but negative. Clark added that variations in the yields per 
TH- îare did not appear to be a function of economic factors, although 
ftsr did not test this relationship. Also, a "cobweb" effect appeared 
operative between jute production and the lagged jute price. 
Ir a similar study, Hussain (7.21) estimated acreage response 
:un tions for rice and jute in East Pakistan for the 1948/49 to 1962/63 
zmziod. For rice, the proportion of rice acreage to rice plus jute 
acreage was regressed on the lagged, relative price of rice to jute.^ 
For jute, the proportion of jute to jute plus rice acreage was the 
dependent variable while the lagged, relative price of jute to 
Cstfflaer)rice was the independent variable. Several regression equations 
were derived. The price elasticity of rice acreage for the 17 dis-
2 tricts was estimated to be +0.03 at the data mean. In a subset of 
the data representing only the nine principal jute-growing regions 
wfeere cœnpetition between jute and rice production was expected to be 
stroagest, the estimated price elasticity increased to +0.05. When the 
data on (summer)rice which is most seasonally competitive with jute 
was used rather than (summer)- plus (winter)rice, the estimated elasticl-
ties increased to +0.09 and +0.12 for the 17 and 9 regions, respectively. 
^The price for rice was that corresponding to the summer(rice) 
crop only. 
Hussain explicitly notes that the derived elasticities are actually 
the price elasticity of rice to total rice and jute acreage. He adds 
'' . . . the variation in total area is sufficiently small that the price 
elasticity of this ratio may be taken as a good approximation of the 
price elasticity of rice acreage" (7.21, p. 99, footnote 8). 
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Consequently, cropping patterns were more sensitive to changes in the 
relative prices of(summer)rice and jute. 
Since jute was a cash crop while rice was the principal food crop 
for direct consumption, the price elasticities of jute acreage were 
expected to be above those for rice. The derived elasticities supported 
this contention. The price elasticities of jute acreage were estimated 
to be +0.36 and +0.42 at their respective means for the 17 and 9 dis­
tricts, respectively. Hussain (7.21) adds that no statistically signifi­
cant relationship between the lagged rice/jute price ratio and rice 
yields was observed. That is, an increase in the rice/jute price ratio 
was associated with an increase in the relative amount of rice acreage 
not in more intensive cultivation of rice. 
Stern (7.45) derived estimates of the price elasticity of jute 
acreage for selected provinces in India-Pakistan prior to partition. 
The price data represent wholesale price quotations. Again, the depen­
dent variable reflecting jute area as a proportion of total area planted 
to competing crops was postulated to represent planned production pat­
terns^ in response to the lagged, relative prices of these crops. Two 
^Stern (7.45) notes that an interpretation of the price elasticity 
of the acreage ratio may be complicated by changes in the total area 
under cultivation. That is, sufficiently large changes in total area 
relative to changes in the area of the crop being studied may sufficient­
ly outweigh the latter so that values of the dependent and independent 
variables move in opposite directions. Earlier Hussain (7.21) pointed 
out in his study that total area did not appreciably change. 
Where the total area changes, such change is usually attributable 
to a number of factors in addition to variations in relative prices. 
If price changes represent the principal force, changes in total area 
reflect an aggregate production response in contrast to reallocation 
of an essentially fixed number of land units among competing crops. 
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crop combinations were considered: (1) Jute to rice and (2) Jute 
to rice plus ten other competing crops. Two geographical areas were 
considered: (1) Bengal, and (2) Combination of Bengal, Bihar, and 
Orissa. For the combined area, the derived elasticities were +0.57 
and +0.65 for the two-crop combinations, respectively. That is, when 
additional competing crops were introduced into the regression anal­
ysis, the proportion of land area devoted to jute production appeared 
to be more responsive to changes in lagged, relative prices. This 
increase in elasticity was not evident for the derived estimates for 
Bengal which were +0.76 and +0.75 for the two-crop combinations, 
2 
respectively. The R , i.e., the amount of variation "explained" by 
the independent variable, was relatively low for each acreage response 
function estimated. When a distributed lag model including the lagged 
ratio of jute area to area of competing crops was used to analyze 
the Bengal data, short- and long-run prices elasticities were derived 
to be +0.68 and +1.03, respectively. 
Stern (7.44) completed an earlier study of similar design to 
estimate the acreage response by Egyptian producers to changing price 
relationships. The area and price ratios were expressed in terms of 
cotton to the combination of wheat, maize, rice and barley. With 
relative prices lagged one year, the price elasticity of the cotton 
area ratio was found to be +0.37. Stern also derived arc elasticities 
for consecutive years. These values ranged from -2.5 to +3.9. In 
Stern's judgment, a price elasticity between +0.4 and +0.6 was perhaps 
most representative for the 1900 to 1938 period under study. 
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Falcon (7.12) examined the acreage adjustments made by wheat and 
cotton producers in West Pakistan in response to changes in the rela­
tive prices of the two crops to prices of competing crops. For the 
1933/34 to 1958/59 period, the derived price elasticity of the cotton 
acreage ratio was found to be +0.41 for the eight major cotton-
producing regions. The competing crops included in the regression 
analysis were rice, baja, jowar, corn and sugarcane. The effect of 
price relationships on wheat area varied with the nature of wheat-
growing conditions. In the dryland area, relative prices were of little 
importance in explaining cropping patterns. However, the correlation 
between fall-planted acreage and rainfall was 0.7. Falcon adds that 
" . . .  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  b e t w e e n  w h e a t  a n d  t h e  
other fall crops, 65 percent of the total area went into 
wheat production" (7.12, p. 588).^ 
In the irrigated regions where wheat and sugarcane are competi­
tive crops, the price elasticity of wheat acreage to the lagged wheat/ 
sugarcane price ratio was estimated to be +0.1 to +0.2. Falcon further 
notes that the return from sugarcane was perhaps double that of wheat so 
that the income differential was sufficient to induce more production 
^According to Falcon (7.12), the relative constancy of the pro­
portion of wheat acreage was due to: (1) Wheat, pulses and barley 
are planted to over 90 percent of the total acreage. Wheat is the major 
food grain in home consumption and pulses and barley are often inter­
tilled with wheat as a hedge against adverse weather affecting wheat 
production. Falcon adds that prices are incidental to production de­
cisions and absolute acreages vary primarily with total acres under 
cultivation; and (2) While oilseeds can be grown as cash crops, the 
differential in income, at most 10-15 percent, is not sufficient to 
induce a movement away from wheat into oilseeds where producers must 
later purchase wheat in the market. The uncertainty regarding oilseeds 
prices and retail prices for wheat induces cultivators to produce more 
food grains than cash crops. 
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of this cash crop. He does not comment on the location of markets for 
cash crops and the attendant marketing and transportation costs. In 
summary, consumption requirements and water availability appeared to 
be the principal factors affecting cropping patterns in this area 
during the 1933/34 - 1958/59 period. 
Acreage response to prices plus additional independent variables 
Aggregate rice acreage and production functions have been estimated 
for producers in the Java and Madura regions of Indonesia by Mubyarto and 
Fletcher (7.34). Separate estimates were derived for the wet- and dry-
monsoon areas. Since the former accounts for over 80 percent of the 
total rice production in Java and Madura, the estimates for the dry-
monsoon area are not discussed here. Ostensibly, the lagged price 
variable represents the price received by producers^ but deflated by 
an index of prices paid for selected consumer goods. The rice acreage 
function for time period ^  also includes variables representing rain­
fall in period the "standing area" of rice grown in the previous dry 
season, and time as a trend variable. The period studied is 1951-62. 
The derived elasticity with respect to the lagged price was +0.05 for 
^The authors (7.34) note that the Indonesian government has 
attempted to exercise close control over the prices and distribution of 
rice. The program, which was discontinued in 1964, was designed to re­
quire a minimum delivery of rice to the government at a fixed price. 
The limited success of the program was primarily due to the fact that 
the government price was usually considerably below the free market 
price. Another study is cited in which the program was considered to 
have reduced price instabilities and marketing margins. If this pro­
gram was operative during the 1951-62 period, the derived price 
elasticities may have been affected. A measure of price stability, 
lower marketing margins, and some reduction in uncertainty associated 
with the fixed government price even though it was usually below the 
market price likely affect producers' decisions. 
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the combined Java-Madura area but the estimate was not statistically 
significant. In estimating the rice output function, the "standing 
2 
area" variable was omitted. The R was .88 and the derived price 
elasticity was +0.33 which was statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.^ 
Acreage response functions were also estimated for five regencies 
in the Java-Madura area. Due to data limitations, the dependent 
variable, rice acreage, represents annual acreage for wet plus dry 
crops. Lagged and deflated prices, rainfall, and time are the inde­
pendent variables. For three of the five regencies, the price 
elasticity is not statistically significant and one of the three is 
negative. The other two price elasticities are positive and statistical­
ly significant. For the Wonosobo regency, the price elasticity was de­
rived to be +0.565 which was also statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. The authors attribute this relatively-high elasticity 
to two factors: (1) Corn is generally preferred to rice in consump­
tion; and (2) Corn production recently increased considerably through 
higher use-levels of fertilizer and improved cultivation practices. 
Thus, producers in this regency had two reasons for being more sensi­
tive to changes in the deflated rice price. 
Acreage response functions have been estimated for rice and corn 
in the Philippines by Mangahas, Recto, and Ruftan (7.30). Three sets 
of regression equations involving three different methods of introducing 
^The authors (7.34) do not discuss the likelihood of problems of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
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lagged output price relationships were derived. The other independent 
variables were: (1) Lagged factor-price index represented by the 
lagged wage rate for hired agricultural workers; (2) Lagged technology 
index represented by the lagged index of the ratio of the yield of 
rough corn or rice to the yield of the competitive crop or crops; and 
(3) Time as a trend variable. Both simple, i.e., "nonadjustment" 
models, and distributed lag models were used in running the three sets 
of regressions. Separate regressions were run for the prewar and 
postwar periods for the Philippines and only for the postwar periods 
for selected regions within the Philippines. 
For estimating the price elasticity of rice area, the authors 
found the simple models using the second-trial combination of output 
prices to provide the best estimates. For the Philippines, the price 
elasticity for the prewar period was derived to be +0.15 which was 
only significant at the 40 percent level. For the postwar period, 
a negative price elasticity was derived. For the particular regions 
2 
studied, the price elasticities ranged from +0.09 to +0.58. Also, the 
rice area was significantly influenced by factor prices in one region, 
^In the first-trial set, the lagged output price, either corn or 
rice, and the lagged index of all alternative crops were introduced 
as separate variables. In the second trial, the lagged output price and 
the lagged price of the most-competitive crop were introduced as a price 
ratio. In the third trial, the lagged output price and the lagged price 
index of all competing crops were introduced as a ratio. 
2 The price elasticity for one region was negative. The authors 
note that in this region an influx of people has been associated with 
substantial expansion of the area under cultivation. They conclude 
that changes in the rice area were most affected by either technology 
or the trend variable causing the price coefficients to be not meaning­
ful. 
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technology in six of the seven regions, and by the trend variable in 
four regions. 
The magnitude and sign of the derived price elasticities vary with 
the trial runs and with the simple versus the distributed lag models. 
For the Philippines, as an aggregate, none of the estimates was 
statistically significant. However, the elasticities were slightly 
higher for the postwar period. Long-run elasticities were also higher 
than the short-run estimates. A number of the price elasticities for 
particular regions were found to be negative. 
The price elasticities derived for rice were generally higher than 
those for corn. In addition, the authors (7.30) noted that on the 
basis of the regional estimates, the price elasticity for corn is 
highest in the areas in which strong commerical markets operate. The 
same holds true for rice where commercial markets and(or) extensive 
irrigation development exists. 
Khrishna's (7.27) work on deriving acreage response functions for 
several crops in the Punjab has served as the principal impetus to 
attempts to quantify producer response in less-developed areas. Prior 
to his work; assertions relative to producer response were based 
primarily on intuition or a priori arguments. Krishna uses an "ad­
justment" or distributed lag model patterned after the models developed 
by Nerlove (7.36). The dependent variable is always in terms of crop 
area. The lagged price variable is introduced as the ratio of the post-
harvest price of the crop being studied to a single alternative crop 
or to an index of post-harvest prices of alternative crops. The nature 
of the price ratio varies with the crop under consideration. The other 
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independent variables were: (1) Relative yield of the crop studied; 
i.e., relative to a single crop or to an index of yields of alternative 
crops, (2) Lagged, total irrigated area by year; (3) Rainfall term; 
and (4) Lagged crop area of the crop being investigated. 
Through prior analysis, Krishna determined which of these inde­
pendent variables, in addition to the lagged price ratio, should be 
introduced in the estimating equations for specific crops. For example, 
in estimating the area response for American varieties of cotton, the 
lagged irrigation area and previous year's area planted to these 
varieties were used. Rainfall was introduced for the dryland crops 
such as wheat, barley, and millets. For irrigated wheat, the lagged 
irrigation area and previous year's irrigated wheat area were used. 
The derived regression coefficients for the price variable and the 
price elasticities indicate a generally positive producer response in 
adjusting cropping patterns to price variations. All the price co­
efficients and elasticities are positive with the exception of jowar 
and gram.^ As indicated in Table 7.1a, the short- and long-run price 
elasticities are much higher for cotton, as a cash crop, than for the 
food and feed grains. Also, long-run elasticities for each crop are 
substantially above those for the short-run. With the exception of 
barley and gram, all of the price elasticities are statistically signifi­
cant. 
^Krishna (7.27) states that jowar is an inferior grain crop. That 
is, as per capita real incomes increase, less jowar is demanded for 
consumption. The converse also holds true. 
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In comparing the importance of price relative to the other in de­
pendent variables, Krishna (7.27) observed that price alone was the 
important "explainer" for maize and sugarcane. In terms of elasticities,^ 
irrigation area was more important than price for American cotton, 
bajra and irrigated wheat; yield was more important than price for 
rice; and in the case of unirrigated wheat, barley, and gram, rainfall 
was more important than price. 
Behrman's study (7.5) of producer response in Thailand is based on 
a modified Nerlovian dynamic supply model. The estimating model is 
written in implicit from in Equation 7.5. The dependent variable, 
A^, represents the desired planted area of the crop studied in time 
period _t. The independent variables are interpreted as follows : 
= f(p*, Y®, a a N^, M^) (7.5) 
= Relative price of the crop being studied which producers 
expect to realize during t 
= Crop yield expected by producers during 
a = Ratio of the standard deviation of prices of the crop to the 
t 
standard deviation of the index of prices for alternative crops, both 
standard deviations being based on prices prevailing in the three pre­
ceding production periods 
= Standard deviation of actual yields of the crop realized in 
the three preceding production periods 
^Krishna (7.27) also derived elasticities of crop acreage with re­
spect to irrigated area, relative yield, and rainfall for selected crops. 
These are not shown in Table 7.1a. 
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= Farm population in the area being studied 
= Annual malaria death rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the 
area under study. 
The importance of expected prices and yields on producers' de­
cisions is apparent. Behrman (7.5) indicates that and are in­
cluded as proxies for variances of producers' subjective probability 
distributions relative to prices and yields. For producers, particularly 
subsistence-oriented producers, large variations in yields and prices 
generate a good deal of uncertainty with respect to income and the re­
lationship of actual production to consumption requirements, including 
required payments in kind. That is, as cr and c increase for the 
t t 
crop in question, ceteris paribus, producers would be expected to alter 
cropping patterns in favor of crops in competition with this crop. 
The term is included to reflect a tendency for producers to gear 
production plans to consumption needs for the principal food grains 
consumed. That is, increases in would be associated with a decision 
to increase the planted area of the principal crop which is consumed 
directly.^ The term is included to reflect changes in malaria 
control where improvements would tend to expand the total cultivable 
area and would favorably affect the area planted to those crops most 
prevalent in areas most susceptive to malaria. 
Since and variables are not observable, the area response 
models are rewritten in terms of lagged price and yield variables 
which are historically observable. Similarly, the models are written 
^Behrman (7.5) includes in the area response model for rice 
but not for cassava, corn, and kenaf. 
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in a reduced form so that = actual area planted for the crop being 
studied in ^  is substituted for the unobservable A^. The estimates for 
coefficients of the parameters of the models are derived through the 
use of maximum likelihood estimators. A selected number of the derived 
short- and long-run elasticities of area planted are listed in Table 
7.1a. 
Yield response to price relationships 
The price elasticity of area component of Equation 7.3 was dis­
cussed above.^ Relatively-fewer estimates of the price elasticity of 
Y Po 
yield, are available. Since P = —, changes in the relative output/ 
input price relationships affect the sign of dP. If p^ increases rela­
tive to pj, ceteris paribus, producers find it profitable to increase 
the use-levels of at least some of the j inputs. As additional labor, 
fertilizer, and irrigation water inputs are used, yield and output are 
expected to increase. 
The estimates derived by Mubyarto and Fletcher (7.34) and by 
2 Behrman (7.5) are presented in Table 7.2a. The derived elasticities 
for rice are positive but of relatively-low magnitude. The estimates are 
quite variable for corn and kenaf. 
Clark (7.10) states that agricultural practices and costs of pro­
duction for jute were relatively constant in East Bengal during the 
period in his study. He adds that variations in jute yields were 
^The derived price elasticities are not always comparable in 
form to Gp expressed in Equation 7.3. 
2 Table 7.2b represents a specification of the various independent 
variables used in deriving the price elasticity of yield estimates. 
Table 7.2a. Estimates of price elasticity of crop yields for specified 
crops and geographic areas corresponding to varying time 
periods and estimating procedures, as specified 
Crop and 
geographic area 
Price elasticity of yield 
SR LR Per iod 
RICE: 
Java-Madura 
(wet) .20* 1951-62 
I I  (dry) .06* 
Thailand , , 
Loei Province .28 .28 1940-63 
CORN: 
Thailand 
Province: , , 
Nakhornratsima .60 .15 1950-63 
Phitsnulok 6.07^ 28.4^ 1950-63 
KENAF: 
Thailand H h h 
4 provinces .09-.81 .10-.81 ' 1954-63 
*Simpie model. 
^Distributed lag model. 
^Range of estimates derived for individual provinces. 
^The four provinces are Ubonratthani, Khon-kaen, Srisaket, and 
Roi-et. 
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Independent 
.89 A (7.34) 
.80 B (7.34) 
.52 C (7.5) 
.75 D (7.5) 
.63 E (7.5) 
.40-.96^ F (7.5) 
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Table 7.2b. Specification of respective independent variables 
associated with elasticity estimates in Table 7.2a 
A Lagged and deflated price of rice, rainfall, standing rice area at 
end of December of the previous dry season, and time. 
B Same as A except substitute standing rice area at the end of 
August of the previous wet season. 
C Lagged relative price of rice, lagged rice area, farm population, 
and annual rainfall. 
D Lagged relative price of corn, lagged corn area, proxy for price 
uncertainty and annual rainfall. 
E Same as D plus proxy for yield uncertainty. 
F All equations include lagged relative price of kenaf and lagged 
kenaf area. The equations vary as to the inclusion of proxy 
variables for price and yield uncertainty. 
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primarily random with environmental conditions rather than economic 
variables being the principal factor. 
In regressing cotton yields on the lagged price ratio of cotton to 
2 
alternative crops, the R 's derived by Falcon (7.12) were extremely low. 
That is, the price variable "explained" extremely little of the varia­
tion in cotton yields. Rather, Falcon states that lack of incentives, 
physical unavailability of inputs, capital rationing, uncertainty, and 
ignorance of better production practices were the determining factors. 
Because of these factors, the lack of yield response to changing rela­
tive prices cannot be imputed as economic irrationality on the part of 
producers. 
In his study of rice and jute production in East Pakistan, Hussain 
(7.21) notes that inputs other than land and labor are not widely used. 
Consequently, variations in prices of variable inputs other than labor 
have little effect on input-use levels. He concludes that no statistical 
ly significant relationship exists between the lagged rice/jute price 
ratio and rice yields. Increases in the price ratio are associated 
with larger areas planted to rice and not to more-intensive cultivation 
of rice. 
Mangahas, et al. (7.30) estimated yield-response equations for 
rice and corn. However, the coefficients of the relative price variable 
were nearly all rejected because they were found to be negative or not 
statistically significant even at rather high probability levels. They 
add that, 
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"These results may have been due mainly to large differences 
between actual yields and intended yields, caused by unfore­
seen weather or other exogenous factors affecting yield" 
(7.30, p. 691). 
Quantities marketed as a function of market prices 
Production and resource allocation decisions are directly condi­
tioned by consumption requirements and(or) anticipated market prices 
or exchange values. After resources have been committed, the effect 
of changes in market price expectations on output levels can, for some 
crops, be reflected in the intensity of weeding operations and use-
levels of irrigation water. As the crop matures for harvesting, pro­
ducers can decide whether or not to harvest. This decision applies 
primarily to the production of nonedible, cash crops where producers 
are often located at some distance from marketing outlets so that 
transportation costs and reliability of market information are impor­
tant factors in harvesting and marketing decisions. That is, the ex­
pected net returns may not be sufficient to induce the producer to 
harvest the crop. Of course, market uncertainties, transportation 
costs, and marketing margins affect producers at all locations from 
marketing centers. However, these uncertainties tend to increase with 
distance from the marketing point. Finally, once the crop has been 
harvested, the producer-consumer faces the decision of whether to con­
sume or market, at least for edible commodities. 
This relation between quantities marketed and changes in market 
price, presumably the price received by the producer, has been the 
subject of discussion for several years. The controversy centers on 
whether quantities marketed are inversely related to prices received 
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so that a downward-sloping supply function exists or whether the con­
verse relationship holds. But the controversy has been muddled by 
writers referring to noncoraparable situations and(or) not being very ex­
plicit about the conditions they are attempting to describe and evalu­
ate. Some studies are based on a priori arguments; others are supported 
by data. 
For those proponents of an inverse relationship between quantities 
marketed and prevailing market prices, the point of departure is the 
assumption of a relatively-fixed demand for cash by producers such as 
D = p q . As the market price received increases, the quantity of q 
c n n n 
that must be marketed so as to obtain is reduced. See Figure 7.1. 
The converse also holds. 
Figure 7.1. Inverse relationship between price and quantity 
marketed for obtaining D 
c 
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In Figure 7.1, the curve is a rectangular hyperbola with a 
price elasticity of quantity marketed equal to negative unity. If 
external financing, savings, or hoards are not used to az least 
partially satisfy , the quantity which must be marketed has first 
claim on production realized. The quantities available for consumption 
are a residual. As this residual is chronically inadequate for many 
small-scale producers, they must resort to financing or credit in kind 
in order to sustain consumption patterns. The above viewpoint is best 
articulated by Mathur and Ezekiel (7.32), Khatkhate (7.25), and Neumark 
(7.37).^ Mathur and Ezekiel and Neumark are explicit in stating that 
this market behavior is applicable to producers operating in "... an 
intrinsically nonmonetized economy operating on the margins of sub­
sistence to the monetized world around. . . " (7.32, p. 399) and in 
" ... an embryonic exchange economy ..." (7.37, p. 48). Because pro-
One of the earlier proponents of a perverse market supply function 
was Boeke (7.7, pp. 29-30) who considered this phenomenon representative 
of Eastern society as compared with Western society. For a discussion 
of a perverse market supply function for rubber by native growers in 
the Netherlands Indies, see Boeke (7.6, p. 49). This perverse relation­
ship for rubber marketings appears to be adequately but conditionally 
refuted by Joosten (7.23). Joosten concludes, "If the peasant farmer 
has alternative opportunities no perverse supply curves are to be ex­
pected in the case of cash crop commodities. In this connection it is 
interesting to note that the statistical data on the production of the 
great rubber estates tend to exhibit a perverse supply curve...The 
rubber estates had no alternatives" (7.23, p. 102). The condition 
imposed by Joosten is that the peasant has alternative production 
opportunities. 
This perversity is also noted by Chaturvedi (7.8, p. 20) and 
Bansil (7.1, p. 30), both on an a priori basis. 
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ducers operate in this environment of limited contact with forces of 
change so that the essentially traditional production and consumption 
patterns are sustained, the demand for cash to pay rent and taxes and 
to purchase a limited number of consumer goods is assumed to be nearly 
invariant. Implicity, the price elasticity of substitution between 
those commodities produced and directly consumed and those purchased as 
consumer goods is zero. The income elasticity of demand for these 
consumer goods is also assumed to be zero.^ 
Only Mathur and Ezekiel (7.32) adduce evidence to support their 
proposition of a downward-s loping market supply function. Their evi­
dence is the following: 
"In an investigation conducted under the auspices of the Gokhale 
Institute of Politics and Economics in the Akola and Amraoti 
districts of the state of Maharashtra in India during 1955-56 
and 1956-57, it was found that while prices increased by 
about 33 percent between the two years, sales decreased by 
about 7.5 percent. This was in spite of the fact that total 
production had increased by about 38 percent" (7.32, footnote 
4, p. 397). 
Presumably, Mathur and Ezekiel are referring to food grains production 
and sales. However, Dandekar (7.11), after consulting with Mathur, 
states that the co-authors were actually referring to all farm products 
rather than food grains only. Furthermore, Dandekar cites another 
analysis of the same data made by Mathur (7.31) which indicates that 
prices and quantities marketed moved in the same direction for wheat, 
_ 
Mathur and Ezekiel assert that the income elasticity of demand 
is only close to zero. This follows from their statement that "It 
is probably likely that an increase in food consumption will be 
accompanied by some increases in the consumption of non-food consumer 
goods for which an increase in cash income will be necessary" (7.32, 
p. 398). 
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jowar, and other cereals.^ Since these are food grains, the results are 
contrary to Mathur and Ezekiel's proposition of a perverse market supply 
function for food grains. 
Mathur and Ezekiel (7.32) reinforce their proposition by assert­
ing that producers save in kind rather than in monetary terms. That 
is, any output in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy and 
customary consumption patterns is placed in contingency stocks as a 
hedge against adverse production and market price conditions. Further­
more, as market prices fall so that a larger quantity of must be 
marketed, a portion of increased marketings comes from contingency 
stocks. The increased marketings tend to drive market prices even lower 
until rightward shifts in the market demand curve lessen the downward 
pressure on prices and a temporary equilibrium is realized. The demand 
curve shifts to the right because falling food grains prices raise pro­
ducers * real incomes. 
Although Mathur and Ezekiel (7.32) are explicit that the market 
behavior they postulate applies to semi-subsistence farmers operating in 
an essentially-nonmonetized economy, their evidence of perverse market­
ing behavior is based on data reflecting the aggregate effect of market­
ing decisions by producers of all size holdings. The percent of total 
marketings attributable to various farm size groupings was given in 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 6.1. Referring to column (2), which is 
^Dandekar (7.11) further notes that the price elasticities of 
market supply are negative for cotton and groundnuts. He concludes 
that because these two crops account for 50 and 10 percent, respectively, 
of total sales of farm products, a perverse market supply relationship 
for all farm products resulted, as was observed by Mathur and Ezekiel. 
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in terms of total value of all agricultural marketings, producers 
operating less than 15 acres of land in India accounted for 46.4 percent 
of all marketings. Mathur and Ezekiel do not state what size of hold­
ings characterizes semi-subsistence producers. However, the relatively-
large proportion of the total value of marketings attributed to small-
scale producers who act in the manner postulated by Mathur and Ezekiel 
may tend to generate a perverse market supply relationship. 
Implicitly, Mathur and Ezekiel (7.32) do not admit any effect of 
changes in market prices on production decisions and quantities pro­
duced. For example, rising market prices requiring less to be marketed 
and permitting more to be consumed do not have a favorable impact on 
production. However, this is rather consistent with the economic en­
vironment they postulate. However, the authors state, "... when 
the per capita income of the farmer rises above the level at which the 
farmer's food grain needs are more or less satisfied, the inverse re­
lationship between price and marketed surplus will be less likely to 
hold and the existing instability in the food grain market will probably 
be considerably reduced" (7.32, p. 400). The authors do not discuss 
how or when per capita incomes increase. Consequently, it is not 
possible to impute their postulated market supply behavior as being of 
a short-run or long-term nature. Presumably, this behavior persists 
as long as per capita production of food grains remains below per capita 
"food grains needs". Despite the scattered successes of the so-called 
"Green Revolution", the extremely high population growth rates, es­
pecially in rural areas, suggest that substantial increases in per capita 
production of food grains will only be a longer-term phenomenon in many 
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less-developed areas. 
Krishnan (7.29) relaxes the Mathur-Ezekiel assumption of a fixed 
demand for cash and constructs a short-run behavioral model describing 
the relationship between aggregate marketing of food grains by pro­
ducers-consumers and market prices. The point of departure is that 
— 1 
quantity of food grains produced, Q, which can be consumed or marketed. 
Krishnan uses a demand function incorporating constant price and income 
elasticities. Equation 7.6, which is appropriate for a time period 
confined to the production year. 
rQ = AP'^^CQP)^ (7.6) 
M = (1-r) Q (7.7) 
The terms in Equations 7.6 and 7.7 are interpreted as follows: 
r = Proportion of net food grains produced that are directly 
c onsumed 
P = Food grains price 
a and R = Price and income elasticities of demand, respectively 
PQ = Income or value of the endowment of food grains 
A = A constant 
M = -(B - a) ^  (7.8) 
e i-r 
Equation 7.7 represents the amount of Q which is marketed. As P varies, 
so do producers' income, QP, and rQ. The price elasticity of quantity 
Q may also include any contingency stocks which are potentially 
marketable. Krishnan (7.29) notes that Q is net of seed requirements, 
etc. Presumably, et cetera includes any payments in kind. 
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of quantity marketed is given in Equation 7.8.^ Since the term 
— i s  a l w a y s  n o n - n e g a t i v e ,  t h e  s i g n  o f  d e p e n d s  u p o n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
magnitude of g and a . If the price elasticity of demand, a , is 
greater than the income elasticity of demand, B, will be positive 
indicating that, ceteris paribus, prices and quantities marketed move 
in the same direction. If the converse holds, is negative and a 
perverse price-quantity marketed relationship holds. Krishnan 
quantifies Equation 7.8 by substituting -a = -0.3584, S = 0.5216, and 
2 
r = .65. With these data, the derived = -0.303. That is, with 
small changes in P, given ct, 0, and Q, price and quantity marketed move 
in opposite directions. He carefully points out, however, that he is 
dealing with a short-run phenomenon and that any effect of price varia­
tions on production have not been taken into account. His model and 
analysis are only appropriate when Q is assumed. Furthermore, as economic 
development proceeds, both Tj—^ and B decline. Conversely, the ab­
solute value of O! increases. Consequently, is expected to eventually 
be positive but with a low value. In the extreme where all food grains 
are marketed such that r = 0 and food is purchased as processed goods, 
= 0. That is, the market supply function is perfectly inelastic and 
price changes have no effect on quantities marketed. This result 
necessarily follows from the implicit assumption in Krishnan*s model that 
^The derivation of M is given in Appendix B. A similar deriva­
tion is made when Q is disaggregated into two food grain commodities. 
This is a more meaningful construct since it reflects the impact of a 
change in the relative prices of the two goods on consumption and mar­
keting decisions. 
2 The elasticity estimates were derived in an earlier study by 
Krishnan which is cited in (7.29). The estimate of r = .65 is based on 
results from the All-India Rural Credit Survey (8.59). 
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food grains can only be consumed or marketed. The possibilities of 
storage and utilization as livestock feed are not admitted. 
Bardhan (7.2) has recently completed an econometric study of the 
market supply function for food grains in twenty-seven villages in the 
Indian states of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, Multiple regression analysis 
was used to assess the impact of six independent variables upon the de= 
pendent variable, the latter designated as the percent of total pro­
duction of food grains sold. The dependent variable reflects both 
cereals and pulses. Payments in kind represented one of the six in­
dependent variables. The remaining five variables follow: 
= Food grains production (in maunds) per adult unit of the 
cultivating population of the village 
= Derived average price of food grains in a village^ 
= Value of commercial crops produced, not including food grains, 
per adult unit of the cultivating population 
X^ = Value of milk and milk products per adult unit of the 
cultivating population 
= Index of concentration of cultivated acreage in a village 
Essentially two sets of regression were completed. The first in­
cluded all cultivators in the village surveys. The second set included 
only those who were in a relatively-good position in terms of land hold-
^The average food grain price for each village was derived by 
dividing the total value of food grains production by the total physical 
output. The regressions were also run using another average price de­
rived by dividing the total value of food grains sales by the total 
volume of sales. In general, the average price based on sales resulted 
in larger negative regression coefficient for X^, a higher R , and 
larger negative price elasticity of percentage marketed. 
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ings and annual incomes.^ The individual village surveys were conducted 
at differing times over the 1954-61 period. Four villages were surveyed 
twice. Each village survey related to the economic activities for a 
single year. 
Only the importance of and in explaining Y, the dependent 
variable, will be discussed here. Consider first. In all regressions, 
the derived regression coefficient for X^ was positive and was statis­
tically significant at the 1-5 percent level. That is, increases in 
per capita food grain production were associated with an increase in 
the percent of total food grains produced which are marketed. In the 
regression including all cultivators surveyed, the production elasticity 
of percent marketed was estimated to be about .8. With the regression 
subsets of cultivators having ten cultivable acres or more and those 
having ten or more acres plus annual incomes of Rs. 1,000 or more, the 
production elasticities dropped to .6 and .4, respectively. 
Similarly, the magnitudes of the X^ regression coefficients were 
reduced. Consequently, among those cultivators in relatively good 
economic positions, the effect of per capita food grain production 
on percent marketed was less than when those producers in poorer economic 
positions were included in the analysis. 
^For example, one regression run was only for cultivators with 
"operational holdings" of ten acres or more. A further subset was 
used: those cultivators having ten acres or more which generated an 
annual income of Rs. 1,000 or more, net of outlays for cultivation costs. 
Bardhan indicates that this net income figure "may be regarded as 
above the subsistence minimum for the period under consideration" (7.2, 
p. 57). 
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The derived regression coefficients for were negative for all re­
gressions completed. The coefficient was statistically significant at 
the 1-5 percent level when all cultivators were included. It was sig­
nificant at the 10-25 percent level when the subsets based on acreage 
and income considerations were analyzed. Thus, increases in the de­
rived average price of food grains, ceteris paribus, were associated 
with reductions in the quantities of food grains marketed and an inverse 
market supply function was expected to be operative. But, as already 
noted, these results were based on survey data covering only one crop 
year. The price elasticity of proportion marketed was about -.6 for the 
sample of all cultivators. For those having ten or more acres and at 
least Rs. 1,000, the price elasticities increased to -.33 and -.45, 
respectively.^ That is, for those in relatively better economic posi­
tions, the perverse response to price changes is expected to diminish. 
As Bardhan (7.2) points out, even though rising prices apparently 
cause the income effect to outweigh the substitution effect so that more 
food grains were consumed and quantities marketed reduced, higher prices 
may be an incentive to private investment and increased output. On the 
basis of the data, as analyzed, improved economic positions tend to 
lessen the strength of the inverse price relationship. Further, the re­
sults apply to the aggregate marketings by producers surveyed and for a 
particular region of India. The activities of individual producers are 
not discernible. The results need not apply to other regions of India. 
^Intuitively, the latter subset, i.e., those having 10 or more acres 
and at least Rs. 1,000, would be expected to be associated with a higher 
price elasticity; i.e., a less-negative elasticity, than the subset not 
having any income constraint. The derived elasticities do not support 
this contention. 
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As with Khatkhate, Neumark, and, to a lesser extent, Mathur and 
Ezekiel, Khusro (7.26) attempts to describe on an a priori basis the 
aggregate market behavior of producers as the market price varies. 
Khusro argues for a normal market supply function; i.e., one where prices 
and quantities marketed move in the same direction. His initial remarks 
emphasize the aggregate responses of Indian farmers to government pric­
ing policies affecting output and input prices. This suggests a situa­
tion where Krishnan's (7.29) short-run Q is not valid. Yet, when 
Khusro demonstrates the effect of a price decline on quantity marketed, 
as in Figure 7.2, he is evaluating consumption and marketing decisions 
while production is invariant.^ That is, AZ is the given production of 
food grains. Consequently, Khusro is also considering a short-run, 
decision-making situation. 
F r e e  Prices 
Marginal Utility of 
Cash Receipts 
From Sales at 
Controlled Prices 
Morginal Utility of 
Produce Retained 
For Consumption 
Marginal Utility 
of Sales at 
 ric«s_,^-^ 
A E F R' Z 
Figure 7.2. Determination of quantities consumed and marketed 
under two price situations 
^Figure 7.2 is Khusro's Figure III (7.26, p. 277). 
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Curve RR' represents the diminishing marginal utility associated 
with increases in direct consumption of food grains produced.^ The 
marginal utility of income from sales is denoted as S S. The inter­
section of RR ' and S S at point D represents the point at which utility 
is maximized. Accordingly, AE and EZ of the total food grain production 
are consumed and marketed, respectively. Khusro then postulates that 
the government imposes a controlled price which is lower than the "free 
market price" implicit in S S. The new MU sales curve, designated as 
s s, lies below s's. With the lower market price, each level of market­
ing results in lower sales revenue. Implicitly, other prices are in­
variant so that the lower income reduces purchasing power and fewer 
consumer goods can be obtained. Consequently, each level of marketing 
now provides less utility. The new point of utility maximization is at 
G. With the lower market price, consumption has been increased by EF 
while marketings have been reduced by this amount. The changes in price 
and quantity marketed have been in the same direction, and a normal 
market supply function exists. 
Khusro's (7.26) analysis has one important limitation which he 
acknowledges. That limitation is the assumption that the utility derived 
from direct consumption is independent of the utility indirectly derived 
through sales revenue or income. When this assumption is relaxed, shifts 
in S's in Figure 7.2 induce shifts in RR ' and vice versa. Consequently, 
^It is not clear why the MU is presumably zero at point R . The 
point at which MU is zero is likely much closer to point Z. This 
ambiguity does not affect Khusro's argument as he presents it. 
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a stable point of utility maximization is indeterminate. The qualita­
tive assessment of price movements upon changes in quantities marketed 
is also indeterminate. 
As noted earlier, Khusro referred to producer's response to govern­
ment price policies. Implicitly, this response is both in terms of pro­
duction realized and of quantities marketed. Consequently, the assump­
tion of a given production level is no longer appropriate when attempt­
ing to assess the impact of market price changes on quantities marketed. 
Krishna (7.28) developed a construct for estimating the price 
elasticity of market supply for a single crop. The construct incorporates 
the effect of price changes on both consumption and production. The 
basic formulation is given in Equation 7.9 where M, Q, and C are the 
quantities of wheat marketed, produced, and consumed, respectively. 
Shocking Equation 7.9 with respect to P, the relative price of wheat. 
Equation 7.10 is obtained. Equation 7.10 is restated in terms of 
elasticities in Equation 7.11 where r = b = price elasticity of pro­
duction, and d = total elasticity of home consumption with respect to P. 
Based on estimates available for the various components of Equation 7.11, 
Krishna derives estimates of e, the price elasticity of quantity of 
wheat marketed in the Punjab. 
M = Q - C (7.9) 
dM ^ dp àÇ (7.10) dP dP dP 
e = rb - (r-l)d (7.11) 
1 The construct and interpretations are developed in Appendix C. 
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See Table 7.3. The estimates are all positive as long as price 
elasticity of the substitution effect on consumption is negative. See 
Appendix B. However, both Nowshirvani (7.38) and Behrman (7.5) correct 
an error in Krishna's formulation. See Appendix 3. Using the ranges 
of values for the parameters, as cited by Krishna (7.28, p. 83), the 
minimum and maximum values for the estimated price elasticities of 
marketings for the three different formulations are given in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. Minimum and maximum values for the estimated price 
elasticity of quantity of wheat marketed based on three 
- different estimating procedures 
m = .1 m = .5 m = .9 
Krishna 
Nowshirvani 
Behrman 
2.30 to 5.56 
-2.74 to 5.56 
-2.56 to 6.03 
.12 to .78 
-.22 to .74 
-.19 to .85 
.08 to .26 
.07 to .56 
.07 to .26 
When relatively-small proportions are marketed, such as m = .1 .5, 
some of the derived elasticities are negative indicating that a per­
verse market supply function may be operative under these conditions. 
Therefore, when the effect of price changes on production as well as 
on direct consumption is admitted, the occurrence of a backward-sloping 
market supply function cannot be ruled out. This conclusion is based 
on the effect of small price movements and given the estimates of the 
parameters used. 
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Mubyarto and Fletcher (7.34), using the uncorrected Krishna 
formulation, derived estimates of the price elasticity of rice market­
ings in Java-Madura. Based on their estimates that b = .1 and d = .5, 
the price elasticities are -3.5 and -.3 when 10 percent and 50 percent 
are marketed, respectively. Similarly, Mangahas, et ai. (7.30) use the 
Krishna model to derive estimates of the price elasticities of rice and 
corn marketings in the Philippines. Since they do not have estimates 
of d, their elasticities reduce to e = rb. They point out that this 
is a low estimate since the second term in Equation 7.11 is expected 
to be negative. Since they set d equal to zero, the error observed by 
Nowshirvani and Behrman does not enter into their derived estimates. 
The estimates for b were given in Table 7.1 for several regions of the 
Philippines. The values for r vary among regions ranging from .37 to 
.65 for rice and .19 to .40 for corn. Out of the 18 regions for which 
estimates of e^ are derived, only three are negative. The positive 
values range from .18 to 1.28 for rice and .17 to 2.5 for corn. 
Finally, Behrman (7.3) uses his construct, as in Equation C.20 
in Appendix C, to estimate the price elasticity of rice marketings for 
Thailand. But since he assumes that g = h = 0,^ his estimating formula­
tion reduces to e = rb,. The derived short-run values for e are around 
1 — 
.4. 
At the beginning of this section, it was noted that those attempt­
ing to determine the nature of the market supply function base their 
conclusions on differing situations. Yet, whether the quantity pro-
^Behrman states, "Regardless of what factors underlie the results 
which were obtained no significant relative price or income response in 
Thai per capita domestic rice consumption has been supported statistical­
ly . : ."(7.5, p. 313). 
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duced is fixed or variable, the possibility of a perverse market supply 
function for aggregate marketings exists. 
Public price supports, ceilings, and subsidizations 
Public price policies have a differential impact on producers. 
In the case of price supports designed to raise and(or) stabilize pro­
ducers' incomes, the level of benefits realized is essentially propor­
tional to the level of marketings. Subsistence-oriented producers, 
tenants required to market to their landlords, and debtors required to 
market to their creditors are little affected, if any, by the prices 
supported in the market. The relative levels at which prices are 
supported affect the relative profitability of competing crops and, in 
turn, production patterns. Much of the data in Table 7.1 lend support 
to this postulated behavior, at least among producers of cash crops. 
Supported prices reduce the price uncertainty producers confront 
when making production and private investment decisions. This, of 
course, assumes that prices are announced in advance of the production 
period. But supported prices are also associated with a guarantee 
that the government will actually purchase these commodities if the mar­
ket price falls below the announced price. Consequently, the government 
must allow for financial and administrative resources for purchasing 
and storing these commodities. Not all commodities are easily storable, 
especially in tropical climates. Therefore, spoilage and quality de­
terioration are additional costs that must be considered. However, the 
accumulated stocks can serve as contingencies for adverse production 
periods and as buffer stocks to be released on to the market when market 
prices rise too high. Price variability is reduced and food and fjlber 
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costs to consumers are kept from rising. 
Public subsidization of input costs can be used to encourage the 
use of fertilizers, improved seeds, and pesticides. Referring to the 
o ™ 
capital constraint in Equation 2.9, K - Zp.q., as some of the p. 
j=l ^ ^ 
are reduced, more q. are obtainable with K°. As with price supports, 
the subsidization of input prices primarily benefits the market-oriented 
producers--those who are the largest purchasers of inputs in the market. 
If the levels at which the q^ are used increase, a major proportion of 
the increase in production would be expected to appear in the market. 
The rightward shift in the market supply curve would tend to keep market 
prices down. Consumers and exporters would benefit. Producers partici­
pating in the market but not using the price-subsidized inputs would be 
penalized by the lower prices they receive. In addition, the public 
must assume the costs of the subsidies; these funds have opportunity 
costs. 
The use of price ceilings to keep market prices from rising benefit 
consumers, manufacturers using agricultural commodities, and exporters. 
On the other hand, if the price controls are set at too low a level, 
production and quantities marketed may be reduced. Consequently, while 
consumers prefer the low prices, the quantity supplied may be insuf­
ficient to meet the demand and some rationing program must be implemented. 
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Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
Affecting the Agricultural Sector 
The importance of the agricultural sector, both in terms of number 
of people employed and proportion of national income originating within 
the sector, has already been noted. The contribution of the agricultural 
sector to general economic expansion is, of course, conditioned by growth 
within the sector itself. Higher per capita real incomes may be 
associated with higher absolute levels of savings with some transfers 
to other sectors of the economy, the potential for higher direct and 
indirect tax revenues, and an expanding market for consumer and pro­
ducer goods. Conversely, higher per capita incomes, through output in­
creases and(or) price advances, may result in a decrease in the quanti­
ties of agricultural commodities marketed. Evidence of this behavior 
was noted in the previous section. Even assuming that the price 
elasticity of quantities marketed is positive, government policies may 
be implemented in an attempt to increase the magnitude of this elasticity. 
A net transfer of income out of the agricultural sector may be 
effected by turning the terms of trade against producers, by implementing 
more rigorous tax policies, and by creating institutions to facilitate 
saving which can be used for private investment elsewhere in the economy. 
In economic systems based on Communistic principles or where remnants 
of feudal systems are still operative, output and income transfers are 
effected through marketing quotas and compulsory deliveries.^ However, 
^The relative emphasis given to income transfers through the mar­
keting mechanism or through compulsory transfers is the crux of Owen's 
(7.40) discussion of the Marshallian and Marxian approaches to capital 
transfers within the economy. Compulsory deliveries to the government 
have been required in several Asian countries having capitalistic-
oriented economic systems (7.47). In a vein similar to Owen, Schultz 
(7.42) uses the terms "market approach" and "command approach". 
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turning the terms of trade against agriculturalists, increasing the tax 
burden, and raising marketing quotas may act as disincentives to in­
creasing output levels and undertaking private investment in the firm. 
Consequently, the increased need for larger transfers of income to 
the government and to other sectors of the economy must be balanced 
against the possibility of a reduced rate of growth of agricultural out­
put and marketings. Reduced per capita real, disposable incomes result 
in many low-income producers having neither the financial capacity nor 
incentive to expand productivity. A partial withdrawal from the mone­
tized economy may also result, especially for subsistence-oriented 
producers. 
As is apparent, the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies 
in stimulating and guiding economic activity at preferred growth points 
depends on the infrastructure of the economy and its stage of economic 
development. Where activities of the banking system are primarily con­
fined to the relatively urban areas, increases in the money supply 
through the central bank system have a relatively minor impact on the 
money supply in rural areas. Where the degree of monetization in the 
economy is low, the administrative structure for assessing and collect­
ing taxes is weak, and the opportunities for tax evasion are widespread, 
governments cannot rely on personal income taxes as a principal source 
of public revenues. Yet, such revenues are necessary for implementing 
national development plans and alleviating bottlenecks retarding de­
velopmental processes. 
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Monetary policies 
Monetary policies are designed to affect the money supply and, in 
turn, interest rates and the general price level. The "quantity theory 
of money", expressed in Equation 7.12, is a useful point of reference. 
MV = PT (7.12) 
The terms have the following interpretations : 
M = Money supply; the quantity of money in circulation 
V = Velocity or turnover of money in transactions, expressed in 
"number of times" per year or period of time under consideration 
P = The average price level of all transactions 
T = The number of transactions or the volume of goods and services 
exchanged against money during this period. 
Economic expansion brought about by private, public, or foreign 
investment and by increased monetization of the economy increase the 
magnitude of T in Equation 7.12. As investment funds are committed and 
hoards mobilized, M and to some extent V increase. Since T does not 
increase at the same rate as M, i.e., a lag exists between expending 
investment funds and consequent economic activity, MV > PT. Prices are 
forced up and inflationary tendencies may result. While a mild amount 
of inflation may not cause alarm or may even be desirable if profits are 
increased and reinvested in the economy, substantial inflation tends to 
dampen the incentive for productive investment by both indigenous and 
foreign investors. The attractiveness of purchasing real estate, in­
vesting in metals and jewelry, and transferring capital abroad in­
creases. Rising production costs are disadvantageous when attempts are 
made to maintain or improve the foreign trade position. A weak currency 
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tends to discourage both saving and investment. Without adequate 
foreign exchange safeguards, capital needed domestically flows into 
foreign banks and investment projects abroad. The problems of develop­
ing government budgets and national plans are accentuated by fluctuating 
prices and economic uncertainty. 
Increased monetization of the economy and the availability of more 
consumer and producer goods may tend to raise V as money previously 
held as hoards is brought into circulation. But the principal means 
of dampening the price increases is through increasing T, the volume 
of goods and services being produced in the economy. 
Depending upon the structure of the banking system, variations in 
M can be effected by purchases and sales of government securities, by 
altering discount rates, by new issues of money, and by foreign ex­
change controls. But the dispersion effects of changes in M are affected 
by the location of banks associated with the central banking system. 
^The expectational elasticity of future prices concept reflects 
the impact of expected price changes on consumption, saving, and private 
investment decisions. This elasticity is defined as the ratio of the 
percent change in expected prices to the percent change in actual prices. 
For example, if the expectational elasticity equals 1.0, future prices 
are expected to increase at the same rate as in the past. If the ex­
pectational elasticity exceeds 1.0, future prices are expected to rise 
at a rate higher than current price increases. Unless monetary incomes 
are expected to increase at a rate higher than the increase in the 
general price level, future real incomes are expected to fall. In 
anticipation of this eventuality, consumers are motivated to increase 
current consumption at the expense of saving. This behavior, in turn, 
tends to accentuate inflationary tendencies. Similarly, expectational 
elasticities not equal to 1.0 generate price uncertainties and cloud 
business prospects surrounding private investment. 
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Since the majority of these banks are primarily located in relatively-
urban areas, the effect on the money supply in rural areas is usually 
not pronounced.^ The effect is felt through any increases in funds 
secured by cooperatives, marketing middlemen, professional moneylenders, 
and landlords who, in turn, lend at least a portion of these funds to 
cultivators and noncultivators in rural areas. An increase in loanable 
funds may not depress interest rates charged. Rather, interest rates 
may be maintained while larger loans and(or) loans to more individuals 
are made. Additional credit availability may have some beneficial 
impact on private investment but not as much as if interest rates were 
also lowered. 
The "pluralistic" economic structure of most less-developed 
countries; i.e., the tendency for growth points within and among sectors 
to surface, generates differential demands for money. Yet, rural areas 
having growth points are relatively disadvantaged since individuals 
often do not have access to the lower cost, institutional credit. The 
establishment of rural branches of commercial banks, agricultural banks, 
and marketing and credit cooperatives would provide additional channels 
through which money reaches demanders in nonurban areas. Some channels 
and links already exist; the problem is to increase this number and to 
strengthen the linkages. Not only can additional funds flow to these 
areas but local savers have increased outlets for any monetary "sur­
pluses" generated, savings which can be lent locally or transferred to 
other sectors of the economy, fhat is, an improved mechanism is avail-
able for increasing the mobility of capital within the economy. 
^One section of Chapter V dealing with agricultural credit dis­
cussed the links between urban and rural money markets. 
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The effectiveness of monetary policy is also affected by other 
components of the economy's infrastructure. Improved communications, 
transportation, and marketing facilities favorably affect the flow of 
inputs, including capital, and commodities produced. For example, 
public investment in an irrigation system in a relatively-remote area 
would be expected to increase agricultural output and per capita incomes. 
In Equation 7.12, T would be increased while V is relatively constant. 
If M is essentially unchanged, P would tend to fall. On the other hand, 
if additional marketing outlets are opened either through more traders 
coming to the market center or producers transporting their goods to 
other markets, the money supply in this area of economic activity is 
essentially increased. That is, additional traders bring money with 
them. As M is increased, the decline in P is lessened and producers 
are able to realize higher marketing revenues. Finally, V may be in­
creased as communication and transport facilities are improved. 
In summary, the effectiveness of monetary policies depends upon 
the level of monetization in the economy and the structure and distribu­
tion of the banking system. Monetary stability is crucial to sustaining 
developmental processes. Fiscal measures are also important in 
stabilizing the value of local currencies and the cost of living and 
production indices. 
Fiscal policies 
Fiscal policies take the form of programs of public taxation and 
public expenditures designed to influence the direction of economic 
activity and the distribution of wealth and income in the economy. 
The major portion of this discussion will focus on taxation policies; 
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however, a few connnents will be made on public expenditures. In Chapter 
VI, the need for public investment in social overhead capital was dis­
cussed. Such investment is necessary to remove some of the structural 
bottlenecks in the economy. The tendency may be to view the impor­
tance of such investment by utilizing the concept of the "multiplier". 
If income equal in t^, investment in t^, I, raises income in 
to + I, assuming Y^ is sustained. Defining b as the marginal 
propensity to consume, I in t^ is income of which bl is expended or 
consumed in t^. Consequently, income in t^ is Yg = Y^ + I + bl, assuming 
that I and Y are sustained in t_. In a similar manner, Y^ = Y + I + 
o  2  ' t o  
2 t— 1 (b + b + ... +b )I. This geometric series can be reduced, as in 
Equation 7.13. Since b < 1.0, as t becomes sufficiently large, b*" -> 0 
and Equation 7.14 results. The term -—is designated as the i - b 
"multiplier". If b = .9, the multiplier has a value of 10. If I = 
100 units, Y^ - Yg = 1000 which is the additional income generated by I. 
Implicit in the formulation is an assumption of constant prices. 
But more importantly, the assumption that bl is expended in t^ is based 
on another implicit assumption that sufficient consumer goods become 
available for purchase so that prices are not forced upward. Therefore, 
the use of the "multiplier" presumes the absence of structural bottle­
necks in the economy so that inputs and commodities flow freely within 
and among sectors. Where transportation, marketing, and communications 
facilities seriously retard this flow, use of the "multiplier" is in­
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appropriate. Such is the case for most, if not all, less-developed 
countries. 
Government revenues are necessary for underwriting the costs of 
maintaining the government system and for implementing development 
programs. Such revenues are raised through a variety of tax devices.^ 
The alternative is deficit spending. The feasibility of alternative tax 
devices depends upon the comprehensiveness of an administrative structure 
for assessing and collecting taxes and on the stage of economic develop-
2 
ment of the society. 
Since agriculture is the principal sector in most less-developed 
countries, this sector also provides a major fraction of tax revenues. 
In the absence of higher output and income levels, an across-the-board 
increase in taxes results in reduced consumption and(or) savings levels. 
But if this forced saving is at the expense of consumption levels, labor 
efficiency and productivity may be impaired. For these same individuals, 
an increase in taxes reduces their capacity for private investment and 
for an improvement in their economic well-being. The question arises as 
to whether the tax funds are used more productively by the individual pro-
ducer or by the government. A partial answer follows: as long as per 
^Generating public revenues through marketing quotas and compulsory 
deliveries is essentially a direct tax on producer-consumers, though 
not specifically designated as taxes. 
2 Referring to Equation 7.14, since the term b in the multiplier 
(1/1-b) is the marginal propensity to consume, an increase in the tax 
level would be expected to lower b and, in turn, reduce the value of 
the multiplier. To the extent the tax structure is progressive, a 
mechanism exists for partially stabilizing economic activity. 
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V 
capita consumption levels remain low, if the tax increments were returned 
to the producer, an increase in consumption rather than private invest­
ment is likely. This follows from physical requirements and a high 
income elasticity of demand for food.^ Low returns to private invest­
ment would accentuate this behavior. What is needed is a tax program 
which has a differential impact on taxpayers so that private initiative 
is not discouraged while the government obtains funds necessary to de­
fray the costs of programs stimulating and complementing private in­
itiative. The difficulties in devising such a program are quite apparent. 
For example, given the numerous uncertainties facing producers, what is 
the appropriate level of profits the risk-taker should be permitted to 
earn? As uncertainties increase, profit margins must usually also in­
crease before additional private Investment is made. In this situation, 
a progressive tax on profits would dampen investment incentives. Con­
versely, tax relief in some areas may stimulate economic activity and 
future tax remittances to the government. 
The need for a comprehensive tax program is reinforced by the un­
equal distribution of wealth and income found in most less-developed 
countries. That is, tax programs are one means for redistribution of 
Income. Given the high marginal propensities to consume among low-
income groups, a redistribution of income in their favor would stimulate 
Ijoan Robinson states the problem more clearly: "But for the most 
part, the mass of their people are living below the minimum of subsis­
tence necessary for working efficiency. The problem can be stated in 
a straightforward manner in terms of the need to provide for an in­
crease in necessary consumption while restraining unnecessary consump­
tion" as quoted in >fyrdal (7.35, p. 2097). 
! 
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the market for consumer and producer goods, including imported goods. 
Wai (7.49) provides some interesting insights as to the levels of 
taxation among various countries, classified according to per capita 
income level. The variation is quite large within income groupings, but 
government revenue as a percent of national income tends to be higher 
2 
among the "high" income countries. The median percentage is 25.0 
for the "high" income countries and 15.2 and 13.7 for the "medium" 
3 
and "low" income countries, respectively. Within the "low" income 
countries, the percentages which are based on 1959 data range from 23.7 
for the United Arab Republic to 7.7 for India. The comparable figures 
for Western European countries are in the 20-30 percent range, with 
the exception of Switzerland at 8.1 percent. The lower, apparent in-
In this connection, Bauer writes, "Many branches of the consumer 
goods industries, the development of which is ultimately closely linked 
to agricultural advance, have been working below capacity for some 
years. This is the result of several factors. These include the ex­
tremely low productivity of agriculture and its consequent failure to 
provide a growing market for industrial output" (8.9, p. 57). 
2 Government revenue includes all taxes, transfer payments, sur­
pluses of government trading associations, interest and dividends re­
ceived, sales of public assets, and repayments of loans. 
3 The three income groupings are based on per capita annual in­
comes greater than $500, $200-500, and less than $200. Wai (7.49) 
adds that revenues from local governments are not included in the 
median percentages. For example, he estimates that the 7.7 percent 
for India would be doubled if revenues from local governments were in-
cluded. 
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cidence of taxation among the "low" income countries is likely due to 
a number of factors. First, low per capita incomes, realizing that 
these are only averages, reflect a low capacity to pay taxes especially 
where inflation drives up the cost of living. Second, the relatively-
low degree of monetization of the economy in some countries or areas 
within countries provides a low tax base for income taxes and turnover 
taxes on commodities sold and purchased. The difficulties of identify­
ing and valuing commodities and services is apparent. Third, the ad­
ministrative mechanism for assessing and collecting taxes affects both 
the scope and intensiveness of taxation and, in turn, the effectiveness 
of tax policies. Even more fundamental is the need for appropriate 
legislation which can be enforced. The politically powerful have either 
a direct or indirect self-interest in supporting legislation which 
provides them tax loopholes and exemptions with few penalties for tax 
2 
evasion (7.13, 7.16, 7.35) Not only are potential government revenues 
reduced but tax avoidance by the elite certainly does not encourage 
tax compliance by the nonelite. 
^As noted in the previous footnote, taxes generating local govern­
ment revenues are not included. Furthermore, information on who bears 
or pays the taxes is not available. Where a relatively-umall group 
accounting for a proportionately larger amount of national income are 
not taxed or are able to evade taxes, the tax burdens of those paying 
taxes would be considerably higher than the percentages indicated above. 
2 In this connection Myrdal states, "... in colonial times taxa­
tion was looked upon as an instrument of exploitation and that re­
sistance to paying taxes was often part of the nationalist struggle for 
independence. Although that day is long past, the idea that taxes should 
be paid according to the intention of the legislator has never become 
part of the mores of the business community. Tax offenders are seldom 
prosecuted; when they are and are found guilty, the punishment is very 
mild and no publicity attends it" (7.35, p. 2100). 
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Two broad distinctions in tax policies of "low" income countries 
relative to those of "high" income are discernible (7.35, 7.49). Most 
"high" income countries place relatively more emphasis on direct taxes 
such as income and property taxes. The median percentages for direct 
taxes as a percent of total central government revenue for 1959 were 
43, 29, and 20 percent for the "high", "medium", and "low" income 
countries, respectively (7.49). The second distinction is that lower 
income countries obtain a major portion of their tax revenues from taxes 
on foreign trade and from other indirect taxes which can be shifted to 
other individuals.^ For the "low" income countries, taxes on foreign 
trade as a percent of all government revenue ranged from 20 percent for 
countries of the Near East to 50-60 percent for Ghana and Central 
American countries (7.49). 
A few of the more prevalent types of taxation are discussed below 
along with their qualitative impact on producer-consumers. 
Personal income tax In a sense, personal income taxes are a 
form of forced saving. This tax represents a claim on income earned, 
usually net income. The immediate consequence of imposing or raising 
this tax is that the profits or return to management is reduced. If an 
allowance for tax is built into the firm's cost structure, the cost 
curves are shifted upward reducing profits realized, ceteris paribus. 
When profits are reduced, the capacity for saving and(or) private invest-
^The following situation is noted in Thailand: "Under the present 
tax system, tax on foreign trade accounts for about one-half of total 
government revenue while income tax constitutes less than 10 percent. 
There is no property tax, and the rate of land tax is relatively low 
compared with that in neighboring countries. Professional incomes re­
main practically untouched" (7.46, p. 173). 
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ment is also reduced. This reasoning is often used as the basis for 
arguing against progressive income tax. But as Goode (7.16) and others 
have noted, the relatively wealthy in many less-developed areas are 
often conspicuous for their nonproductive investments and expenditures 
rather than for productively reinvesting earned profits.^ Higher taxes 
for these individuals need not adversely affect economic activity. 
Furthermore, a portion of taxes from rural areas may be indirectly re­
turned to producers in the form of public investment in the infra­
structure of the economy which raises the productivity of agricultural 
inputs and opens new marketing outlets for agricultural commodities and 
consumer goods.^ 
An increase in taxes, ceteris paribus, is associated with a de­
crease in disposable, personal incomes. If individuals are to maintain 
their level of living, either external financing must be obtained or 
incomes must be raised through increased output, lower production costs, 
or off-farm income from hiring out labor or engaging in small-scale 
processing and marketing activities. If the demand for income increases, 
as in Figure 8.5, through using more labor inputs and necessary comple­
mentary inputs, the firm's output level may be increased. If the market­
ing and demand structure is such that market prices are not lowered as 
the aggregate output is increased, gross incomes and perhaps net incomes 
^Some of the attributes of investment behavior by landlords was 
noted in Chapter III. Chapter VIII includes a discussion of factors 
other than net returns affecting decisions for private investment. 
2 For example, taxes on rubber exports in Malaya were used to sub­
sidize replanting costs as relatively unproductive trees were removed 
from production (7.52). 
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are increased. However, producers must have access to the necessary 
complementary inputs. 
Since income taxes are usually paid in cash, an increase in taxes 
is equivalent to an increase in the demand for cash. Abstracting from 
external income, the increased demand for cash is met by increased 
marketings or through credit financing. Indebtedness or a higher debt 
burden often has a deleterious effect on the borrower's future 
economic well-being. Increased marketings while output levels are in­
variant are only possible through reductions in consumption or in­
ventories. For the subsistence-oriented, reducing per capita con­
sumption must be juxtaposed with the potentially adverse consequences 
for personal health and labor productivity. Higher present marketings 
often mean that these individuals must repurchase the same commodities 
at a later date, usually through credit from local merchants and money­
lenders. The producer gets it from both sides; he must sell when 
market prices are relatively low and purchase when prices are high 
plus repay credit costs. 
Even where income taxes are attempted to be levied according to 
the individual's ability to pay, the problems of enforcing compliance 
and determining income levels are sizeable. The peasant who may be 
illiterate and unaccustomed to keeping a system of accounts is not in 
a position to provide records indicating his income. A large proportion 
of the edible commodities produced is consumed directly. Another 
portion is bartered rather than sold in the market. The difficulties 
in determining his income are apparent. At the other extreme, high 
income individuals are more aware of means of evading taxes and have 
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the political and economic influence to escape the major brunt of their 
implicit tax load. 
Finally, devising and implementing an effective income tax program 
requires a large input of administrative resources. The reliance on 
local collectors alters social relationships in the villages. This 
newly-found power by tax collectors often generates opportunities for 
preferential treatment and often extracurricular tax collections. 
Furthermore, the low per capita incomes and consequent large number of 
relatively-small tax receipts to be collected must be weighed against 
the costs of such collections. An alternative form of taxation may be 
both more physically and economically feasible. 
Property taxes Property taxes are declining in relative impor­
tance as a source of public revenue (7.49, 7.50). In the agricultural 
sector, at least at low stages of economic development, land is the 
principal form of wealth and property taxes are nearly snynoymous with 
land taxes. Yet, property taxes have some appealing features, some of 
which potentially function as instrument variables in conditioning 
economic activity. 
Property is tangible and more easily identifiable than income. 
However, the problem of valuation as a tax base remains. In some areas, 
the absence of land markets complicates problems of determining market 
values as a tax base. The capitalized value of current income imputed 
to land or the potential capitalized value associated with the highest 
use of land requires data on existing and potential costs and returns. 
When land values are assessed on the basis of income from land, pro­
duction costs are taken into account. Exemptions for family size and 
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costs of private investment may be admitted to further reflect the 
producer's ability to pay. The inherent danger in land taxes is that 
they become regressive. For example, if taxes are only based on a 
percent of the capitalized value of per acre output, producers' in­
centives for increasing output and income are stifled, particularly for 
small-scale producers. Conversely, problems associated with taxing 
that output which is directly consumed are partially avoided. 
Land and other property taxes may be viewed as a fixed cost. 
That is, they must be paid regardless of the income accruing to the 
property. Such taxes are built into the cost structure by increasing 
the level of total and average fixed costs, as in Figure 3.1. Such 
taxes reduce net profits, ceteris paribus. In tenancy systems, land 
taxes can be easily shifted to either cash or crop-share tenants by in­
creasing the rents they must pay and, in turn, reducing their net in-
2 
comes. 
The taxing of Ricardian rent and the rent associated with Henry 
George's "single-tax" concept is essentially a tax on capital gains; 
i.e., an accretion of land values due to positive externalities from 
population growth and(or) economic growth. Taxing at least a portion of 
^Assuming that a lump-sum land tax is levied, the effect of this 
type of tax on input allocation and production conditions can be handled 
as in Equation 2.35. Where the cultivator's land taxes vary with the 
value or productivity of different land tracts, these differential taxes 
affect the relative costs of using land inputs and, in turn, production 
decisions and cropping patterns. Under such circumstances, property 
taxes are not fixed but variable. 
Where tenancy legislation has been enacted, the government has, 
in principle, a means for influencing the extent to which taxes are 
shifted to tenants (7.50). However, as already noted in Chapter III, 
such legislation is often ineffective and(or) loosely enforced. Also, 
the landlord has other means for raising rents even though the nominal 
rent is at or below the legislated ceilings. 
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this increment to wealth need not affect production incentives (7.50). 
At times, land taxes have been proposed as an inducement to use land more 
intensively where such profitable opportunities exist (7.16, 7.50).^ 
Land taxes are increased to the point where cropping patterns are altered 
and idle, but productive land, is brought into production. Similarly, 
land previously used in an extensive manner, such as in pastures and 
some tree crops, may now be forced into more intensive uses. Even 
abstracting from the problems of determining the highest-use levels 
and the structure of taxes which will motivate or force this behavior, 
three other factors are important. First, the implicit assumption is 
made that producers have access to those complementary inputs necessary 
for more intensive land cultivation. This assumption is not too re­
strictive for most large landowners. Second, the increase in taxes 
may be largely passed on to tenants without any significant modification 
in cropping patterns. However, even if previously idle land is now 
cultivated by sharecroppers, new employment opportunities have been 
generated and as rents are paid to the landlord, the supply of agri­
cultural commodities in the marketing system increases. Third, the 
opponents of property taxes have the political power to block or 
effectively weaken any proposed tax legislation. 
Higher tax levels may induce absentee landlords and large land­
owners to sell their land or to participate more actively in the firm's 
operations. Furthermore, an increase in land taxes would tend to dis­
courage land purchases as a hedge against inflation and as a means for 
enhancing one's social and political status. Investment in land for 
^Situations of misuse and underutilization of land were noted in 
Chapter III. 
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such purposes is nonproductive investment from the standpoint of economic 
development. 
Some of the problems of devising and implementing a progressive land 
or property tax have already been noted. In addition to political ob­
stacles and shiftability of these taxes to tenants, a large input of ad­
ministrative inputs for assessing and reassessing land valuations would 
be necessary. 
Turnover taxes Turnover taxes are a tax on commodities entering 
the marketing channels. These taxes, along with export taxes, have re­
placed land taxes as a major source of public revenue from the agricul­
tural sector. There are several advantages of this type of tax (7.47): 
(1) The difficulties and costs associated with cadastral surveys for 
use in assessing land taxes are avoided; (2) The taxes are assessed and 
collected with relative ease;^ (3) The tax structure can be readily 
altered as production and incomes vary from year to year; and (4) The 
producers who are primarily subsistence-oriented are in effect given a 
tax exemption since they have only limited participation in the market. 
Turnover taxes are easily passed on to the producer in the form 
of a lower price for the commodities he markets and(or) a higher price 
charged the final consumer. If the tax is selective in that differential 
rates are applied to commodities, the relative profitability of producing 
these commodities and the relative costs in consumption are altered so 
that supply and demand conditions are altered. But this may be con-
sistent with public policy to encourage the production of some goods 
^Where producers sell or barter goods on a personal basis outside 
of the regular marketing system, turnover taxes are easily avoided. 
Collection is facilitated where the major portion of the crop is sold to 
a few large wholesalers and processors or through marketing cooperatives. 
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relative to others. 
The qualitative impact on output levels can be assessed with the 
use of Equation 7.15.^ The term R(q) represents total revenue and C(q) 
and F are the variable and fixed costs, respectively, while q is the 
output level and TT denotes profits. The turnover tax, t, is subtracted 
from R so that r R(q) is the total revenue actually received by the 
producer where r = (1-t). 
TT = r*R(q) - C(q) - F (7.15) 
= r*R'(q) - c'(q) = 0 (7.16) 
Upon taking the first derivative of Equation 7.15 with respect to 
q. Equation 7.16 is obtained. The total differential of Equation 7.16 is 
given in Equation 7.17 and Equation 7.18 follows after rearranging the 
terms. The denominator of the right-hand term is negative since R (q) >0, 
R'(q) = 0 for the producer who is a price-taker and C (q) is positive 
since the MC curve is assumed to be upward sloping and the rate of 
change, c"(q) is positive. Multiplying Equation 7.18 by minus one, 
> 0 so that when dt is reduced and, in turn, dr increased, the 
quantity produced increases and vice versa. 
r R"(q)dq +R'(q)dr = c"(q)dq (7.17) 
I 
- = f . *'(9) _ (7.18) 
^ j^r R"(q) - c"(q^ 
^This was previously developed as Equation 2.58. 
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If the turnover tax is borne by the consumer rather than the pro­
ducer, the increased cost to the consumer, ceteris paribus, reduces his 
real income and the demand curve for the commodity in question shifts 
leftward with both the market price and quantity which clears the market 
falling. In the aggregate, total revenue to producers falls. Turnover 
taxes are relatively easy to collect since they can be levied at market­
ing and retailing points. However, since they apply only to commodities 
entering marketing channels, no tax is levied on that production directly 
consumed. In addition, turnover taxes tend to be regressive. The 
small-scale producer who markets relatively-small quantities absorbs 
the same per unit tax on commodities marketed as the commercial or 
marketed-oriented producers. Conversely, since the small-scale producer 
directly consumes a major portion of his output, no tax is levied on 
these goods. The market-oriented producer who purchases a relatively-
large proportion of his consumer goods in the market is subject to 
taxation on these transactions. 
Tax on production inputs While the "tax-added" cost of such 
inputs as fertilizers, machinery, and improved seeds would seem to 
generate additional public revenue, the second-round effects likely 
discourage this form of tax in less-developed areas. Referring to the 
m 
working capital constraint in Equation 2.9, K - E p.q., as the p. 
j=l J J J 
increase the quantity of q^ which can be purchased is reduced. Apply­
ing fewer variable inputs to the land, ceteris paribus, results in re­
duced output. As production falls, the aggregate supply curve is ex­
pected to shift leftward. The market price and, in turn, consumers* 
cost of living and producers' production costs are forced upward. In­
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flationary tendencies may be set into motion. 
When the tax is placed on improved inputs, a lesser quantity of 
q^ can be obtained as long as K° holds. However, the higher pro­
ductivity of these inputs may reduce per unit production costs to the 
cultivator and the quantities offered for marketing may be maintained 
or increased. In either case, imposing a tax on production inputs dis­
courages use of such inputs. Furthermore, differential tax rates 
affect the relative costs of using inputs and, in turn, patterns of 
input allocation. That is, this form of tax can be used for not only 
generating public revenue but for directing input use and production 
configurations. 
Import and export taxes The importance of taxes on foreign 
trade as a component of total government revenue has already been 
noted. The impact of export taxes depends on the direction in which 
they are shifted. If the producer bears the tax with the export offer 
price unchanged, the lower returns on the export crop relative to com­
peting crops motivates producers to alter cropping patterns in favor 
of the latter.^ Consequently, the quantity offered for export is ex­
pected to fall. If the tax is shifted forward to the international 
consumer, the rise in the export offer price tends to place the ex­
porter at a competitive disadvantage. That is, if the tax is sufficient­
ly high, the export crop is priced out of the international market. 
Export taxes, whether levied on a specific or ad valorem basis, 
do not reflect production costs and differential net returns to pro-
^The qualitative impact of variations in export taxes which are 
borne by the producer is the same as that outlined earlier for turn­
over taxes. 
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ducers. Similarly, such taxes do not reflect the producer's ability to 
pay. Since export taxes are usually specific in nature and borne by 
the producer, they are regressive. The per unit tax is the same for 
all producers, regardless of scale of operations. 
In the case of taxes on imported goods, consumers pay the tax in 
the form of higher prices. The real incomes of consumers are lowered. 
In the case of producer goods, total production costs are forced up­
ward. The terms of trade are turned against producers. Manipulating 
the terms of trade as a means of transferring income or capital from the 
agricultural sector to the government or other sectors of the economy is 
conditioned by two important factors: (1) The degree of participation 
in the market or monetized economy; and (2) The strength of market 
participation as reflected by the rate at which individuals enter and 
withdraw from the market economy. 
Higher prices for imported goods may provide temporary protection 
for import-substitution industries which are attempting to grow and 
survive. The imposition of taxes, however, invites the danger of re­
taliation on the part of other countries participating in international 
trade. Taxes on foreign trade can be varied as economic conditions in 
world markets change. In the case of ad valorem taxes, when export 
prices fall, government revenues can be maintained only if export taxes 
or exports are increased. When prices fall and tax levels are in­
creased, the producer is penalized twice. When the price of export crops 
has fallen relative to nonexport crops, producers are motivated to shift 
resources to the latter. Consequently, considerable reliance on import 
and export taxes as a major source of government revenues makes the 
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government's revenue position vulnerable to fluctuations in world trade. 
Countries exporting a small number of commodities are in an especially 
precarious position. Diversification of exports would tend to stabilize 
export earnings and public tax revenues. Since exports and imports are 
channeled through relatively-few ports, these taxes are often the 
easiest to collect. 
Marketing boards The use of marketing boards is another public 
instrument to affect economic activity. Although functions relating to 
quality control in assembling and processing goods for export markets 
and dispensing technical information are important, the principal ob­
jective of marketing boards is to stabilize prices and, in turn, pro­
ducers' incomes of those commodities covered by board activities. 
Another important objective is the generation of board profits or re­
serves to finance public expenditures on the economy's infrastructure 
and for production loans to growers. Furthermore, a number of market­
ing middlemen are eliminated (7.47). 
Monetary reserves are accumulated during periods of relatively-
high prices when the differentials between prices received by producers 
and export prices are high. Since producers' incomes are not raised 
correspondingly, they are, in effect, taxed.^ Conversely, during 
periods of lagging export prices, producer prices are supported at 
higher than market levels so that producers' monetary incomes are nearly 
^The amount of the tax is equivalent to the difference between the 
producer and export prices after transportation, processing, and mar­
keting costs have been deducted plus some allowance for the producer's 
contribution to the price stabilizing fund (7.47). 
411 
maintained. The cost of income maintenance is financed by board profits 
or reserves accumulated in the past. 
Immediately following World War II, marketing boards were at least 
partially successful in dampening inflationary pressures associated 
with potentially rising export incomes which would be used to demand 
relatively limited quantities of imported manufactured goods (7.9, 7.24). 
While prices were partially stabilized, producers realized prices 
substantially below export prices. The monetary reserves which con­
sequently were accumulated, in excess of operating expenses of the 
boards, were used to underwrite the costs of development projects es­
pecially in Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda through board projects or 
through loans and grants to public programs (7.9, 7.24, 7.47). The 
financial contributions of marketing boards to development programs were 
reduced as export prices became less favorable in the late 1950*s and 
as governments placed more emphasis on variable export taxes as a 
source of revenue. 
A similar situation existed in Burma were public investments have 
been primarily financed by profits earned by the State Agricultural 
Marketing Board on rice. Since this organization has a monopoly on 
rice exports, substantial profits have been realized by the price 
differentials between prices paid producers and export prices. Profits 
from these activities have ranged from 25 to 40 percent of total govern­
ment revenue (7.48, p. 25). Government control of rice exports in 
Thailand also resulted in sizeable profits, a major portion of which 
was channeled into government revenue (7.46).^ 
^Government control of rice exports was discontinued in 1955 and 
emphasis was shifted to use of export taxes. The tax level varied with 
export prices. Prices to domestic consumers were kept relatively low(7.46). 
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Whether a country's economic development has been furthered through 
the operation of marketing boards is open to conjecture (7.24). Suf­
ficient evidence is not available. The contributions of boards to 
dampening inflation and generating funds for public uses have been 
noted. The question is whether this "taxing" of producers is preferable 
to letting producer incomes vary with export prices.^ The consequences 
for saving, private investment, and personal enterprise on the part of 
producers are subject to debate. 
If marketing boards are to be economically successful, they must 
be implemented when export prices are low so that necessary reserves 
for operating expenses can be accumulated as export prices increase 
(7.49). In addition, sufficient control over private marketing is 
necessary to eliminate private sales which would undermine the board's 
monopoly position. 
Agricultural Extension Services 
Extension personnel are generally viewed as the transmitters of 
information relative to costs and returns of improved inputs, alterna­
tive production techniques, and economic outlook data for use by pro­
ducers. More generally, they have three broad functions: (1) To per­
ceive and diagnose problems confronting the producer whether such 
problems deal with technical aspects of production, securing credit, or 
gaining access to remunerative marketing outlets; (2) To devise means 
for alleviating or solving these problems; and (3) To communicate and 
^Kamarck (7.24, p. 126) gives a summary of the criticisms leveled 
against marketing boards by the East African Royal Commission. 
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to persuade producers to adopt these recommended means. They essentially 
act as consultants to producers or producer organizations so that the 
latter can more rationally accommodate their decision-making processes 
to a changing environment. The general responsiveness of producers 
to changing price and profit situations was borne out in the previous 
section on public pricing policies. This responsiveness, however, does 
not imply that producers, especially subsistence-oriented producers, 
have the capability to acquire or digest technical information on 
improved inputs and cultivation practices. Competent extension agents 
can fill that need. But the flow of information need not be uni­
directional. Extension workers are, theoretically, in the best position 
to communicate the needs and potentials of producers to regional and 
national planning groups. The effectiveness of extension personnel is 
contingent upon a number of factors, some of which are listed below: 
(1) As representatives of the government, their creditability and 
motives are regarded with various degrees of suspicion (7.20, 7.41, 
7.52).^ Producers living in relatively-isolated villages are more 
While this suspicion is expected to be more pronounced among low-
income, subsistence-oriented individuals the following quotation rela­
tive to the Community Development Program in India adds another 
dimension: "... high caste people (are likely) to be suspicious of 
any program sponsored by the government, and to fear that any coopera­
tion on their part will contribute to the ultimate destruction of their 
cherished status and their advantageous economic position. Therefore, 
they oppose the Community Development Program; it is seen as a pallia­
tive to gain their confidence in order to undermine their social, 
ritual, and economic status", as quoted in Myrdal (7.35, p. 1343). 
A similar point is made by Hoselitz (7.20, p. 411). 
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skeptical. If extension services are provided through a local co­
operative or through cooperation of a village leader, individuals con­
tacted are likely more receptive.^ 
(2) They need to have a working knowledge of agricultural opera-
2 
tions and of existing patterns of economic and social relationships. 
3 
They also need information to extend. 
Contrary to the tendency to view the information provided by ex­
tension personnel as relating to improved inputs and new cultivation 
practices, a considerable potential exists for increasing productivity 
through communicating information on existing production techniques 
(7.9, 7.22, 7.35). Consequently, within a range of production increases, 
^According to Rahim, "Field research conducted by the Academy 
(Pakistan Academy for Rural Development) revealed that in a village 
certain persons occupy 'strategic positions* in the communication net­
work, and to these persons other villagers went for information and ad­
vice. These 'central persons' or 'opinion leaders' have one character­
istic in common: they maintain regular contacts with sources of in­
formation and influence in the town and other places outside the 
village" (7.41, p. 420). A similar phenomenon among tribal and com­
munal groups was noted in Chapter III. 
2 In this connection, Kamarck writes, "... when the colonial 
powers departed, the (extension) services they had established were 
still in their infancy. Paradoxically, while political independence 
has improved the African farmers 'receptivity to the services' advice, 
the departure of 'expatriates' before Africans had been trained to re­
place them has weakened the effectiveness of the services" (7.24, p. 
114). 
3 Johnston (7.22) makes this point relative to extension activities 
in Africa where agricultural research, particularly research on food 
crops, has been on such a small scale that only a limited amount of 
information is available for transmission. The concentration of re­
search activities in the tropics on improving export crops is mentioned 
by McPherson and Jonnston (7.33). However, Johnston (7.22) also notes 
the rapidity with which cash crops such as cotton and cocoa have been 
adopted. Extension workers and other government programs were in­
strumental in promoting the spread of cash crops production. The tardi­
ness with which relevant information flows from research institutions 
is also mentioned by Rahim (7.41). 
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the limited flow of information from current research need not seriously 
impede agricultural expansion. Certainly, the discovery of higher-
yielding inputs and superior production practices would complement this 
expansion. Where demonstration is possible, the effectiveness of trans­
mitting such information is improved.^ Even where improved inputs and 
information are forthcoming from indigenous research institutions, 
their applicability is limited by differing soil and climatic condi­
tions and by variation in social systems. Even though the proposed 
change is technically feasible, extension agents do not always give 
2 
sufficient consideration to economic feasibility (7.22, 7.24, 7.33). 
The ingenuity necessary for making adaptations to local conditions is 
particularly scarce in most developing countries. 
(3) The number of producers in the area serviced by the extension 
representative must be manageable. Otherwise, the agent must spread 
his expertise and time too thinly and lose some of his effectiveness. 
Local participation in initial discussions and planning of extension 
^Whyte and Williams (7.51) note some of the problems of input 
availability and need for complementary, technical information in 
Peru. For example, the extension agent explains the merits of using 
insecticides and the mechanics of application, but does not have the 
insecticide nor applicators to demonstrate its use. Some producers 
are persuaded to experiment, but when the insecticide arrives, the ex­
tension agent is not present to assist or supervise the actual use. 
Consequently, application rates for some were too high so that crops 
were damaged or too low so that no tangible results could be observed. 
2 Furthermore, in Africa producers are included to think in terms 
of returns to his labor rather than the extension agents' stress on 
increasing the technical yields per unit of land. Consequently, 
producers may favor extensive over intensive cultivation (7.24, pp. 
114-5). 
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projects helps to ensure their acceptance and rapid adoption. At the 
same time, the extension representatives are perhaps encouraged to re­
think the economic and social feasibility of their programs as applied 
to specific localities and cultures. Repeated visits to the same 
villages and same producers not only convey an appearance of genuine 
interest but provide the representative with an opportunity to monitor 
producer operations. Where producers are collectively bound by a 
cooperative, communal organization, or confidence in a village leader, 
the extension agent may spend the major portion of his time with these 
organizational or social leaders, in effect, employing them as his 
assistants,thereby permitting the agent to indirectly contact a larger 
2 
number of producers. Of course, the effectiveness of such an arrange­
ment would depend upon the competence and willingness of these leaders 
3 
to absorb and transmit the information provided by the extension agent. 
(4) Finally, while the work of extension personnel may be a 
necessary ingredient to stimulating agricultural productivity, it 
definitely is not sufficient. That is, competent extension agents may 
^The papers by Singh (7.43) and Holmberg (7.19) emphasize this point 
that insufficient local involvement in early stages contributed to the 
failure or limited success of proposals which were clearly in the 
economic interests of producers. 
2 See Rahim (7.41) for a discussion of techniques used for dissemina­
ting information to members of cooperatives in Comilla, East Pakistan. 
3 The conservative or traditional orientation of tribal societies 
was modified somewhat by British and Belgian colonialists through en­
couraging formal education of tribal chiefs and their sons so as to 
make these current and subsequent leaders more receptive to change 
(7.24). 
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effectively explain the merits of a nontraditional input or a new cash 
crop; but if the producer has a high-risk aversion, does not have 
access to necessary financing, does not have the managerial capability, 
or does not have a strong ego-focused image of change,^ the recommenda­
tions offered will not be implemented and the cultivator will continue 
2 
traditional production practices. Furthermore, where tenurial in­
security encourages exploitative cultivation practices and discourages 
private investment, few producers are interested in soil conservation 
and investment in productivity-increasing inputs whose benefits are 
realized over a period of time. These individuals have a strong time 
preference for current income. Inadequate transportation and marketing 
facilities reduce net returns to increments of labor and capital and 
dampen the producer's economic incentive to change. Finally, where be­
lief in magic and reliance on patron saints for promoting economic well-
being is strong, recommendations by extension agents will carry little 
weight. 
Implicit in (4) above is the fact that the benefits of extension 
programs primarily accrue to landowners and particularly those having 
^As used by Hirschman (8.33) and discussed in Chapter VIII. 
Briefly, individuals having an ego-focused image of change think in 
terms of improving their relative position and are not strongly 
constrained by the lack of group approval or by the absence of 
positive-sum outcomes to the group. 
2 
Even if individuals have a strong orientation towards personal 
gain, altering planting times and disease and pest control programs 
require the cooperation of surrounding producers. 
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sizeable land holdings (7.35). These are the individuals who are 
more literate and more market-oriented, and who have a greater 
capacity, both in terms of financing and in adjusting activities within 
the firm, for introducing change. Few benefits are realized by share­
croppers and landless laborers. 
As noted above, a number of factors interact to condition the rate 
at which change occurs. Not only must the economic feasibility be con­
vincing, but proposed changes are more attractive when they can be 
grafted on to existing personal relationships and work patterns without 
largely disrupting the latter. For example, where land tracts are 
relatively small and noncontiguous, digging irrigation wells and con­
structing modest irrigation systems require cooperation of several 
landowners. While certain changes may be associated with positive-
sum outcomes, the costs and benefits are not equally shared by all 
participants. Consequently, the differential net returns affect relative 
Hlyrdal (7.35) in writing about the community development programs 
in India, notes that activities of the agricultural extension service 
had a side effect detrimental to other objectives of the government. 
Relative to the peasant landlord group, Myrdal states, "At least some 
of the members of this politically influential group--mainly those who 
cultivated the land themselves—learned that money can be earned by the 
modernization of agriculture and that liberal aid can be obtained from 
the government for this purpose. Having absorbed that lesson, peasant 
landlords are less disposed than even to agree that their holdings 
should be broken up for the benefit of less fortunate villagers. Be­
cause it preceded rather than followed the completion of land reforms, 
the extension program has impeded ceiling legislation, tenancy reform, 
and attempts to foster cooperative farming . . . Although Indian leaders 
profess to want to see agriculture assume a more 'socialist pattern*, 
their own community development program has the effect of making agri­
cultural practice more capitalistic" (7.35, p. 1345). 
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economic positions and, in turn, relative social and local political 
positions. Recognizing these eventualities, extension agents should 
anticipate the longer-term consequences of change. While Goldschmidt 
(7.15) emphasizes this point as a potential deterrent to adopting 
change, Frankel's (7.14) orientation is that such changes are necessary 
concomitants of economic change. That is, economic and social conse­
quences cannot be segregated but both interact and are necessary for 
initiating and sustaining change. These reservations are most impor­
tant for villages and societies at low points on the continuum of 
agricultural development. Fully market-oriented producers and operators 
of plantation systems are not constrained by social pressures for con­
formity. As noted in Chapter III and elsewhere, large landowners are 
often opposed to change because of the danger of altering economic and 
social relationships with their sharecroppers and landless laborers in 
favor of the latter groups. 
A portion of Chapter VI was devoted to investment in the infra­
structure of the economy. Including a discussion of extension services 
in this chapter does not imply that expenditures on extension activities 
is not an investment in the economy's infrastructure. Such expenditures 
are as much an investment as developing transportation and marketing 
facilities and building schools and banking systems. 
Other Public Programs and Policies 
Indirectly, the need for a number of other public measures has 
been observed. In Chapter III, the inhibiting nature of current tenure 
systems suggested the need for land reform. The constraining impact of 
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private credit markets in rural areas on producers' capability for 
improving their economic well-being and for private investment was ex­
amined in Chapter V. The importance of adequate transportation and 
marketing systems was outlined in Chapter VI. As should be apparent, 
relaxing one of these bottlenecks to agricultural development without 
removing other obstacles only partially alleviates the constraints on 
economic growth. For most developing countries, high rates of popula­
tion growth are an additional impediment. The need is for agrarian 
reform; i.e., a coordinated program of alleviating obstacles simul­
taneously. However, few countries have the financial and adminis­
trative resources even if they have the will. They face the ubiquitous 
economic problem: allocating scarce resources among competing, though 
often mutually supporting, means so as to maximize objectives being 
pursued. Investment in roads, extension service systems, or rural 
credit institutions cannot be based only on a priori reasoning. Each 
potential allocation of financial and administrative resources must 
be subjected to at least an economic test of its merits relative to 
alternative uses. 
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CHAPTER VIII. VALUES, ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES OF 
AGRICULTURALISTS AS PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS^ 
In the preceding chapters, the nature and role of the infra­
structure affecting the operation of the economy were discussed. With­
in this framework, decisions affecting production, investment and con­
sumption are conditioned by economic indicators such as relative price 
relationships and by social or noneconomic factors such as values and 
attitudes affecting producers' and consumers' objectives. The intro­
duction of this dichotomization of economic and noneconomic factors is 
for purposes of convenience rather than for a depicting reality. Where 
producers are primarily subsistence-oriented with limited participation 
in the money or exchange economy, the "prices" affecting resource alloca­
tion and production patterns are more indicative of attitudes toward 
consumption requirements. That is, the "prices" are implicit consumer 
valuations rather than the usual interpretation of prices as repre­
senting the values which equate market supply and demand. Another 
simple, but important, example will help to demonstrate the ambiguity 
of this dichotomization. Producers often resort to credit for financing 
production and consumption expenditures. The economic variable in this 
business transaction is the interest rate. However, the real interest 
rate is often a combination of the monetary rate plus an additional 
^It is arguable that a discussion of these personal attributes 
is not within the sphere of most economists' professional competence. 
Inclusion of this chapter in the study does not imply expertise on 
the part of the writer. Rather, a limited survey of some of these 
factors offers additional insights into the human component of de­
velopmental processes. 
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cost to the borrower where the latter cost is a function of the relation­
ship between borrower and lender. Because of his indebtedness to a 
merchant, trader or landlord, who may also be a relative--both an 
economic and social relationship—the borrower is effectively forced to 
continue purchases from the merchant at inflated prices, to sell to the 
trader in advance of the harvest season at a price much below the price 
at harvest, or to provide labor inputs and other services to the land­
lord. Conversely, relatives and preferred customers may be given 
price concessions and favorable terms for repayment. The point to be 
made is that the personal relationships between the two parties and 
their relative bargaining positions influence the terms under which 
credit is obtained. 
The tendency to attack problems within the confines of and using 
the tools and concepts of one's own discipline is rightfully waning. 
Whereas research into the nature of social variables was considered to 
be within the purview of only psychologists, sociologists and social 
anthropologists with economists acknowledging some impact of these 
variables on their own discipline but not incorporating these factors 
into their own research,^ an interdisciplinary approach, often within 
^Hagen puts this problem into perspective: "A number of econo­
mists who are students of economic growth make generous reference to 
the importance of noneconomic factors." Kaldor, Leibenstein, Rostow, 
Lewis, Hirschman, and Mason and "virtually all of the writers of texts 
on economic development are examples." Hagen adds, "But many of these 
treat these factors much as Mark Twain accused everyone of treating 
the weather. Having mentioned noneconomic factors, they then proceed 
to ignore them and discuss development as though only economic factors 
bring it about. The others (including present company) in essence say, 
'Change in noneconomic factors must be taken into account, but I don't 
know what causes it*" (8.28, pp. 624-25). 
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the individual, to researching problems existent in less-developed areas 
is gaining momentum.^ This does not suggest that economists, most 
narrowly trained as economists, can or should attempt to convey com­
petence in the other social sciences. Although these consequences are 
a result of specialization, interdisciplinary approaches to problem-
solving should produce a hybrid product. The danger seemingly in­
herent in an essentially single disciplinary approach is for economists, 
for example, to impute the existence and nature of social variables on 
the basis of changes in observable economic phenomena. If following 
implementation of a program of government price supports at a higher 
than historically prevailing level or by introduction of a new cash 
crop producers respond positively by increased marketings, they are 
interpreted as being rational, nontraditional and market-oriented. The 
antonyms of these terms are applied if marketings do not change sub­
stantially. In actuality, however, the latter weak, aggregate response 
may be due to a number of factors. The lack of marketing outlets and(or) 
high transportation and middlemen costs, unawareness of opportunities, 
or lack of access to additional and nontraditional inputs effectively 
constrain the producer to his usual cropping and marketing pattern. 
Furthermore, such aggregates as changes in production and marketings 
disguise the activities of individual producers. 
Another example to demonstrate the interrelationship of social and 
economic factors follows. As discussed in Chapter V, borrowers often 
have a preference for obtaining funds from local moneylenders even though 
^Included would be Myrdal (8.49), Hagen (8.27), Drnnont (8.18), Adel-
man and Morris (8.2), Georgescu-Roegen (8.22), Sen (8.61), Whyte and 
Williams (8.66), and several papers in Wharton (8.65). 
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such sources levy comparatively high cDsts. Where borrowers have access 
to government banks and cooperatives which ostensibly provide funds at 
a lower cost but yet patronize moneylenders, borrowers may be viewed 
as being parochial and economically irrational. But the appeal of 
moneylenders is that they provide funds with no paperwork involved, on 
short notice, and usually without stipulations as to use by the borrower. 
Also, because of current indebtedness the borrower may be constrained 
to secure additional financing from his current creditor. Cooperatives 
often do not lend for consumption purposes. Banks are often located at 
a distance which in terms of transportation, lodging, and time raise 
the effective interest rate even if the prospective borrower has the 
necessary collateral which banks usually require. 
A good deal of nonspecificity is associated with the context in 
which noneconomic variables are used. Given the heterogeneity of man's 
composition and his activities, the definition of the context in 
which such variables is used must necessarily be general in nature. 
For example, a value may be viewed as a standard of what is desirable 
against which anticipated or actual outcomes can be evaluated. Kluck-
hohn (8.40) defines a value as a: 
" . . .  c o n c e p t i o n ,  e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t ,  d i s t i n c t i v e  o f  a n  
individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which 
influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends 
of action" (8.40, p. 395). "The essential thing about values 
is their referability to standards more perduring then im­
mediate or completely 'selfish' or autistic motivations" 
(8.40, p. 430). 1 
^Kluckhohn adds, "Pragmatically speaking, values are also more or 
less stable ways of resolving ambivalence. That is, actors (in­
dividuals) perhaps most often think about and refer to values when 
they are in doubt about alternative courses of conduct: when the long-
run results of the possible (footnote continued on the following page) 
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Thus, values connote whac is desirable, and since they do not change 
quickly, the value structure represents a stabilizing force in social 
and economic systems, particularly when economic systems are at low 
stages of development. But since values both affect and are affected 
by the economic variables, the value structure of a society is modified 
as the developmental processes gain momentum. 
Attitudes are defined here as the individual's outlook or subjective 
estimation, whether rational or irrational, of his capacity to control 
or influence the forces which interact to affect his economic and social 
well-being; i.e., the realization of his value structure. In a sense, 
attitudes represent the dynamic component of the value structure which 
induces differential changes in values over time. For example, a pro­
ducer may positively value raising his family's consumption levels 
through increased production. If, however, he perceives his role in 
shaping the production process as being purely passive; i.e., his 
attitude is that his well-being is exogenously determined by some super­
natural force, his likelihood of raising production and consumption 
levels is diminished. Furthermore, he does not understand how if in 
fact he can break out of this essentially low-level equilibrium which 
tends to persist over time. His objective, in this example, would be 
something of the nature of attempting to appease and gain favorable 
stature with this supernatural force so that he will eventually be re­
warded. Thus, objectives will be used in the context of representing 
(footnote continued from preceding page) selections of paths of be­
havior are not immediately obvious or scientifically demonstrable or 
when the pressures of personal motivation are strong on one side and 
social sanctions or practical expediency of some other kind strong on 
the other side" (8.40, p. 395). 
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summary statements of producers' values and attitudes which interact to 
determine his goals during the planning period. These goals will be 
stated in terms of constrained maximization problems where the con­
straints are the means available to the producer, his attitudes toward 
these means, and also some components of the value structure.^ Thus, 
the goals will be values or proxies for values and will also be con­
strained by other values. 
To gain insights into the nature of these noneconomic variables, 
what Spengler (8.63) terms the "content of men's minds", a selected 
number is examined below. The categorizations are not distinct nor are 
they independent of one another. The principal focus here is how 
these phenomena are influenced by existing conditions and how they 
act, qualitatively, as "friction points" in retarding or facilitating 
economic development. But, changes in economic indicators are not 
synonymous with changes in social well-being. Change rarely has a 
positive-sum outcome so that everyone is better off, relatively or 
absolutely. 
Religion 
The emphasis in the recent past given to the role of the Weberian 
"Protestant Ethic" as a positive force stimulating the economic develop­
ment of parts of Western Europe and of North America suggests that 
proselytization of non-Protestants in less-developed areas may be one 
of the keys unlocking economic development. Certainly, the personal 
attributes of thrift, hard work, and productive investment would be 
_ 
See Equations 2.19 and 9.1. 
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conducive to accelerating developmental processes, but they are by no 
means sufficient. Where producers have few resources, which they are 
currently using efficiently, but able to generate only a small "surplus", 
if any, and where few opportunities for productive investment exist, 
even if the capacity for investing is available, thrift and hard work 
can do little to raise the producer's level of living. Focusing on 
the producer's enterprise or indolence obscures the likelihood that some 
of his personal attributes are derived from the environment in which he 
operates. Apparent leisure and unproductive expenditures may be the 
consequence of a stagnant economic system which provides few rewards 
to additional labor and capital inputs. Furthermore, the physical 
capacity for work may be low. Where such conditions exist, religious 
beliefs and practices have little impact on economic well-being. Only 
when developmental processes are set in motion, for an individual or 
groups of individuals, does the facilitating or inhibiting nature of 
religious beliefs assume importance. 
Of the noneconomic variables to be considered, religious beliefs 
and practices are likely the most resistant to change. Where they 
are inimical to economic and social chajige, additional obstacles to 
development exist. In Asian Drama, Myrdal writes: 
" . . .  r e l i g i o n  u s u a l l y  a c t s  a s  a  t r e m e n d o u s  f o r c e  f o r  
social inertia. The writer (Myrdal) knows of no instance in 
present-day South Asia where religion has induced social 
change. Least of all does it foster realization of the 
modernization ideals--though, of course, appeals to religion 
on the 'higher' level can be used for, as well as against, those 
ideals, while cruder religious conceptions can be exploited 
to incite people to resistance or to demonstrations, riots 
and lynchings. . . . But the religiously sanctioned beliefs and 
valuations not only act as obstacles among the people to getting 
the plan accepted and effectuated but also as inhibitions in 
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the planners themselves insofar as they share them, or are 
afraid to counteract them" (8.49, pp. 103-4). 
Quoting Myrdal once more; 
"In particular, social and economic stratification is accorded 
the sanction of religion ... in general the inherited strat­
ification implies low social and spatial mobility, little free 
competition in its wider sense, and great inequalities. This 
system of social relations is a product of history and is 
strongly supported by custom in traditional society; religious 
beliefs and valuations furnish the emotional support" (8.49, 
p. 104).1 
He adds, however, that the major world religions are not necessarily 
adverse to economic change and developmental processes. They are sub­
ject to varied interpretations with such interpretations often adduced 
to project and support particular points of view and programs of action. 
They are also amenable to diverse economic systems. Excepting Hinduism, 
they have a common thread of egalitarianlsm which provides a potential 
justification for economic and social reforms. 
Myrdal's statement is similar to the view expressed by Max Weber 
in his book. The Religion of India, as interpreted by Morris (8.47). 
In attempting to account for the lack of economic development in India 
and China relative to Western Europe, even though "capitalism and 
capitalistic enterprises" existed all through history in the former, 
Weber emphasized the spread of Hinduism as a force creating and sus­
taining the caste system. The attendant social and economic rigidities 
were the principal forces that precluded the evolution of a "capital­
istic" system and the corresponding high rates of economic growth. 
Srinivas in Goheen, et al. (8.25) comments that, "It is not un­
likely that the failure of Indians to improve their material conditions 
lay in the social and political institutions of the country. The in­
stitution of caste tended to confine the loyalties of individuals to 
a group which become progressively smaller owing to the marked tendency 
to fisson in the caste system" (8.25, p. 5). This phenomenon, in it­
self, would tend to dampen aspirational levels and the socially 
acceptable range of alternative economic activities. 
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Hinduism 
If Myrdal (8.49) is correct in his evaluation of the effect of 
religion, the implications associated with the adverse features of re­
ligion for aspirational levels, occupations choice and resource mo­
bility are quite apparent. However, economic success in terms of 
wealth accumulation or success in terras of craftsmanship within one's 
caste does not appear to be precluded (8.25). But wealth accumulation 
may or may not be influenced by another facet of Hinduism; i.e., the 
weight given to the importance of asceticism (8.6, 8.25, 8.62).^ If 
asceticism is practiced so as to limit income or "surplus" accumulation 
through, for example, abstention from work by various degrees, those 
following this practice would not contribute to development from an 
economic standpoint. On the other hand, if asceticism is translated 
into either deferring present consumption in favor of future consumption 
or by renouncing one's wealth after it has been accumulated, both forms 
of activity can have a positive impact on development. The former, as 
Singer in Goheen, et al. (8.25) suggests, implies an "ethic of austerity" 
so that asceticism is not an obstacle to economic development but is a 
phenomenon facilitating such development. The latter may be undertaken 
% 
The extremely influential Ghandi advocated a form of asceticism 
which is described by Singer: "Indian asceticism has traditionally 
been other-worldly .... The novel element in Ghandi's asceticism is 
to be found in his philosophy and program of social reform. His 
philosophy of nonviolence (ahimsa), of the simple life in self-
sufficient villages, of the necessity of work and the dignity of manual 
labor, of service to neighbors, of social justice in the distribution of 
power and wealth, has breathed a vitality into traditional Indian 
asceticism which animated India's successful struggle for independence 
and which shapes much of the present government's domestic programs. 
Ghandi himself found the source of this social philosophy in Hindu 
religious traditions" (8.62, p. 84). 
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in the forms of intergenerational transfers of property; redistributions 
of wealth in favor of the poor; and by building a temple, excavating a 
tank, planting trees, or various other actions some of which are 
socially and economically useful (8.6, 8.25). 
In his study, Morris (8.47) attempts to test the Weberian hypo­
thesis that the effect of Hinduism on values and social structures has 
inhibited the economic growth of South Asia.^ Examining available 
historical evidence, he concludes that the caste system was not 
2 
rigidly confining. Cooperation among different jati took place in 
both the modern and traditional areas. Intercaste mobility into the 
mason and handloom weaving jatis has been evidenced. In addition, 
caste members were not always found to have confined their activities 
to their particular caste. Even in the relatively tradition-oriented 
rural sector, "Castes 'traditionally' identified with specific occupa­
tions were often found in other activities, socially both higher and 
lower" (8.47, p. 606). Nor does Morris find evidence that the value 
Morris, in interpreting Weber, states that "... the growth 
of modern industry was handicapped, it is contended, not only by the 
ritually limited supply of entrepreneurship but also by the enormous 
difficulties of recruiting labor .... The magical barriers to geo­
graphical mobility, to undertaking new occupations, to working in 
novel relationships with other castes, all served as inhibitions to 
the flow of craftsmen into industry" (8.47, p. 593). 
2 According to Morris, the jati are subcastes. They are "... 
endogamous groups invariably confined to limited territories. The 
jati is the functional social unit in the countryside .... Only the 
jati embodies those notions of belief, bulwarked by specific concepts 
of pollution, which could have any systematic effect on economic be­
havior" (8.47, p. 603). 
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structure associated with Hinduism need have a depressing effect on 
economic activity.^ He suggests that Hindu theology is so varied that 
theological support can be found to " . . . rationalize or stimula're a 
variety of economic behaviors ranging from the most passive and other­
worldly to the most aggressive and profit-maximizing" (8.47, p. 595). 
Morris, relying on the fieldwork of anthropologists, states that 
" . . . groups, just coming into the Hindu system or striving to raise 
their status, tend to be responsive to the values and practices of the 
dominant group in their immediate locality .... The implications of 
this recent work suggest once again that there are a number of 'Hindu' 
value systems to which groups can respond" (8.47, p. 596). Instead of 
explaining the differential growth of regions and activities within 
regions by the impact of Hinduism, Morris suggests that the really 
important factors were economic in nature--investment returns, 
tenurial arrangements, and the ability to take advantage of economic 
opportunities. Where economic activities were profitable, economic 
2 
growth took place. 
^The danger in citing the supposed dichotomy between Indian 
"spiritualism" and Western "materialism" is that these phenomena tend to 
be viewed as being mutually exclusive; i.e., that Indian "spiritualism" 
is incompatible with '\naterialism". Singer writes that in the tra­
ditional Indian pantheon (officially recognized gods of the people), 
material wealth and power have an important place. "Wealth and power 
are indeed considered as essential in the scheme of things as are the 
other three basic values: duty, liberation and pleasure. And this 
judgment is supported by the stories of the epics in which wealth and 
power, usually the reward of virtue, are ever present" (8.62, p. 82). 
2 
Also see Srinivas and Karve in Goheen, et ai. (8.25). Berna 
concludes that entrepreneurship in modern Indian industry is more 
directly a function of access to capital, business experience and 
technical knowledge rather than considerations of caste tradition, and 
approval or disapproval of the social group. He adds, however, that 
the existing social structure strongly affects who is able to accumulate 
capital and to obtain the business (footnote continued on following page) 
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Islam 
As with Hinduism, aspects of Islam can be adduced as having an 
inhibiting effect on economic and social change. What is not known 
is the strength of these beliefs, their pervasiveness, and their re­
sistance to reinterpretation, especially by the younger members of 
society, as economic change is both perceived and experienced. The 
Islamic belief that all phenomena proceed from God lessens the in­
dividual's curosity in understanding his environment and also suggests 
an individual inertia to change. This sustains, if not a fatalistic 
outlook, one which is heavily tradition-oriented (8.1, 8.55). The 
solutions to problems faced by man have been given by God and such 
solutions are embodied in the traditional structure of society. The 
adoption of exogenous changes is facilitated if such changes can be 
grafted on without essentially modifying the traditional structure. 
Swift (8.64), in writing about Malayan peasants, states that the folk 
religion emphasizes luck and a preordained determination of events. 
Official religion embodies the belief that this world is only temporary 
and that otherworldly rewards are not associated with worldly wealth 
and success. Furthermore, wealth accumulation may be detrimental to 
the quality of the afterlife. Even though peasants' stated preferences 
are not for wealth but for comfort and security. Swift adds that he 
would be surprised if peasants' beliefs and attitudes ever precluded 
them from taking advantage of an opportunity to significantly increase 
their wealth. Yet, these personality factors do condition economic be­
havior. 
(footnote continued from preceding page) experience and technical knowl­
edge (8.12, p. 358). 
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Kermani (8.39) notes that the constitutions of most Middle Eastern 
countries stipulate that all laws must not contradict Islamic principles. 
Usury and even charging of interest on loans are prohibited.^ As noted 
previously in Chapter III, Moslem law prescribes that inheritances, in­
cluding land, must be divided among heirs, at least all male heirs 
(8.37, 8.49). Consequently, land units are subdivided and become 
successively fragmented. 
The Moslem imams (high priests) with their political and religious 
powers have competed with central governments in influencing the economic 
development of the area. While Islam decrees complete equality of 
human rights, the high priests have merged with other minorities within 
the ruling group to help " . ... delay the region's social and cultural 
integration by constantly teaching the poverty-stricken majority of the 
virtues of patience and surrender" (8.39, p. 55). At the same time, the 
high priests realize the privileges accorded to other members of the 
upper classes. In addition to participating in political processes, 
they own large units of land and engage in business enterprises. 
In his study of the Javanese town of Modjokuto, Geertz (8.21) 
comments on the impact of Islamic reform during 1912 to 1920 on economic 
activity among traders. Worldly pursuits now had religious sanction. 
Fatalism and appeal to magic were suppressed as a business ethic em­
bodying self-determination surfaced. This rational pursuit of economic 
gain tended to increase traders* economic and social mobility. Geertz 
adds that although these modified beliefs are held primarily by trader-
^Kermani (8.39) adds that a Moslem may not feel he has violated 
Islamic teachings by paying interest on credit. A more serious offense 
is that of receiving interest on money lent. 
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entrepreneurs, these individuals have a strong and consistent motiva­
tion to convert those individuals still adhering to the more tra­
ditional beliefs emanating from Islam. 
Buddhism 
Buddhism's orientation toward otherworldliness is not necessary 
in conflict with material success in this world (3.52, 8.56). In his 
discussion of capital, credit and saving among Lao peasants, Halpern 
(8.29) indicates that the Lao are not necessarily adverse to material­
ism but that their sense of fatalism is an inhibiting influence on 
their motivation for improving their economic well-being. Neverthe­
less, even though peasants are essentially subsistence-oriented, in­
vestments in jewelry and improved housing are valued. In addition, 
the "spread effects" of colonialism and the reduced relative isolation 
of villages have tended to modify peasants' attitudes toward producing 
for the market in order to obtain a larger number and variety of con­
sumer goods. Pfanner (8.56) notes that among peasants in Lower Burma, 
social status is not associated with wealth accumulation. However, re­
ligious expenditures are socially valued. But, to sustain or increase 
these expenditures, a positive attitude toward increasing production 
and temporary wealth accumulation is necessary. Pfanner adds that 
adherence to essentially traditional production and consumption patterns 
is only partly an outgrowth of values stemming from Buddhism, Few 
favorable economic opportunities have been available. As these economic 
opportunities arise and(or) are perceived by producers, the rate of 
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adoption will exceed past levels. Increments to income, however, are 
largely expended for religious and ceremonial purposes (8.29, 8.56). 
Such expenditures provide psychic and social returns but do not 
contribute to generating a physical capacity and attitudinal structure 
favorable to stimulating growth processes. As noted previously, however, 
expansion of production and income is primarily valued in an indirect 
manner. Higher incomes permit increased religious expenditures; the 
latter is valued directly. 
In relation to Wolf's (8.67) discussion of the role of "culture 
2 brokers", Pfanner comments that the Buddhist monk appears to have little 
influence on economic activities in the village: 
Pfanner (8.56) cites the case where the government encouraged 
village peasants to plant early-maturing varieties of rice so that 
groundnuts could be planted as a second crop. During the period 1959-
1960, total gross income in the Mayin village was increased by 26 
percent. However, a number of other factors contributed to this re­
sponsiveness to growing groundnuts. A market was assured, transportation 
facilities provided, and the new crop was amenable to traditional re­
sources and production practices. 
2 Wolf terms community leaders, local entrepreneurs, and national-
oriented individuals from local communities as "culture brokers". He 
states, "Their basic function is to relate community-oriented individuals 
who want to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack 
economic security and political connections with nation-oriented in­
dividuals who operate primarily in terms of the complex cultural forms 
standardized as national institutions, but whose success in these 
operations depends on the size and strength of their personal following. 
These functions are of course expressed through cultural forms or 
mechanisms which will differ from culture to culture" (8.67, pp. 1075-
1076). 
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"Within certain limits the monk neither advances nor impedes 
economic innovations that have been introduced and, in keep­
ing with the traditional performance expected of his role, 
generally remains neutral and indifferent to the activities 
involving agricultural extension or community development" 
(8.56, p. 59)1 
Buddhism as a state religion can have a positive impact on develop­
mental processes. According to Nash (8.52), the development-oriented 
elite in Burma are influential in both the religious and secular 
hierarchy. Sinc3 they affect the aspirations and motivations of the 
nonelite, they can play the role of the transmitters of a development-
oriented, nationalistic ideology. "Buddhism is the vehicle of symbolic 
identification between the mass of peasants and the development-oriented 
urban elite" (8.52, p. 141). Nash suggests that this linkage may be 
instrumental in motivating Burmese peasants to place less emphasis 
on present consumption so that a greater capacity for capital accumula­
tion can be generated. By implication, a smaller proportion of income 
would be expended on religious expenditures with more devoted to 
private investment or absorbed by the government through taxation and 
community development programs. 
Traditional African religion 
Traditional African religion, if such an all-inclusive categorization 
can be made, is varied and exhibits a general capacity to accommodate 
other religions such as Christianity and Islam as well as the secular 
changes resulting from economic growth (8.30, 8.32). Traditional be-
^In contrast, a number of Laotian community development projects 
designed to provide needed irrigation water by drilling wells were un­
successful- The wells were not maintained and fell into disuse. How­
ever, the two wells which were drilled on church grounds were not only 
maintained in repair but improvements were also made. The reason for 
this differential success has been attributed to the failure to secure 
the prior support of the Buddhist (footnote continued on next page) 
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liefs such as the power of magic, the role of spirits in influencing 
the physical environment, and the intertwining of ancestral spirits and 
land tenure systems, are not necessarily abandoned in this accultura­
tion process. Rather, they tend to be temporarily suppressed or 
partially modified so as not to provide major obstacles to change, 
particularly economic change. In this respect, Fallers comments: 
"Whatever features of traditional African life may 
stand in the way of more rapid economic development, an 
absorbing interest in achieving states of inner spiritual 
perfection is not among them. On the contrary, Africans 
seem to have, on a whole, a very utilitarian, matter-of-fact 
view of goods and services. . . . There is no evidence that 
in traditional Africa, economic concerns were rejected as 
spiritually unworthy. Far from viewing the biological man 
and his wants as base and unworthy of concern, there is a 
certain tendency for traditional African religions to make 
the health, fertility and prosperity of the living in­
dividual and the living community matters of central impor­
tance" (8.19, p. 115). 
Of course, this favorable attitude toward physical well-being does 
not imply that production and exchange are the principal objectives of 
human activities. Rather, production and exchange are responsive to 
economic conditions and must take place within a social framework. 
The control and use of land among Africans is affected by the 
recognition of ancestral rights to land. In addition to a personal 
attachment to land,^ in some areas the "rights" obtained through in­
heritance forbid the sale or pledging of land. Even those who leave 
or abandon the land or transfer it generally retain some right or claim 
(footnote continued from preceding page) monks for these development 
projects. See Arensberg and Niehoff (8.5). 
^Included would be such factors as the importance attached to 
first occupancy through ancestral rights, often involving mythical 
relationships with the soil; the desire to attract one's relatives to 
the land; the economic return from land; and prestige associated with 
rights to land (8.14). 
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to this land (8.14). Consequently, the ability to secure clear titles 
to land through individual transfer, land reform programs and govern­
ment resettlement programs is doubtful (8.8, 8.13). Under these cir­
cumstances, the incentives for land transfer, population mobility and 
private investment in land are not favorable. 
The importance accorded magic and the various spirits affects the 
conception and execution of individuals' decision-making processes. 
Where one's understanding of nature and production processes is found 
in the interaction of various spirits, producers believe they have 
little control over their environment. To ensure good crops and health, 
sacrifices must be made to the appropriate spirits. Not only can such 
sacrifices be expensive and time-consuming, in terms of opportunity 
costs, but such an attitudinal structure is not in itself favorable to 
individual economic planning and adoption of new production techniques. 
This does not imply that producers are unresponsive to favorable 
opportunities, but it does suggest a time lag in the adoption of new 
practices. If the desirability of practices is demonstrated in a con­
vincing manner and producers have the means to adopt, the time lag may 
be extremely short.^ The tendency to interpret nature in terms of 
spirits is reduced or suppressed as natural science curricula are in­
troduced and expanded in educational systems. 
^Hammond (8.30) provides some interesting insights into the cultural 
adjustments of the Mossi at the Niger Irrigation Project. He indicates 
that "... they fail to find the institutions upon which they have 
always depended for security; they find instead a natural environment 
governed by forces they do not know. Their water supply is no longer 
dependent upon the supernatural controls of the earth custodians but 
comes from a dam built by Europeans" (8.30, p. 252). Necessary pro­
duction inputs and supervision by European agronomists were provided 
and the Mossi adapted themselves (footnote continued on following page) 
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Magic can serve other purposes. Magic may be the most effective 
means of social control in traditional areas. It can be used by both 
individuals in authority and by other members of the community to punish 
those who deviate from the customary ways of life in the community.^ 
Schneider, in his study of the Pakot of western Kenya, writes that, "Be­
cause magic is accepted as a stern reality, deviation is rare and un­
doubtedly carefully considered" (8.59, p. 159). However, the threat 
of being subjected to magic also induces those in authority to conform 
to accepted community behavior so that their relationship to the com­
munity is that of serving rather than innovating or commanding. 
Civil-religious hierarchy in Latin America 
In some Latin American communities, a socio-economic structure 
2 
termed a "corporate" peasant community is found. Within this community, 
a civil-religious hierarchial structure is found which operates the public 
(footnote continued from preceding page) relatively rapidly and easily. 
The new source of water did not induce the Mossi to alter their tra­
dit i o n a l  b e l i e f s  i n  sp i r i t s .  R a t h e r ,  t h e y  t o o k  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  " . . .  
the forces of the natural order are different in their new habitat and 
accordingly must be controlled in a different way. Finding the in­
digenous inhabitants . . . to be zealous Moslems, the Mossi settlers 
have accepted Islam as the religion of their new country . . . new 
arrivals rapidly embrace Islam as the system by which the supernatural 
forces governing their new environment can be manipulated" (8.30, 
p. 253). 
^Magic and witchcraft are used for similar purposes in some Latin 
American villages. See WolE (8.68) and Nash (8.51). 
2 Wolf (8.68) describes the "corporate" community as comprised of 
peasants mostly subsistence-oriented but with some market exchange. 
The social system, however, is bounded and with well-defined sets of 
rights and duties which prescribe and sustain traditional behavior. 
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life of the community in both religious and secular aspects. The system 
imposes obligations of wealth and time on the male members but rewards 
them with power and prestige within the community (8.51, 8.68). Wolf 
(8.68) states that the achievement of power is a matter of community 
decision rather than through the efforts of the individual. This is 
because prestige within the community is largely a function of upward 
movement within their hierarchy along a prescribed ladder of achieve­
ment. Since the positions are without pay, expensive in terms of ex­
pected obligations, and do not permit the holder to engage in any other 
renumerative activities, accumulated wealth is rapidly dissipated within 
this system. Such accumulated wealth, largely in terms of livestock 
and land, cannot be hidden from other members of the community. Where 
individuals are reluctant to undertake these positions, they are 
punished or are forced to leave the community. In either case, deviant 
behavior is discouraged and the social structure remains essentially 
intact. 
The financial obligations attendant with these hierarchial posi­
tions reduce any income inequalities that are generated within the 
community; and, in turn, lessen the likelihood of any internal dissen-
tion which would threaten the continued existence of the community. 
While it would appear that this socially-enforced redistribution of 
wealth would discourage the incentive to accumulate such wealth, Nash 
states that "... the richer people vie for public recognition and as 
measures of their piety, for the opportunity to expend funds in the up­
keep of a given saint for a year, with attendant festivals" (8.51, p. 
293). The wealthier members assume office more frequently than the 
445 
poorer members of the community. 
Extended Family 
The impact of the extended or joint family on economic develop­
ment has been given much speculation. The extended family is character­
ized by various degrees of comprehensiveness. In general, however, it 
represents a suppression of individual goals in favor of family goals. 
Personal gains are expected to be shared with other members of the 
family and vice versa. The most frequent criticism made of the ex­
tended family is that it stifles individual initiative to assume risks, 
to work hard, and to adopt innovâtions--attributes which are considered 
necessary for generating a class of entrepreneurs which will capitalize 
on the pressures and incentives growing out of the developmental process­
es. Hoselitz (8.36) cautions, however, that such a pessimistic role of 
the extended family is " . . . based upon the assumption of a basically, 
individualistic society, such as is said to prevail in the West" (8.36, 
p. 112). Hoselitz further adds: 
"If we consider, on the other hand, that the tra­
ditional norms under which many persons in underdeveloped 
countries have come to regard their demands upon, and their 
duties toward, their extended families, we may perhaps under­
stand that because of the prevalence of traditional norms 
different from those of the West, membership in an extended 
family may not be an impediment to the development of 
entrepreneurship or the willingness to work hard" (8.36, 
p. 112). 
As will subsequently be indicated, the extended family system has 
both advantages and disadvantages. Thus, its impact on economic de-
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velopment can only be assessed by examining, where possible, the 
operation of the system in particular situations. In addition, the 
2 
extended family, like other social institutions, undergoes changes. 
A growing pressure of population on the family land holdings and the 
attraction of employment opportunities elsewhere act to modify the ex­
tended family system so as to be more compatible with evolving economic 
conditions. 
In its most extreme form, members of the extended family pool all 
of their resources for common use by members subject to the judgment 
of the family patriarch. Individual business enterprise is replaced by 
members cooperating for a collective goal (8.27). In addition to con­
siderations of mutual concern for collective survival, particularly 
when living near the subsistence level and when annual production is 
variable," the pooling of resources and an acceptable governing arrange-
^Bauer's (8.9) position is that the joint family system has bene­
ficial economic and social consequences where the economy is at the sub­
sistence or near-subsistence stage. Beyond this stage, however, the 
joint family system generally restrains economic growth. 
2 Comhaire comments that "... those tribal communities far from 
being stagnant, were living organisms long before the advent of Euro­
peans ... it is important to keep such a situation in mind, because 
institutions already tested that way should not be expected to give way 
without a fight under pressure of Western-inspired change" (8.17, p. 46). 
3 
Lewis (8.42) in his study of Tepoztlan in Mexico writes, "Families 
in Tepoztlan are strong and cohesive, held together by traditional bonds 
of loyalty, common economic strivings, mutual dependence, the prospect 
of inheritance, and, finally, the absence of any other social group to 
which the individual can turn. Cooperation within the immediate family 
is essential, for without a family the individual stands unprotected 
and isolated, a prey to every form of aggression, exploitation, and 
humiliation known in Tepoztlan" (8.42, p. 54). 
447 
ment can result in certain economies of size.^ Conceivably, the tendency 
toward land fragmentation is reduced, the combined assets offer a better 
collateral position for obtaining credit financing, and labor sharing at 
planting and harvesting permit a greater amount of land to be cultivated 
than the sum of holdings individually manageable. 
In False Start in Africa, Dumont (8.18) is critical of the role of 
the extended family. He writes that, "By giving the greatest economic 
power to the heads of extended families, African society is confiding 
the levers of progress to the oldest people, often least receptive to 
modern techniques" (8.18, p. 134). Adoption of nontraditional tech­
niques usually requires perception, innovative capacities, and the 
willingness to assume the risks associated with change. Dumont asserts 
that the family heads, usually the eldest member in the family, generally 
do not have these attributes. 
A less-confining form of the extended family is perhaps the most 
prevalent form. Resources are not pooled for collective use. Rather, 
individual members retain ownership but share an affinity and social 
responsibility for the well-being of the less-fortunate members of the 
family. Criticisms of this familial arrangement seem to be based on 
the assumption that members receiving a transfer of wealth, ignoring 
for the moment the fact that assistance can be in the form of labor 
assistance and lending of draft animals, are "free loaders" who repre­
sent a continual threat to the ability of the more ambitious to improve 
^Belshaw's study of kin groups in Southeastern Papua provides 
some examples of cooperation to obtain certain economies (8.11, 
pp. 56-7). 
448 
their economic position. If this is the case, the criticisms seem 
totally valid, at least from an economic viewpoint. If, however, such 
financial assistance is more the form of a loan and is used productively 
by the recipient, these internal transfers represent a means of improv-
2 ing both individual and group economic positions. Not only do in­
dividuals provide assistance, they may themselves receive similar 
assistance at a later date. Also, attempts to improve the economic 
viability of the less fortunate is a means by which the same individuals 
will make fewer claims on the wealth of others in the future. 
The importance of the mutual assistance aspect of extended family 
systems has already been noted. A few specific situations are briefly 
described below. Belshaw notes: 
"Perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of the 
situation in the Southern Massim is the key role that associa­
tions of kinsfolk play. In order to increase his output, even 
the most individualistic of entrepreneurs calls upon his kin 
for labor. They also supply him with raw materials and working 
capital. The wide ramifications of the kindship system and 
the possibility of following different lines of choice within 
it enable those who want to co-operate to do so, while others 
may stand out if they wish: in other words, there is room for 
personal preference in establishing effective economic relations" 
(8.11, p. 55). 
_ 
Miracle (8.45) and, to a lesser extent, Bauer (8.10) and Hersko-
vits (8.31) are of this opinion. 
2 
Berna (8.12) in a study of entrepreneurship in South India cites 
the financial assistance of family members and relatives that was pro­
vided to permit individuals to undertake business enterprises. However, 
he does not indicate that these individuals were members of an extended 
family system. 
In a similar vein, Bauer cites the following positive aspect of 
the extended family system in Africa: "It often results in the pooling 
of family resources for such purposes as the education of promising 
children and setting up a family member in a trade or profession. In 
such circumstances it amounts to a circulation of capital within the 
family" (8.10, p. 8). 
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The system provides flexibility and a local source of inputs which is 
likely less costly than if labor and capital were obtained externally. 
Such activities also tend to reinforce the social organization of the 
1 
communities. 
Activities similar to those described above are undertaken by the 
Wolof of Senegal and Gambia (8.3). Labor requirements, especially for 
weeding and clearing fields, are high because only rudimentary tools 
are used. Cooperative work groups, delineated according to sex and age, 
provide labor inputs on a reciprocal basis. In addition, the work 
groups are called upon to construct and repair village property. In 
addition to labor-sharing, the Wolof provide assistance to lessen the 
heavy burden of ceremonial expenditures among kin members. Money, 
livestock, grain, or kola nuts are provided; the amounts provided by 
individuals differ with social class and age. The alternative is to 
secure assistance from local traders who charge high rates of interest. 
Ames (8.3) notes that the cooperative work group is already making a 
marked contribution in the production of both cash and subsistence 
crops. Perhaps, more importantly, the existing social and economic 
structure can serve as the foundation for additional enterprises and 
services (8.3, p. 236). Cooperative marketing and purchasing institutions, 
an expansion of the internal credit facilities, and programs of economic 
planning can be grafted on to or integrated into the framework of co­
operation that presently exists. 
^Also see Lewis' (8.42) comments on life in Tepoztlan, Mexico 
and Comhaire (8.17) for the role of the extended family in Leopold-
ville. 
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Ottenberg's (8.54) study of the Ibo in Nigeria provides additional 
examples of group and family assistance to members both within and out­
side the village. Prestige is accorded individual initiative, enter­
prise, and wealth accumulation. Members of his family and lineage pro­
vide assistance in the form of land resources and financial loans to 
enterprising individuals whereby the former acquire prestige through 
the successes of those who are assisted. Ottenberg also notes that 
the traditional leadership within local groupings is shifting away from 
the elders to educated young men, traders, and businessmen. 
Miracle (8.45) emphasizes the negative aspects of the extended 
family, particularly as it affects capital accumulation. He states 
that regardless of how or by whom savings are accumulated, they are 
rapidly dissipated by meeting the demand and needs of kinsmen usually 
residing in nearby areas. Farmers must be skilled in concealing 
savings, must make highly liquid local investments, or must invest in 
livestock or buildings in an area distant to where he resides. As a 
result, the incentive for local, productive investment is reduced.^ 
Secondary effects also exist. Miracle states that housewives buy non-
durables in extremely-small quantities so as not to give the appear­
ance of having wealth in the form of visible stocks of these commodities. 
^In this connection, Bauer notes, "The fear of the obligations of 
the family system is partly responsible for the widespread use of tex­
tiles and trinkets as outlets for savings, in preference to more pro­
ductive forms of investment which are more likely to attract the 
attention of relatives" (8.10, p. 8). 
2 
For example, single cubes of sugar, half cups of cooking oil, 
single matches are purchased (8.45, p. 221). 
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Such retailing practices would appear to be of a relatively high-cost 
nature. In addition, individuals are reluctant to utilize deposit 
accounts in banks because of the fear that through bribery or word-of-
mouth relatives will become aware of such savings. These factors 
interact to increase the problems of the accumulation and most pro­
ductive uses of capital. Thus, the African in transition from a 
communal structure to an essentially free enterprise economy often has 
to accommodate the socially-sanctioned claims and needs of his family 
members. 
Even when the individual enters occupations other than farming, he 
often does not escape his family obligations. If he becomes a shop­
keeper, his ability to remain in business and his incentives to continue 
in this more competitive environment have to be affected by the social 
claim by relatives to take what they need from his shop (8.31). Similar 
problems are encountered by those providing professional services. 
Politicians, too, are not immune from discharging their social obliga­
tions; the logical consequence is the encouragement of nepotism (8.17, 
8.31). 
In summary, communal structures and extended family systems can 
have both positive and negative impacts on developmental processes. 
Such structures maintain and reinforce the relationships among members. 
In a hypothetically ideal sense, they provide an existing economic and 
social infrastructure onto which modernization components can be grafted, 
assuming such modifications are economically and socially feasible and 
available to the members. The competitiveness, inclination towards 
diversification, and the smaller scales of operation associated with 
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private ownership are avoided. Lower per unit production costs and 
greater flexibility to accommodate changing market conditions may 
also result. Finally, the extended family system represents a potential 
foundation on which cooperative enterprises in marketing, credit, and 
retailing consumer goods can be built. 
Other Values and Attitudes Influencing Individuals' Objectives 
At early stages of economic development, values and attitudes are 
largely derivable from and sustained by religious beliefs. In their 
religions, individuals find guidance for their behavior toward other 
individuals and toward the secular world. Religion and tradition 
interact to exert varying degrees of social control over individual 
goals as translated into behavior patterns. Deviants are subjected to 
social pressure and to the displeasure of religious and magical spirits 
which are summoned to punish individuals or to purge them of the forces 
causing their nontraditional behavior. 
Values and attitudes have other origins. They are often conditioned 
by individual experiences associated with nature and attempts to increase 
their control over nature. Interspatial contact through trading 
practices, intermittent employment away from the village, and military 
and local government responsibilities increase individual awareness of 
alternative forms of life and of the means potentially available to 
affect his own well-being. In addition, contact with other cultures 
through colonialism, warfare, and missionaries alters the structure 
of values and attitudes, or at least partially suppresses these phenom­
ena. 
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Values evolve through time. In a sense, they represent man's 
accommodation with his environment. They are also instrumental in 
shaping his environment. Thus, values are not quickly discarded or 
replaced; but they do change as man's environment changes. Such is the 
nature of the pressures and incentives generated by economic develop­
ment and by increased contact with other economic and social groups 
within and external to the economy. From the standpoint of national 
planning, the problem is to determine the nature and strength of such 
values and attitudes, the substitution ratios among them, and the means 
whereby such social factors have a basis for facilitating the realiza­
tion of national goals. But are the values and goals of the national 
planners consistent with or reflective of those characterizing the 
people for whom the plans are being devised and implemented? 
The previous discussion on religion and familism bore out the 
contention that their influence on individual behavior need not be in­
imical to economic change. On the other hand, they do contain features 
which, if strongly stressed, could inhibit individuals* aspirations 
and their attitudes toward developmental processes. As change occurs, 
individuals are likely to find a justification in their religion for 
the roles they assume rather than regard religion as defining their 
role in the social and economic structure of society. 
What values exist among agricultural producers in less-developed 
areas? At low stages of economic development where producers are 
essentially subsistence-oriented the emphasis is on security; i.e., 
acting so as to ensure survival of the family (8.27, 8.49, 8.55). 
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Security is not only the value but the objective of these individuals. 
Planning horizons are largely confined to production cycles. Low levels 
of production relative to consumption requirements leave little "surplus" 
for saving or investment. The emphasis is on maintenance rather than 
expansion of capital stock. A small "surplus", if any, is generally not 
the consequence of inefficient use of available resources but rather the 
small quantity and low productivity of traditional resources. Over 
time, the stress on survival has contributed to the evolution of the most 
efficient production practices, given the resource configuration of the 
producer. Family labor is often underemployed during much of the year. 
This does not necessarily reflect a high value placed on leisure but 
rather an absence of diversification of farm enterprises and the lack 
of necessary complementary inputs. Furthermore, because of inadequate 
diets and poor physical health, laborers may have less ability to work 
over time. Despite the relatively-low levels of living, a high value is 
placed on the proper observance of marriage and funeral ceremonies, 
^As indicated earlier, the extended family and village coopera­
tion are means whereby communal survival is enhanced (8.27, 8.42), 
Jacoby (8.37) also makes this point but adds that such mutual de­
pendence is a potential basis for establishing cooperatives: "... 
the time-honoured institution of mutual aid, which still today is a 
vital factor in the life of the peasant and time and again has helped 
him to overcome the frequently recurring periods of emergency. The 
decisive effort, therefore, should be concentrated on making him 
realize that his everyday life is a permanent state of emergency and 
thus transforming the mutual aid concept into an understanding of the 
benefits of cooperative activities. When first this basic change in 
mentality has been achieved and the cooperative ideology established 
the generally overestimated difficulties in introducing technical 
'know-how' will be overcome relatively fast" (8.37, p. 32). 
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fiestas, and religious observances. Social pressure is so strong that 
producers incur debt in order to meet these social obligations. 
How does the producer view his situation? If he does not under­
stand the nature of the environment in which he operates but relies 
primarily on traditional interpretations to guide his motivations and 
behavior, he has difficulty in perceiving ways to influence his economic 
well-being.^ Although he experiences the influence of natural forces 
on his farming operations and on his family's health, he does not view 
the causal relationships in terms consistent with scientific explana­
tions but rather in terms of supernatural phenomena (8.9, 8.27, 8.31, 
8,55). The continued observance of traditional behavior obviates the 
need for individual thought and innovative decision-making, the latter 
2 both tending to create anxiety and uncertainty. Such traditional 
guidance is provided by the villege elders and tribal chiefs, guidance 
which usually tends to be conservative in nature (8.18, 8.55). 
^In a study of eighty farm operators near Calcutta, Bose (8.15) 
attempted to determine the relationship between producers' personal 
attributes and their behavior toward the adoption of improved agri­
cultural practices. He found a statistically significant positive 
correlation between the adoption of improved practices and (1) business 
attitude toward farming; (2) rationality; and (3) scientific attitude. 
Conversely, a statistically significant negative correlation with (1) 
traditional outlook and (2) religious inclinations was found. Familism 
had a low negative correlation which was not statistically significant. 
The sample respondents were cultivating owners operating three or more 
acres of land and had more than average education relative to the popula­
tion in the region. For example, 36 respondents and between five and 
ten years of education, five had completed high school, and seven had 
two years of college education. Extensive communication with the city 
also existed. 
2 In his study of an Egyptian village, Adams (8.1) notes that the 
responsibility for individual decision-making increases anxieties and 
that such individuals may find more security in the workings of Com­
munism rather than liberal democracy. Adams suggests that individuals 
are attracted by the absolute assurances of Communism and the "re­
ligious fervor of its (footnote continued on the following page) 
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Even if favorable weather enables the producer to generate a 
"surplus" in excess of customary consumption levels, the net returns 
from investment in additional traditional inputs may be so low as to 
discourage investment (8.56, 8.60). Furthermore, increasing consumption 
levels would likely have highest priority. Where nontraditional inputs 
are available and their productivity demonstrated elsewhere, the pro­
ducer may consider such inputs as too risky for his own operations. 
The costs of not meeting consumption requirements with his own production 
will range from going into debt to no longer having the means to survive. 
Traditional production patterns provide a good deal of security, even 
though at low levels of living. In addition, his receptivity to the 
suggestions by government representatives and merchants that he alter 
his cropping or resource allocation pattern is low. This follows from 
a general distrust for people from outside his immediate village, es­
pecially for government officials (8.6, 8.16, 8.23, 8.24). This dis­
trust is largely a questioning of the motives of those who suggest 
changes. The merchants' purchasing and retailing activities tend to 
exploit the peasants. Based on past experiences, the peasant is 
rationally skeptical of the merchant's suggestions to purchase a new 
input from him or to produce a new cash crop which will eventually be 
marketed through him. Similarly, the government is seen as an external 
force whose representatives have a historical impact of harming rather 
than helping peasants. Furthermore, changes in inputs and in pro­
duction techniques may be resisted because (1) they tend to alter the 
(footnote continued from preceding page) missionaries". "Traditional 
Islam's demand is that the elements of a working system be absolute, 
not that they be logically consistent" (8.1, p. 234). 
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social relationships in the village (8.35, 8.43, 8.66, 8.68); and (2) 
the introduction of new seed varieties and crops may alter traditional 
consumption patterns of producers (8.4, 8.43). However, innovations 
which can be grafted on to the existing production and consumption 
patterns without seriously disrupting traditional behavior generally 
have a higher degree of receptivity.^ 
Villages, initially operating as essentially "closed" communities, 
eventually have contact with the outside world. Such contact assumes a 
number of forms with varied consequences. Contact has been both imposed 
and endogenously generated. Colonialism and military conquest have left 
their impact. The superimposition of external cultures disrupted or at 
least suppressed traditional forms of government, economic activity, and 
social structures. Labor was appropriated for slave trade and for work 
in mines and on plantations producing export crops. The ruling elite 
attempted to introduce their own forms of government and educational 
systems. In some areas, the life styles of the colonialists influenced 
the occupational structures and aspirations of native peoples. For ex­
ample, British influence in Africa and Asia influenced some of the in­
digenous population to aspire to public administration, education and 
trading positions. Similar influences resulted from the Spanish iK---;. 
volvement in Latin America. The Ibo of Nigeria and Kikuyu of Kenya 
^Myrdal writes that although cultivators may resist change in 
their work patterns and life styles, they sometimes have economic reasons 
for this attitude. For example, even though water and climatic condi­
tions are favorable for double cropping, payments to the landlord, hired 
laborers, and water authorities are the same for the first as for the 
second crop. The second crop, however, usually has a lower yield while 
requiring more labor inputs (8.49, p. 1285-6). 
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were strongly influenced by the British and incorporated European 
values concerning individual enterprise, initiative, and consumption 
patterns into their own cultures (8.44, 8.54, 8.59). The work of 
missionaries in education and religion also influenced the under­
standing of the physical environment and the aspirations of some African 
peoples. On the other hand, the imposition of external force tended 
to strengthen traditional values among other societies and increased 
their resistance to change (8.59). 
Latin America was colonized in the 16th and 17th centuries by 
southern Europeans whose countries were economically backward rela­
tive to Britain's position during her colonialization period in the 
17th and 18th centuries (8.26). Further, the maintenace of relation­
ships with the mother country tended to reinforce this initial 
differential impact. The Spanish were considered to be less enter­
prising and less technologically-oriented than the British. However, 
Wolf (8.68) in his discussion of the "open" peasant community in Latin 
America states that their outward-looking orientation arose when these 
communities were established by European settlers whose consumption 
and production patterns influenced local people and involved them in 
the outside market. Furthermore, the peasants produced cash crops 
which were in increasing demand in Europe. 
Contact is also endogenously generated. The impact of population 
growth on limited land resources forces emigration and partial employ­
ment away from the village (8.41, 8.68). Where social pressure against 
wealth accumulation is strong, enterprising individuals either acquiesce 
or move to a less-traditional village. Similarly, if individuals find 
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economic demands made on them to support the civil-religious hierarchy 
and the village fiestas to be oppressive, the alternative is to move 
to another area (8.51, 8.66). 
Only the most isolated villages today do not have some interaction 
with a money economy. As the range and variety of contacts increase 
through "culture brokers", traders, communications media, and spatial 
mobility, the scope of individuals' awareness and experiences expands 
with at least a partial impact on behavior patterns of producers and 
consumers. As subsistence-oriented producers are drawn into the ex­
change or money economy to obtain those essentials they themselves do 
not produce, they also become aware of the existence and availability 
of other consumer goods.^ In order to obtain these, however, producers 
need to increase their demand for money income or for "surplus" com­
modities which can be exchanged. For some, the aspired level of living 
is above the existing level. But the aspired level is also above the 
attainable level if previous production and consumption patterns are 
maintained. The producer now faces a more complex matrix of decisions. 
Previously, he had a strong preference for present consumption over 
future consumption. This resulted primarily from his low levels of 
living. His problem now is to generate additional money income or ob­
tain external credit which can be used to purchase some of these goods 
directly or can be invested in his production unit to increase future 
output and income levels. Where available, off-farm employment on a 
^The existence and availability of goods is assumed here. Such 
goods may be obtained from village specialization and exchange, from a 
consumer goods industry in the economy, and from imports from abroad. 
Thus, the agricultural sector is developing as a market for the goods 
currently or potentially producible by other sectors of the economy. 
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nearby plantation or in another sector of the economy is a means of 
augmenting income. In addition, such labor mobility may result in the 
acquisition of production skills and changes in producers* aspirations, 
not only in terms of consumer goods but also in housing, medical 
services, and education for their children. If these aspirations are 
held strongly, they can assume the role of values thereby exerting a 
stronger impact on producer behavior. 
Increased participation in the money economy also acquaints pro­
ducers with the existence of nontradltional inputs, if they are avail­
able, and with the relative valuations placed on goods sold in the 
market. A few enterprising producers may perceive that by substituting 
a cash crop for a crop previously consumed, the income from selling 
the cash crop will more than cover the expenditures for purchasing the 
crop consumed but previously produced. Improved inputs for expanding 
production may be made available through financing by a local merchant 
or moneylender. In both cases, however, the producer has, in effect, 
made a partial substitution of values; i.e., wealth accumulation for 
security^ and also has demonstrated an optimistic or favorable attitude 
toward realizing his goal. Another producer may also place a high value 
on increased income; but if his subjective probability toward realizing 
the higher income is low, he is motivated to continue his previous 
cropping pattern. Where investments are contemplated, the decision­
making process becomes much more complex: (1) The planning horizon 
^Since valuing wealth accumulation is incompatible with some 
professed religious beliefs, the value may alternatively be stated in 
terms such as better housing and clothing or better transportation 
with a bicycle. 
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nrast be lengthened and the net returns from the investment estimated; 
(2) With a longer planning period, additional uncertainties are in­
troduced; price variability, production variability, and tenurial 
security must be taken into account; and (3) The investor must decide 
between productive investments and those made for security, prestige, 
and liquidity purposes. The determination of net returns from alter­
native investments is a complicated problem for producers, regardless 
of the stage of economic development. 
Land is almost universally valued for the security and prestige 
it provides. This is true of the Indian peasant as it is of the Latin 
American hacienda owner. But the transfer of title to land through 
ownership does not in itself represent a productive investment. Only 
if ownership induces a shift to more productive cultivation practices 
or more investment in nonland inputs can land investments be termed 
productive investments. In Africa, cattle are valued for the prestige 
which accrues to the owner rather than for their profitability (8.7, 
8.35).^ In other societies, jewelry and ornaments are prized for the 
prestige they provide and for their high liquidity if money or credit 
financing Is required to meet contingency situations (8.34, 8.55, 8.64). 
^Hoselitz cites an interesting example of the consequences result­
ing from a failure to recognize the value East Africans place on cattle. 
The immunization of cattle against disease carried by tsetse fly was 
anticipated to result in larger, healthier herds which would permit 
large-scale exportation of beef. To the East African, cattle were a 
form of wealth and immunization would permit him to increase his wealth. 
But, according to Hoselitz, immunization did not generally lead to an 
increase in the amount of beef marketed but rather to problems of over­
grazing as herd numbers expanded. Hoselitz concludes that "... the 
value system of the East Africans places emphasis on the number of heads 
owned by a person rather than on the returns he can gain by marketing 
them" (8.35, p. 413). 
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At relatively-low stages of economic development, individual be­
havior is at least partially circumscribed by the social approval of 
his peers.^ Among communal and extended family groups, the social 
approval associated with internal redistributions of wealth and 
allocations of collectively-held land according to family needs tend 
to constrain individual activity. At later stages of development, the 
same family structure can provide a means for transferring capital to 
those attempting to improve their position within agriculture and 
2 
those establishing nonagricultural enterprises. 
^See Hirschman (8.33, pp. 11-14) for his discussion of the "group-
focused" image of change. Briefly, an economic and social equilibrium 
has evolved through time with individuals having fairly well-defined 
roles in the community structure. Individual initiative may result in 
zero-sum outcomes where one's gain is another's loss, thereby upsetting 
the previous equilibrium. Such initiative is discouraged by social 
pressure and by group-imposed penalties. Individual well-being is 
suppressed in favor of collective considerations. 
2 For example, the Ibo of Nigeria are a highly individualistic 
people. While individuals are dependent upon their family and 
community for forms of support, they nevertheless have to demonstrate 
their own ability to succeed in the world (8.54). Positions of 
prestige and authority within society are largely achieved rather 
than ascribed. In contrast. Wolf's (8.68) discussion of the "corporate" 
community in Latin America indicates the emphasis of communal control 
over individual activity. This control includes a restriction on the 
sale of privately-owned land to outsiders which tends to limit in­
troduction of outside people and their influence and to maintain the 
property and social structure of the community. Wolf states that, 
"Adherence to the culture validates membership in an existing society 
and acts as a passport to participation in the life of the community. 
The particular traits held help the individual remain within the 
equilibrium of relationships which maintain the community" (8.68, 
p. 460). 
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Among Malayan peasants. Swift (8.64) notes a strong value placed 
on wealth as a means to comfort and security. He adds, however, that 
emphasis on wealth beyond a certain point produces hostility among 
other peasants. The peasant who works hard is esteemed; but if his 
individual initiative causes him to lessen his participation in 
ceremonial events or in helping his counterparts observe these events, 
his behavior elicits hostility. Swift comments that: 
"The most striking quality about the economically 
successful peasant is a lack of concern for public judgment, 
a feeling that he will exact respect and recognition in 
spite of the popular view, an awareness that he is an ob­
ject of criticism and jealousy, which he returns with a 
private contempt for his less industrious and successful 
neighbors" (8.64, p. 151). 
A similar attitude has been found among Lao peasants (8.29). Work, per 
se, is not valued nor is an extremely-high value placed on the 
accumulation of land and capital. Individuals who are too aggressive 
in their attempts to accumulate wealth are viewed with disfavor, if not 
open hostility, by their village counterparts. Halpern (8.29) adds 
that the villagers are not disinterested in the accumulation of capital 
and material goods. They can perceive benefits resulting from more 
land and livestock, improved housing and clothing. Rather, the stronger 
attitude is one tending toward fatalism. For example, wealth accumula­
tion is not important since the individual feels as though he cannot 
influence or control his own well-being. He considers his success as 
being determined by " ... forces present in the individual at birth 
as well as those acting upon him from the outside" (8.29, p. 99). 
The effectiveness of social pressure in constraining individual 
activity is present in some Latin American peasant societies. In his 
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study of a Guatemalan peasant society, Nash (8.51) states that in­
dividuals who begin to act in their economic self-interest begin to 
weaken their ties with the community. If they also refuse to partici­
pate in the civil-religious structure of the community, they may be 
forced to emigrate to another Indian community or to a Ladino^ town. 
In the Mexican Indian community included in his study, those con­
sciously violating accepted modes of behavior were physically punished, 
at times resulting in death. Nash concludes that: 
" . . .  t h e y  e j e c t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  d e v i a n t ,  t h e  s o c i a l  d e ­
viant and the culturally marginal person. This keeps a 
successful economic innovation which might lead to a change 
in the social system from spreading by conduction to other 
members of the society. At the same time the economic 
opportunities that would entice members of these societies 
need to be extraordinary before they will hazard their small 
resources and their social positions" (8.51, p. 303). 
Wolf's (8.68) description of the "corporate" and "open" communi­
ties in Latin America provides additional evidence. In the "corporate" 
community; i.e., the "socially bounded" community, influences external 
to the community are resisted, individual accumulation and display of 
wealth are discouraged, and the community has the right to review and 
revise individual decisions. Hard work and poverty, as well as be­
havior indicative of these attributes, are commended while laziness 
and greed and their accompanying behavior are reproved. Conversely, 
in the "open" community; i.e., the community which actively participates 
in the surrounding economies, external interaction is favored and 
emphasized, wealth accumulation and display are permitted and expected, 
and individual initiative is unrestrained by community approval. As 
mentioned earlier. Wolf attributes these behavioral differences to the 
^Ladinos are Westernized or Western-oriented Indians. 
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fact that many of the "open" communities were established by settlers 
who brought to Latin America cultural patterns of consumption and pro­
duction which involved these communities in relations with an outside 
market. 
Srinivas in Goheen, et al. (8.25), writing about agricultural 
peasants in India, states that an individual who works hard and saves 
money is respected in the community. Wealth accumulation is attributed 
as much to hard work as to the belief that "God has favored a 'virtuous* 
man." When a wealthy man is also considered a "bad" man in the com­
munity, his wealth is attributed to "the good actions which he un­
doubtedly performed in a previous incarnation." Villagers also point 
out that some recent misfortune has affected him or his family which 
they interpret as "divine anger with his present 'badness'" (8.25, p. 4). 
Associated with economic change and development is a differential 
distribution of costs and benefits among individuals in the economy. 
The relative demand for various goods produced undergoes change. Those 
individuals best able to perceive new economic opportunities as they 
arise and who have the resources to take advantage of these opportuni­
ties are in a position to increase their wealth. Wealth, in addition 
to providing the capacity to exploit future economic opportunities, 
also provides social and political power. In the absence of wealth 
redistribution programs through tax policies and transfer payments the 
wealthy accumulate more wealth, and the relatively disadvantaged tend 
to lose their bargaining position and become increasingly dependent on 
the wealthy and the government for their well-being. Concomitantly, 
through increased contact with the rest of the economy and improved 
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communications systems, the disadvantaged become increasingly aware of 
their relative position in society. A potential climate for social 
and political turmoil is created. High population growth rates tend 
to accentuate the situation. The tenant, the landless laborer, the 
small owner-operator want more land, better education facilities, and 
a more equitable sharing of the costs and returns. They continue to 
be dependent upon the landlord, the patron and the moneylender; but 
through labor unions and pressure on the government to initiate re­
forms, they find means to potentially improve their economic and 
political bargaining position. 
In most societies land is highly valued and is a symbol of 
prestige. Where producers are restricted to cultivating only small 
plots, a redistribution of land is seen as the means to improve 
their positions. Thus, the wealthy and the landowners see advantages 
in maintaining the economic and social status quo (8.35, 8.39, 8.46). 
The landlord or patron needs the labor services of his "clients". But 
at the same time, the landlord often provides credit, production inputs, 
and counseling services. A mutual dependence exists. However, the 
peasant's stronger dependence places him in an inferior bargaining 
position. The landless laborers and tenants represent potential threats 
to landowners' positions. To the extent this is true, the elites are 
primarily interested in economic change which benefits them but leaves 
the disadvantaged in a continuing inferior power position. Though they 
are likely increasingly constrained by the threat of peasant organization 
and retaliation, the elite, directly or indirectly through the political 
system, may publicly support reform measures but take measures to see 
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that they are not effectively implemented. 
As the economy expands through sectoral development and increased 
division of labor, a restructuring of the values attached to various 
occupations undergoes change. The prestige associated with occupations 
in agriculture and crafts declines relative to that accorded positions 
in public administration, education and law. There is some suggestion 
that both managerial innovation and capital formation are hindered by 
persistent high evaluation of a "leisure class" and the choice of 
current luxury consumption over reinvestment and productive expansion 
(8.20, 8.46). Values and attitudes oriented toward economic growth 
and development are only necessary but not sufficient. In addition, 
individuals must be aware of the opportunities, a proper configuration 
of economic incentives must exist, producers must have the resources 
or access to external assistance in order to exploit such opportunities, 
and the uncertainties facing the producer must be acceptable. 
Objectives 
To some extent, the objectives or goals which individuals pursue 
were discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. The varying 
degrees of responsiveness to changing prices and to information pro­
vided by extension personnel were discussed in the previous chapter. 
In some cases, social factors tend to constrain the economic activity 
of individuals. However, the observance of these social proprieties 
are also objectives in themselves, at least by the conformists. In 
other areas, economic pursuits are limited only by individual's aware­
ness and entrepreneurship and by the resources available to him. Even 
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in the relatively "open" communities, income or profit maximization over 
time is only a means to the higher objective of utility maximization. 
But since utility is derived from consumption of both goods and leisure 
and from participation in community affairs, the usual assumption of 
profit maximization is rarely, if ever, synonymous with the more 
generalized objective of utility maximization. Instead, the more mean­
ingful objective of market-oriented producers is that of constrained 
profit maximization^ with constraints not only on resource availabilities 
but also (1) Labor availability where a portion of the economically-
productive labor inputs are devoted to social and local governmental 
affairs and (2) "Surpluses" available for productive investments must 
compete with less-productive or nonproductive investments. Again, the 
objective is utility maximization and not pure profit maximization. 
This objective is consistent with the general contention that nearly all 
producers are "economic men" in that they prefer more to fewer economic 
goods. Added here is the proposition that a number of implicit con­
straints are involved. 
At low stages of economic development, producers' objectives tend 
toward production for survival and any investment is geared toward 
maintenance of the production plant rather than expansion of the size 
^According to Kamarck (8.38), the African producer thinks in terms 
of increasing returns to his labor rather than profits. Nair (8.50) 
notes that among rice cultivators in most parts of India, both among 
landowners and tenants having varying sizes of operations, "The in­
crease in gross output and therefore income does not interest them if 
the margin of profit per para or bag of rice decreases thereby, which 
it normally does of course, with heavier investments in fertilizer and 
labour such as the Japanese method or any more scientific method of 
cultivation must involve" (8.50, p. 44). 
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of operations. The principal constraint on investment is the inability 
to generate a production "surplus" in excess of consumption requirements. 
Consumption requirements, however, usually include expenditures for 
gifts, social events and religious activities. These latter expenditures 
represent funds which could potentially be invested. However, two 
additional considerations are necessary. First, one of the producer's 
objectives is to mtain or improve his social standing in the community. 
Prestige accrues to those who satisfy these socially-approved activi­
ties, and prestige provides utility. Second, producer's planning hori­
zons are extremely short; a high value is placed on present consumption 
over future consumption. In addition, the low returns from investment 
in traditional inputs may be discouraging, especially if producers are 
able to discount returns over time (8.56, 8.60). Few institutions 
exist in many rural areas for accepting and paying a return on savings. 
An attitude of distrust coupled with the costs associated with traveling 
to these institutions located outside of the community lessen the in­
centive to make savings deposits. 
Consumption patterns for these subsistence-oriented producers are 
relatively inflexible through time. They are established by custom 
and tend to vary primarily with the family cycle. With only limited 
contact with the economy external to the village, these traditional 
consumption patterns continue. A number of goods not produced by the 
farmer must usually be obtained from a local merchant or trader. Such 
goods often include sugar, salt, tobacco, cooking utensils and some 
clothing. The quantity purchased of each is relatively invariant as 
long as the traditional consumption pattern is maintained. 
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As long as prices are invariant, traditional consumption patterns 
imply a corresponding income demand which is also essentially invariant. 
Production decisions in terms of essentially-fixed incomes are not in­
compatible with producer behavior at low stages of economic development 
(8.53). As noted earlier, however, the demand for income varies with the 
prices paid for consumption goods not directly produced. Such behavior 
is primarily indigenous to essentially-closed communities where limited 
resources, restricted aspirations, and strong social pressure interact 
to maintain an economic and social status quo. As these cormunities 
are opened, the strength of these forces declines and producer-consumers 
are introduced to nontraditional influences. 
For the subsistence-oriented producer, output is primarily a 
function of the quantity of labor applied to the resource base con­
sisting of laad, draft animals, and relatively-s imp le tools and imple­
ments. Figure 8.1 loosely summarizes the situation faced by the pro­
ducer. The production possibility curve is drawn so that the 
rises rapidly with initial labor inputs but then rapidly declines as a 
relatively-large quantity of labor is employed. Movements to the left 
of L on the horizontal axis denote additional units of labor employed. 
The vertical axis represents income which reflects the total value of 
production aggregated by the exchange value of the individual com­
modities according to a numeraire or by some monetary unit. Super­
imposed in Figure 8.1 are the producer's subjective indifference curves 
representing the marginal rates of substitution between income and 
leisure. Leisure denotes nonwork but includes time spent in social and 
governmental activities. Income, translated into physical quantities. 
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Labor 
Leisure 
Figure 8.1. Optimum labor-use level for maximizing individual utility 
Y, 
Figure 8.2. Optimum production for maximizing individual utility 
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represents consumption requirements, including payments in kind for 
taxes and debt obligations, stocks for draft animals, allowance for 
maintenance of capital stock, income necessary to purchase or obtain 
goods consumed but not produced, and income for undertaking customary 
social expenditures. The indifference curves are drawn to indicate 
a h igh marginal rate of substitution of leisure or nonwork for in­
come. This is postulated as the consequence of the ability to sustain 
traditional consumption patterns and of the limited aspirations and 
opportunities to alter consumption patterns. In Figure 8.1 utility is 
* 1 
maximized by expending L^L of labor to produce 01^ of income. Of 
"k 
the total quantity of labor inputs available for work, L , LL^ is de­
voted to leisure. Assuming only two products are produced, and Y^, 
the production possibility curve representing the combinations of Y^ 
* 
and Yg which can be produced using L^L of labor is diagrammed in 
Figure 8.2. The positions and shapes of the production possibility 
curves are a function of the labor-allocation decision made in Figure 
2 8.1. Superimposing the producer's indifference curve representing his 
preference in the consumption of Y^ and Y^, the planned optimal out-
* * 
put configuration is denoted by Y^ and Y^ . 
______ * 
Referring to Equations 2.9 or 9.1, the utilization of L^L of labor 
implies that a sufficient quantity of K° is available to 
sustain this amount of labor. If not, only a lesser amount of labor 
can be employed which generates less income and a lower level of utility. 
2 
The more realistic proposition is that the decisions made in 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 are essentially simultaneously determined. That is, 
if Y^' and Y^* represent consumption requirements, then L^L of labor, 
given fixed resources and production techniques employed, is required 
to produce these output levels. Thus, the producer's decision in 
Figure 8.2 determines the necessary, corresponding decision to be made 
in Figure 8.1. A more comprehensive discussion of these decision­
making processes is presented in Chapter IX, 
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In Figure 8.3, each unit of labor employed results in a higher in­
come level either as a result of an increase in the exchange values, 
for example, the exchange value of wheat relative to sugar, salt and 
tobacco increases, or because of a favorable production period. The 
indifference curves are assumed to be essentially unchanged as income 
increases. This, again, is the assumed result of the producer's 
limited contact with an exchange economy which, as yet, supplies only 
the goods traditionally purchased and consumed. As income increases, 
the tangencies of the higher indifference curves with the respective 
income-possibility curves indicate that the producer maximizes utility 
by working less and enjoying more leisure. This phenomenon represents 
a backward-s loping labor supply function of the producer to his firm.^ 
In Figure 8.4, the smaller physical quantities produced do not in­
dicate that the producer has reduced the quantities of goods he con­
sumes. Rather, the amount of and(or) necessary for exchange in 
order to obtain those goods consumed but not produced and some of 
2 
those goods used in social events is reduced. 
As mentioned earlier, increased contact with an exchange or money 
economy, an economy which provides a larger variety of consumer goods 
^If income increased through higher exchange values only, the MPP^ 
of labor at various labor-use levels is unchanged but the MVP^ in­
creases for the specific input level being considered. In 
this exercise, the MVP^ may be considered the implicit wage or salary of 
the producer. If his salary increases, he is inclined to work less. 
2 Such marketing behavior implies that changes in the quantity 
marketed are inversely related to price movements. The objective is to 
market that quantity whose value will permit the producer to obtain 
those goods consumed but not produced by him. This behavior is noted by 
a number of contributors to a discussion of marketed surpluses in India. 
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Labor 
Leisure 
Figure 8.3. Changes in optimum laborruse levels as monetary income in­
creases 
P(L,L*) 
Figure 8.4. Changes in the optimum output configuration as labor-use 
levels vary 
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as development proceeds, induces more enterprising producers to raise 
their aspirations and alter their desired consumption pattern,^ The 
principal objective is still that of utility maximization; however, the 
components and their respective utility coefficients undergo change. 
The question now arises as to whether or not these producers are able 
to generate the additional income through increased production which is 
needed to purchase these newly-demanded goods. If production remains 
largely invariant, one alternative is to secure external financing from 
a merchant, moneylender or landlord in order to purchase these goods. 
However, granting that producers have relatively short planning hori­
zons, the newly-acquired indebtedness and the capacity for repayment 
must be taken into account. The potential dangers of continued in­
debtedness were discussed in Chapter V. Implicitly, the utility from 
consumption is greater than the disutility of indebtedness and the 
potentially attendant consequences of debt. 
Another approach which is perhaps more likely and more desirable 
from the standpoint of economic development is represented in Figures 
2 8.5 and 8.6. Through increased market contact, the relative demands 
^For example, "The speed with which the peasants of South-East 
Asia and West Africa (with their different cultural backgrounds) acquired 
the taste for the new imported commodities and expanded their export 
production in order to be able to buy them offers us concrete evidence 
of their capacity to respond positively to economic incentives (8.48, 
pp. 41-42). 
^Such a statement, of course, is based on the questionable presump­
tion that the values of economic planners, for example, are those shared 
by the producers. To economic planners, less leisure and productive in­
vestment of any surpluses generated are preferred to the converse. Pro­
ducers, on the other hand, weigh these alternatives heavily only if such 
behavior results in higher levels of utility to them. The increased 
economic-orientation which economic development generally creates, at 
least within a range of incomes, and the emphasis on the insatiability 
of demand for consumer goods as markets expand would tend to alter pro­
ducers' values towards those (footnote continued on the following page) 
L3L2LI 
Labor 
Leisure 
Figure 8.5. Changes in labor-use levels resulting from a change in 
MRS and from higher incomes 
PlLpL") 
P(LrL' )  
P(L,Ln 
Yf Y2 
Figure 8.6. Changes in utility-maximizing output patterns corresponding 
to higher labor-use levels 
(footnote continued from preceding page) held by national planners sub­
ject, of course, to certain constraints. For example, resettlement pro­
grams in Africa have met resistance because of the attachment of people 
to particular units of land. 
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for farm-produced goods, consumer goods and leisure are hypothesized to 
change in the direction that causes the marginal rate of substitution of 
leisure for income to fall. That is, income and the purchasing power it 
represents now have a higher value relative to leisure than was pre­
viously the case. In Figure 8.5, indifference curve ' reflects the 
change in preference between income and leisure and the resulting 
marginal rate of substitution between the two. If the new family of 
indifference curves not only has a different shape but assumes a 
* 
different position on the income possibility curves, for example, I^ , 
* * 
the producer s optimal behavior is to now employ L of labor in 
* * 
order to produce I^ . The additional of labor causes the pro­
duction possibility curve in Figure 8.6 to shift to the right. A 
higher level of utility, U^, is possible due to the shift in preferences 
and consequent additional amount of labor used. Consumption of both 
and can be increased as can the quantity of consumer goods pur­
chased in the market. In the aggregate, higher consumption levels of 
consumer goods purchased in the market are possible only if the cor­
responding quantities of these goods demanded are available. If income 
and demand are present but not the goods, inflationary tendencies and 
consumer frustration result. Ceteris paribus, the terms of trade are 
turned against producers and an increased amount of income or capital 
potentially leaves the agricultural sector. A larger quantity of goods 
must be marketed in response to the rise in prices. The frustrated ex­
pectations of producer-consumers may condition subsequent attitudes and 
objectives relative to income accumulation and developmental processes 
in general. 
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As the opportunity to increase the consumption of all goods above 
* "k 
the initial levels of and Y^ arises, so does the possibility of 
saving increments of income through noneonsumption. Capital formation 
has now been introduced. As long as the producer's planning horizon 
remains constricted to the next production period or harvest cycle, 
such savings will likely be hoarded or lent on a short-term basis to 
relatives and fellow villagers.^ Utility is also derived from hoarding 
and from lending, regardless of whether or not any interest is paid. 
On the other hand, if through education, government programs, or ob­
servation of others the producer is able to expand his planning hori-
2 
zon, longer-term productive investment is a feasible alternative. 
Savings 
Savings provide only the means to invest; favorable investment 
opportunities must exist to mobilize and channel savings into pro­
ductive uses. Where the saver and the investor are two different 
persons, institutions such as savings associations and rural banks are 
necessary to make the transfer. Private lending by the saver is an 
alternative. But the most important determinant of savings is the level 
of income. The relatively low per capita incomes in most less-
developed areas suggest a low capacity for saving. However, per capita 
incomes do not reflect income distributions. The relatively few who 
^The short planning horizons need not preclude producers from 
buying improved seeds, fertilizer and additional irrigation water in­
puts. The returns from these inputs are largely confined to the period 
in which they are used. 
2 The problem of allocating income between immediate consumption 
and investment providing a flow of returns over time is deferred to 
Chapter IX. 
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receive a major proportion of the income have a high capacity to save. 
Even those at the lower end of the income scale save.^ But the All-
India Rural Credit Survey (8.58) provides data indicating that the 
2 
primary reason for not saving is the lack of a means for saving. See 
Table 8.1. The indication that "no margin for saving" existed does 
not imply that expenditures in excess of basic consumption and pro­
duction needs were not made. 
Increasing present consumption through reducing savings always 
remains an alternative. The nature of the increased consumption is 
important. If savings are in the form of commodities produced and in 
excess of traditional consumption patterns, higher consumption means 
fewer goods marketed. The savings remain in the firm-household unit 
and within the agricultural sector without stimulating developmental 
processes. Higher per capita consumption may have a secondary impact 
on improving physical health and increasing labor productivity. Alter­
natively, such savings may be used to support larger families which are 
not exactly a boon to areas wrestling with problems of overpopulation. 
Hagen writes, " . • . as we get more income data about low-income 
countries we find that even at incomes of $50 or $100 per capita, they 
can save, and adequately to achieve economic progress, if they are 
sufficiently motivated to do so" (8.28, p. 624). In a similar vein, 
Hirschman comments, "With respect to savings and capital, anthropolo­
gists have long known that primitive people who, by Western standards, 
live 'on the margin of subsistence* insist nevertheless on devoting a 
considerable portion of their time, energies, and resources to ceremonial 
purposes, giftmaking, and other activities not directly related to con­
sumption" (8.33, p. 2). 
^This conclusion is reinforced by the survey response that lack 
of facilities, low interest rates, and transactions difficulties were 
not significantly limiting factors. 
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Table 8.1. Distribution of districts, by number of cultivators for up­
per and lower strata,^ according to reasons for not placing 
savings in accounts or not purchasing bonds, stock shares or 
insurance policies. All-India Rural Credit Survey, 1950-51 
Number of cultivators replying in the 
Total affirmative 
number 1 5 10 20 30 40 60 
of to to to to to to and 
districts Nil 4 9 19 29 39 59 above 
Is it because you have 
no margin for saving? 
Lower strata 
Upper strata 
Is it because you 
prefer to hold savings 
in cash? 
Lower strata 
Upper strata 
Do you prefer to 
purchase gold and 
jewelry? 
Lower strata 
Upper strata 
Do you prefer to lend 
money? 
Lower strata 
Upper strata 
75 2 14 — jy  
75 1 1 3 26 44 
75 39 20 6 1 
75 17 29 15 10 4 
75 56 16 3 
75 43 20 5 7 
75 61 12 1 1 
75 33 28 8 6 
The definitions for "Upper" and "Lower" strata cultivators are 
given in Chapter V, footnote 1, p. 215. 
Source: Abstracts from Tables 11.3 and 11.4, All-India Rural 
Credit Survey (8.58). 
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Where savings are used to increase consumption of consumer goods pro­
duced in other sectors of the economy, such expenditures represent 
transfers out of the agricultural sector which may have a beneficial 
impact on stimulating the growth of these other sectors. When the 
supplies of these consumer goods do not keep pace with increases in 
demand, prices are bid up. Initially, the terms of trade are turned 
against the agricultural sector and larger quantities of income flow 
outward from this sector. If as prices rise producer-consumers expect 
prices to rise further in the future, additional incentive for in­
creasing present consumption is created.^ Savings are reduced and 
price increases accentuated. The consumer goods sectors are growing, 
but the question of whether or not the quantity of agricultural com­
modities necessary to meet the food requirements of laborers and the 
raw materials of manufacturers will be forthcoming is raised. If 
not, prices for agricultural products will be bid up adding to the 
existing inflationary tendencies. Additional marketings of agri­
cultural commodities are needed. Additional investment in the agri­
cultural sector must take place if production and marketings are to 
be increased. 
Investment 
Criteria for investment decisions were outlined in Chapter II. In­
vestment may be either productive or nonproductive. From a develop­
mental standpoint, the former is preferred. For a number of situations, 
the latter is entirely rational. Given a sufficiently-liberal inter-
^See the discussion of the elasticity of expectations with regard 
to prices in Chapter VII, p. 391. 
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prêtât ion, the present value rule in Equation 8.1 embodies the factors 
influencing investment decisions. The criterion of the rule is to 
select that investment opportunity from existing alternatives which 
results in the highest nonnegative present value. If the PV is nega­
tive, the investment should not be made ; if zero, the investor can be 
indifferent to that particular investment opportunity. It is not 
PV = -(I) + Z [R(t) - E(t)](l + P)"t + I (1 + p)-" (8.1) 
t=l " 
PV = Cs (1 + i)" (1 + P)""] -(S) (8.2) 
suggested that investors are actually able to quantify Equations 8.1 
and 8.2, but these equations summarize the factors which rational, 
prospective investors would tend to take into account. As already 
noted in Chapter II, the components in Equation 8.1 have the following 
interpretations : 
(1) -(I) is the initial monetary cost of the investment; 
(2) n is the final time period of the planning horizon in terms 
of the length of time over which net returns accrue to the investment 
or a self-imposed, constricted time period during which the investment 
must show a favorable return; 
(3) R(t) and E(t) are the estimated returns and costs, respectively, 
in the ( t = 1, ..., n) time periods for the particular investment 
opportunity being contemplated; 
(4) (1 + p) ^  is the discounting mechanism for determing the PV 
of the estimated net returns through time. The discount factor, p, in­
corporates considerations of the economic opportunity cost of invest­
ment, uncertainty, and social factors; and 
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(5) 1 (1 + p) "is the discounted terminal value of the investment 
n 
if the investment is not entirely used up in the production process. 
Nonproductive investment Consider nonproductive investment 
first. Such investment may be in the form of jewelry and ornaments, 
consumer durables, improved housing, hoarding, and in some cases, land 
purchases.^ Land is equally physically productive, ceteris paribus, 
whether it is owned or rented. It is in this context that investment 
through purchasing land is unproductive. Land ownership, however, 
likely motivates some producers to make investments which affect the 
land's productivity and to engage in cultivation practices which tend 
to maintain productivity through time. Where effective land rents are 
high, producers in favorable financial positions may have the incentive 
to purchase land thereby affecting the distribution of income and 
their own capacity to generate a capital surplus. In addition, land 
ownership provides psychic returns through the prestige and security 
it accords. The other forms of nonproductive investment provide 
similar returns. Jewelry and hoarding in the form of gold and other 
metals also provide a hedge against inflation and political instability 
affecting the value of paper currency. Since they have high liquidity, 
they can also be used readily to finance or secure financing for un­
foreseen contingencies. 
^To those not believing in the influence of patron saints and 
magical spirits on individual well-being, expenditures for religious 
ceremonies are, in a sense, nonproductive investment. To the believer 
whose religion embodies reincarnation, such expenditures can be viewed 
as highly productive investment, although in the nonphysical sense. 
Similarly, gifts to landlords and patrons may provide an intertemporal 
pay-off to the giver in terms of counsel, allocation of more productive 
tracts of land and a more secure tenurial arrangement. 
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Referring to Equation 8.1, the following intuitive interpretation is 
given to the components when nonproductive investments are considered: 
(1) The R(t) are the social and psychic returns referred to 
earlier which have a qualitative dimension. In the case of housing in­
vestment, maintenance costs would be reflected in the E(t); 
(2) p includes the opportunity cost associated with these in­
vestments. For example, the opportunity cost is the rate of return 
foregone by not making productive investments or by not placing the 
funds in a credit institutions where interest could be earned. Estimates 
of the rate of return to productive investment are scarce. If Schultz 
(8.61) is correct in his contention that the rate of return on invest­
ment in traditional inputs is low, the opportunity cost component in P 
is fairly small. Where improved inputs are available and adaptable, 
the opportunity cost would be substantially higher. In addition, un­
certainty associated with the estimated rate of return could be in­
corporated by reducing this estimated rate. Consequently, P would 
vary with the nature of productive inputs and with the price and pro­
duction uncertainty estimated to accompany these inputs. With land, 
the possibility of land reform and expropriation introduces an element 
of institutional uncertainty. The lower p, the less net returns are dis­
counted and the more attractive are nonproductive investments; 
(3) As noted previously, n is the length of the planning horizon 
which may be one year or an intergenerational time span. Consumer 
durables have a limited life of usefulness, as does housing. Conversely, 
land, jewelry and gold are essentially indestructible and provide returns 
over an extended period of time. Planning horizons also vary with the 
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personal attributes and attitudes of the investor; and 
(4) The more durable investments have a discounted terminal 
value since they are not used up or consumed during the planning period. 
Given the inflationary tendencies in many developing areas, the term 
1^(1+ p) " should be stated in real terras; i.e., the monetary value 
is adjusted to reflect the impact of inflation on prices paid by pro­
ducer-consumers. Since land and gold serve as a hedge against inflation, 
the monetary value of these investments at the end of the planning 
period would tend to rise with rising prices in the economy. 
Productive investment This category of investment includes 
undertakings such as constructing terraces, drainage ditches and irriga­
tion systems for land; adding new enterprises to the farm; purchasing 
draft animals and machinery; and placing funds in a credit institution 
or lending privately so that a return in addition to repayment of 
principal is realized. 
For productive investment in the firm. Equation 8.1 has its usual 
connotations. The R(t) and E(t) are the returns and costs, respectively, 
associated with the investment considered. These monetary values should 
be expressed in real terms to take account of changes in price levels. 
The length of the planning period, n, is the life of the investment or 
a shorter period during which the investor requires the project to be 
profitable. Constricting the planning period is one means of allowing 
for the different forms of uncertainty that are present. Alternatively, 
tenurial insecurity and production variability can be taken into account 
by increasing p. In situations where social pressure is a factor in in­
fluencing wealth accumulation through private investment, such social 
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factors can be incorporated by subjectively raising p. That is, as p is 
increased, the net returns must be sufficiently large to compensate for 
uncertainty and for adverse social phenomena. The rate of interest 
obtainable on savings accounts or through private lending serve as 
approximations of the opportunity cost component of P. The data in 
Chapter V on interest charges levied by private lenders suggest that the 
opportunity cost of productive investment is high. In addition, the 
localization of lending and borrowing reduces the uncertainty of de­
fault by the borrower. 
The discounted terminal value of the investment in Equation 8.1 is 
extremely important to potential investors. This is especially true 
for tenant operators. If the possibility of termination of tenure 
is high and the investor has no assurance of recovering the remaining 
capitalized real value of the investment, not only is the discounted 
terminal value equal to zero, but P is increased and(or) n is reduced. 
If allowance is made for compensating the investor for the remaining 
value of his investment, this component in Equation 8.1 will have a 
positive value and will influence the individual's investment decisions. 
If costs and returns are shared by the landlord and the tenant, the 
appropriate coefficients should be prefixed in Equation 8.1. 
Placing funds in public savings institutions provides not only high 
liquidity but a good deal of security. As indicated previously, the 
lack of such institutions in some rural areas and a general attitude 
of skepticism toward government-affiliated agencies reduce the number 
of individuals who can or do patronize these organizations. In Equation 
8.2, S is the quantity of funds placed in savings at the beginning of 
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and i is the interest rate paid which is compounded annually. As 
before, n is the terminal point of the planning period. The discount 
factor, P, represents opportunity cost plus allowance for uncertainty. 
Since compounded interest and principal are in monetary terms, they should 
be adjusted to real terms to reflect expected future changes in general 
price level of the economy. The opportunity cost of saving is the rate 
of return foregone by not making the most productive, alternative in­
vestment. In the case of traditional inputs, this opportunity cost may 
be relatively low. The uncertainty component in P would be essentially 
zero because of the high liquidity and assured returns associated with 
savings accounts. If p = i, the PV is zero only if prices are stable 
so that the real value of S is unchanged. With inflation, the real 
value of S in S(1 + i)^ will be less than the initial real value of 
the S deposited; i.e., the last term in Equation 8.2. Where savings 
institutions are not located in the saver's community, any expense in­
curred in making the initial deposit and final withdrawal must be 
considered. 
Private moneylending is often a profitable alternative especially 
where traditional inputs result in a low opportunity cost associated 
with lending.^ Short-term returns are relatively high and expenses low. 
Since lenders have a personal acquaintance with borrowers, the un­
certainty associated with possible default is also low. Equation 8.2 
is appropriate for moneylending also. In place of S, the quantity of 
^In this connection, Rahim notes that the strong demand for credit 
among East Pakistan farmers permits the relatively affluent producers to 
earn a 50 to 100 percent return on private lendings (8.57, p. 417). 
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funds lent is substituted. If the loan is repaid at the end of t^ and 
the principal plus interest is relent at the beginning of t^, the mone­
tary value of the initial loan plus interest is L(1 + i^)(l + ig). If 
the interest rates charged are invariant, at the end of the n-th period, 
the funds plus interest have a monetary value of L(1 + i)". More 
realistically, the value of the loan at the end of t^ is L(1 + ij^) less 
expenses involved in the lending transaction. 
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CHAPTER IX. INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the preceding chapters, a number of economic and social factors 
influencing individuals' production, consumption, and investment de­
cisions; resource productivity and agricultural output levels; and the 
well-being of agriculturalists as producers and consumers have been 
discussed. As was evident, individual factors could not be discussed 
independently of other factors. Rural credit institutions are related 
to marketing and land tenure systems. Producers* attitudes and ob­
jectives are influenced by tenurial arrangements; social systems; and the 
infrastructure of the economy, especially marketing, education and 
communications facilities. The marketing structure, in turn, is condi­
tioned by the nature of credit institutions, the level of producers* 
marketings and incomes, and the state of transportation and communications 
facilities. In attempting to describe and predict the behavior of agri­
culturalists, the interaction among these factors together with the 
impact of climatic forces must be assessed. Without an inventory of 
the quantity and productivity of the producer*s resources, including 
his personal attributes, and the choice indicators he faces, only a 
qualitative assessment of these factors can be made. This is the ob­
jective of the subsequent discussion. 
The focal point of departure is the small-scale producer whose de­
cisions and activities are essentially subsistence-oriented. This 
orientation is primarily the result of the producer's inability to 
generate an output level in excess of annual consumption requirements. 
I 
Although the implication is that the producer is "survival-oriented". 
4vn 
his consumption pattern nearly always contains items which are not 
physically consumed.^ The importance given to exchanging gifts, post-
harvest festivals and religious observances suggests possession of 
or access to financial means permitting levels of living above physical 
survival. The ubiquity of these expenditures also suggests the means 
for saving and additional capital accumulation in the econony. In 
addition, the majority of subsistence-oriented producers have some 
contact with an exchange or money economy where they obtain those items 
they consume but do not produce. Also, practices of hiring labor and 
supplying labor for hire are common in many areas. 
For heuristic purposes, the producer is subjected to a number of 
hypothetical, but meaningful, situations which affect his capacity and 
motivation to potentially improve his economic well-being. Through 
the use of these situations, as postulated, the transition or evolu­
tion of a subsistence-oriented producer toward a market-oriented pro­
ducer is described. This initial focal point should not obscure the 
/ 
fact that in any less-developed area producers operating on a variety 
of scales of production coexist. Both small-scale producers and planta­
tion growers produce for the export market. Subsistence-oriented and 
large-scale, commercial producers both contribute to meeting domestic 
food and fiber demands. The longer-term importance of the large number 
of small-scale producers is that they must eventually be more fully in­
tegrated into the economy. They also represent a huge potential market 
for indigenously-produced consumer goods. These factors suggest the 
^These expenditures are in addition to rents, taxes and debt re­
payment. 
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importance of understanding their motivation and capabilities to adjust 
and take advantage of economic changes as they occur. 
Production 
The frame of reference for resource allocation and production de­
cisions is given in Equation 9.1.^ The expression, incorporating the 
use of Lagrangean multipliers, can be viewed either as a utility maximiza­
tion or profit maximization problem depending upon whether the producer 
is subsistence- or market-oriented. In either case, producers' activi­
ties are subject to the constraints imposed in Equation 9.1, the estima­
ted price relationships, and the physical productivity of the production 
inputs used. It is not presumed that producers are actually able to 
n 
J = 2 p.q. + M-
i=l ^ ^ 
{_[F](q^, •••'%)} (9.1) 
quantify Equation 9.1 and complete the calculations described later. 
Rather, Equation 9.1 reflects those factors producers take into account 
when making their production decisions. The marginal conditions for 
economic efficiency, which are derived below, represent the conditions 
producers tend to approximate in order to maximize their objectives sub­
ject to the constraints imposed. Equation 9.1 is interpreted below. 
^Tenant-producers are not considered,in this chapter. The dis­
cussion at several other points in the study should have emphasized 
some of the problems peculiar to tenants. However, they confront many 
of the same problems faced by small-scale owner-operators. 
m 
K + cp 
S 
- Z 
k=l 
A'JH 
Outputs and valuations 
n 
In the expression Z p.q., the q. are the n outputs produced for 
i=l 1 1 1 
consumption and(or) exchange. For simplification, assume all are 
crops. The corresponding p^ are the implicit prices or valuations re­
flecting consumption requirements and preferences for those goods 
directly consumed and the exchange values for those traded or sold.^ 
The exchange values are determined according to supply-demand conditions 
in the marketplace. For example, p^ results from that price or ex­
change value which equates the aggregate demand and supply for q^ such 
that D^(p^) = Sj^(p^). At a later stage when producers are market-
oriented, all the p^ (i = 1, ..., n) represent the prices received by 
producers in the market. At this point, it is not necessary to de­
signate which q^ are consumed directly and which are exchanged. 
Working capital constraint 
m 
In the working capital constraint, P [k° — Z rr.q.], the terms 
j=l J J 
have differing connotations depending upon whether the producer is 
subsistence-oriented or market-oriented. Consider the subsistence-
oriented producer first. K° represents a "wages fund" concept where 
K° is a stock of commodities, theoretically aggregated according to 
calories or some other common denominator, which is used to sustain 
laborers and draft animals whose services are used in the production 
process. The q^ are the variable inputs used by the firm. For this 
class of producer, the variable inputs are largely services from labor, 
^A question may exist as to the legitimacy of summing implicit con­
sumer valuations based on consumption patterns and prices in terms of 
exchange values. Figure 2.1 denotes the derivation of the implicit 
"price" ratio; i.e., ratio of consumer valuations, between two commodities. 
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both family and hired, and from draft animals. Seed requirements are 
also included. The denote the "demands" on K° which, in turn, per­
mit the qj to provide their services. For example, the represent 
the additional consumption laborers and draft animals require if they 
are to be physically able to provide an increment of input services to 
the production process. The q^ represent different classes of labor 
classified, for example, on the basis of age, sex, and hired versus 
nonhired labor. The , therefore, vary with the respective q^. 
Implicitly, a linear relationship exists between the and the re­
spective quantities of q^ used. 
Referring to Figure 8.1, the point of tangency between the income 
possibility curve and the marginal rate of substitution of income for 
leisure represents the producer's preferred labor-leisure-income 
pattern. The question arises as to whether or not sufficient means; 
i.e., K°, exists for sustaining that amount of labc". If K° is 
* 
sufficient to support only L^L of labor and if financing in terms of K 
is not secured, the producer is forced to choose more leisure over 
labor. The alternative is to offer a portion of his labor services for 
hire, which would otherwise be devoted to leisure, so that his income 
from the firm and from wages approaches the desired level If ex­
ternal employment is not available, then since the producer in Figure 
* 
8.1 would prefer to expend L^L of labor to generate of income, 
he is, in effect, involuntarily unemployed to the extent of of 
labor inputs. In this situation, government transfers, for example, 
in the form of food assistance to augment K°, would physically permit 
the producer to use more labor inputs so as to earn a higher income. A 
500 
portion of this incremental income may flow to the government and to 
other sectors of the economy.^ If K° permits the producer to reach 
point A, he is, according to his objective, fully employed at that 
point. Society, however, may view him as being less than fully 
o * 
employed. If K exceeds that necessary to sustain L^L of labor, a 
portion need not be consumed or the can be increased until K° is 
exhausted. The increase in and the consequent greater capacity to 
work conceivably shift the income possibility curve upward for each 
level of labor input. Both income and utility levels could be in-
, 2 
creased. 
For the market-oriented producer, K° is defined as the producer's 
working capital expressed in monetary terms. The q. are again the 
variable inputs. In addition to labor and draft animal inputs, 
fertilizer, inputs of irrigation water, and machine services are in­
cluded. The TT. are rewritten as p. where the latter are the actual 
J J 
prices or opportunity costs of obtaining and using these inputs. 
For the two classes of producers, the Lagrangean multiplier H has 
a different interpretation. For subsistence-oriented producers, P 
represents the marginal utility derived from consuming the goods pro­
ducible with an additional unit of K. For market-oriented producers, 
M- represents the marginal value product obtainable with an additional 
unit of K. 
^As the K° of other producers is increased, the aggregate effect 
on individual real and money incomes will be affected by the capacity 
of the marketing system to absorb increased marketings, by market 
prices received, and by the effect on prices for consumer goods as per 
capita incomes of producers vary. 
2 See preceding footnote. 
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Land constraint: 
Land, as one of the inputs of the production process, acts as an 
additional constraint on the scope of producer's activities. Tenants 
are constrained by the amount of lend they can rent and owner-operators 
by the amount they own and can rent as tenants. In areas of shifting 
cultivation, the land constraint represents the amount of land cleared 
for production. Where land is communally held, individual land con­
straints are determined by centrally- or collectively-determined land 
allocations. 
s 
In Equation 9.1, the land constraint is expressed as 9 Cl - Z 8 q ]. 
k=l 
L° is defined as the aggregate of land services, as distinguished from 
the number of acres or hectares under cultivation. The q^ represent 
the different classes of land in terms of productivity. Where land 
is inherited by more than one member of the family and where each class 
of land is equally divided so that the aggregate amount of land in each 
inheritance is of nearly equal value, successive fragmentation of land 
holdings occurs. Thus, each producer usually holds land of varying 
productivity. The 6^ are the indicators of productivity. If q^ is 
twice as productive as q^, 8^ = 28^ and q^ provides twice as many land 
services in the aggregated L°. The Lagrangean multiplier 9 has the 
same Interpretation as M- but in terms of an increment in L° rather than 
K°. 
Implicit production function 
i 
The production function in Equation 2.37, for example, is in ex­
plicit form. However, stating the production function in an implicit 
form has advantages when the marginal conditions for economic ef­
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ficiency are derived. The implicit production function [F](q^, ...., q^) 
is actually a composite of n production functions; i.e., one for each of 
the n outputs. The term [F] may be viewed as a vector of the n functions. 
For example, if q, is an output, q, = F Cq.jq, ] where q. are the vari-
i- i- 1 J K J 
able inputs including labor, fertilizer and irrigation water while q^ 
are the variable land inputs. The expression [F](q^, ..., q^) is an 
abbreviated form of [F](q^, ..., q^, ..., q^; , Ag) 
where n+m+s = v and q = q. , and q ,, = q, ,. The notation becomes 
n+l J=1 m+1 k=l 
somewhat cumbersome, but the concept is that m different inputs of 
working capital and ^  different land inputs are available for producing 
n different outputs. Not every input is necessarily used to produce 
every output. 
Marginal conditions for economic efficiency 
The first-order marginal conditions for economic efficiency for a 
constrained revenue maximization problem were derived in Equations 2.9 
to 2.18. Since the marginal conditions will be frequently referred to 
in this chapter, they are restated. In addition, the formulation in 
Equation 9.1 which serves as the basis for deriving the marginal condi­
tions is a modified version of Equation 2.9. Upon taking the partial 
derivates of Equation 9.1 with respect to the q^(i = 1, ..., v), M-, 9, 
and X and setting these equal to zero, the following sets of equations 
are derived: 
+ = 0 (i = 1, ..., n) (9.2) 
^ = 0 <9.3) 
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= -cpQ, + &F, ^  = 0 (k = 1, s) 5j 
^ ^  (i = 1, ..., n) (9.4) 
m 
#- - - .fjVj ° ° 
#- -1'" - J/A = ° 
Bj 
ax 
= [F](q^, ..., q^) =0 (9.7) 
Selecting any two equations from Equation 9.3 and(or) Equation 9.4 
and dividing the two, the least-cost combinations of using inputs are 
obtained, as in Equations 9.8a to 9.8f. These results must be satisfied 
for any combination of inputs. 
f!r_ = MRgi (j, r = 1, ..., m) 
"r pi Mppi a/ j-r (i = 1, .... n) (9.8a) 
r r 
MPP^ MPP^ 
J- = (9.8b) 
"j 
9 MPPI ôq^ (k, 1=1,...,s) 
0^ = —— = ^ = ^^k-1 (i = 1' n) (9.8c) 
1 MPP^" \ 
MPP,^ MPP^ k _ 1 
\ ®1 
TT. F^ MPP^ oq 
= -4- = —4 = 7 - MRS , 
k MPP^ k k 
(9.8d) 
(j = 1, . '# # ; in ) 
(k = 1, . 9 ® ) (9.8e) 
(i = 1, . • • • > II) 
504 
Equation 9.8f summarizes the necessary result that the marginal physical 
product corresponding to the last increment of each variable input must 
be equal for all inputs in the production of each of the n outputs. 
Similarly, selecting any two equations from Equation 9.2 and 
dividing the two, the optimal output configuration is obtained, as in 
Equation 9.9. This result must be satisfied for any combination of 
outputs. 
P; pi 
—^ = -V = = RPT (i, h = 1, ..., n) (9.9) 
Ph 3q. 
Finally, selecting any one equation from Equation 9.2 and dividing 
this by any equation from Equation 9.3 and(or) Equation 9.4, the 
necessary input-output relationships are derived in Equations 9.10a 
to 9.10d. 
-M-TT. Ft Ôq_ 1. = = _ _2i i = (1, n) 
p i ôq j = (1, ..., m) (9.10a) 
1 r J 
MPP^P . 
—= MVP: = p. (9.10b) 
-_fk = iL = Jli ' i = (1, n) 
p^ pi Bq^ k = (1, ..., s) (9.10c) 
MPP^P. 
e, ^ = MVP, = cp (9.10d) 
If Equations 9.8f, 9.9, and 9.10d are satisfied simultaneously, 
subject to Equations 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7; if the second-order conditions 
for a constrained maximization problem are met; and if the implicit 
assumptions of non-negativity for all goods and coefficients hold, an 
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optimum resource allocation pattern resulting in an optimum output 
configuration is determined. Of course, the output configuration is 
only the planned or expected one. The actual output realized, given 
the planned resource allocation, is subject to the producer's ability 
to estimate the technical coefficients of production and the exogenous 
forces of nature. The producer's next decision is that of disposing of 
the realized outputs so as to maximize his level of utility. The com­
modities can be consumed directly, exchanged for other commodities which 
are consumed, or stored for future contingencies. A number of additional 
claims on income such as land rent, debt repayment, taxes, replenish­
ment of K°, and maintenance of fixed resources usually exist. Most of 
these additional claims must be met if output levels are to be maintained 
in subsequent production periods. Only that output or income which is 
in excess of these fixed and variable costs is relevant for the pro­
ducer's consumption decisions. In order to systematize the discussion 
of the producer as a consumer, the producer is assumed to have some 
contact with an exchange or money economy. As the producer moves away 
from subsistence- towards market-oriented production, the frequency of 
contact with the money economy steadily increases. 
Exchange Economy 
The basic operation of an exchange economy was discussed in 
Chapter VI. Since the equations specified there will be used again in 
the discussion of a series of postulated situations affecting producer 
and consumer behavior, the equations are restated so as to facilitate 
reference to them. Equation 9.11 represents the excess demand for the 
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i-th good by the r-th producer. The terms and q°^ denote the quanti­
ty demanded and brought to the market, respectively, of the i-th good 
by the r-th producer. The result from the maximizing formulation in 
Equation 9.1. The q^^ result from the implicit demand function given 
in Equation 9.12.^ If is positive, the r-th producer has a net de­
mand for q^; if negative, he supplies q^ in exchange for some other 
commodity. 
E. = q, - q? (i = 1, ..., n) (9.11) ir ir ir (r = 1, ..., t) 
q.^ = f(Pi/Pi/h Yp:?) (i, h = 1, ..., n) (9.12) 
" o 
^ P.q._ = Z P_.q.._ (r = 1, ..., t) (9.13) 
i=l i=l 
n n 
Z p.(q. - q? ) = 2 P.E. =0 (r = 1, ..., t) (9.14) 
i=l ^ ^ i=l ^ ^ 
" o 
The value of his endowment, in effect his income, is ^ p.q. , as 
i=l ^ 
n 
in Equation 9.13; Z P.q. represents the value of expenditures on the 
i=l ^ 
q^ demanded. The p^ represent the exchange values in terms"of a 
numeraire. Excluding the possibility of çredit financing, the maximum 
value of goods obtained through exchange is restricted to the value of 
the producer's endowment. This contraint is satisfied in Equation 9.13. 
This represents the r-th producer's budget constraint which is restated 
in Equation 9.14 in terms of excess demands. That is, the total value 
of the r-th producer's excess demands must sum to zero. 
The functional relationship specifies that demand for q^, for ex­
ample, is a function of p^ relative to prices of other consumer goods, 
monetary income, and T = tastes and preferences. 
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The producer as a consumer derives utility from goods he consumes. 
These goods include the obtained in the market plus the goods pro­
duced and consumed directly. The r-th producer's utility function is 
stated in Kquation 9.15. The vector [c] represents the respective 
quantities of those goods produced and consumed directly.^ By Equation 
9.11, the utility function can be rewritten as in Equation 9.16. The 
producer's objective, now operating as a consumer, is to maximize 
Equation 9.16 subject to his budget constraint, Equation 9.14. The 
constrained utility maximization problem is represented in Equation 9.17 
with the use of a Lagrangean multiplier, ^ . 
"r " "r^'^lr' ^nr'^^^^ (9.13) 
"r ' VVL (9.16) 
^ = "r«lr + <r- •- V + 
The first-order conditions for utility maximization by the r-th 
producer-consumer are obtained by taking the first partial derivates of 
Equation 9.17 with respect to the E.^(i = 1, ..., n) and A. and setting 
these equal to zero. 
dS OU 
^ ^ . Xp .  0 (9.18) 
Ir Ir 
ÔS dU 
âT ^ âf" - = 0 
nr nr 
^The vector [C1 corresponds to the ccanmodities retained for direct 
consumption in the price elasticity of quantities marketed formulations 
discussed in Chapter VII. 
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1=1 
SE. 
ince —_i£. = Equation 9.18 can be rewritten as; 
^ir 
ÔU ÔE ÔU 
° â^" S • " (9.18) 
ÔU ÔE ÔU 
r _ nr , _ r 
- - Â: - Ap - G ÔE ôq ^n ôq 'n 
nr ^nr ^nr 
ÔU / ôq Xp ôq p 
au / aq ° T ' ®'i-n 
r ^nr ^n ^Ir "^n 
Taking any two equations, for example, the first and last from Equation 
set 9.18' and dividing, the r-th producer maximizes his utility when the 
marginal rate of substitution between the two goods is equal to their 
inverse price ratio. This condition must hold for all combinations of 
q.. When both Equation 9.20 and the second-order conditions for a 
constrained maximization problem have been satisfied, the r-th in­
dividual has maximized his utility by the appropriate production, exchange, 
and consumption decisions. 
Subsistence- and market-oriented producers co-exist. In the follow­
ing discussion, a number of situations affecting the producer's capabili­
ty and incentive to make the transformation from subsistence- to market-
oriented production are postulated. This transition, or rather the 
tendency towards market-orientation, is not an irreversible process. 
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Subsistence production represents the home base to which producers can 
return when adverse economic conditions reduce the profitability of 
producing for the market. The return to essentially-subsistence pro­
duction is rational as long as adverse economic conditions persist. 
The relative lack of farm management studies for most less-
developed areas forces economists and national planners to rely on 
aggregate production data.^ Not only are such data usually considered 
suspect but the aggregates mask the nature of individual economic 
activity. Increased aggregate output does not imply increases on the 
part of all producers. 
Case 1: Planned Production Equals Planned Consumption 
Given the essentially-unpredictable impact of environmental condi­
tions on production levels, the situation in Case 1 would only be co­
incidental. Nevertheless, Case 1 does help to orient the discussion 
of subsequent case situations. 
After the components of Equation 9.1 have been specified and the 
marginal conditions for efficiency have been met, the resulting planned 
output configuration is such that (1) The outputs of q^ (i = 1, ..., n) 
are equal to the respective quantities consumed in [c]; and (2) The 
quantity of q^ produced is equal to the amount consumed directly and 
that marketed in order to expend E = CP I^EE] + FC = Considering 
^The studies in economics of farm management conducted by the 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
in India are exceptions. 
^Recall that [Ê] represents a vector of those consumer goods pur­
chased from a merchant-trader, and FC denotes any fixed cash payments for 
rent and taxes. At low stages of economic development, E is assumed to 
be fixed for subsistence- (footnote continued on the following page) 
. 
I 
1 
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the r-th producer, the excess demands in Equation 9.11 for q^ (i = 1, 
..., n-1) are equal to zero; q^ = q° for these n-1 commodities. The 
excess demand for q^ is negative since q^ = 0, q° > 0 and q^ - q° < 0. 
The negative excess demand indicates that q^ is marketed. Let [Êl be 
represented by q^^^ and q^^^. Since q°^^ = *^^+2 ~ excess de­
mands for these two goods are positive. In determining the conditions 
for utility maximization in Case 1, only q > q ,,» and q need be 
n n+i n+z 
considered. According to Equation 9.13 the r-th producer's income is:^ 
n+2 o o o 
Y = Z P.q. where q ,i = q = 0. Expenditures are equal to Y = 
r . 1 ir ^n+1 ^n+2 r i=n 
n+2 
Z p.q. where q =0. Subtracting the r-th producer's income from his 
i=n ^ ^ 
expenditures, assuming the value of goods sold must equal the value of 
purchases, his budget constraint is expressed in Equation 9.21. The r-th 
producer-consumer's utility function is given in Equation 9.22 and the 
n+2 n+2 
^ Pi(q,r - q°,) - z P,E - 0 (9.21) 
i=n i=n 
\ ' "r(En + <• Vl + <+l' V2 + 
n+2 
- k ( Z p.E,^) (9.23) 
i=n ^ 
constrained utility maximization problem in Equation 9,23. Taking the 
first partial derivates of Equation 9.23 with respect to E^, E^^^, 
(footnote continued from preceding page) oriented producers. Recall 
further that only one go^d, q , Is marketed to provide the income 
necessary to undertake E . All goods produced in excess of Cc] 
and the marketed are exchanged according to the mechanics of the 
exchange economy. 
'^Since the excess demands for q.(i = 1, ..., n-1) are zero, these 
q^ are excluded from Equations 9.13 and 9.14. 
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E and ^ and setting these derivates equal to zero, the following 
n+2 
equations are derived: 
ÔS ÔU 
^ - ^P- = 0 (i = n, n+1, n+2) (9.24) 
"^^ir *Gir ^ 
ÔS n+2 
= - ( ï = 0 (9.25) 
i=n 
Since ÔE.^/ &q^^ = 1, Equation 9.26 holds. Dividing any two equations 
of 9.26, Equation 9.27 is obtained. 
ÔU BE. 
^ - \p. = 0 (i = n, n+1, n+2) (9.26) 
^^ir ^^ir 
MU MU ,, MU ,„ 
_n= _il±i = -JSji (9.27) 
^n ^n+1 ^n+2 
In Equation 9.27, is the price received for the q^ marketed; it 
is also the opportunity cost associated with directly consuming q^. 
Therefore, the marginal utility of consuming q^ per monetary unit of p^ 
must equal the marginal utilities derived in consuming q^^^ and 
each divided by its respective cost. The second-order conditions are 
assumed to b<î satisfied. Equation 9.27 indicates that utility has been 
maximized subject to the budget constraint, prices for consumer goods, 
and implicitly, [c]. The more general condition that holds is: 
MU MU MU 
—i = —^ = ... = —^ (9.28) 
^1 ^2 ^n+2 
In the absence of change, the production and consumption patterns which 
are evolved would be repeated from one time period to the next. Of course. 
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the influences of weather, the effect of changes in the family cycle on 
consumption patterns, and the appearance of unforeseen contingencies 
make invariant production and consumption patterns unrealistic. 
Case 2: Actual Production Exceeds Planned Production of 
In this situation, the production of q^(i =1, n) is still 
assumed to equal the planned consumption as reflected in Ccl. However, 
the actual production of q^ is greater than that amount necessary to 
satisfy direct consumption and to expend E = p^q^^ The "surplus" q^ 
may be the consequence of favorable weather during the production period. 
Alternatively, the estimated p^ used for planning the amount of q^ that 
must be produced and marketed is less than the actual p^ received by 
"k 
the producer so that less q^ needs to be marketed to undertake E . 
Furthermore, the prices in [pg] may have fallen. In any of the above 
circumstances, a smaller amount of q^ needs to be marketed. Initially, 
income is greater than expenditures, as in Equation 9.29. 
n+2 n+2 
Y_ = E p q° > T. p q (9.29) 
^ i=n 1 i=n ^ 
The question now arises as to the disposition of the "surplus" q^. 
A number of alternatives exist. The number considered by the producer 
depends partly upon the length of his planning horizon and the size of 
the "surplus". If the "surplus" is relatively small, buying land is 
not a feasible alternative. If his planning horizon only extends to the 
next production period, productive investment yielding a flow of returns 
over several periods is not an important alternative. This short planning 
horizon is assumed to constrain producer's alternatives in Case 2. Some 
of the more-feasible alternatives open to the producer include the 
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following : 
(1) Increase consumption of q^; 
(2) Increase consumption of [lil; 
(3) Increase consumption of some of the other q^(i =1, n-1) 
through exchange of the "surplus" q^; 
(4) Place in inventories for any contingencies which may arise 
in the coming production period; and 
(5) Invest in nonproductive items such as jewelry and ornaments, 
expend socially, or place in hoards. 
Investments in durables, such as jewelry, provide a flow of psychic 
returns as long as the items are held. In this sense they are unpro­
ductive. Indirectly, they provide at least a partial means for making 
productive investment when they are used as collateral for securing 
external financing. Since such durables are held beyond the production 
period planning horizon, they will not be considered in Case 2. Items 
(1) and (3) may provide a return in the subsequent production period if 
through increased consumption producers' physical well-being is improved 
so that they have a greater physical capacity to work. Depending on the 
pattern of current consumption and the amounts by which consumption is 
increased, the income-possibility curves in Figure 8.5 may shift upward 
at all points. Even where savings institutions exist, as in post 
offices and credit associations, they will not be considered in Case 2. 
This is because of assumed unfamiliarity or mistrust of these institu­
tions by producers at low stages of economic development. Finally, in­
creasing K° is a feasible alternative. Since this involves interproduc­
tion periods, it will not be considered at this point. 
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Since all these alternatives are eventually consumption-oriented, 
the best utilization of the "surplus" is that which maximizes utility 
during the planning period. For convenience, let hoarding be included 
in (4) and assume that contingency stocks are not carried forward into 
the next production period. Alternatives (1), (2), and (3) can be 
considered within the context of the exchange system specified in Case 
1. For alternatives (4) and (5), two additional consumer goods are 
added. Let = contingency stocks and q^^ = social and religious 
expenditures.^ Although they are introduced as new goods, it is likely 
that producers in Case 1 also made social and religious expenditures. 
The demand for contingency stocks, is a function of a number 
of factors. Although such demand would vary with individuals. Equation 
9.30 represents an implicit demand function which includes the most 
important parameters. In Equation 9.30, Lc] and [E] are as previously 
qn+3 = S([C], CE], , S, 0, A) (9.30) 
defined; the other components are identified as: 
2 Op = Variability of production from one production period to the 
next, primarily as the result of weather conditions 
S = Existence of storage facilities and the costs of storage, 
including spoilage 
0 = Opportunity cost in terms of deferred gratification in con­
sumption foregone and in terms of the potential costs associated with 
necessity for external financing to meet contingencies. 
^Social expenditures can also have intertemporal returns in that 
they may help to ensure, for example, favorable renting and credit 
arrangements. 
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A = Attitudes of the producer whether, for example, emphasis is on 
fatalism as compared with planned actions, even though on a short-term 
bas is. 
For subsistence-oriented producers at relatively-low stages of 
economic development, the combination of a limited capacity to generate 
a "surplus" of and short planning periods tends to motivate producers 
to increase consumption rather than place in stocks for contingencies. 
Where an attitude of fatalism prevails, production variability and 
necessity to resort to credit financing are considered as phenomena over 
which the producer has no control. Where climatic factors are not 
favorable, the costs of storage are high. In areas where ties of the 
extended family are still strong, any stocks planned for contingencies 
may be "demanded" for consumption by other family members. 
Social and religious expenditures often have a strong claim on 
available Income. Even at relatively-low levels of per capita income, 
the observance of social proprieties maintains or Increases the social 
status of the producer. The observance of social events in the family, 
postharvest festivals, and offerings to village saints and religious 
spirits are often costly in terms of available Income.^ But to the pro­
ducer, there is a certain practicality to these expenditures. Mainten­
ance of social status helps to ensure his well-being as fellow villagers 
offer assistance when adversities occur. Postharvest festivals are a 
means of solidifying labor-exchange and collective work arrangements. 
'some of these phenomena were described in Chapter VIII. See, for 
example, the discussion of the civ11-religious hierarchy in Latin 
America and traditional religion in Africa. 
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Gifts to the landlord or patron may be reciprocated by giving the donor 
favorable treatment in renting and credit-financing arrangements. Again, 
where fatalism is strong, contributions to saints and spirits are viewed 
as means toward ensuring favorable production in the next period, good 
health, and general well-being of the producer's family. To the ex­
ternal observer, fatalism may appear as highly irrational. If the pro­
ducer does not have a creditable alternative, fatalistic attitudes are 
also rational attitudes to him. An implicit demand function for social 
and religious expenditures is given in Equation 9.31 where Cc], [E] and 
A are as in Equation 9.30 where: 
Q^^ = h([c], [E], P^^, SS, A) (9.31) 
p = Monetary or opportunity costs associated with these ex-
penditures 
SS = Social status and obligations of the producer as they affect 
his relationship to the community and to those wielding the most power 
over him. 
Before introducing q^^^ and q^^ into the exchange economy, their 
respective prices must be interpreted. Let p^^ be viewed as the larger 
of the opportunity cost of marketings foregone or the opportunity cost 
of foregone increased consumption of q^. Let be the larger of 
actual costs of social and religious expenditures or the opportunity 
costs of these outlays. 
The process of deriving the conditions for utility maximization is 
the same as for Case 1. Since the individual is assumed to be unable 
to affect the p^(i = n, ..., n44), placing the "surplus" q^ on the market 
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for exchange by the r-th producer would not affect the p^ he receives 
nor the p^(l = n+1, n-+A). The producer is able to affect the p^ 
(i = 1, n-1), however, since those have been defined as implicit 
consumer valuations. As the absolute "'JIKI relative fonsimipi ion levels ol 
these q^(i =1, ..., n) are varied, the corresponding p^ are also ex­
pected to change. Thus, for those goods which are both consumed 
directly and obtained through exchange with q^, two valuations for 
the same good result: (1) The implicit consumer valuation, and (2) 
The exchange value or market price of the good. The use of implicit 
consumer valuations must be abandoned at this point. That is, they 
may be still used in specifying Equation 9.1; but since a "surplus" 
is now available for exchange, the exchange values of the q^ are the 
relevant prices for determining the actual consumption pattern which 
maximizes utility. The p^, in terms of consumer valuations, were 
important in deriving the planned production and consumption patterns. 
The exchange values can be viewed as the opportunity costs of consumption. 
Equations 9.11 through 9.20 also apply here. The only difference 
is that i = 1, ..., n-H. Again, if the second-order conditions are 
satisfied, the consumption pattern which maximizes utility is that for 
which Equation 9.32 holds. If the prices are fixed and the units of 
Pi P2 Pn-H. 
consumer goods perfectly divisible, increasing the consumption of one 
good, for example, q^, will lower the marginal utility of the last incre-
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ment of q consumed.^ The equality stated in Equation 9.28 no longer 
holds. The consumption levels of all other goods must be increased be­
fore equality is restored as in Equation 9.32. 
At this point, only the individual producer-consumer has been 
considered. Only in this situation can prices received and paid be 
assumed invariant as the individual in question determines his market­
ing and consumption decisions. As additional producers generate 
"surpluses", this assumption must be relaxed. The only exception is 
an unlikely situation where all prices are fixed through government 
policies. The introduction of price variations is deferred to Case 4. 
Case 3: Actual Production is Less Than 
Planned Production of q 
n 
This situation is similar to that encountered in Case 2 with the 
exception that actual production of q^ is less than that planned amount 
necessary to purchase E = p^q^ and to meet planned, direct consumption 
of Q^. If E =[PG][E] + FC is to be maintained, a portion of [E] must 
be advanced on credit by the merchant or external financing must be ob-
2 tained. Alternatively, the producer can provide labor services for 
hire to generate additional income if such opportunities exist. Assume 
that excess demands for the other q^(i =1, n-1) are still zero 
and that consumption requirements or demands cannot be reduced below the 
^The usual assumption of diminishing marginal utility with higher 
consumption levels has implicitly been. made. 
2 Alternatively, credit in kind is secured for a portion of q so 
that the planned consumption and necessary marketing of q can 
take place. 
519 
essentially subsistence levels.^ The r-th producer's income is given in 
Equation 9.33. His income, however, is less than his planned ex­
penditures . 
n+2 n+2 
"'r = PiV "= (9-33) 
i=n i=n 
n+2 n+2 
Yr = PiS°r + C; . g (9.34) 
i=n 1-1 
To remove the inequality, the necessary amount of credit, C^, is 
added to the income from the q° actually marketed, as in Equation 9.34. 
The utility function for the r-th producer-consumer and his budget 
constraint are given in Equations 9.35 and 9.36, respectively. The 
constrained utility maximization problem is of the same format as in 
"r ' Vl- 1i.+2= 
n+2 
Z p.E. + C =0 (9.36) 
i=n ^ ^ ^ 
Equation 9.23. If the first- and second-order conditions for a con­
strained maximization problem are satisfied, utility is maximized when 
the actual consumption pattern results in Equation 9.37 being satisfied. 
Pl "2 P„+2 
i 
^This is not consistent with an earlier statement that some of 
the q^ may represent demand for social expenditures. If they are, they 
could be reduced even for subsistence-oriented producers. 
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The -ind must be given a modified interpretation. In 
addition to the prices charged by the merchant-trader for these items, 
the real cost is the retail price plus the effective cost of the 
credit obtained. 
The consumption pattern has been maintained only through the use 
of external financing. The credit plus interest must subsequently 
be repaid. The question of generating the means for repayment arises. 
According to Figure 8.5, if the marginal rate of substitution of leisure 
for income changes and if K° is sufficient to sustain a larger level of 
labor employment, a higher income can be planned. That is, the new 
income is sufficiently high to permit the producer to maintain his 
usual consumption pattern and to repay the credit advanced. If 
additional income is not available through revenue from increased pro­
duction or from income earned off the farm, the original debt must be 
refinanced. Indebtedness becomes even more burdensome if a series of 
unfavorable production periods occurs. As was noted in Chapter V, 
continued indebtedness greatly reduces the bargaining position of the 
debtor and is often a very costly situation to him. The source of 
credit is important. Relatives may be willing to defer repayment until 
the producer's income position improves. Landlords may use indebtedness 
as a lever for raising the producer's rent. Merchant-traders may put 
a double squeeze on debtors who are effectively forced to patronize 
these individuals. The merchant may both pay the producer a lower price 
for the output he markets and charge him a higher price for the items re­
tailed by the merchant. Professional moneylenders exert a continuing 
hold over their debtors. If the debt level becomes too high, the money­
y/. I 
lender may eventually appropriate the land of the debtor in lieu of debt 
repayment. To some extent, existing social pressure in the village 
tends to constrain the degree to which merchants and resident money­
lenders can exploit their debtors. Even though they provide useful 
and necessary services, the credit terms associated with these private 
sources of credit teild to reduce the ability of subsistence-oriented 
producers to generate a surplus for debt repayment, for increasing 
consumption, and perhaps eventually for productive investment in the 
firm. 
Case 4: Production in Terms of Exchange Values With 
"Surpluses" Generated by Several Producers 
This situation is a modification of Case 2 where a single individual 
generated a "surplus" of which was subsequently consumed and(or) ex­
changed in the market according to prevailing exchange values. This 
increased contact with the exchange economy is postulated to affect the 
producer's behavior regarding production and consumption decisions. The 
increased awareness of benefits through exchange and of the relative ex­
change values of goods in the market cause at least some producers to 
alter their production and consumption patterns. A portion of the 
goods previously produced and consumed directly, where the last incre­
ments consumed provided relatively-small increments of utility, can be 
exchanged either for goods not produced or goods produced in only 
relatively-small quantities. Such is the basis and the reason for the 
existence of an exchange economy. 
The relevant prices for production and consumption decisions are 
no longer the implicit consumer valuations, but the exchange values of 
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goods in the market. These values represent the following: (1) 
Marginal revenues earned by goods marketed, (2) Opportunity costs of 
goods produced and directly consumed, and (3) Prices or acquisition 
costs of goods consumed but not produced. The constrained maximization 
problem represented in Equation 9.1 is now in terms of maximizing total 
value of goods produced subject to the K and L constraints and the 
estimated p^, the respective exchange values. If the first- and 
second-order conditions for economic efficiency are satisfied, a re­
source allocation and planned production configuration result. The 
actual production realized affects consumption and marketing decisions. 
The actual production is a function of planned production and the effect 
of weather and other exogenous factors. 
Producers can effect some control over exogenous factors though 
the use of pesticides, herbicides, improved seed varieties, and better 
cultivation practices. These inputs, however, have not yet been intro­
duced into the environment of the r-th producer. The concept of a 
"surplus" being a quantity produced in excess of traditional consumption 
requirements is no longer valid. Direct consumption represented by Cc] 
is relaxed. Consumption patterns now vary with the range of goods 
available through exchange, the exchange ratios, and the budget con­
straint of each of the t producer-consumers. "Surpluses" are now in 
terms of negative excess demands. Again, demand for the individual q^ 
is represented by Equation 9.12. As in Case 2, some of the q°^ for tjie 
r-th producer can be increased by favorable weather during the production 
period. The q° also increase for other producers in the area. Assume 
that only q° increases over the planned production level. 
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For a point of departure, assume that each of the t producers is 
in equilibrium. That is, a set of prices exists so that the excess de­
mands for each commodity by each producer-consumer are equal to zero, 
as in Equation 9.38 and Equation 9.20 holds for all t producer-consumers. 
p/ \ _ n n+2 ) 
EirCPi» , Pn+2^ " (r = 1, t) (9.38) 
The increased production of q^ upsets the previously-postulated 
equilibrium. Not only does MU vary with a change in consumption, 
but aggregate variations in the quantity of q^ marketed affect p^ and, 
in turn, the real and monetary incomes of the t producer-consumers. 
As a consequence of price and income changes, changes in the relative 
demand for the q^ cause a secondary or, theoretically, a simultaneous 
round of forces to be set into motion. As demands for the q^^ vary so 
does the (p^, ..., p^^^) price configuration which, in turn, affects 
producer's incomes as in Equation 9.13. Only a general equilibrium 
solution can provide a price configuration such that Equations 9.20 and 
9.38 are satisfied and individual utility is maximized subject to the 
constraints involved. 
The problems of determinancy, in the absence of a general equi­
librium solution, can be elucidated by considering the decision-making 
processes of an individual producer-consumer. In Figure 9.1, the 
producer-consumer is assued to consume only two commodities, q^ and q^. 
Assume that only q^ is produced. Point A represents the initial equi­
librium. The individual has produced Oq° which provides revenue amount­
ing to = P^<1°* Each point on is an economically-feasible combina­
tion of and which can be consumed. ITiat is, with and the pre-
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Figure 9.1. Optimum consumption patterns as relative prices and 
income vary 
m 
vailing p^, the maximum amount of that can be consumed is Oq^; however, 
the entire quantity Oq° must be marketed. Alternatively, if Oq° is con­
sumed, no revenue is available to purchase q^. At point A, MU^ / p^ = 
1 ^1 MU^ / p^, and utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint R -
n 1 o 
The producer-consumer's optimizing behavior is to market q^q^ of q^ 
and consume Oqand Oq^ of the two goods. 
* 
With the increased amount of q^ produced, for example, q^ in 
Figure 9.1, and with p^ and p^ temporarily invariant, the individual 
3 1 * 3 
earns a higher revenue, R = p^q^. R permits him to consume larger 
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quantities of both and q^, thereby moving to a higher utility level. 
With prices invariant, the increase in money incoaie is also an equivalent 
increase in real income. Utility is now maximized at point B with 
q^q* marketed, Oq^ consumed directly and Oq^ purchased for consumption 
with revenue from marketings. The analysis is completed at this point 
only if the prices remain invariant. However, some of the other pro­
ducers have also increased their production of q^. With more q^ 
marketed, p^ will vary unless it is supported by government price policy 
or, CO incidentally, demand and market supply increase at the same rate. 
The hypothetical supply-demand conditions are represented in 
Figure 9.2. The hypothesized conditions are assumed to reflect the 
activities of the local merchant-trader who has some degree of both 
monopolistic and monopsonistic influence. The demand curve he faces, 
for example, DD is the demand curve by wholesalers at the next stage in 
the marketing process. The curve is downward-sloping because of product 
differentiation, restricted mobility of buyers, and(or) credit arrange­
ments. The corresponding marginal revenue curve lies below DD at all 
points. The merchant-trader, as a buyer of the q^ locally produced, has 
a degree of monopsonistic power because of an assumed limited number of 
i 
competing buyers and(or) because credit advances to producers require 
or induce the latter to market their q^ with the trader-creditor. Be­
cause of this monopsonistic power, a marginal acquisition cost curve, ME^, 
exists for each aggregate supply curve denoted as S. That is, as the 
merchant-trader buys additional increments of q^, each increment has a 
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Figure 9.2. Hypothetical supply-demand conditions for q and 
corresponding market prices 
higher cost to him.^ He maximizes his net returns at the price-quantity 
configuration where MR = ME^. With in Figure 9.2, he purchases Oq^ 
and pays p^ to producers marketing q^. With the increased production of 
q as a result of favorable weather, tiie market supply curve in Figure 
9.2 is expected to shift to the right. Curve with the corresponding 
2 2 ME is drawn. If demand is invariant, Oq is now purchased but at a 
s n 
lower price, p\ 
^The market supply curves become vertical; i.e., perfectly inelas­
tic, at the point where the merchant-trader * s financial resources, in­
cluding external credit financing, are exhausted and(or) quantities 
offered by producers are exhausted. 
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Returning to Figure 9.1, the lower market price now received by 
2 2 2 *3 the producer-consumer, p^, results in R = p^q^ < R . The new budget 
1 3 
constraint in Figure 9.1 lies between R and R . In addition, since 
2 ] p^ < p^, becomes less expensive relative to q^ in consumption. With 
2 2 3 1 p , R not only lies to the left of R but has less slope than R and 
n 
3 — 2 1 R . That is, with p, and p < p , relatively more q can be consumed 
' *^1 "^n n' •' ^n 
2 
with the new monetary income R . Assume the new equilibrium point is 
at C. A different consumption and marketing pattern now results. In 
addition to variations in p , the resulting variations in money income 
n 
to all t producer-consumers affect the demand for q^. As q^^ varies 
so does p^. For the individual in Figure 9.1, an increase in p^ re­
sults in the intersection of R^ on the ordinate to move downward. 
While monetary income is unchanged, real income is lower. Another 
optimal consumption and marketing configuration results. Also, those 
individuals producing and marketing q^ realize changes in as p^ 
varies. This, in turn, affects their demand for both q^ and q^ and an­
other round of price and quantity adjustments follows. 
With variations in real and monetary income, as described above, 
how does the producer-consumer theoretically determine his consumption 
and marketing decisions?^ Assume he produces and consumes both q^ and 
q^. In addition, he consumes but does not produce q^^^. In Figure 9.3, 
the three commodities are represented by the three axes. Movements away 
Hlathematical formulations of the effect of changes in relative 
prices on production, consumption, and, in turn, quantities marketed 
were given in Chapter VII. An alternative, geometric approach is intro­
duced here. 
yjjh 
® q*n+l 
An+I 
Figure 9.3. Determination of optimum production and consumption 
patterns when and are produced and q^, q^, and 
q .. are consumed 
from 0 and along the q^ and q^^^ axes denote larger quantities as do move­
ments up the q^ axis. The production possibility curve, PP, denotes 
1 
various combinations of q^ and q^ that can be produced. Superimposed 
on PP is the estimated p^/p^ price ratio used for production planning; 
* * 
Assume p^/p^ = RPT at Point A; Oq^ and q^ = AA are produced. As with 
the producer-consumer in Figure 9.1, the individual in Figure 9.3 must de-
"k ic 
cide how much of q, and q to market and how much of the three commodi-
^1 ^n 
ties to consume. As already noted in Figure 9.1, these decisions vary 
^These are the possibilities from Equation 9.1 when q. represents 
only q^ and ^ 
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with different prices. These prices, in turn, vary with the aggregate 
impact on supply and demand resulting from the combined effect of in­
dividual decisions. 
Where producers are forced to market immediately after harvest at 
prevailing or predetermined prices either because credit advances are 
tied to marketing obligations or due to lack of storage facilities, the 
marketing decision is simplified or is determined for them. Part of 
the income received goes for credit repayment. That is, the credit 
repayment, whether in kind or in money, is subtracted from in Equa­
tion 9.13. The utility maximization process with the modified budget 
constraint proceeds as described earlier. 
Where storage facilities exist and producers have control over 
their marketing decisions, a hypothetical approach is described below. 
Since producers can control their marketings^ and since market prices 
fluctuate, the estimated future market prices which are also the 
opportunity costs of direct consumption are important for decisions to 
market or consume. The ability to make reasonable estimates is directly 
influenced by the amount and reliability of information about future 
supply and demand conditions in the market. The prices the r-th pro­
ducer receives and pays are conditioned by the marketing and consumption 
decisions of others. Table 9.1 is a two-way classification table of 
expected, subjective utilities for the r-th producer-consumer with 
different combinations of market prices for p^ and p^ that may be ex-
^Of course, control over marketings is constrained W immediate 
consumption requirements. As time passes, portions of and q^ are 
consumed, thereby reducing the quantities available for speculative 
marketing. 
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Table 9.1. Estimated, subjective utilities of the r-th producer-
consumer as his real income varies with different assump-
tions regarding hypothetical probabilities associated with 
decisions of the other t-1 individuals in marketing and 
(.2) (.5) (.3) 
n n n 
Price 
1 
Pn 
2 
Pn 
3 
Pn 
(.3) 1 Pi 
(.6) 4 
2 
Pi 
(.1) »? 3 Pi 
pected to exist during the marketing and consumption period. Similarly, 
in conjunction with Figure 9.3, Table 9.1 represents a game theory 
approach to marketing and consumption decisions of the r-th individual. 
The (i = 1,2,3) represent the decisions of the other t-1 
2 producer-consumers in marketing q^. For example, corresponds to 
2 i in Figure 9.2 with the corresponding p^. That is, each reflects 
different supply-demand conditions in the market resulting in different 
market prices, p\ Similarly, the represent market conditions for 
q^ with corresponding prices, p^. According to Figure 9.3, the r-th 
* * i i individual has produced q^ and q^ = AA. As p^ and p^ vary, so does 
his money income. Variations in p^^^, ceteris paribus, affect the real 
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income of the individual in question. Thus, and p^, together with 
an estimate of generate a level of real income; i.e., a budget 
constraint, which can be superimposed in Figure 9.3. Previously, a 
money income line; i.e., an iso-revenue line denoted as p^/p^, was 
superimposed to determine the optimal production configuration. 
Alternative real incomes exist for the various estimated combinations of 
Pi' Pn' Pn+r 
In Figure 9.3, a family of three-dimensional indifference curves 
reflecting consumer preferences among q^, q^, and q^^^ can be drawn. 
These are similar to the two-dimensional utility curves drawn in Figure 
9.1. In Figure 9.3, as was true in Figure 9.1, points of tangency exist 
between the budget constraints and the utility curves. Different budget 
constraints; i.e., levels of real income, result in different tangencies 
with the utility curves, and in turn, varying levels of utility. These 
11 33 levels of subjective utility are denoted as U , U in Table 9.1. 
Corresponding to each U is a different marketing and consumption pattern. 
If the individual is able to place subjective probability estimates on 
the likelihood of the alternative and occurring, the decision­
making process is simplified. In Table 9.1, hypothetical estimates of 
the subjective probabilities of the alternative marketing conditions 
have been assigned. For example, the r-th individual estimates that 
2 there is a 50 percent likelihood that p^ will be the market price he 
receives for the q^ he markets. With these hypothetical estimates, the 
2 2 
r-th individual expects p^ and p^ to be the market prices most likely 
to prevail. With these estimated prices, he can estimate his real in-
* 
come, as in Equation 9.39. Let this real income level be denoted as R 
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"r " ' Pn+1 (9-39) 
* 
in Figure 9.3. If R is tangent to a three-dimensional utility curve 
at point Bj the following decisions are made: (1) Consume Oq^ and 
c * 
market of q^, respectively; (2) Consume BB of q^ and market (AA -
BB); and (3) Consume Oq^^^ with the revenue from marketing q^ and q^. 
With varying prices, the actual impact on the individual producer-
consumer is no longer discernible. What can be said is that as long as 
all p^ are variable, a new configuration of market or exchange values 
will be evolved which will generate individual equilibriums for all 
participants.^ Relative to their initial position, some individuals 
will be better off; others may be worse off. Some qualitative implica­
tions are discussed below. 
Larger quantity of goods available for consumption 
Since the q? (i = 1, ..., n-1) have been assumed invariant, the in­
crease in q° produced and exchanged results in a larger aggregate of 
goods available for consumption in the exchange economy. This suggests 
that even though some individuals may be made worse off in the exchange 
process, a redistribution pattern of commodities theoretically exists 
whereby each individual is at least as well off as he was in the initial 
equilibrium. According to Figure 9.2, a larger quantity of q^ is 
marketed at a lower price. Ex post, if producers had acted collectively, 
the same amount of income; i.e., p^q^, could have been obtained by not 
n^n 
Perhaps it should be pointed out that the equilibrium is on the 
consumption side, given the production configuration that has been 
realized. This, of course, does not imply that the resource market is 
also in equilibrium. Furthermore, intertemporal considerations of 
equilibrium have not been introduced. 
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increasing the quantity of q^ to be marketed, thereby causing the supply 
1 2 
schedule to remain stationary. The quantity q^q^ would then have been 
available for internal exchange and consumption. Instead, the quantity 
12 1 q^q^ leaves the exchange economy for consumption elsewhere. Such con­
sumption may take place in a deficit-producing area of the agricultural 
sector, in the nonagricultural sector, or in the export market. Thus, an 
increased outflow of q^ for use elsewhere has resulted. 
Change in the terms of trade 
In addition to the internal exchange values undergoing change, the 
prices received and paid through external contact with the merchant-
trader have been altered. As p changes in Figure 9.2, the [p ] are 
n h 
likely to change as the real incomes of producers-consumers change. The 
income elasticities of demand for goods in [E] are relatively high. 
Assuming that only q^^^ is included in [E], the expected increase in 
demand for q^^^ is indicated in Figure 9.4. In the aggregate, a larger 
quantity is purchased at a higher price. In the process, the merchant 
is able to generate a larger revenue. The shaded area represents the 
initial total revenue to the merchant. With the rightward shift in 
demand, total revenue to the merchant has increased. This revenue is 
represented by the area delineated by horizontal lines. That is, there 
has been a net outflow of income from producers to the merchant-trader. 
The question now arises as to the disposition of this higher income 
by the merchant. 
_ __ 
A portion of q^q^^ may be retained by the merchant-trader for sub­
sequent resale to producers whose stocks have been exhausted prior to 
the next harvest period. 
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Figure 9.4. Shift in demand for and corresponding price 
increase 
So far in the analysis, the merchant-trader represents the only 
link with the external world. He is the channel through which transfers 
of income from the agricultural sector can potentially be used in the 
development of other sectors of the economy. Total revenues to the 
merchant can be further increased, ceteris paribus, by a shift in the 
supply schedule to the right. Such a shift could result from a decrease 
in the supply price of items to the merchant, and(or) an improvement in 
his financial position which permits him to obtain his inventory at lower 
per unit costs or a larger inventory at the same unit cost. 
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Degree of exploitation by the merchant-trader 
Because of his monopolistic and monopsonistic powers, the merchant-
trader is able to exact prices and revenues in excess of those which 
would prevail under more competitive conditions. Referring to Figure 
9.2, if the monopsonistic powers were abolished a larger quantity would 
be purchased at the price corresponding to the intersection of MR and 
2 S^. Similarly, with a larger quantity at a price above p^ would be 
purchased. If both monopolistic and monopsonistic powers were eliminated, 
1 2 producers would receive p^ and p^ with and S^, respectively. That is, 
these are the prices at which aggregate supply equals aggregate demand. 
Under present conditions, by paying producers prices below p^ while 
charging consumers through wholesale middlemen, p^, the merchant-trader 
realizes a monopolis tic-monopsonistic gain of p^p^AB. With an even 
larger exploitative gain is realized.^ Under more competitive conditions, 
producers would receive higher prices while consumers could obtain q^ 
at a lower cost. 
Case 5: Introduction of Government Programs 
Up to this point, producers are making their production and consump­
tion decisions in terms of past or estimated exchange and market values 
and then participating in an exchange economy to maximize utility through 
optimum consumption and marketing patterns. Because of assumed limited 
planning horizons, private investment, other than maintenance of capital 
stock, has not been considered yet. "Surpluses" have been generated 
^The merchant-trader is also in a position to realize monopolistic 
gain through his retailing activities. See Figures 6.4 and 9.4. 
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through favorable weather conditions. However, unusually favorable 
weather is only a temporary phenomenon. During periods of unfavorable 
weather, "deficits" will occur to many producers. Because of producers' 
limited planning horizons and their general inability to generate 
sizeable "surpluses", producers continue to operate at essentially-low 
levels of economic equilibrium. The relatively-low per capita incomes 
minimize the need and capacity for contact with the external world. The 
most prevalent exception, however, is that of hiring out labor services 
to employers outside of the community either on a part-time or longer-
term basis. 
Increasingly, governments have assumed the role of attempting to 
create an environment favorable to expanding agricultural productivity 
and output. The means have been varied: public investment in the 
infrastructure of the agricultural sector, planned price and credit 
policies, and agrarian reforms of varying ambitions. Legislation 
controlling land ownership and use, tenancy arrangements, terms of 
credit, and judicial recourse when conflicts arise is effective only if 
such legislation is vigorously implemented. In addition, individuals 
must be aware of its existence and must have the means, intellectual 
and financial, to initiate proceedings to ensure protection of their 
rights. 
A limited number of hypothetical situations are discussed below 
with attempts to assess their qualitative impact on individuals as pro­
ducers and consumers. 
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Public investment in the form of food assistance 
Public distribution of food can have both humanitarian and output-
increasing consequences. Food may be distributed as grants or as a 
form of essentially low-cost credit. In Chapter V the necessity and 
the relatively-high cost of securing credit for planting expenses and 
sustaining consumption until harvest were discussed. Public assistance 
can, at least partially, fill this need on the part of subsistence-
oriented producers. To demonstrate this possibility. Figure 8.1 is re­
drawn here as Figure 9.5. The income-possibility curve, as before, re­
presents the maximum amount of income obtainable with various levels of 
labor inputs. For the individual producer, increases in labor use and 
higher output levels do not affect price relationships. The labor-
leisure scale denotes the maximum amount of labor services available 
a> 
E 
o 
o 
c 
Labor —I 
Leisure 
Figure 9.5. Optimum labor-use level for maximizing in­
dividual utility 
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within the producing unit. Since demands on labor for other than pro­
duction purposes exist and since utility is also derived from nonwork, 
the maximum amount of labor will rarely be employed. Utility is maxi­
mized at point B where L of labor is used to generate I of income. 
o o 
The question now arises as to whether or not B is a feasible point. 
That is, in Equation 9.1 is K° sufficiently large to sustain of 
labor. If the magnitude of K° permits only using of labor to realize 
I^, of labor is involuntarily unemployed. The corresponding amount 
of utility is where < U^. Assume that the producer receives an 
amount of K through public distribution which would permit him to 
sustain L of labor. If the food is given in the form of a grant with-
o 
out any stipulation as to use, the producer may either (1) Continue to 
employ of labor but increase direct consumption so that utility is 
increased to, for example, point C; or (2) Increase the amount of labor 
used without substantially increasing the consumption level per labor 
input until is used to reach point B. 
Consider alternative (1) first. Within the production-consumption 
period, the grant amounting in value to I^I^ permits the producer to 
reach U^. The utility derived at point C is equivalent to that at B. 
A larger quantity of goods is now available for marketing and exchange. 
If the grant is in the form of q^, the situation in Case 2 is replicated 
here. For the aggregate effect, however. Case 4 is appropriate. A 
new set of equilibrium exchange values is evolved, total revenues to the 
merchant increase, and a larger quantity of goods is available for 
aggregate consumption. Unless the .grant is sustained in subsequent 
periods, however, the new equilibrium is only temporary. In the next 
33H 
period, only of labor can be used to generate 1^ providing . Thus, 
grants in this form and under these conditions have not contributed to 
increasing agricultural productivity.^ 
Alternative (2) may have longer-term consequences. Using the food 
equivalent of ^^^2 employ more labor, income is increased to I^. The 
addition to income, net of the amount of food assistance, is An 
even greater quantity of goods is now available for marketing and ex­
change. If the increased output is marketed to the local merchant with 
the residual traded within the exchange economy. Case 4 is essentially 
replicated here. That is, a larger quantity of agricultural goods leave 
the sector, the terms of trade to agriculturalists are lowered, and the 
exchange values adjust until the market is cleared. Referring to 
Figure 6.5, the demand curve would likely shift leftward as the supply 
schedule moves to the right. Depending on the position of the new 
schedules, the degree of exploitation by the merchant may have lessened. 
In the aggregate, producer-consumers now have a greater quantity of 
goods for consumption resulting in higher aggregate utility. Such an 
orientation reflects a strong preference for present consumption and an 
aversion to deferred gratification. If the food aid is not provided 
in the subsequent production period, producers will revert back to pro-
2 ducing at point A in Figure 9.5. In this situation, food aid has had 
a one-shot impact permitting higher consumption levels during the distribu­
tion period but with little effect on future agricultural productivity. 
^An indirect, secondary effect through improved physical condition 
may result. Labor may become more efficient, thereby causing the produc­
tion possibility curves to shift upward. 
2 See preceding footnote. 
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On the other hand, if the experience in using food aid to generate has 
a favorable impact on producers' attitudes and objectives toward in­
creasing their output levels, a portion of the increased output may be 
used to expand K° for use in the following production period. Con­
ceivably, point B could be reached again or some point on the AB arc in 
Figure 9.5. This change in producer behavior implies a lengthening of 
his planning horizon. That is, by deferring present consumption, a 
planned, higher future production and consumption level can be con­
templated. At this point, the potential for private, productive invest­
ment has been introduced into the firm and the exchange economy. 
From the standpoint of increasing agricultural productivity and, in 
turn, the capacity of this sector to provide a "surplus" for use in 
creating and expanding other sectors of the economy, alternative (2) is 
clearly preferable. Therefore, national planners should be motivated to 
structure food distribution programs so that the possibility of realiz­
ing alternative (2) is enhanced. One such proposed program follows. 
Since subsistence-oriented producers are inclined or, perforce, forced 
to secure credit in kind from the local merchant in order to sustain 
their consumption patterns until the next harvest period, public dis­
tribution of food could at least partially meet this need. Since the 
producer is often accustomed to repayment in kind of principal plus 
interest to the merchant, the producer could also make such payments to 
a public agency. In this situation, the food aid could be viewed as 
a revolving "working capital" fund where interest payment represents a 
net transfer from the agricultural sector. The requirement that food 
aid must be repaid should induce producers to produce at a point on arc 
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AB rather than at point C in Figure 9.5. Of course, the costs of 
establishing the public distribution and collection mechanisms would 
have to be taken into account. Such a mechanism, however, could serve 
as the channel or lever for implementing other government policies such 
as collecting tax revenues and providing extension service assistance. 
In addition, the collection mechanism could conceivably be expanded 
into a marketing outlet as an alternative to the local merchant or trader. 
These latter individuals, however, provide a number of services to pro­
ducers. If a public agency is to provide an effective alternative to 
the local merchant, the latter's services must be duplicated in order 
to gain producers' acceptance. As mentioned earlier, however, the 
costs in terms of capital and administrative resources are likely to 
be high for an effective program. Such an investment requires that a 
continuing source of food for public distribution exists. Indigenous 
buffer stocks and long-term external assistance would enhance the 
possibility of using food distribution programs to expand agricultural 
productivity. 
Public investment in the infrastructure of the agricultural sector 
Chapter VI was devoted to a brief discussion of the impact of the 
infrastructure on producers' activities. Educational systems reduce 
man's reliance on magic and spirits to maintain and improve his well-
being and increase his understanding of the forces which interact to 
determine his production and income outcomes. This increased under­
standing should lengthen producers' planning horizons. The implications 
for producers' attitudes toward adoption of nontraditional inputs and for 
private investment in the firm are apparent. Literacy reduces the 
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strength of the moneylender's and merchant's grasp on the producer. 
Public investment in marketing, communications, and transportation 
facilities increases the number of marketing outlets open to producers 
and retailers, improves resource mobility, and provides a more effective 
mechanism through which consumers signal preferences and resource owners 
indicate the availability of input services. Marketing costs and 
middlemen's margins may be reduced as transportation costs are reduced 
and as better transportation and communication systems increase competi­
tion among buyers of agricultural commodities and retailers of consumer 
goods. Higher net prices to producers and lower retail costs to con­
sumers, ceteris paribus, increase both monetary and real incomes. The 
introduction of new consumer and producer goods is also facilitated. 
The increased availability and variety of consumer goods affect 
consumers' tastes, as in Equation 9.12, and, in turn, consumers' con­
sumption patterns and demand for income. The increased demand for in­
come is expected to motivate producers to work harder, as in Figure 
8.5, and to associate higher opportunity costs with certain social ex­
penditures and nonproductive investments. In addition, a wider range 
of consumer goods should affect both the price and income elasticity of 
demand for those goods produced and consumed directly. This is 
especially true if per capita, real incomes also increase. As noted in 
Chapter VII, the interaction of these phenomena tends to increase the 
price elasticity of quantities marketed. In the process, producer-
consumers become more sensitive to changing economic conditions. 
Public investment in irrigation and land reclamation programs, in 
plant and animal disease control measures, and in research projects to 
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breed improved crop varieties and determine optimum mixes of comple­
mentary inputs all tend to affect the technical coefficients of pro­
duction and, in turn, resource productivity. 
Consider land reclamation or disease control programs which 
essentially do not require additional investment in complimentary in­
puts by producers. The increase in the technical coefficients of pro­
duction and the availability of additional land for production create 
a capacity for expanding output, given resource availabilities and 
existing production techniques. The increased production can be 
marketed, consumed, and exchanged. As in previous case situations in­
volving expanded outputs, only a limited amount of the increase leaves 
the exchange economy. Exchange values fluctuate to clear the markets, 
and the major proportion of output is locally consumed. The incentives 
for increasing production are primarily to generate the means for 
purchasing the limited variety of items retailed by the local merchant 
and for obtaining traditional consumer goods through exchange with 
other producers and craftsmen in the locality. Two important conse­
quences are apparent. First, producers and the economy are essentially 
"inward-oriented". Incentives are largely internal to the community or 
exchange system. Second, the linkages with the external economy are few 
and weak. Such conditions favor evolution of a dualistic economy. Any 
"surpluses" generated in the agricultural sector have little impact on 
stimulating the development of other sectors. Producers are wary of 
individuals and influences external to their community. If this sector 
is to perform its historical and theoretical role as the primum mobile 
of general economic expansion, the exchange economy must be opened up 
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through additional linkages with the rest of the economy. Extension 
service personnel can act as transmitters of change as can the merchant-
trader . 
Reforms and public investment in social overhead capital facilities 
create and strengthen linkages among communities and various sectors of 
the economy. Consequently, producers become increasingly market-oriented 
in terms of production incentives, resource availabilities, and consump­
tion patterns. Furthermore, investment and economic expansion in other 
sectors of the economy affect the value of M-, as in Equation 9.10b. 
Increases in ki should motivate some producers to invest a portion of 
their capital funds outside the firm thereby increasing capi!:?.! mobility 
in the economy. Only through the evolution of an integrated economic 
system can economic agents effectively signal their preferences and 
governments attempt to implement policies to effectively guide economic 
activity. It is in establishing these linkages that the public sector 
can play an important role in developmental processes. 
Public pricing policies 
Public pricing policies whether through marketing boards or legisla­
ted price programs affect the p^ and p^ as they appear in production, 
consumption, and investment functions. Since such policies are selective, 
relative prices change. The least-cost combination of inputs, as re­
presented by Equation 9.8a, changes with variations in the relative 
prices of inputs. Similarly, optimum output configurations, as in 
Equation 9.9, are altered. Finally, price relationships affect the 
values of R(t) and E(t) in the investment decision rule. See Equation 
2.67. 
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Public pricing policies reduce price uncertainty for some com­
modities; prices of other commodities are subject to fluctuations in 
market conditions. Consequently, positive price policies orient 
decision-making processes, especially for private investors. 
Public pricing policies without reforming the infrastructure are 
less effective. Where producers are required because of credit ad­
vances to market their output with landlords and merchant-traders at 
prices largely determined by the latter, publicly-supported market 
prices have little effect on production decisions and incomes received 
through marketing. The advantages of price supports accrue to the 
marketing middlemen. 
If the government subsidizes the costs of credit and improved in­
puts without improving marketing channels, the marketing system may not 
be able to absorb the increased output. The problem of "deficit" and 
"surplus" areas may be accentuated with adverse prices resulting in both 
of these areas. Prices are adverse to consumers in "deficit" areas and 
to producers in "surplus" areas. 
The contribution of the public sector was discussed in Chapters VI 
and VII. Public programs and policies simply cannot have an a priori 
justification. The allocation of funds and administrative resources 
necessary for these measures must be weighed as to their alternative uses 
toward reaching public goals and(or) planning objectives. 
Prior to discussing Case 6, assume that either government invest­
ment or public financing of individual marketing middlemen has re­
sulted in a modification of the marketing structure. In addition, the 
increased contact with a market offering a larger variety of consumer 
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goods has altered the producer's income-leisure preferences, as in 
Figure 8.5. Finally, market expansion has not been only in terms of 
marketing outlets and the availability of consumer goods. Nontraditional 
production inputs now appear in the market as they become available, and 
the mobility of capital and labor inputs is increased. Producers now 
gear production and consumption decisions to prevailing and anticipated 
market prices and become more responsive to changes in market conditions. 
Private, productive investment is introduced on a broader scale as 
planning horizons are expanded and as producers become aware of existing 
investment opportunities. 
Case 6: Economic Decisions in Terms of Market Conditions 
With Intertemporal Private Investment 
From Case 1 to the present, the producer has been transformed from 
an essentially self-sufficient producer to one producing in terms of 
and for an exchange economy to one who is market-oriented in his economic 
activities. Referring to Equation 9.1, the terms now have a somewhat 
different interpretation. The p^ represent prices received by producers 
in the market. The TT^ are now p^ where the latter denote prices paid 
for or the opportunity costs of inputs used by producers. K° is the 
quantity of working capital in monetary terms. The q^ are no longer 
restricted to labor and draft animal services and to seed requirements. 
They may also include such inputs as fertilizers, irrigation water, 
and herb ic ides. 
The maximization process is similar to that in the previous cases. 
The producer, as a price-taker, estimates future p^ and p^. Satis­
faction of the first- and second-order conditions for economic 
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efficiency is associated with a planned output configuration and a de­
rived input demand pattern. At this point, assume that input markets 
are in equilibrium. The producer's allocation between work generating 
income and leisure is again determined as in Figure 8.5. The planned 
output levels are, of course, conditioned by exogenous forces which 
influence actual output levels. 
For single-period utility maximization by producer-consumers, the 
process is similar to that used previously. In Case 6, most outputs are 
sold in the market, and most consumer goods are purchased there. For 
example, wheat is sold and flour or bread is purchased; cotton and wool 
are sold while textiles and clothing are purchased. The additional 
consumer goods, not previously available prior to market expansion, are 
denoted as q^(i = n45, ..., n+k); (k-4) is the additional number of con­
sumer goods now available. Commodities such as rice and wheat can 
still be produced and consumed directly. However, the costs or prices 
attached to these goods in consumption are the market prices; i.e., 
their opportunity costs. With planning horizons spanning several pro­
duction periods, savings and private investment are introduced as 
additional, potential claims on incomes and profits realized. Contingency 
stocks and social and religious expenditures were introduced in Case 2 as 
^n+3 ^n+4' respectively. 
If all outputs are marketed, actual output levels multiplied by 
their respective market prices equals total revenue to the producer.^ 
Total revenue, however, exceeds the income available for purchasing con-
^The prices received in the market should be net of the producers' 
selling costs such as transportation costs and sales commissions. 
547 
sumor and investment goods. Deductions of payments to some variable in­
puts and to fixed costs must be made before the level of disposable in­
come is determined. Disposable income is denoted as DI in Equation 9.40. 
Variable costs would include those for seed, fertilizer, hired labor and 
irrigation water inputs. Scsne of the q^ represent inputs of family 
labor. The corresponding p^ should be their opportunity costs in terms 
of wages which could be earned if these labor inputs were not employed 
on the farm. More realistically, these opportunity costs should be 
discounted by a factor representing any social costs associated with 
working for an employer in perhaps another area together with the 
economic costs of transportation and housing necessary to secure external 
employment. For family labor, the product imputed to these inputs is a 
positive contribution to disposable income. Conversely, payments to 
hired labor are negative contributions since such payments leave the firm 
m 
and household unit. Thus, in the summation ^ p.q. in Equation 9.40, j=l ^ J 
those q^ representing inputs of family labor assume zero values. Fixed 
costs denoted as FC include specific taxes, cash rents, and allowance 
for depreciation. Disposable income also includes profits accruing to 
the firm. Equation 9.40 is the new budget constraint for the utility 
n m 
DI = Z p.q. - E p.q. - FC (9.40) 
^ i=l ^ ^ 1=1 J J 
n+4+k 
S = U 
r r (Vl- •••• "nW - /i-J (9.41) 1^- i 
maximization problem for the r-th market-oriented producer-consumer. See 
Equation 9.41. Implicitly, only quantities of q^^^ and q^ are produced 
and consumed directly. The additional goods consumed are q^^^^ to q^^_^ 
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where k is unspecified. For example, may be wheat flour while 
represents a transistor radio. For single-period utility maxi­
mization, DI is allocated among alternative consumption goods so that 
the marginal utility per last dollar expended on each good is equal 
for all alternative goods. As the producer's planning horizon is ex­
tended, savings and private investment are introduced as additional 
potential uses for DI. The producer's objective remains that of 
maximizing utility during the planning period. Utility is derived from 
commodities directly consumed, consumer goods purchasable from inccme, 
wealth accumulation, and leisure. 
What incentives exist for saving and investment? That is, what are 
the relative increments to aggregate utility through saving as compared 
with increasing present consumption or using funds for private invest­
ment? This question was partially discussed in the Chapter VIII sub­
section dealing with producer's objectives. That discussion indicated 
that the criterion for choosing among alternative types of investment is 
to select that alternative which yields the highest level of net returns 
discounted over the planning period. Not only is the derived PV of 
alternative investments important, but the time-distribution of net re­
turns is an additional factor. Potential investors having precarious 
financial positions may not be able to withstand negative net returns 
during early periods of the investment payoff even though the PV 
associated with the investment is positive. The problem of comparing 
psychic or social returns with monetary returns is resolved by trans­
forming these phenomena into the conmon denominator of utility. Psychic 
returns provide utility directly; monetary returns provide utility 
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through consuming consumer goods, hoarding, and saving. For convenience, 
the length of the planning period is assumed equal for all alternative 
uses of available funds. 
Saving and lending decisions 
Intuitively, low per capita incomes provide individuals with a 
relatively-low capacity to save. However, as noted before, expenditures 
on social and religious observances and on investment in jewelry suggest 
that individuals are not so close to the margin of physical subsistence 
that they cannot save. Savings in the form of "surpluses" generated can 
be hoarded, placed in savings accounts, or invested directly. Given 
that producers are now market-oriented with multi-period planning horizons, 
hoarding or simply holding money in excess of that amount necessary for 
routine transactions is not economically rational. Therefore, hoarding 
will be ignored. "Surpluses" placed in savings accounts and lent 
privately are examined in this section. "Surpluses" for direct private 
investment are discussed in the following section. 
Funds placed in branch banks and post offices provide an essentially-
guaranteed return determined by the of interest paid and the fre­
quency with which interest is compounded.^ Annual or compounded interest 
provides income streams to the saver during this planning period. Assum­
ing interest is only paid annually, S amount of savings deposited in 
time period t^ has earned interest in the amount of iS at the beginning 
of t^. At this point, the savings have a monetary value of (l+i)S. The 
'"Funds may also be placed in informal savings associations where no 
interest is paid on savings regularly deposited but one individual re­
ceives the total amount deposited. This individual is selected by 
lottery or on a revolving basis. Cooperative credit associations usually 
pay interest but not necessarily (footnote continued on following page) 
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interest income, iS, may be withdrawn or left in the account to earn 
interest in t^. As the price level in the economy varies while i is 
invariant, the real value of the interest income and savings plus 
interest varies. 
Whore funds are lent privately rather than placed in a savings 
account, interest income is also earned. Such loans are usually made on 
a short-term basis which provides lenders with a relatively-high turn­
over of funds. The uncertainty of debtor default is low since the 
lender is usually personally familiar with the prospective borrower's 
financial position and personal attributes. If additional lending 
opportunities are not available as previous loans are repaid, the lender 
has the option of placing these funds in a savings account or making 
private investment- These options provide him with a reasonably high 
degree of flexibility in using funds for private lending. 
Prior to specifying the income streams, one additional assumption 
is made. This assumption is that in the absence of net investment, the 
n Q 
real value of the producer's output; i.e., S p.q. is unchanged during 
i=l 1 1 
the planning period. Thus, = Y2 even though the p^^ and 
may vary from one time period to the next. Recapitulating, the producer 
expects to realize Y^ during each production year of his planning period. 
Due to exogenous forces, however, Y , > Y in t so that a "surplus" 
actual 00
for potential savings results. The producer-consumer now must decide 
how to utilize this "surplus". A three-year planning period is arbi­
trarily specified. The income streams for the alternatives considered 
Tfootnote continued from preceding page) on as regular a basis as the 
public agencies. These two types of savings institutions will not be in­
cluded in the following discussion, although they could be readily in-
cluded. 
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above are listed in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2. Alternative income streams according to dispostion of 
"surplus" 
t 
o h ^2 ^3 
Y Y + AY Y Y (9.42) 
o o o o o 
Y Y 
, (l+i)S 
Y + 
(l+i)S 
Y + 
(l+i)S (9.43) 
o o Pi o P2 o P3 
Y Y Y + 
(l+i)^S 
Y + 
(l+i)^S (9.44) 
o o Pi o P2 o P3 
Y Y 1 Y + (l+il^L Y + (l+i)^L (9.45) 
o o Pi o P2 o P3 
Equation 9.42 reflects the alternative of Increasing immediate con­
sumption either through consuming the "surplus" directly or the equivalent 
value of consumer goods. Postharvest festivals and special religious 
offerings may absorb this "surplus". Higher present consumption, however, 
leaves expected future income unchanged. That is, is expected to be 
forthcoming throughout the rest of the planning period. Associated with 
this income stream is an intertemporal, subjective utility configuration. 
The time-distribution and aggregate of expected utility is implicit in 
Equation 9.46 where Y, = Y + ûY and Y^ = Y . The term L denotes l o o  t A l  o  t  
the amount of leisure, as in Figure 8.1. 
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* 3 3 
u = z U = z U(Y , L ) (9.46) 
t=o t=o 
The income streams obtainable through saving are given in Equations 
9.43 and 9.44. In Equation 9.43 the individual annually earns interest 
income amounting to iS which is withdrawn for expenditure on consumer 
goods. Since S remains intact, the same amount of interest is earned 
and consumed in t^ and t^. Alternatively, in Equation 9.44 the interest 
accrued is left on account to earn additional interest income. At the 
end of t^, S amount of initial savings now has a monetary value of 
3 (1+i) S. These funds can be used for consumption, continued savings, or 
investment in the next planning period. Given that the value of i 
is expected to be invariant during t to t., the interest earned, in 
monetary terms, is a fixed income. The real value of this income, how­
ever, varies with changes in the general price level. Therefore, 
potential savers must view simple or compounded interest in terms of 
its real value or its purchasing power. The certainty of earning 
interest is high; the uncertainty of its real value is dependent upon 
recent and anticipated price movements. Taking into account the time-
distribution of income, price uncertainty, and the potential saver's 
intertemporal demand for income, subjective utility configurations similar 
is to Equation 9.46 result. For Equation 9.43, + —-— for t = 1, 
2, 3 where p^ is the consumer price index. Utility is also derived 
from the security provided by S. The corresponding utility function is 
given in Equation 9.47. For the income stream represented by Equation 
9.44, Yj. = Y^ in Equation 9.47, but S/p^ should now be written as S^/p^ 
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U* = Z U = Z U(Y^, Lj., -§-) (9.47) 
t=o t=o t 
since S plus compounded interest provide increasing amounts of security 
2 
through time. That is U 3 ^ U ^] if p. = p_. 
Pi P2 1 / 
Where private moneylending is a feasible alternative. Equation 9.45 
represents one of several possible income streams. With annual interest, 
the lender's funds have a monetary worth of (l+i)L at the end of t^ 
where L is the quantity of funds lent. If the entire amount is relent 
in t^ at the same interest rate, at the end of t^ the monetary value of 
2 
such funds has increased to (1+i) L. As before, the estimated monetary 
value should be adjusted for expected price movements. The certainty 
of income associated with savings deposits no longer holds. Since 
merchants and landlords, as competing moneylenders, provide services in 
addition to extending credit and since the demand for credit varies with 
production and income levels, the market for private lenders is somewhat 
uncertain. The absence of publically-enforced regulation of moneylending 
activities permits moneylenders to exert some influence over the rates 
they charge; i may be variable from year to year. Certain nonmonetary 
returns may accrue through lending to friends and relatives. In 
addition, any goodwill through lending may be reciprocated at a later 
date. Finally, landlords as moneylenders are able to exact returns in 
addition to interest income. Tenant indebtedness may enable landlords 
to raise the tenant's effective rent and(or) force the tenant to market 
his output through the landlord who is in a position to influence prices 
paid to and received by tenants. After weighing these economic and non-
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economic factors, another subjective utility configuration is derived. 
At this point, producers with "surpluses" to consume, save, or lend 
select that alternative from Table 9.2 which maximizes their utility over 
the planning period. Several combinations of consuming, saving, and 
lending within the planning period are feasible. Each has a correspond­
ing utility pattern. The producer has another alternative. "Surpluses" 
represent the means for making both productive and nonproductive invest­
ments which contribute to wealth accumulation and income flows. These 
investments generate additional utility configurations for the producer-
consumer . 
Investment decisions 
The factors affecting investment decisions were discussed in 
Chapter VIII where the present value rule was used as the investment 
decision-making criterion. The investor rationally selects those having 
a PV greater than zero. Since his objective is to maximize utility over 
the planning period, investment and consumption alternatives must be 
evaluated simultaneously. Table 9.3 is comprised of a set of equations 
denoting the intertemporal wealth and income positions of the producer-
investor. Each equation has a corresponding intertemporal utility pattern. 
As with Table 9.2, only a few of several possible situations are included. 
Equation 9.48 is appropriate for the producer's decision to invest 
the "surplus" in a nonproductive manner. That is, investment is made 
in an asset which enhances the wealth position of the investor but does 
not provide any direct monetary return. This asset, denoted as W, may 
be in the form of jewelry and other durables.^ In addition to the economic 
Since the surplus is likely not large, purchasing land is not a 
feasible alternative. Investment (footnote continued on following page) 
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Table 9.3. Alternative income streams associated with private invest-
ment of "surplus" 
t 
o "l >^2 S 
Y Y + • 
w Y + w Y + W (9.48) 
o o Pi o P2 o 
'3 T 
NR, NR_+ 
Y Y + • 1 Y 4- 2 Y + 3 3 (9.49) 
o o Pi o P2 o P3 
, NT NR, NR. NR + I ' 
Y Y + 1 Y + 2 Y + 3 3 (9.50) 
o o Pi o P2 o P3 
security provided by W, psychic returns are derived through its owner­
ship, display, and possible inclusion in inheritances. Where inflation 
and government instability cause individuals to be skeptical of the value 
of paper currency, an asset whose monetary value rises with inflation is 
an attractive investment alternative. Consequently, W should reflect 
the estimated real value of the asset during the planning period. These 
estimated real values are denoted as to W^. The consumption patterns 
sustainable by and the investment in W represent a particular utility 
pattern during the planning period. 
The time stream of income corresponding to investment in traditional 
inputs is given in Equation 9.49. The net returns in each time period, 
i.e., R(t) - E(t), are denoted as NR^. The net returns in the first 
(footnote continued from preceding page) in improved housing would 
necessitate expenditures for maintenance. Alternatively, the monetary 
value of W is reduced by the allowance for depreciation through time. 
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periods may be zero or negative. As the productivity of the investment 
rnatcrial i/.es, the net returns assume positive values. If at the end of 
t,^ the flow of returns has not been exhausted, the remainder has a 
T 
capitalized monetary value which is denoted as 1^. The superscript T 
denotes investment in traditional inputs. In Equation 9.50, the com­
ponents have the same connotation. The superscript NT denotes investment 
in nontraditional inputs. The components of Equations 9.49 and 9.50 
are divided by respective time-period price levels to adjust expected 
monetary values to expected real values. is already in real terms. 
The net returns for respective investment alternatives must be 
estimated for each time period. Incorporated in the net returns are 
estimates of the time-distribution of the physical productivity of the 
investment; the expected prices at which the output can be sold; and 
the anticipated costs, in addition to the initial investment, which are 
incurred. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding these estimates 
are the uncertainties growing out of the producer's tenurial arrangement, 
the rate at which other producers will adopt similar investments, the 
rate at which improved technology appears, and the possibility of un­
planned contingencies which arise before positive net returns from the 
investment are forthcoming. The uncertainty is greatest with investment 
in nontraditional inputs. Not only is there the uncertainty of physical 
response. But if the investment affects the quality, texture, or color 
of the output, additional market and price uncertainties are real 
phenomena. With traditional inputs, however, familiarity and experience 
give producers a better basis for evaluating the profitability of these 
investments. 
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The producer-consumer has now been confronted with the alternative 
opportunities to increase consumption, save, lend, or invest. He 
selects that income stream from Tables 9.2 and 9.3 which maximizes the 
utility accruing to him over his planning period. Corresponding to that 
optimal income stream is a particular behavioral pattern which trans­
lates into the best disposition of the available "surplus". 
Partial Equilibrium In the Input Market 
In the preceding discussion, producers have been assumed to have 
fixed endowments of resources and after resource allocation decisions have 
been made, the resource or input markets have been assumed to be in 
equilibrium. Agricultural inputs have various degrees of mobility and of 
alternative uses in the economy. Land is essentially fixed, geo­
graphically. The major proportion of cultivable land has little alter­
native use other than for agricultural purposes. On the other hand, 
labor is the most mobile of the agricultural inputs. As noted in 
Chapter VI, many agriculturalists also engage in trading. Even small-
scale producers engage some hired labor during peak labor demand periods, 
especially during harvest. They themselves may also offer labor services 
for hire during slack periods of labor demand within the firm. Some in­
dividuals leave the farm to secure nonfarm unemployment only to return 
at a later date. Of course, labor supply and mobility are a function of 
the extent and reliability of market information, the spatial distribu­
tion of points of supply and demand, and the stage of development of the 
economy as it affects the demand for essentially unskilled labor from 
rural areas. 
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The discussion in Chapter V suggests a large amount of localized 
capital mobility among traders, moneylenders, and debtors. Where sav­
ings are generated and savings institutions are accessible, the mobility 
of such funds Is enhanced. Furthermore, large-scale producers and ab­
sentee landlords are inclined to transfer funds from their agricultural 
operations to nonrural banks, investment in rural and urban real estate, 
and purchase of domestic and foreign government debentures. Rural 
capital is also mobilized and transferred through public tax policies and 
through turning the terms of trade against the agricultural sector. As 
with labor, capital mobility is affected by the existence of savings and 
banking institutions and by the awareness of capital demand and invest­
ment opportunities throughout the economy and in the international mar­
ket . 
The t producers are endowed with quantities of land, labor, and capi­
tal which they can utilize directly or offer to others demanding the 
services of these inputs. Let these input endowments be denoted as 
q°, q°, and q°, respectively. Since these inputs can be employed 
directly, the producer has an implied derived demand for the inputs he 
owns. His objective remains to be that of utility maximization as in 
Equation 9.46. For example, he derives utility from leisure and from 
the uses of that income which is imputed to labor when it is directly 
employed on the farm plus any income earned through external employ­
ment . 
The problem is to determine the derived demand for land, labor, and 
capital denoted as q^, q^, and q^, respectively. Once these quantities 
have been estimated, then excess demand functions for the three classes 
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of inputs can be specified.^ For simplification, assume that the land 
2 
market is, in effect, in equilibrium. The derived demand for labor and 
capital in the production of a single output was theoretically represented 
3 in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. The derived demand for capital and labor was 
based on a change in the wage rate with the price of capital and the 
budget constraint invariant. Alternatively, if Equations 2.10 to 2.13 
are solved simultaneously for the q^ and q^, a derived demand configura­
tion for the variable q^ inputs corresponding to the optimal output con­
figuration of the q^ is obtained.^ For the individual producer, the p^ 
and pj used for planning are invariant with respect to his individual de-
The assumption of equilibrium in the input markets used earlier in 
this chapter implies that the excess demand functions for the t producers-
consumers were equal to zero, individually and collectively. That is, 
an input price configuration existed which cleared the market. 
2 This simplification is not too restrictive. In some less-developed 
areas, especially Africa, a land market per area does not exist. Land­
lords and tribal chiefs allocate land tracts to "tenants" according to 
various criteria, some unrelated to market conditions. For each "tenant" 
his allotment is his land constraint. 
3 Equation 2.46 is also a static input demand function based on 
estimated technical coefficients and price relationships. However, 
there is no allowance for a capital, constraint. That is, the producer 
is assumed to have the financial resources which permit him to employ 
the input up to the point where its MVP equals its respective price. 
In addition, Equation 2.8 must be satisfied. 
^In Appendix D, a formalized version of the derived demand for vari­
able inputs is developed. Instead of the prices being invariant, as in 
Equations 2.10 to 2.13, the output and input prices are permitted 
to vary simultaneously. It is these expected or anticipated variations 
in price relationships that are important for planning production and, 
in turn, input demand decisions. 
560 
cLstons. lIL.s budget constraint, K*" , represents the total amount of 
financial resources at his disposal for potential use in production. 
K° would include any savings from past profits, working capital funds, 
and external financing. However, K° has alternative uses, the number of 
alternatives depending on the stage of economic development and the 
infrastructure of the economy. The funds represented by K° can be 
placed in savings institutions, lent locally, or invested in nonagri-
cultural sectors. This has already been noted at two points. First, 
in Equation 2.18 the marginal value product of each input in the pro­
duction of each output must equal M- where H can be interpreted as the 
opportunity cost of using a unit of K° in the production of the n out­
puts. If the MVPt < M' where (i = I, ..., n) and (j = 1, m), 
J 
then the producer will find it economically advantageous to shift a 
portion of K° from use in his production unit to elsewhere in the economy. 
This transfer would continue until MVP^ = M- holds. Similarly, if 
MVPj > p., this signals that a flow of capital resources in the pro­
duction unit should take place until equality holds. Second, the saving, 
lending, and investment alternatives were introduced in Equations 9.43 -
9.45 and 9.48 - 9.50. The producer selects that alternative which maxi­
mizes his utility over his particular planning period. 
Since a short-run equilibrium in the input market is under con­
sideration here, uses of K° will be confined to such inputs as labor, 
seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation water. The fact that a residual from 
fertilizer applications usually remains to affect output in the following 
production period is ignored. In addition to the K on hand, denoted as 
q°, additional K may be demanded if Equation 9.51 has a positive value. 
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That is, the discounted value of net returns from the use of the additional 
units of K less the repayment of K plus interest must be positive. As be­
fore, P denotes the opportunity cost of using K in production plus a sub-
V = {[R(t^) - E(tj^)] - [K+iK]} (1+P)"^ (9.51) 
jective allowance for uncertainty. If the r-th producer determines 
that units of K in addition to q° can be profitably used, he becomes a 
net demander of K and q - q° >0. 
cr cr 
Previously, the land market has been assumed to be in equilibrium so 
that q^^ = q°^ for each of the r = (1, ..., t) individuals. Most pro­
ducers have some endowment of capital, q°, and several will also be net 
demanders. The same applies to labor, denoted as q^ and q^. However, 
capital is not demanded as capital per se but for the purchasing power 
it provides in obtaining the variable inputs of production. The markets 
for these various inputs must also be in equilibrium. Consider only 
fertilizer and irrigation water which are designated as q^ and q^, re­
spectively. Endowments of q^ and q^ may be assumed zero; that is, 
q° = q° =0 for the t producers. The problem now is to indicate the 
conditions necessary for a short-run equilibrium of the input markets. 
In addition to the t producers, some of whom are net demanders and 
net suppliers of inputs, the suppliers of fertilizers and irrigation 
water inputs plus moneylenders providing external financing must be 
added. Consequently, there are potentially t+v participants in the in­
put markets where v denotes the number of suppliers of q^, q^, and q^. 
Referring to Equation 9.1 since (j =1, ..., m), m variable inputs are 
introduced with the aggregate use-level constrained by K°. To simplify 
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the discussion, let m=3 where 
= Labor 
q^ = Fertilizer 
q^ = Irrigation water. 
Credit is introduced as q^ and enters Equation 9.1 as K°. The t 
individuals have endowments of labor, q°^, and some have working capital, 
q°^.^ The other (v-t) individuals have endowments of fertilizer, 
irrigation water, and in the case of landless laborers, labor inputs 
which are denoted as q^r' '^Sr' ^Ir' respectively, where (r =1, ..., 
t, t+1, ..., v). Moneylenders have q°^. Those who are net suppliers of 
inputs; i.e., Ej^ = q^^ - q°^ < 0, demand payments in cash or in kind. 
Let this demand for cash be represented as q^. Money is lent, inputs 
retailed, and labor services offered for hire in exchange for q^. 
As noted earlier, input demands including credit are derived on the 
basis of estimated price and productivity relationships. The excess de-
j = (1, 5) 
r = (1, t, t+l,...,v) (9.52) 
^The subsequent discussion is generalizable to a larger number of 
inputs. To refer to the labor market with attendant supply and demand 
curves implies homogenous labor inputs. To alleviate this oversimplifica­
tion and consequent distortion of actual conditions, different classes of 
labor can be identified as separate inputs, each having its own supply-
demand conditions. 
^When working capital is in kind, represents the units of funds 
corresponding to the monetized value of these stocks. The monetized 
values are essentially the real costs of using these stocks to sustain 
laborers and draft animals. Of course, if they are consumed directly, 
transport and marketing costs are not encountered. Since such working 
capital can be lent to others, it can also be viewed as an endowment of 
credit. Consequently, if = q^^ - q^^ > 0, the r-th individual is a 
net positive demander of credit for use as working capital which repre­
sents the means for effectively demanding q^^, and q^. 
^jr "^jr ^jr 
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mand functions are given in Equation 9.52. Net demands are constrained 
by the values of individual endowments. These constraints can be best 
understood by segregating the discussion according to the type of 
participant. 
Net suppliers of , q^, and q^ 
The common characteristic of these individuals is that each supplies 
inputs in exchange for cash, q^. If ^2r~ ^ 3r~ ^ (r ~ t+1, ..., 
v); i.e., if these resource owners do not demand any quantities for in­
ventory stocks, the values of their endowments and their income con­
straints are represented below: 
^r ^2^2t == t+l, v) (9.53) 
^r ^ P3^3r = t+1, ..., v) (9.54) 
^r " (r = t+1, ..., v) (9.55) 
In Equations 9.53 and 9.54, p^ and p^ are the prices at which q° and q° 
are retailed to producers. The monetary values of y^ represent these 
individuals' respective demands for q^. That is, they demand cash equal 
to the value of their sales. For the net suppliers of credit, for ex­
ample, moneylenders, p^ = (1+1). That is, if 100 units of money are 
lent at simple, annual interest of 20 percent, the amount of q^ de­
manded is (1 + .20)(100) = 120 units of money. 
Landless laborers and net suppliers of q^ 
The r-th producer may be a net supplier or demander of q^. His 
endowment, q°^, is the amount of labor services potentially available 
within the firm. His derived demand Includes the demand for productive 
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purposes and for leisure, as demonstrated in Figure 8.1. If the derived 
demand is less than his endowment, he provides labor services for hire. 
Landless laborers also have an endowment of labor services. They may 
have a demand for leisure; they do not have a derived demand for pro­
ductive purposes in the sense that the r-th producer has. Rather, they 
supply labor inputs in exchange for which is synonymous with wage re­
ceipts. The budget constraint for producers and landless laborers, in 
terms of labor income, is given in Equation 9.56. The corresponding 
price represents the per unit wage rate for landless laborers and labor 
for hire provided by producers. It also represents the opportunity 
cost of direct use of labor services within the firm. That is, the price 
is the amount of firm product which must be imputed to each labor input 
directly employed. For the t producers, if Equation 9.56 is negative, 
they realize an income from labor services offered for hire. In turn, 
they demand q^, q^, or q^ with this income. Equation 9.56 is negative 
for landless laborers seeking employment; they will demand only with 
their labor income. 
= Pj^Cq^^ - q°j.) (r = 1, ..., t, t+ 1, ..., v) (9.56) 
Producers with positive excess demand for credit, q^, for use in pro­
curing q^, qg, and q^ 
This situation is best understood if q°^ = 0, although this stipula­
tion is not necessary. If the r-th producer has a derived demand for 
100 units of q^, his initial monetized excess demand function for q^ is 
given in Equation 9.57. But, his actual budget constraint is more 
complicated. Ho has the use of 100 units of q^ to obtain other inputs. 
= (l+i)E4r = (l+DEq^^-q^l^l = (1+1)100 (9.57) 
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In addition, however, he must repay (1+i) 100 at the end of the production 
year. Rewrite Equation 9.57 as 9.58 where represents, in effect, the 
transfer of 100 q^ from a creditor to the r-th producer. R^ represents 
the repayment of (H-i)lOO which must be made to the creditor. According 
to Equation 9.5 8, the r-th producer-debtor has 100 units of q^ for use 
in purchasing other inputs. Assume the entire amount is expended on q^, 
as in Equation 9.59, where q°^ = 0 and q^^ = lOO/p^. Then if = 0, 
the necessary condition represented by Equation 9.14 is satisfied as in 
Equation 9.60. That is, the sum of expenditures must equal the pur-
p.E, = (l+i)100 + T. - R. (9.58) 
4 4r J J 
" P2<l2r " "zr'  (*'59) 
p^E - p.E, = 100 - 100 = 0 (9.60) 
2 2r 4 4r 
chasing power of the r-th producer. Of course, if Ej^^ < 0, then 
p^E^^ represents a means, in addition to T^, for purchasing additional 
units of q as well as other inputs. 
^ 5 
Conceptually, a price configuration exists such that 2 E. 
j=l J"" 
(p^, ..., p^) = E^ = 0 where (r = 1, ..., t, t+1, ..., v). At this 
point the r-th individual is in equilibrium. If E^ = 0 for all v in­
dividuals, then a configuration of equilibrium prices for the various in­
put markets results. That is, equilibrium levels for the interest and 
wage rates and for fertilizer and irrigation water prices are evolved. 
Resource allocation patterns result and, in turn, production configura­
tions. With the production levels realized, the producer-consumer de­
termines his optimum consumption pattern which may include savings and 
private investment. 
CIIAPTKK X. FRICTION POINTS OF A(JK K;ULTUIIA.L DFVf-I.OIWNT : SUMMARY 
The interrelationships among various factors affecting producers' 
production, consumption, and investment decisions have been stressed in 
the preceding chapters, especially Chapter IX. While a number of 
"vicious circles" in the Nurkse (2.6) and Singer (2.7) sense can be 
postulated, this conceptual approach to developmental problems is mis­
leading. As observed in Chapter II, the concept of a "vicious circle" 
likely implies the existence of "propitious" or "beneficient circles". 
That is, if the "vicious circle" can be turned around, the "propitious 
circle" should result. For example, if the "vicious circle" is 
identified as one of low per capita real incomes —> low per capita 
savings low per capita private investment —> low per capita real 
incomes, a reduction in taxes with per capita real incomes invariant 
would be expected to generate a higher per capita level of savings, a 
portion of which can be invested so as to increase resource productivity 
and producers' incomes. A "propitious circle" which should be cumulative 
upward is now operative. Of course, this reasoning ignores several, 
potential obstacles to the upward, cumulative growth. Beginning with 
higher per capita savings, private investment may not be undertaken be­
cause the potential investment has an unfavorable estimated present 
value.^ The assumption that private investment is also profitable invest­
ment cannot be made on an a priori basis. In addition, producers* ob-
^See a later section of this chapter for a discussion of some of 
the "friction points" influencing investment decisions. 
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jectives condition decisions to consume, hoard, expend socially, and in­
vest in either productive or nonproductive ventures. For subsistence-
oriented producers, the need and, in turn, the utility derived from in­
creasing present consumption represent a strong first claim on any 
savings or "surpluses" that are generated. 
One additional comment on the use of "circles" as a conceptual 
approach is necessary. A circular and causatively-reinforcing inter­
relationship implies that the "circle" can be broken into at any point 
so as to make it cumulative upward. However, the validity of this 
assumption and(or) behavioral proposition has already been questioned 
in the preceding paragraph. The various links or components of the 
"circle" are not of equal strength and importance. Higher savings 
whether through increased incomes, lower taxes, or public subsidiza­
tion of certain private costs are not sufficient for expanding private, 
productive investment. Similarly, public investment and price policies 
which raise incomes or potential incomes need not generate additional 
savings. The increments of income may rather be spent on consumer 
goods and in bidding up the prices of these commodities. True, at least 
a partial transfer of income out of the agricultural sector for use 
elsewhere in the economy takes place. However, the subsequent capacity 
of the agricultural sector for increasing food and fiber supplies is 
not improved. In a "second round" of economic activities, the income 
transfers implicit in increased expenditures for consumer goods may 
stimulate production of these goods. In turn, the increased avail­
ability and variety of such goods may act as a positive incentive 
motivating producers to try to raise their incomes. Production and con­
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sumption decisions are not only interrelated for those goods which are 
produced and directly consumed, but these decisions also affect pro­
ducers' motivations for increasing production and income levels. 
The importance of the agricultural sector in developmental processes 
was outlined in Chapter I. In most less-developed countries, a majority 
of people derive, directly or indirectly, their incomes from this 
sector. In addition to considerations of personal economic and social 
well-being, per capita real income levels condition the level of 
government revenues through taxation and market demand for producer and 
consumer goods produced elsewhere in the economy. Government revenues 
are necessary for sustaining public functions. A strong market demand 
in the agricultural sector is likely prerequisite to diversification 
and general expansion of the economy. All of these considerations 
interact to influence social and political stability which, in turn, 
condition the economic climate for developmental processes. 
Planning on national and regional scales is seen as the means for 
influencing the direction and rate of economic activity. Planners 
have the generalized objective of increasing market supplies of agri­
cultural commodities for domestic consumption and for export; aug­
menting individual real incomes so as to raise levels of living and to 
expand markets for consumer and producer goods in a diversified 
economy; and improving resource mobility, both labor and capital, among 
all sectors of the economy. A number of "friction points" tending to 
impede developmental processes are implicit in the constructs used in 
Chapter IX where production, consumption, and investment decisions were 
integrated. Since the price elasticity of quantities marketed con­
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structs in Chapter VII incorporate both production and consumption, they 
serve as useful points of reference for observing these "friction points". 
In addition, the focal point of interest for developmental processes 
is primarily on quantities marketed. Since Behrman's (7.5) modification 
of the original Krishna (7.28) formulation is the more general construct, 
it is used here. The Behrman construct is given in Equation 10.2^, 
where the terms are identified as follows: 
= q^ - (10.1) 
P, _ 
— = rb^ - (r-l) g + hk(l+bj) -
(r-Dhb^d-k) (10.2) 
= Price elasticity of q^ marketed, Mj^, with respect to p^, the 
price received for q^ 
r = 1/m where m = M^/q^, the proportion of which is marketed 
q^ = Planned quantity of the subsistence crop to be produced as 
a function of (pj^/p2) 
q^ = Planned quantity of goods and services, other than q^ to be 
produced as a function of (P]^/P2) 
p^ = Absolute price of q^ 
Pg = Aggregate price of q^ 
p^ = Aggregate price of all commodities other than q^ which are 
consumed by the producer of q^ 
I = Total net income of the producer 
^A detailed presentation of the Behrman and Krishna formulations is 
made in Appendix C. Equation 10.2 is a restatement of Equation C.20. 
Behrman uses upper-case letters for price and quantity notation. The use 
of lower-case letters here (footnote continued on the following page) 
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Cj = Direct consumption of by the producer as a function of 
(P1/P3) and I 
= Price elasticity of with respect to (P1/P2) 
b^ = Price elasticity of q^ with respect to (P1/P2) 
g = Price elasticity of with respect to (P^/Pg) 
h = Income elasticity of with respect to I 
k = p^q^/I, the proportion of total net income accounted for by 
the value of q^ produced 
While Equation 10.2 relates to only the price elasticity of q^ 
marketed, similar formulations can be made for other q^ produced. The 
production component in Equation 10.2 is discussed first; the consump­
tion component is subsequently considered. Finally, private investment 
which is not reflected in Equation 10.2 is discussed. 
Production 
Recognizing that production decisions are not independent of con­
sumption and investment decisions for the majority of agriculturalists 
in less-developed areas, the constrained-maximization formulation 
yielding the q^ is restated here as Equation 10.3. These q^ correspond 
to the q^ and q^ implicit in Equation 10.2. The modification for tenant 
producers is given in Equation 10.4 where rand c^ are the tenant's 
share of the returns and costs, respectively. The r^ are not to be 
confused with r in Equation 10.2. 
n m 8 , (10.3) 
Z p q + p. [k-2 p q ] + 9 [L° - E e q ] + X {[F](q ,q )J 
i=l ^ ^ j=l J J k=I 
(footnote continued from preceding page) does not denote any changes in 
the Behrman formulation. 
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n m s 
J = Z r . p . q ,  +  M' [ k °  - Z  c.p.q . ]  +  cp [L°- Z 8 q ] + 
i=l 1 1 1 j=i J J J k=l ^ ^  
\{[F] (q^, q^)} (10.4) 
Referring to Equation 10.2, the production components are repre­
sented by and b^, the price elasticities of production for q^ and 
q^, respectively. The first "friction point" is the p^/p2 price ratio. 
dCP^/Pg) 
Since b^ = / 1 , as p, increases relative to p„, ceteris 
i  ^ 1 2  
paribus, producers find it profitable to increase production of q^ 
relative to q^. The increase in the relative price of q^ may be the 
result of supply-demand conditions in the market or public-pricing 
policies. Increased production of q^ is consistent with the marginal 
conditions for economic efficiency corresponding to Equation 10.2. 
See, for example. Equations 2.16 and 2.18. If the production function 
^1 is of a simplified Cobb-Douglas type such as q^ - akX^ where ak re­
presents the fixed inputs and the variable input, the short-run 
price elasticity of production with respect to p^/p2 is given in Equa-
1 
b 
tion 10.5. As b^ increases, as does e^. 
G = 
1 1-b 
h- (10.5) 
Referring to Equation 10.2, as the values of b^ and b^ change, 
so does e^. The impact of these changes can be qualitatively determined 
by taking the first derivates of e^ with respect to bj^ and b^, as in 
1 
This expression was derived earlier as Equation 2.62. That is, 
if Y = q^ and p^ = P-j^/P2s Equation 10.5 results. 
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Equations 10.6 and 10.7, respectively. The expression de^/db^ is positive 
de 
= r - (r-l)[hk] > 0 (10.6) 
dbi 
de, 
•— = (r-l)[(r-l) h (l-k)l > 0 (10.7) 
dbj 
because r ^  1.0 and h and k are < 1.0. 
How might db^ > 0 arise? Implicit in [p] in Equation 10.3 is a 
functional relationship between q^ and at least some of the q^ vari­
able inputs. If the relationship is the same as postulated above; i.e., 
b, 
q^ = akX^ , b^ represents the technical coefficient associated with 
variable input one of the q^. Variable may represent, for ex­
ample, seed, fertilizer or managerial input. As improved seeds and 
fertilizer mixtures become available or as extension agents are able to 
raise the quality of managerial inputs, the value of bj^ increases. Con­
sequently, and e^ are both expected to increase. These technological 
innovations relax some of the existing "friction points". Consider 
Equation 10.7 where de^/db^ > 0. In Equation 10.2, b^ has a negative 
value.^ Therefore, if db^ < 0 in Equation 10.7, b^ in the production of 
q^ has increased relative to b^ In the production of q^. The term b^ 
can increase in value similar to that postulated for . Thus, producers 
find it profitable, ceteris paribus, to produce more q^ relative to q^. 
Furthermore, the value of k is reduced. Consequently, de^ and db^ move 
in the same direction, and the ratio has a positive value. 
^The term b^ is negative in this particular formulation because b^ 
is in terms of p^/pg rather than Pg/p^. 
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The term k in Equation 10.2 indicates a degree of diversification 
of sources of income to the firm. Such sources may include income 
from external employment. The qualitative impact of changes in k on 
e. is given in Equation 10.8 where has a negative value. The sign 
de^ I-Hj, 
^ = - (r-l)[h(14b^) + (r-Dhb^l = -h [ + b^J (10.8) 
of de^/dk depends upon the relative values of the bracketed terms. 
Assume b^ = .2 and b^ = -.2. When m = .1 and r = 10, indicating that 
only a relatively-small proportion of q^ is marketed, de^/dk has a posi­
tive value. If dk > 0, de^ > 0. This relationship is appropriate to 
situations where: (1) Previous external income is no longer available; 
(2) Production of cash crops for the export market is no longer profit­
able; and(or) (3) Net income is reduced through an increase in taxes 
or rents. In either case, ceteris paribus, k increases. The term de^^ 
also increases because more q^ must now be marketed in order to obtain 
that income necessary for purchasing consumer goods. 
As k decreases through diversification of firm enterprises and any 
increase in net income and as m increases indicating that a greater 
proportion of q is marketed, de /dk < 0. That is, with more diversifica­
tion as to sources of income so that dk < 0, ceteris paribus, producers 
are more sensitive in their decisions to market 
Several other "friction points" affecting relative and absolute 
production levels of q^ and q^ are implicit in Equation 10.3. The levels 
of K° and the p^ affect the number of variable inputs, q^, that can be 
used. Variations in use-levels of the q^ affect both absolute and 
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relaLlvc output levels. As some p^ are reduced through improved trans­
portation and marketing systems and(or) public price subsidization 
policies, ceteris paribus, the cost structure of the firm is lowered. 
For example, the cost curves in Figure 4.12 shift downward and pro­
ducers are able to earn higher net returns. Such higher incon» may be 
saved, spent on consumer or producer goods, or privately invested. 
Factors conditioning this decision were discussed in Chapter IX, 
Case 6. The implications for income distribution and strength of markets 
for consumer goods are quite apparent. 
Working-capital constraint 
Given the p^ in Equation 10.3, the level of K" determines the 
number of q^ that can be obtained and, in turn, the feasible points on 
the firm's SAC actually available to the producer. See Figure 3.4. 
The level of K° is not independent of consumption decisions. That is, 
as direct consumption is increased and (or) larger quantities of q^^ 
marketed or exchanged for nonedible consumer goods, ceteris paribus, 
the amount of working-capital is reduced. This reduction can be off­
set by securing external financing often in the form of production 
inputs and consumer goods necessary to plant crops and to sustain 
laborers until the harvest period. The cost of credit becomes an 
additional fixed cost which when built int;o the cost structure of the 
firm raises average costs of production. As the SAC shifts upward, 
ceteris paribus, profits or net returns to inputs are reduced. As in­
terest rates and other credit costs increase, producer-debtors find it 
increasingly difficult to improve their economic well-being. 
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This is the dilemma of vast number of producers in most less-
developed countries. External financing is often necessary. For a 
variety of reasons ranging from convenience to necessity, most producers 
obtain their credit from private sources such as professional money­
lenders, merchant-traders, and landlords. In addition to the relatively-
high nominal rates of interest, abstracting from whether or not these 
are exorbitant, debtors often pay additional costs when creditors re­
quire producers to market their commodities with them at prices de­
terminable by the latter"; merchant-traders inflate the retail prices 
of producer and consumer goods provided as credit in kind; and land­
lords require tenants to provide labor services and gifts in addition 
to repayment of the loan plus interest. 
Low-cost credit through cooperatives and public agencies lessens 
producers* reliance on private sources of credit. Lower-cost credit 
and the absence of marketing ties detrimental to the debtor tend to 
effect a redistribution of income away from merchants, traders, and 
moneylenders toward producer-debtors. The effect of this redistribution 
on developmental processes depends on the relative uses made of this 
income. That is, is economic growth promoted by income transfers 
from producers to creditors or by producers retaining a larger share of 
their revenues? Producer-debtors, however, are definitely in an improved 
economic position. 
Credit offered through cooperatives and public agencies provides 
opportunities to supervise the use of credit to help ensure that it is 
employed in its highest use. This highest use may be in production or 
consumption. The ranking of uses depends upon the objectives of the 
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lending agency. Collateral with a secure title is usually necessary to 
obtain credit from cooperatives and public sources. Collateral is a 
scarce commodity for small-scale producers, especially tenant-operators. 
Tenure Arrangement 
For tenant-operators. Equation 10.4 is the appropriate maximizing 
formulation. The r. and c. are the tenant's share of the returns and 
1 J 
costs of production, respectively. As the Cj are increased relative to 
the rceteris paribus, the tenant realizes a smaller proportion of the 
net returns while the landlord is in an improved position. Income has 
been redistributed in favor of the landlord. The question arises as 
to the disposition of this income by the landlord. Several references 
in Chapter III indicate that landlords are often not inclined to under­
take investments which would increase land productivity. Rather, buying 
land and other real estate is a preferred alternative. Such transactions 
are usually not of a productive nature. That is, they are nonproductive 
since the productive capacity of the economy is not increased. 
For the small-scale producer whose principal asset or resource is 
family labor, the landlord may provide inputs in addition to land. 
Monetary and credit in kind are advanced prior to harvest, services of 
draft animals are provided, and the landlord may provide personal 
counsel and managerial inputs. Absentee landlords, on the other hand, 
are primarily interested in income from rents with little regard for 
land-use practices. When coupled with insecurity of tenancy, tenants 
are rationally motivated to extract maximum present returns from the 
land even though subsequent productivity is impaired. The tenant's re-
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liance on the landlord for credit and managerial assistance decreases 
the tenant's bargaining position. The abuses of required marketings 
and the tenant's obligation to provide labor inputs to the landlord 
have already been noted. 
The logical means for making tenancy arrangements more equitable 
is through tenancy legislation to protect the rights of both land­
lords and tenants. The fact that several countries already have 
existing legislation was brought out in Chapter III. Such legislation, 
however, is usually not effectively enforced. Landlords have several 
means to circumvent laws protecting tenants* rights. At the same time, 
tenants have little political power and little recourse to judicial 
means for ensuring their legislated rights. 
Opportunity cost component, p. 
The marginal conditions for economic efficiency require that the 
MVP of each input per unit of input cost in the production of various 
outputs must equal p.. See Equation 2.18. One interpretation of M. 
is that it represents the opportunity cost of using K° in production of 
the n outputs. As H is increased, some producers find investment out­
side the firm to be more remunerative than using K° as working capital. 
The spread of savings institutions in rural areas increases the number 
of investment outlets. Corporate and government stocks and bonds are 
feasible alternatives for larger-scale producers. The increased 
mobility of capital helps ensure that capital is redistributed accord­
ing to its highest known and expected uses. 
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Consumption 
The importance of the consumption component in Equation 10.2 on 
quantity marketed varies with the stage of economic development and 
with the type of commodity being considered. Referring to Equation 10.2, 
is affected by g and h, the two components reflecting price and 
income elasticity of demand for direct consumption, respectively. 
In the case of nonedible cash crops, g and h can be assumed to be 
zero and r = 1.0 so chat e^ = b^. That is, the price elasticity of 
quantity marketed is equal the price elasticity of q^ in production 
with respect to p^/pg. For edible commodities, g and h are nonzero 
and, therefore, affect the value of e^. Let Equation 10.9 represent 
the implicit demand function for q^ where DI = disposable income and 
T = consumer's tastes or preferences. 
= f (p^/pg, DI : T) (10.9) 
Price elasticity of demand for direct consumption, g 
Recognizing that changes in p^/p^ also affect DI since DI is a 
function of several factors including p^, the price elasticity of 
demand is isolated for examination. The term g is actually 
SC Pi/Pn 
"r / ~S7—7—T which represents the percent change in demand for q in 
^1 iPi'Ps^ 
direct consumption with respect to percent change in P^/Pg" The sign 
of g is negative since an increase in p^ relative to p^ makes q^ more 
expensive in consumption relative to q^ and q^ is substituted for q^. 
The absolute value of g varies with commodities and with consump­
tion patterns. Assume q^^ represents rice. For subsistence-oriented 
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producers whose principal food item is rice, Lhe absolute value of g 
is expected to be very low. That is, the generally low level of con­
sumption and the importance of in the total consumption pattern 
interact so that changes in the r&tio have little effect on con­
sumption decisions. Consumption patterns are geared more to physical 
requirements than to the relative costs of goods consumed. 
As real, disposable incomes of producer-consumers increase and 
as a larger variety of consumer goods becomes available, individuals 
have both the means and incentive to alter consumption patterns. That 
is, the relative quantities of consumer goods demanded become more 
responsive to changes in relative prices of these goods. In this 
situation, consumer goods act as "incentive goods". In turn, the 
producer's demand for income increases. To meet the higher demand for 
income, labor may be substituted for leisure, as in Figure 8.5. If 
prices received and paid are invariant, larger quantities of goods must 
be marketed. Alternatively, external financing is used to finance the 
newly-demanded consumer goods. Use of credit in this manner does not 
improve the debtor's capacity to repay. In the absence of higher real, 
disposable incomes, debt must be refinanced, assets sold, or conspicuous 
consumption reduced. Refinancing and selling assets cause the debtor's 
economic position to deteriorate. Reducing conspicuous consumption is 
likely to have adverse social rather than economic repercussions. In 
all of these situations, a net transfer of income from the producer-
consumer takes place. 
Referring to Equation 10.2, the qualitative impact of an increase 
in the absolute value of g is given in.Equation 10.10. Increases in g 
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make the producer-consumer more sensitive to relative prices and, in turn, 
the price elasticity of marketed is also increased. 
de^ 
= - (r-l)[-l] > 0 (10.10) 
Income elasticity of demand for direct consumption, h 
llie income elasticity of demand for direct consumption of q^ is 
I defined as ^ = h. As relative prices of the q^ produced 
vary, ceteris paribus, the producer's monetary income, I, also varies. 
Corresponding changes occur in the relative demand for those q^ pro­
duced and consumed directly and for those consuner goods purchased in 
the market. Because of physical requirements and consumption tastes 
and preferences, the producer attaches differing importance to these 
commodities. Consequently, the value of h varies for individual 
commodities. For example, at low levels of living, certain cereals 
representing the major component of consumption patterns have a high h. 
That is, even as incomes rise, a major proportion of income increments 
is spent on consuming additional food grains. 
Rising per capita, real incomes and an increased variety of 
consumer goods motivate individuals to restructure their consumption 
preferences and, in turn, the value of h attached to respective consumer 
goods. But this substitution among goods occurs largely after levels 
of living have risen above some minimum, physical level. Previously, 
consumption patterns were traditional and essentially fixed. Conse­
quently, processed foods, clothing, improved housing, and education in­
crease in relative importance. The income elasticity of demand for 
5 « ]  
cereals declines, relatively and absolutely. 
The quantitative impact of a change in income elasticity of demand 
for q^ and price responsiveness of marketing q^, as in Equation 10.2, 
is evaluated in Equation 10.11. Since k < 1.0 and has a negative 
de 
^ = -(r-1) [k(Hbp - (r-DCl-kXbg] (10.11) 
value in Equation 10.2, de^/dh is always negative. Thus, as h declines 
with higher per capita incomes and changes in consumers tastes, the 
price elasticity of quantities of q^ marketed increases. 
The important income level is the level of real, disposable income. 
Disposable income is a function of gross returns, production costs, 
rents, debt repayment, and taxes. The effects of various terms of 
credit were discussed previously as was the general ineffectiveness of 
tenure legislation in regulating rents. The incidence and level of 
taxation is another "friction peint". Imposing new taxes and(or) 
raising levels of existing taxes, ceteris paribus, reduces disposable 
incomes. However, a portion of taxes may be subsequently returned in 
the form of public investment in the economy's infrastructure and under­
writing costs of positive pricing policies. 
Turnover and import-export taxes represent income transfers through 
turning the terms of trade against producer-consumers. In addition, 
the relative incidence of taxes affects the relative profitability of 
producing various commodities and the relative costs of consumer goods. 
Consequently, resource allocation, production, and consumption patterns 
are altered for many individuals. 
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Private Investment 
Investment in outlets other than working capital imply a lengthen­
ing of the planning period beyond the production cycle. Ttiat is, 
whether funds are Invested In an irrigation pump, improved housing, 
savings account, or an item of jewelry, investors usually realize a 
flow of returns extending beyond the next production period. This, of 
course, does not preclude liquidating the investment at any time. 
Lengthening of the planning horizon is prerequisite to sustained 
economic development. This attitudinal change also introduces new un­
certainties not encountered when traditional production and consumption 
patterns are maintained. When investment in nontraditional inputs is 
contemplated, additional managerial inputs may be necessary. This 
should be reflected in estimates of the MPP of various inputs, estimates 
which usually are not synonymous with results achieved on experimental 
plots and demonstration farms. Additional price uncertainty is involved 
when new outputs are added to the firm. Several "friction points" 
appear in the investment decision function, as in Equation 10.12, 
stated earlier as Equation 2.67. 
n 
PV = -(I) + E [R(t) - E(t)] (l+pyc + I^(l-P)"'^ (10.12) 
t=o ^ 
Initial investment cost 
The initial cost is represented as I; the magnitude varies with type 
of investment. The construction of an irrigation system is more costly 
than purchasing a new plow. Consequently, the potential investor's 
financial position which includes both accumulated reserves and access 
to external financing affects the number of feasible investment opportuni-
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L/c h. Mtjfit Hmall-Hcale producerH, whetFier tenants or owner-operators, 
simply do not have the financial capacity to invest in an irrigation 
system. 
When external financing is used for part of the investment cost, 
credit costs also enter into Equation 10.12. These costs may be re­
flected in the E(t). Alternatively, the credit component of I may be 
represented by C where the total credit cost to the investor is C(l+1)^. 
Thus, the incentive and capacity for private investment are conditioned 
by the availability of credit and its cost. 
Estimated net returns 
Not only are the estimated net returns important; i.e., 
n 
E [R(t) - E(t)], but also the distribution of these returns over the 
t=o 
investment planning period. If net returns are negative during an early 
part of the period, producers having limited financial resources may 
not be able to undertake the investment. This is particularly true 
when external financing is used for part of the initial investment. 
Interest payments may have to be made before the investment becomes 
profitable. Similarly, those potential investors experiencing low levels 
of living may not be motivated to assume the uncertainty of an unsure 
distribution of net returns through time. The values of R(t) and E(t) 
depend on prices received and paid aid on the physical productivity of the 
inputs. These "friction points" have been discussed previously. 
Discount factor, P 
As P is increased, ceteris paribus, the PV of the investment under 
consideration decreases. Several factors are or can be implicit in P. 
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The opportunity cost associated with investment funds is included. 
This component is similar to H in Equation 10.3. As economic expansion 
provides alternative uses of investment funds outside the firm, as 
savings institutions become more widely dispersed, and as government 
bonds and corporation stocks assume greater familiarity and reliability, 
the opportunity cost in P also changes. Each of these alternative, 
competing investments has its own uncertainty which should be reflected 
in the opportunity cost. 
Price and technical uncertainties associated with the potential 
investment are also included in P. As these uncertainties increase, 
so does P and PV is lowered. Public pricing policies through, for ex­
ample, marketing boards can reduce near-term price uncertainty. 
Technical uncertainty is associated with investment in nontraditional 
inputs. This uncertainty is particularly crucial for producers who 
are "survival-oriented" and for those embodying fatalistic attitudes 
and reliance on supernatural phenomena for ensuring their well-being. 
Improved education and communications systems together with the work 
of extension personnel should partially alleviate this technical un­
certainty. 
Length of planning horizon, n 
The length of the planning horizon is the period over which the 
investment provides a flow of returns or a more constricted period over 
which the investment must show a favorable PV. Tenurial insecurity, 
the need for net positive returns within a short time period, and the 
uncertainty of agrarian reform and land redistribution may be reflected 
in either or both n and p. Effective legislation guaranteeing tenants' 
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rights and providing owners with secure titles to land reduces one ele­
ment of uncertainty. Access to low cost, long-term financing lessens 
the need for net positive returns soon after the investment is made. 
Relatively-low cost credit for essential consumption purposes would 
complement the above. 
The length of planning horizon is conditioned not only by the 
individual's economic position; but his attitude toward planning to 
influence his economic well-being and his orientation toward in­
creasing income demand are important. 
As already noted in the preceding discussion on consumption, in­
come demand is function of the availability of consumer goods and in­
dividuals' aspirations and expectations for raising their levels of 
living. Without an increased demand for income and(or) wealth, there 
is little motivation for private investment. 
Summary 
The inappropriateness of manipulating or concentrating on one 
factor or "friction point" in developmental processes has been stressed 
at several points throughout the study. These interrelationships among 
factors emphasize the importance of simultaneous action at several points. 
Relaxing one obstacle is not sufficient for mitigating or removing other 
impediments to agricultural and general economic expansion. Yet, the 
call for a simultaneous attack on developmental problems is incompatible 
with many of the realities which confront national planners in less-
developed areas. Resources are scarce everywhere but capital and ad­
ministrative inputs are particularly scarce in these areas. Thus, re-
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sources which may be committed to building roads, radio stations and 
monuments have alternative uses in education facilities, health systems, 
and irrigation networks. The best use of these resources is conditioned 
by planning objectives and the length of the planning horizon. Further­
more, planning alternatives are constrained by the existing distribution 
of economic and political power. Most countries have evolved to their 
present state over a period of several centuries. Those individuals 
currently vested with economic and political power are often reluctant 
to admit change. Finally, planning requires facts and planning principles. 
While most "friction points" are interrelated, their importance 
and strength in inducing or permitting favorable change among other 
growth points vary. Land tenure systems appear to be the "friction 
point" with the strongest, most important secondary effects. Several 
reasons are applicable: 
(1) As tenure arrangements vary among squatters, communal holdings, 
tenant-operators, and owner-operators, differential arrangements for 
sharing costs and returns result. The level of net returns affects 
the individual's economic well-being and his motivation and opportunity 
for increasing future returns; 
(2) The tenure situation affects access to alternative sources of 
external financing. Those public and cooperative agencies providing 
credit at relatively-low costs usually require collateral to secure the 
loans. Land is usually the preferred form of collateral. Since squatters, 
tenant-operators, and those participating in communal organizations do 
not have title or an unambiguous title to land, they must secure credit 
from private sources. The real terms of this credit are more onerous 
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often with adverse consequences for the debtor's future economic and 
social well-being; 
(3) The ccrtainty or uncertainty associated with alternative ten­
ure systemK affects production practices, length of planning horizons, 
and incentives for private investment. Squatters and tenants having 
short-term, unwritten leases are rationally motivated to extract the 
maximum present production without concern for longer-term resource 
productivity. Their planning horizons are often coterminous with the 
production period with little incentive for private investment even if 
they have the capacity to invest. Small-scale owner-operators may have 
the incentive to invest but not the capacity. The inadequacy and in­
effectiveness of tenure legislation to provide security and an equit­
able sharing of costs and returns were noted in Chapter III. Estate 
owners and absentee landlords are not motivated to undertake private 
investment in the firm when the uncertainty of agrarian reform is high, 
particularly if compensation for expropriated land is unlikely or only 
at a low level; and 
(4) The prestige and security associated with ownership motivate 
individuals to invest in land, per se, with less emphasis given to in­
vestment in complementary inputs. Large, extensively-cultivated es­
tates are maintained because owners are more interested in maintaining 
the economic and, in turn, the social and political status quo than in 
increasing agricultural productivity. This orientation coupled with 
the political power wielded by these individuals dampens any prospects 
for legislated agrarian reforms which if implemented and enforced would 
benefit the majority of agriculturalists. 
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Rural credit institutions are an additional important "friction 
point". The lack of collateral with a secure title and the relative 
lack of publicly-regulated institutions in rural areas force borrowers 
to obtain the majority of external financing from private sources. 
While the terms of credit may reflect the risks and costs of making a 
large number of small loans to individuals having tenuous financial 
positions, the high effective interest rates impede most producers from 
improving their economic position, especially through private investment. 
Where favorable economic opportunities exist and producers have 
the incentive and the means, both intellectual and financial, to ex­
ploit these opportunities, they appear to do so. What may be viewed 
as low aspiration levels and values inimical to economic improvement 
may be manifestations of an infrastructure generating low monetary re­
turns, weak incentives for raising demand for consumer goods, and a 
variety of uncertainties. Evidence of a perverse marketing relation­
ship between market prices and quantities marketed is likely applicable 
to particular situations and stages of economic development. As real, 
per capita incomes rise, prices and marketings will move in the same 
direction. 
To some degree, change has its own built-in momentum. Improvements 
in communications, transportation, and educational facilities not only in­
crease individuals* aspirations but awareness of their relative economic 
well-being. Inequitable distributions of wealth and income which condi­
tion all aspects of life coupled with few, effective means for reducing 
these inequalities generate frustration and tendencies for social and 
political instability. Instability accentuates economic and political 
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uncertainty; neither is conducive to private investment and to longer-
term planning. 
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Table 1. Percent of total population in the agricultural sector for 
selected countries as of 1965 
ASIA: 
Percent Percent 
AFRICA: LATIN AMERICA: 
Algeria 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
UAR 
Zambia 
60 
89 
60 
84 
55 
79 
29 
77 
95 
91 
55 
81 
Mexico 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Panama 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Chile 
Argentina 
52 
80 
62 
43 
63 
50 
50 
29 
28 
20 
Afghanistan 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
India 
Nepal 
Indonesia 
Malays ia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
84 
48 
33 
73 
68 
70 
92 
67 
55 
58 
78 
* 
Source : UniLed Nations (A.4). 
Table 2. Average value and percent of imports and exports of three 
classes of commodities to total imports and exports for 
selected countries, 1964-67* 
(1) 
Total 
imports 
(2) 
Food and 
live 
animals 
(2) as percent 
of (1) 
AFRICA a 
Ivory Coast 61,794 (8,584) 13.9 
Morocco^ 2,396 (648) 27.0 
Nigeria^ 252 (23) 9.1 
Sudan^ 80 (17) 21.2 
IIAR® 407 (108) 26.5 
ASIA 2 
India 17,025 (4,903) 28.8 
Pakistan^ 4,806 (723) 15.0 
Million francs C.F.A. Agricultural exports include food and 
live animals, oil-seeds and oil nuts. 
^Million dirhams. Agricultural exports include food and live ani­
mals, alcoholic beverages, wool and other animal hair, and cotton. 
^Million Nigerian pounds. Agricultural exports include food and 
live animals, oil-seeds and oil nuts, natural rubber and rubber-like 
gum, and cotton. 
^Million Sudanese pounds. Agricultural exports include food and 
live animals, oil-seeds and oil nuts, and cotton. 
^Million Egyptian pounds. Agricultural exports include food and 
live animals, and textile fibres and waste. 
f 
Million rupees. Agricultural exports include food and live ani­
mals, beverages and tobacco, and textile fibres and waste. 
^Million rupees. Agricultural exports include food and live ani­
mals and textile fibres and waste. 
Source: United Nations (A.2). 
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(3)  (4)  (5)  
Manufac tured 
goods and (3) as per- Total Agricultural (5) as per-
machinery cent of (1) exports exports cent of (4) 
(36,696) 59.4 74,980 (49,271) 65.7 
(1,010) 42.2 2,169 (1,099) 50.7 
(166) 65.9 248 (126) 50.8 
(43) 53.8 70 (59) 84.3 
(158) 38.8 249 (176) 70.7 
(7,445) 43.7 9,901 (3,611) 36.5 
(2,827) 58.8 2,700 (1,501) 55.6 
Table 2 (continued) 
(1) 
Total 
imports 
(2) 
Food and 
live 
animals 
(2) as percent 
of (1) 
Philippines^ 893 (146) 16.3 
Thailand^ 19,364 (1,244) 6.4 
W. Malaysia"^ 2,592 (635) 24.5 
LATIN AMERICA 
Argentina^ 1,124 (65) 5.8 
Brazil^ 1,381 (266) 19.3 
Colombia™ 552,700 (31,470) 5.7 
„ . n 
Mexico 20,010 (768) 3.8 
Million U. S. dollars. Agricultural exports include food and live 
animals, beverages and tobacco, copra, vegetable fibres, and animal and 
vegetable oils and fats. 
Million bahts. Agricultural exports include food, beverages and 
tobacco, oil-seeds, crude rubber, jute and vegetable fibres. 
^Million Malaysian dollars. Agricultural exports include food and 
live animals, beverages and tobacco, oil-seeds, and natural rubber 
and rubber-like gum. 
Million U. S. dollars. Agricultural exports include food and live 
animals, hides and skins, and textile fibres and waste. 
^Million U. S. dollars. Agricultural exports include food and live 
animals, beverages and tobacco, oil-seeds, wool and animal hair, cotton, 
and vegetable fibres. 
^Thousand U. S. dollars. Agricultural exports include food and 
live animals, beverages and tobacco, and textile fibres and waste. 
^Million pesos. Agricultural exports include food and live animals, 
beverages and tobacco, oil-seeds, and textile fibres. 
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(3)  (4)  (5)  
Manufac Cured 
goods and (3) as per- Total Agricultural (5) as per-
machinery cent of (1) exports exports cent of (4) 
(509) 57.0 825 (463) 56.1 
(11.537) 59.6 13,054 (10,408) 79.7 
(1,083) 41.8 2,981 (1,494) 50.1 
(618) 55.0 1,490 (1,271) 85.3 
(553) 40.0 1,605 (1,208) 75.3 
(333,406) 60.3 526,198 (400,047) 76.0 
(12,468) 62.3 14,047 (8,650) 61.6 
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Table 3- Annual average growth rates for selected economic indicators 
and for^population, for selected countries and specified time 
per iods 
Gross domestic 
produc t^ 
Per iod Total 
Per 
capita Agriculture^ Per iod^ 
Popula-
t ion 
AFRICA: 
Ethiopia 1960-66 4.8 3.0 2.3 I 
II 
1.7 
1.8 
Morocco 1952-60 
1960-67 
5= -2.3j 
0.4^ 
0.7 
2.9 
I 
II 
2.7 
2.8 
Nigeria 1950-60 
1960-66 
10.5 
4.5 
8.4 
2.2 
9.1 
2.0 
1 
II 
3-0 
2.7 
Sudan 1955-60 
1962-64 
4.0 
4.5 
1.0 
1.7 
2.7 
4.7 
I 
II 
3.1 
2.8 
Uganda 1954-60 
1960-67 
4.0 
4.5 
1.5 
2.0 
4.1 
3.8 
I 
II 
2.5 
2.3 
UAR 1962-66 4.9 2.2 2.5 I 
II 
2.4 
2.5 
ASIA: 
Iraq 1953-60 
1960-66 
5.6 
6.7 
2.4 
3.3 
-2.7 
6.1 
I 
II 
2.7 
2.5 
India 1950-60 
1960-67 :::: .1::: 2.8 -0.4 I II 2.0 2.4 
Pakistan 1950-60 
1960-67 
2.5 
5.6 
0.4 
3.4 
1.4 
3.3 
I 
II 
2.2 
2.1 
Philippines 1950-60 
1960-67 
6.8® 
5.1® I::: 5.1 4.6 I II 3.1 3.5 
^Gross domestic product at constant factor cost. 
Includes agriculture, foresty, hunting, and fishing. 
^Period I = 1950-1962. Period II = 1963-1967. 
Gross domestic production at constant market prices. 
Net domestic product at constant factor cost. 
* 
Source: GDP and agriculture data are from United Nations (A.3). 
Population data are from United Nations (A.l). 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Gross domestic 
product 
Per iod Total 
Per 
capita Agriculture^ Per iod^ 
Popu la-
tion 
Indonesia 1958-60 
1960-67 
2.3 
2.2 -0.2 
2.3 
1.7 
I 
II 
2.1 
2.4 
W. Malaysia 1955-60 
1960-66 
3.6 
5.8 
0.4 
2.6 
2.9 
4.2 
I 
II 
3.2^ 
3.0 
Thailand 1957-60 
1960-67 
8.1 
4.0 
I 
II 
3.1 
3.1 
LATIN AMERICA: 
Argentina 1950-60 
1960-67 
3.4 
2.9 
1.4 
1 .3 
2.3 
2.8 
I 
II 
1.9 
1.5 
Brazil 1950-60 
1960-67 
5.7 
3.9 
2.7 
0.9 
4.6 
4.5 
I 
II 
3.0 
3.0 
Colombia 1950-60 
1960-67 
4.6 
4.7 
1.4 
1.5 
3.4 
2.9 
I 
II 
2.7 
3.2 
Honduras 1950-60 
1960-67 
3.4 
5.5 
0.4 
2.1 
2.2 
1.7 
I 
II 
2.9 
3.4 
Mex ico 1950-60 
1960-67 
6.3G 
6.7® 
3.0® 
3.1® 
4.8 
4.0 
I 
II 
3.1 
3.5 
Paraguay 1950-60 
1960-67 
3.2^ 
4.48 
0.8® 
1.3® 
2.2 
3.0 
I 
II 
2.4 
3.1 
Peru 1950-60 
1960-67 
2.3JJ 
2.9^ 
3.8 
2.3 
I 
II 
2.4 
3.1 
Venezuela 1950-60 
1960-67 
8.5® 
5.0® 
4.2® 
1.4% 
5.0 
6.6 
I 
II 
3,8 
3.5 
^Malaysia and Singapore» 
g 
Gross domestic product at constant market prices. 
^Gross national product at constant market prices. 
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APPENDIX B: KRISHNAK'S FORMULATION FOR PRICE ELASTICITY OF MARKETED SURPLUS 
The formulation developed below is applicable to short-run situations 
where the output level is given, and the producer has the options of 
cunsumin% directly and(or) marketing this output. Prior to deriving 
the construct, the following terms used by Krishnan (7.29) are identi­
fied : 
Q = Total output of food grains available for consumption and(or) 
marketing, net of payments in kind and seed requirements 
P = Producer's price received for food grains 
Y = QP = Producer's iiicome if Q is marketed 
r = Proportion of Q directly consumed by the producer 
M = (1-r) Q = Producer's marketable "surplus" of Q 
rQ = f(P, QP) (B.l) 
rQ = AP"'^(QP)^' (B.2) 
= A(Q)9 pC-* 
r = A(Q)®"^ pB"* (B.3) 
1-r = 1 - A(q^9-1 pB-" (B.4) 
M = (1-r) Q = Q - A(Q)^P^''^ (B.5) 
Equations B.l and B.2 indicate that the level of direct consumption 
is a function of price and income. The terms cv and p are the price and 
income elasticities of demand, respectively. The market price is the 
appropriate price term for the consumption function since it is the 
opportunity cost; i.e., the real cost, associated with direct consumption. 
The derivation of Equations B.3 - B.5 is straightforward. Upon taking 
the first derivative of Equation B.5 with respect to P, Equation B.6 is 
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obtained. Multiplying Equation B.6 by P/M and substituting in the pre­
viously-defined symbols, tlie price elasticity of marketed surplus is 
derived, as in Kquation H.7. Since the term is always positive. 
. -(B-a) {A(q)9 P®-""!} (B.6) dP 
— B 3-0 
- - AWLE (B.7) 
(l-r)Q 
= -(B-o?) ^ 1-r 
the sign of depends upon the relative values of Cf and p. Based on 
the data used by Krishnan, or  ^ .36 and R = .52. The derived has a 
negative value indicating that price and quantities marketed move in 
opposite directions. 
Equation B.7 represents Krishnan's formulation. However, if two 
separate food grains which are substitutes in consumption are admitted, 
a more meaningful formulation is readily derivable. 
The producer's income is now written as Y = P^Q^ + P^Q^. The counter­
part of Equation B.2, representing the proportion of consumed 
directly, is given in Equation B.8 where & is the cross-price elastici­
ty of demand. The positive sign of 6 indicates that and are 
substitutes in consumption. Equation B.IO represents the total dif­
ferential of Equation ÎJ.9. 
^lÔl = *^1 * (B.8) 
= (1-r^) P^^Y)^ (B.9) 
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dM^ = a - 8a P^^ Q^ (Y)^"^J dP^ + 
{-6 a P^"^ Pg^'^Y)^ - Ba P^"°' P^^ Qg (Y)®'^} dP^ (B.IO) 
To simplify the derivation of the price elasticity of with re­
spect to , let dP^ = 0. Then, upon dividing Equation B.IO by dP^, 
multiplying by P^/M^, and substituting and (1-r)Q^, Equation B.ll 
is obtained. The sign of the price elasticity of the marketable sur-
plus of with respect to P^ when dP^ = 0 depends upon the relative 
magnitude of the two terms within the brackets. In addition to the 
I 
values of a and B, the sign of M now depends upon the value of 
—' ^ 
P Q / <P,Q, + P9Q9 J • If this value equals about .7, then M is 
L I  v L L  ^ 1  
1 
near zero. The term M is negative only if the ratio is greater than 
^1 _ 
.7. Thus the relative value of also influences the impact of 
changes in P^^ on changes in quantities of marketed. 
The qualitative impact of changes in when P^ is invariant is de­
scribed below. Dividing Equation B.IO by dP^ when dP^ = 0, substituting 
and (1-r^^Q^, multiplying by the price elasticity of 
with respect to P^ is obtained, as in Equation B.12. As long as 6 and 
1 r BP Q 
M = -p-i— [ -6 (11.12) 
"2 l-'l * 
B are positive; i.e., and are substitutes and is not an in-
^The term = price elasticity of Q marketed with respect to P^. 
®1 I 
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ferior good, dP^ and dM^ move in opposite directions. As increases, 
more Q^, the relatively-cheaper good, is retained for direct consumption. 
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APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS FOR PRICE ELASTICITY OF QUANTITIES 
MARKETED 
Krishna's (7.28) formulation for the price elasticity of quantities 
marketed is not based on an assumption of a fixed output level, as was 
Krishnan's (7.29) in Appendix B. Rather, changes in the price level 
are permitted to affect resource allocation decisions and the conse­
quent output level. Krishna's notation is duplicated here. 
Q = Quantity of wheat produced 
C = Quantity of wheat consumed 
M = Quantity of wheat marketed 
M 
m = = Sales ratio 
r = = Reciprocal of sales ratio 
F = Relative price of wheat 
Y = Total income of the peasants 
e = Elasticity of market supply with respect to P 
d = Total elasticity of home consumption with respect to P 
b = Elasticity of output with respect to P 
g = Elasticity of the substitution effect in consumption 
h = Elasticity of the income effect in consumption 
The market supply equation is given in Equation C.l where Q and 
C are functions of P. Shocking Equation C.l with respect to P, Equation 
C.2 is obtained. Multiplying Equation C.2 by P/M and using the relation-
M = Q - C (C.l) 
^ ^  . iÇ_ (c 2) dP dp dP ^ / 
ship (1-r) = (M-Q)/M, the price elasticity of quantity marketed is de-
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rived in Equation C.3. Since (r-1) is greater than 1, the sign of e de-
e = = rb - (r-l)d (C.3) 
pends upon the relative magnitude of b and d and their respective signs. 
dC P Since Krishna does not have estimates of d = ' he decomposes 
the term into components for which estimates are available.^ If 
C = f(P,Y), the total differential is specified in Equation C.4. Then 
P Y dividing by C and multiplying the two right-hand terms by —^ and 
respectively, Equation C.5 is obtained where Krishna terms g the 
elasticity of the substitution effect and h the elasticity of the in-
2 
come effect. Krishna then indicates that if the individual were a 
pure producer in that he produces but does not consume Q and if dP 
dC = -^-dP + (C.4) 
= g (C.5) 
occurs, then dY = QdP. Any other sources of income unaffected by dP do 
not enter into dY. Dividing dY by Y, Equation C.6 is obtained where k = 
Pg 
Y 
Similarly, if the individual is a pure consumer in that he consumes 
(C.6) _É1_ =_aÉ2 Y Y P Y P 
^Y (C.7) 
^Krishna does not specify the reasoning used in deriving these com­
ponents. Nowshirvani (7.38) systematically derives the components. 
2 
Alternatively, g and h are the price and income elasticities of de­
mand for direct consumption, respectively. 
621 
but does not produce Q, and expends his entire income so that E = Y, 
then dP affects his expenditures for Q in his consumption. Let C re­
present the physical quantity of Q consumed where PC = PQ is one com­
ponent of Y = E. Then dY = dE = CdP and upon dividing by Y, Equation 
Cc.7 is obtained. Since the individual producer is also a consumer, 
the relative change in his income is represented by subtracting Equation 
Ç.6 from C.7: 
^ ^ ^ ) (C.8) 
By using the relationships M = Q-C, m = and k = ^ , Equation 
C.8 is rewritten as Equation C.9.. Substituting Equation C.9 into 
P 
Equation C.5, Equation C.10 is derived which when multiplied by 
(C.9) 
yields Equation C.ll. Substituting the new expression for d into 
Equation C.3, Krishna has rewritten e. Equation C.12, in terms of com­
ponents for which estimates are available. These estimates are listed 
= g + hmk (C.IO) 
"^C~ d^ = d = g + hmk (C.ll) 
e = rb - (r-l)(g + hmk) (C.12) 
below; 
(1) b = b^ = .1 to .2 
(2) g = -.2 to -.4 
(3) h = .5 to .8 
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(4) k = .1 to .7 
(5)^ = -.1 to -.2 
Nowshirvani (7.38) correctly observes that when Y = (QP + any 
other monetary income unaffected by dP), the total differential of Y 
should be indicated in Equation C.13. Nowshirvani further questions 
Krishna's use of Equation C.8 which implies that the individual's 
change in monetary income, in terms of PQ, is affected by the impact 
dY = QdP + P dP (C.13) 
of dp on consumption. No such effect is implicit in the definition of 
monetary income in Krishna's model. Using Equation C.13, Nowshirvani 
rewrites Equation C.5 as follows: 
9 + P dP 
dP (C.14) 
+ hk + hkb (C.15) C ^ P P 
OP Again, using k = , Equation C.14 can be rewritten as Equation 
p 
C.15. Multiplying the components of Equation C.15 by , the cor­
rected formulation for d to be used in Equation C.3 is derived, as in 
Equation C.16. This differs from Krishna's d = g + mhk. 
HP p 
= d = g + hk + hkb (C.16) 
C dP 
1 
Behrman (7.5) uses the bj^ and b^ terms in his formulation. 
Equation C.20. He assumes that b^ has the same range of values as b^ 
but with negative signs because b_ is in terms of p,/p« rather than 
P,/Pi. 
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Behrman (7.5) has a slightly different corrected version of the 
Krishna model. However, Behrman also constructs a formulation which 
in addition to the subsistence crop being considered, introduces allow­
ance for income from other sources and for prices paid for other con­
sumer goods. Although time is introduced to represent the adjustment 
process, only a static version of his formulation is presented below 
so that comparisons with the Krishna and Nowshirvani formulation can 
be made. The necessary components and symbols are defined below: 
= Planned quantity of the subsistence crop to be produced 
as a function of (P^/Pg) 
= Planned quantity of goods and services, other than 
to be produced as a function of (P^/P^) 
= Absolute price of 
Pg = Aggregate price for 
P^ = Aggregate price of all commodities other than which are 
consumed by the producer of 
I = Total net income of the producer 
C^= Direct consumption of by the producer as a function of 
(Pl/P^) and I 
b^ = Price elasticity of with respect to (P^/P2) 
b^ = Price elasticity of with respact to (P^/Pg) 
g = Price elasticity of with respect to (P^/P^) 
h = Income elasticity of with respect to I 
m = the proportion of which is marketed 
r = 1/m 
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k = Pj^Qj^/l, the proportion of total net income accounted for by the 
value of Qj^ produced; and 
e = Price elasticity of with respect to P^. 
Ml = Qi - Cj (C.17) 
CM, 
^1 
0?! dfPi/Pg) 
afPi/Pg) 
W, 
ÔC, acPi/Pg) 
ôcp^/p^) ôp^ 
ÔI 
ÔI 
ôP, (C.18) 
ÔM 
1 
X 
2 
ÔQ, 
_1_ 
ôp, p„ acp^/pg) ' P3 atPi/Pg) 
ÔC, 
ÔC, 
ÔI '1 + 
ôQ. 
Pg aCPi/Pg) BCPi/Pg) 
"1 = 
ÔM P 
• - rb^  - (r-1) Cg + hk(l + b^) ]  
(C.19) 
- (r-Dhb^d-k) (C.20) 
Taking the first partial derivative of keeping in mind that 
and are functions of price ratios. Equation C.18 is derived. 
Equation C.19 approximates Equation 0.18 since ôl/ôP^ is now in terms 
of gross income rather than net income. The gross income of the in­
dividual is P^Q^ + PgQg- Equation C.20 is derived by multiplying Equa­
tion C.19 by P^/M^j rearranging the terms, and substituting in the 
previously-defined symbols. 
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APPENDIX D: DERIVED SHŒT-RUN DEMAND FCR LABCR AND CAPITAL 
This appendix is included so that a mathematical derivation of the 
producer's input demand configuration for the short-run can be speci­
fied. This was partially discussed in the Chapter II section, "Demand 
for inputs of production." The advantages of the mathematical formula­
tion below are that (1) All prices plus the working-capital constraint 
are allowed to vary, and (2) Variations in the use-level of one input 
affect the marginal productivity of other inputs in the production 
process. 
The starting point is the firm in short-run equilibrium. Only 
two inputs are specified, although the formulation is generalizable 
to several inputs. Labor is denoted by L and capital by K where K is 
a proxy for those inputs obtainable with capital. The working-capital 
constraint in Equation D.l is represented by B rather than K°; the 
latter can be easily confused with K. The production function is de­
noted by f(L,K). Implicitly, only one output is produced. The price 
received for the output is P while P^ and P^ are the prices paid for 
labor and capital, respectively. The constrained maximization problem 
is given in Equation D.l. The first-partial derivates are given in 
Equations D.2 to D.4. 
J = P f(L,K) + X[B - P^L - P^K] (D.l) 
ÔJ/ÔL = Pfj^ - &P^ = 0 (D.2) 
ÔJ/ÔK = Pf^ - XP^ = 0 
aj/ax = B - P^L - P^K = 0 
(D.3) 
(D.4) 
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The total differentials of Equations D.2 to 0.4 are given in Equa­
tions D,5 to D.7 which are subsequently rewritten in matrix form. 
PfLLdl + + f^ dP - XdP^ - dXP^ = 0 (D.5) 
dP - AdP^ - d\P^ = 0 (D.6) 
dB - P^dL - dP^L - P /K 
-
K = 0 (D.7) 
F^LL ^^LK -^L dL XdP^ -
^^LK P^KK -FK dK 
-
-^K ° dX. -dB + dPLL + dP K 
Applying Cramer's rule, this system of simultaneous equations can now 
be solved for the three unknowns; i.e., dL, dK, and dX.. The solution 
for dL is given in Equation D.8 and rewritten in Equation D.9. The 
dL = - f^dP) + (XdP^ - fgdP) + 
("dB + dP^L + dP^K) / D (D.8) 
dL = [(AdP^ - f^dP) (-P^)^ + (WP^ - f^dP) (-P^P^) + 
(-dB + dP^L + dP^K) (-Pf^K^K ^Vl^^ / D (D.9) 
term D represents the determinant of the matrix of coefficients. The 
right-hand matrix is treated as a matrix of constants. The term 
represents the cofactor of the element in the first row and first 
column of the matrix of coefficients after the right-hand matrix has been 
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substituted for column 1 in the coefficients matrix. Similarly, 
the cofactor of the element in the second row and first column. 
* — * 
When the value for dL is determined, L = dL + L where (1) L 
is the new level of labor demand for the firm, and (2) L is the 
preceding short-run equilibrium use-level for labor. 
* 
The terms dK and K are derived in a similar manner. 
